How many Allied (but non-French) butterflies need to flap?

[merlin]

IMO - Frances armed forces in the spring of 1940 were a lost cause, there's just too much they would have to change too quickly to make a difference to the OTL outcome.
But I wonder, what plausible changes could they have been with other of the Allies, to make a difference to the German Blitzkrieg?
And 'difference' will be greater German losses, delaying the French capitulation, and/or lower Non-Allied losses.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Belgium joining the Allies earlier - allowing for an administrative advance by the mostly French forces in reinforcing the Belgium armed forces and building up supplies etc

This would allow the more mobile French army formations and possibly the BEF as well to be kept in reserve rather than having to lead the race for the stop lines and being out of position when the Germans spring their surprise (which they might not now spring!)

 

[CalBear]

Realistically the greatest difference would be to keep the BEF mainly at home, along with most of the Fighter Commands assets.

The British Army lost enough equipment to fit out three Corps (i.e. a formation 50% larger than the 8th Army) and suffered ~12,000 KIA, along with 41,000 POW (WIA totaled around 16K, figure permanent invalids of around 20%) so ~54,000 unrecoverable losses. That is a CORPS worth of troops, many of them long-serving professionals. Fighter Command lost close to half its strength, ~470 aircraft (TWO MONTHS of production).

Unless one comes up with ways to make wholesale changes in the French command structure, weapons procurement, and training/morale of the French military, and political will, France is doomed. A political decision to have finished the Maginot Line, either with Belgian participation running along Belgium's eastern borders and ending at the sea near Bruges or along the Belgian/French Border if they Belgians don't want to get on board for the Big Win, would have helped a lot, but that is outside the OP.

France was pretty much screwed and the BEF was not going to be able to save it. I'm not 100% sure the mid 1960's BAOR would have been able to save France in 1940.

 

[Mr.J]

What if the Germans (well, Hitler) had decided "screw the weather, the plans are lost, we have to strike before the enemy can react" and launched the invasion on January 14, 1940? With the Belgians on alert, the invasion plan being a standard "Schlieffen Plan" style attack instead of an unexpected strike through the Ardennes, and the weather being far from ideal for the Germans to take advantage of their air power, I can't imagine the campaign would go well for the Wehrmacht. At best for then, they conquer France with higher losses. At worst, the front stabilizes somewhere in Northern France, the German economy starts to break down, the Soviets smell blood and backstab Hitler first, and WWII in Europe ends by early '42.

 

[Starslayer_D]

Roll forward over the western border on September 10th while the polish army can still keep the attention of the wehrmacht bulk deployed against them. Germany with low ammunition reserves and no build up and equipment and troops in need of R&R would be very hard pressed to resist.

 

[merlin]

I think there is scope with Belgium changes - before 'talks' through unofficial channels, maybe more robust fortifications using weapons from scrapped RN ships? And after better delaying action in the Ardennes, and anything else to delay Belgium surrender.

Britain - sorry but I think any attempt not to provide a BEF would be ASB, while politicians tried to avoid it, in reality it was bound to happen.
There has been a thread on a 'standard' British tank, so what difference could/would it be if - no Matildas (I & II), instead Valentines, indeed could there be more of them - quicker to build?
In the air - don't see hordes of Hurri-bombers & Mosquitos as being plausible, but split the light-bomber force to include Henleys, what effect would blowing the bridges over the Albert Canals, and at Sedan? And if instead doing leaflet raids over Germany, what use could be made of Bomber Command?

 

[raharris1973]

Realistically the greatest difference would be to keep the BEF mainly at home, along with most of the Fighter Commands assets.

The British Army lost enough equipment to fit out three Corps (i.e. a formation 50% larger than the 8th Army) and suffered ~12,000 KIA, along with 41,000 POW (WIA totaled around 16K, figure permanent invalids of around 20%) so ~54,000 unrecoverable losses. That is a CORPS worth of troops, many of them long-serving professionals. Fighter Command lost close to half its strength, ~470 aircraft (TWO MONTHS of production).

Unless one comes up with ways to make wholesale changes in the French command structure, weapons procurement, and training/morale of the French military, and political will, France is doomed. A political decision to have finished the Maginot Line, either with Belgian participation running along Belgium's eastern borders and ending at the sea near Bruges or along the Belgian/French Border if they Belgians don't want to get on board for the Big Win, would have helped a lot, but that is outside the OP.

France was pretty much screwed and the BEF was not going to be able to save it. I'm not 100% sure the mid 1960's BAOR would have been able to save France in 1940.

I think this is even more interesting than the OP [like others, I see Belgium as a crucial player].

If the British keep the BEF at home, what are the odds of a Franco-German separate peace before May 1940. If the French were interested, would the Germans reciprocate?

Would the BEF ever end up with anything to do. If Italy gets in the war sure, but could have trouble if Italy stays out because France is out. Unless the British want to throw into the Balkans in the event the Germans OR Italians pull something there.

 

[Starkad]

Roll forward over the western border on September 10th while the polish army can still keep the attention of the wehrmacht bulk deployed against them. Germany with low ammunition reserves and no build up and equipment and troops in need of R&R would be very hard pressed to resist.

Not trying to be snarky, but with what ?

French mobilisation had at least another week to go, all reserve units (A and B series) and overseas units are incomplete or in transit at this point, so are most technical and administrative units, even many regular units will still be (re)absorbing those who completed their service 1 or 2 years ago, missing equipment or have personel assigned to help mobilisation of other units.
Civilian materiel (vehicles, horses...) is being called up/requisitioned, processed and distributed to units etc etc etc
Not a single british unit will be available for a week or so (the first batalion lands on the 10th or 12th IIRC - and personel, vehicles, fuel, ammunition and supplies each landed at separate locations)

The railnet and many roads will be allocated for (and clogged by) mobilisation - mainly on the south - north axis, trying to move units, materiel and supplies from west to east at short notice is going to be "interesting". Even if there is a clear plan well ahead of time that still means mobilisation will be further delayed.

And while the germans will certainly have a problem defending the west against a determined attack, their reserves are mobilising too, and it's much easier to improvise a defense than a major offensive.
And of course (parts of) the Luftwaffe can be moved from Poland to the west very quickly since they are moving to established bases and are no longer required to be in Poland (though withdrawing LW units may well delay the polish campaign).

 

[Starkad]

I think this is even more interesting than the OP [like others, I see Belgium as a crucial player].

Belgium abrogated the french-belgian alliance because of french adventurism in Eastern/Central Europe, specifically the (failed) French-Russian pact.
Increasingly french alliances in the east (in which Belgium had no say) were seen as likely to cause war rather than prevent it

The other factor is the eternal Vlaams-Walloon struggle. The french speaking Walloons were dominant until WW1, but in the interwar years the balance of power shifted to towards the Vlaams. In some quarters on both sides the french alliance was seen as a threat/guarantee that the walloons would always draw the longest straw, thus slowly making the alliance a factional thing.

To keep Belgium in the French-Belgian alliance you need to restrain France's eastern policy, make Germany more directly threatning to Belgium or reduce tensions internally in Belgium - probably a combination of all three...

Alternatively, if things progress as OTL through september and somehow Belgium decides to let the french in well ahead of any german attack, the minimum conditons would be that ALL of Belgium be defended and that France and Britain formally commit to the restoration and integrity of Belgium after the war regardless of the outcome.
And while Belguim's border with Germany is defensible, there are a few minor problems called Luxembourg and Holland. Worst case your force definding eastern Belgium gets cut off by a pincher through Luxembourg and southern Holland (Holland was supposed to blow bridges and flood critical areas, but OTL that didn't work so well)

If the British keep the BEF at home, what are the odds of a Franco-German separate peace before May 1940. If the French were interested, would the Germans reciprocate?

If the french knows ahead of time that Britain will sit this one out, chances are they will not declare war in the first place.
The french were very aware that they needed Britain's full commitment for another war with Germany.
To them that means a growing british land army on the western front. Navy and Airforce is nice, but the army is what matters.

See fx how the Popular Front government wanted to support the spanish republic, then Britain barked and they dropped the idea like a hot potato and fell in line with the Non-intervention Committee approach

If the war starts as OTL and it turns out Britain is sitting on the sidelines enjoying the show, well the Phony War provides lots of opportunity for secret negotiations that could lead to a separate peace and simultaneously utterly wreck future relations with Britain.

In 1939/early 40 victory disease had not yet set in and there's really no reason Hitler & co shouldn't accept a french seperate peace, particularly if that means splitting the Franco-British alliance for years to come, though it could always get snagged on the details.