Would any of the Beagle Channel Islands be suitable? After all, why do one sovereignty conflict when you can do two instead?now that i think about it mainland Argentina would be the perfect place to construct Winterfell AFB.
Would any of the Beagle Channel Islands be suitable? After all, why do one sovereignty conflict when you can do two instead?now that i think about it mainland Argentina would be the perfect place to construct Winterfell AFB.
Just because the pickets were sunk does not mean they were failures as pickets. The US Navy lost multiple picket destroyers off Okinawa and no one's accusing them of incompetence.But did it work?
Sheffield and Coventry were the radar pickets. Both armed with Sea Dart. Both... SUNK. QED.
You mean like the carriers were OTL? Not to mention that both the Phantom and Buccaneer have better range than the Sea Harrier and the proper fleet carriers being discussed can sit back even further.But even with these aircraft carriers of the OP, why risk them when you can lay back and slug the Argentinians when they cannot hit you? Whatever flattops you have should be for the dash in and the dash out. Has no-one ever heard of Guadalcanal?
Ever heard of the fact that the South Atlantic is not the Southeast Pacific, and has way fewer islands much further apart with a lot less flat ground? There's no Espiritu Santo to use as a logistical hub. There's no Guadalcanal to provide air cover up half the combat zone. There aren't more islands in between to push that airpower closer to the target island.Ever hear of CARTWHEEL?
All of this is irrelevant. It is categorically impossible to build a military airfield capable of supporting an invasion anywhere on South Georgia. The terrain is razor sharp glaciated peaks. You cannot build anything anywhere, except on thin strips of gravel beaches, none of which are large enough to build a jet capable airfield.
Establishing a forward FOB for the Harriers was one of the primary objectives of the landing at San Carlos, and it was moderately successful, though was signifcantly hampered the loss of large amounts of material on the Atlantic Conveyor. It is very likely that in a scenairo where the CVA-01 replaces Invincible and Hermes that RAF ground attack Harriers would be taken south by the task force and transferred ashore to a much more extensive FOB that has been set up free from Argentine air attacks. A protection provided by proper fleet air defence.
Anywhere near Stanley was not useable ground, since it was garriosned by near division strength numebrs of Argentine ground troops, equipeed with AFVs, light attack aircraft, radar guided missile and gun AA, and artillery. And as mentioned before is heavily mined. So an invasion of that area would require the mines to be cleared under fire, then a close bombardment of the beach under fire, then a landing of troops be air and water under fire. IF this is succesfful and the inital Argentine defences overwhelemd to create a beachhead, thaen that foothold will end to be continually reinforced under fire with singficant threat of counter attack. Then as troops breakout sinficant ashore facilities and supply depots would have to be established to support the advance, whislt under threat of counter attack and under artillery fire. The people planning corporate had insitutional memory of D-Day when they had done jsut these things, they remembered it sucked. Their response, which was the correct one was to decide they would rather not.
Perhaps Britain could have accomplished such a feat, but it would have been bloody. Which perhaps is not so much of a problem when your centre of supply is across the channel 15km away, and your nation is geared up for total war that it is committed to winning. When your centre of supply is 12,500km away, the economy is weak, and public and politcal support is brittle to say the least, its an entirely different proposition.
Every part of your plan from D-Day down under, to building and operating the Narnia Flying Club is absolutely batshit insane and goes agaisnt every concept of sound military operations.
It would be more feasible to redeploy the BAOR to Chile and invade Argentina over the Andes mountains, than to do what you are suggesting.
Just thinking out loud... If the UK really absolutely had to build a "fast jet capable" air base at South Georgia, perhaps something could have been built slightly of shore ? (Maybe pilings could be driven into the sea bed and a platform built on top ? Or perhaps large floating sections could have been made in the UK, towed to the island then connected together ? Or ??)
I'm thinking this would probably have taken years to complete ?
I share the skepticism of most of the other posters about the likely hood of the UK proceeding with such a plan in the context of the Falklands / Malvinvas conflict.
In all this time, do the Argentinians put any kind of defence on the South Sandwich Islands or South Georgia?
Or along with all the other idiocy going on, are we to assume the Junta just don’t bother about SG & SSI?
But did it work?
Sheffield and Coventry were the radar pickets. Both armed with Sea Dart. Both... SUNK. QED.
Why would they bother? It's the same reason you'd be an idiot to put any major formations on West Falkland Island, there's nothing there TO DEFEND!!
Why would they bother? Is England going to come retake their strategic penguin reserve? It's the same reason you'd be an idiot to put any major formations on West Falkland Island, there's nothing there TO DEFEND!!
But they’ve had quite a while in the scenario to put something there.
OTL they put a small formation on at least one, would they (with the extra time of occupation as suggested) put more out there? They claimed SG & SSI just as they claimed the Falklands and OTL they’d put troops in pre-invasion, so it wouldn’t occur to them the Brits would do the same in the build up to an attempt to retake the Islands?
The problem Argentina has (as I understand it anyway) is Chile - they don't know what Chile is going to do and have to keep a substantial force back at home to secure a very long border as well as roughly a division on the Falklands themselves. How much manpower (I genuinely don't know) did they have spare to garrison specs in the ocean?
I don’t know, but any level of troops with a radio setup mean the “British building RAF Arse End Of Nowhere on an inhospitable Island” plan becomes a contested operation.
I kind of feel this doesn’t need to be stated (but the level of stupid may require it to be) but you can’t build a 3,000ft runway base overnight and in one trip. The equipment and personnel required mean several convoys to and fro. A company of Argentine infantry with a communications element mean, even if they can’t keep the initial element off the island, that the returning convoys will meet opposition on their way to SG & SSI and the idea of a “surprise 16-year-early jet attack” loses the element of surprise.
I wonder if, between the paranoia of a dictatorship and the possible lack of training of a conscript army, they would have trusted a small independent force in the same way as the British Army would?
That is a very good point I’d never considered.
OTL they’d snuck (according to Wikipedia) some men onto Thule Island in the 70’s, so there is precedent?
I'd have thought that they'd have a fairly significant effect on the escort fleet. Does the RN end up with eight Type 82's and a couple of helicopter escort cruisers and if they do how does this change the requirements and procurement of the rest of the escort fleet?Just for giggles, how about we get back to the OP’s point? Or has this thread been derailed into “USM South”?
I believe that two Fleet Carriers like the ones suggested would be in service until at least 2007 (giving them 40 years). If most things go OTL apart from the Carriers, there’s a good chance their replacements would be well on the way by that point too. The use of two assets like that would have proved their usefulness and the Navy would be built around them. The replacement of them would almost be a “no brainer”.
I'd have thought that they'd have a fairly significant effect on the escort fleet. Does the RN end up with eight Type 82's and a couple of helicopter escort cruisers and if they do how does this change the requirements and procurement of the rest of the escort fleet?