How easy would it be for Germany to capture Moscow in 1941?

As to Kalinin several divisions came from the Northwest Front, meaning they didn't come from Moscow and wouldn't have traveled via Moscow. So when they detrain in Kalinin ITTL instead of outside the city

Minor nitpick, but according to Sharp/Radey, it doesn't seem as if they moved by train.

Not even Russian wikipedia has any mention of such a rifle division:

Unsure about this as well. Lopukhovsky does mention that 5 new people's militia divisions were created in October on the basis of previously formed workers and destroyer battalions. On Oct 24, they were re-designated:
1st Moscow -> broken up after 2 weeks.
2nd Moscow -> 129 RD
3rd Moscow -> 130 RD
5th Moscow -> 158 RD
No mention on what happened to the 4th.

I don't know what info you have on the 316th, but in mid-October Russian wikipedia makes it sounds like a really bad situation for them:

I agree that the situation looked bad.
But then again, the division did became a Guards division at the end of the fight, so it must have done something right once it got settled down.
I'm unsure how it would perform before that.
Now, I don't think the outcome is in question - the Germans will defeat the force.
The question is how many days would it take to do it, and how much supply would they consume in the process (and how much supplies would they capture from the Soviets).

South of Volokolamsk was Mozhiask itself, which was heavily under pressure by the 4th Panzer Group, which apparently was actually reinforced from Volokolamsk IOTL:
...
An early breakthrough at Volokolamsk might even screw the defense of Mozhiask and the 5th Army.

Indeed. And if they breach the defense there or further south in mid-October, the situation becomes very unpredictable.
I'm not sure where the Soviet would try to reestablish the frontline in that case,
 
Still working on my reply to Wiking, but I figure I'd clarify this:

Unsure about this as well. Lopukhovsky does mention that 5 new people's militia divisions were created in October on the basis of previously formed workers and destroyer battalions. On Oct 24, they were re-designated:
1st Moscow -> broken up after 2 weeks.
2nd Moscow -> 129 RD
3rd Moscow -> 130 RD
5th Moscow -> 158 RD
No mention on what happened to the 4th.

I've discussed these and what The Soviet General Staff Study says about them. According to them, the units and sub-units of the divisions were created between October 10th and the 18th and were formed and positioned to man Moscow's outer-ring of defense. According to the General Staff Study, they the 1st Moscow Division was organized as such in mid-October. The other three are stated as being organized into divisions on the 23rd-24th and then redesignated to the rifle divisions you mentioned in November, so Lopukhovsky may have been slightly confused by the distinction between the units being formed, the units being organized into divisions, and the redesignation of the divisions name.

The General Staff Study doesn't say much about the command arrangement prior to their organization into divisions: it mentions that some of them were organized into rifle regiments, but otherwise the command arrangement seems to have run straight from the battalions to the Moscow Defense Zone command staff (although this is me making an educated guess).
 
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Deleted member 1487

Minor nitpick, but according to Sharp/Radey, it doesn't seem as if they moved by train.
That's an important detail, thanks for the info.

I agree that the situation looked bad.
But then again, the division did became a Guards division at the end of the fight, so it must have done something right once it got settled down.
I'm unsure how it would perform before that.
Now, I don't think the outcome is in question - the Germans will defeat the force.
The question is how many days would it take to do it, and how much supply would they consume in the process (and how much supplies would they capture from the Soviets).
I edited my post with some info from Zetterling about it on October 14th. It was a fully equipped division when it arrived even if inexperienced, but most importantly it didn't face attack until the 23rd in any serious strength despite what Russian wikipedia claims. By that time it had been heavily reinforced with artillery, AT weapons, and tank forces, plus part of another division (126th IIRC) and two depleted cavalry divisions that escaped from Vyazma. By the time the weak German forces got there that attacked them IOTL they had well over a week to prepare and got serious firepower upgrades, while the mud got much worse, which was just about everything the 316th division/16th army could ask for in that situation. Not only that, but the Luftwaffe was of no help to the OTL German attackers, unlike TTL with the XXXXI corps, which as you know from reading the 'Northern Flank' book was reinforced with priority Luftwaffe support.

Your final line above is the rub, but given the weather and proximity of the 36th motorized to Volokolamsk on the day that the 316th arrived (sans artillery force that arrived after the 14th along with armor reserves), had the XXXXI corps been ordered east it would have hit the Soviet defenses either on the day the 316th arrived or the day after. Given the disorganized defenses and lack of later artillery and armor enhancement the 316th would be in serious trouble on the 11th. I think the XXXXI corps would be through Volokolamsk and probably overrun the 316th no later than the 12th of October especially given their priority Luftwaffe support and the 1st Panzer coming in from nearby on the highway running from Rzhev via Volokolamsk to Moscow after having captured 600 cubic meters of fuel from the Soviets on the 10th of October.

At that point all that would be standing in the way to Moscow would be any piecemeal Soviet reinforcements along the highway, which might well just get overrun as a speed bump inconvenience at that point. The bigger problem would be fuel and other supplies, which may or may not be alieviated by the Luftwaffe.

Indeed. And if they breach the defense there or further south in mid-October, the situation becomes very unpredictable.
I'm not sure where the Soviet would try to reestablish the frontline in that case,
They well might not be able to outside the city. Who knows how well reporting of the front line situation would go at that point given the communication problems.
 
I've discussed these and what The Soviet General Staff Study says about them.

I was wondering if I should order the Soviet General Staff Study. I assume it is this you're referring to:

Would you recommend it?
 

Deleted member 1487

I was wondering if I should order the Soviet General Staff Study. I assume it is this you're referring to:

Would you recommend it?
It's on Scribed if you have an account:
 
I was wondering if I should order the Soviet General Staff Study. I assume it is this you're referring to:

Would you recommend it?

It seems a decent enough primary source. There are some sections where it veers into rather blatant propaganda (the praise of Stalin being some of the most glaring), but otherwise it seems the Soviets were being as honest as they could be in it given it was issued as part of their self-improvement studies in 1943.
 
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Deleted member 1487

It seems a decent enough primary source. There are some sections where it veers into rather blatant propaganda (the praise of Stalin being some of the most glaring), but otherwise it seems the Soviets were being as honest as they could be in it.
By definition it is a secondary source, as it is interpretation of the primary documents to form a coherent narrative about what happened.
 
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