Graf Spee flees immediately
- Thread starter Catspoke
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Graf Spee was spotted at 06:10 and the sunset at 20:48.
The British could overhaul and close.
That said there's a question about how much damage the British would have suffered had Graf Spee attempted to flee and to use their 11 inch guns at long range (possibly outside the range of British cruiser guns) and force the the British to sail inside of Graf Spees engagement range but outside the British engagement range.
Historically both forces sailed at each other and it was 8-11 minutes from sighting to engagement before the British opened fire although both forces were well within their theoretical maximum range.
I suspect the Germans would have seen the ammunition expenditure at long range as not being worth it in theory but in practice if dealing with the idea that this might be the last battle of Graf Spee the extra damage may have been worth it in securing escape for Graf Spee.
The British could overhaul and close.
That said there's a question about how much damage the British would have suffered had Graf Spee attempted to flee and to use their 11 inch guns at long range (possibly outside the range of British cruiser guns) and force the the British to sail inside of Graf Spees engagement range but outside the British engagement range.
Historically both forces sailed at each other and it was 8-11 minutes from sighting to engagement before the British opened fire although both forces were well within their theoretical maximum range.
I suspect the Germans would have seen the ammunition expenditure at long range as not being worth it in theory but in practice if dealing with the idea that this might be the last battle of Graf Spee the extra damage may have been worth it in securing escape for Graf Spee.
Graf Spee was at her best speed (28 knots) several knots slower than the British cruisers (31 knots).
On the day of the Battle Graf Spee was well overdue for a major machinary refit and from memory I recall she could maintain about 24 knots
Given the close positions when they started at pretty much first light, had she turned tail immediately she would only have drawn out the chase for an hour or 2 at best before she would have had to turn and fight.
There was too much daylight left and she was too slow to run away.
It was always up to Harwood and not Langsdorf as to whether there would be an engagement or not and as Harwood was Royal Navy and his force had just the 'one mission' (that to find and sink raiders) it was always going to happen.
On the day of the Battle Graf Spee was well overdue for a major machinary refit and from memory I recall she could maintain about 24 knots
Given the close positions when they started at pretty much first light, had she turned tail immediately she would only have drawn out the chase for an hour or 2 at best before she would have had to turn and fight.
There was too much daylight left and she was too slow to run away.
It was always up to Harwood and not Langsdorf as to whether there would be an engagement or not and as Harwood was Royal Navy and his force had just the 'one mission' (that to find and sink raiders) it was always going to happen.
1 Graf spee used it's hydrophone's to detect the acoustic noise of three vessel's and identifie's them as british cruiser size war vessel's in the pre twilight hour's of the 13th and plot's a course away from them,
2 Useing it's hydrophone's and or radar to avoid enemy war vessel's as graf spee make's it's way safely back to germany sinking merchant vessel's here and there.
2 Useing it's hydrophone's and or radar to avoid enemy war vessel's as graf spee make's it's way safely back to germany sinking merchant vessel's here and there.
The point of the pocket battleship, was to be faster than opposing battleships, and out-gun those ships - cruisers/destroyers that were faster.
I think that when Graf Spee first sighted the RN ship, they thought them to be destroyers rater than cruisers - realised their mistake by the size of the water spouts blown up by the 6& 8" shells.
German officers didn't seem to understand radar, thinking that similar to radio waves it could be picked up, and there fore give away their position.
I think that when Graf Spee first sighted the RN ship, they thought them to be destroyers rater than cruisers - realised their mistake by the size of the water spouts blown up by the 6& 8" shells.
German officers didn't seem to understand radar, thinking that similar to radio waves it could be picked up, and there fore give away their position.
I recall reading, perhaps in Stern's Big Gun Battles book, that given the acceleration of a diesel powered ship, Langsdorff sighted the masts of Exeter early enough, that had he changed course he would have been over the horizon before Harwood's force would have been able to get up to speed for a pursuit. But he was looking for a convoy based on intelligence gathered from his last couple successes. So he decided to close....
Graf Spee turns north, shadowed by seaplane and then the cruisers, driven into the arms of Victorious aircraft and Renown.
You mean HMS Ark Royal not Victorious. HMS Victorious was comisión in November 1940
How would she identify the ships as Crusiers as opposed to other vessels via HE at long range?
She was looking for ships and possibly a convoy to pick off and would more likely approach any HE effect than run from it otherwise she would run from any contact which rather defeats the mission and she had not previously.
Hydrophone effect is good for about 20kms perhaps further for a large convoy - but that is on a submarine moving relatively slowly
I know that Bismarck detected Hood and POW approaching them on HE before they saw them at greater range than that but those were massive Battleships at or close to 30 knots.
And Graf Sprees Radar was a Seetact type which was used as a gunnery radar not a surface search radar - it had a useful range of up to 10 NMs although typically less and given that radar emissions could be detected many times the distance that they could detect stuff* it would only be useful to range in on a target and in 1939 while a useful system the very good optics used on Graf Spee's directors were considered more accurate than Seetact.
Radar and its use was still being understood at the time and one understanding I heard was that using radar was like 2 men in a totally blacked out hall trying to find each other in order to shoot each other - both have torches - you can use the torch but the other guy is going to immediately know where you are.
Building and using Radar in 1939 is hard but detecting it is far easier.
Its one of the reasons the USN/RAAN force at 1st Savo Island did not use Radar as it would have given away their position (or certainly bearing) and their presence.
Captain Bode is often critised for this lack of use of Radar but in this decision he was probably correct as even with radar it is not 100% certain that even the Type 241 surface search set on HMAS Canberra would have detected the Japanese Ships before they were detected.
To have used Radar in the proximity of Harwoods Squadron would have given away Graf Spees location and almost certainly its identity as very few vessels were equipped with radar in 1939.
When you war game it, ammunition expenditure becomes an issue, and if the British close the fire from the light cruisers 6 inch guns can be nasty if they close.
There is a lot of possibility of random events but the British win 2 out of 3 times.
It still seems like a poor decision to close, the convoy would scatter, and a cruiser and 2 DDs would keep the Graf Spee busy long enough that overhauling merchant individual ships would be difficult, and it would still be easy enough to get significant damage to prevent a return to port.
Regardless off British losses its almost certain that in all engagements GF takes hits and is likely mission killed - which one way or another finishes GF as a threat and achieves the 8 British and French Hunting groups (of which Harwoods force is just 1) primary mission.
iirc, at this period HE could distinguish between a merchant and a warship(quite different sound signiatures), but not between a cruiser and a destroyer
Agreed.
Given Graf Spee's mechanical state, as noted she was in need of refit, and the loss of the Arado to mechanical breakdown, it should have been time to head for home.
It's a shame we'll never know Langsdorff's motivation for continuing. It's as if he didn't want the cruise to end. Maybe he thought when he got home, his next command would be a desk?
Regards,
Also if Langsdorf ran South or East He would be closing on HMS Cumberland running North from the Falklands, Cumberland had a 2 to 3 knot advantage and was like her sisters a good sea boat, If Langsdorf ran South he would close at over 50 NM per hour East Close would be more like 20 NM per hour and that closes toward Force H
Issue at Savo was as admitted by Japanese, none of their ships had the capability to receive or identify radar signals. The USN could have and IMO should have used radar
This was reflected in the later 1942 surface battles. Scott, Callahan, & Lee were warned of the direction and range of the Japanese ships, but the Japanese signals intel technicians, if any, did not detect the radar transmissions. The Japanese deck watch did not visually spot the US ships until at range 5,000 yards or less. Or when illuminated by projectile hits and fires.
I though Harwood planned to launch one of his force's spotter planes as soon as the light was good enough to scout the area even before the Graf Spee was sighted?
Even if she had managed to evade that way rather than close, the plane would still likely see her I would have thought. Then the Cruiser's speed advantage comes in.
From the RN point of view GS. turning and running is Ideal, with three cruisers Harwood can follow like a pack of hounds. Harwoods radios will be telling all sundry where GS. is her course and speed. The Various RN and Allied hunting groups can now converge upon their prey. with three ships Harwood can rotate the lead ship and give his crews some respite. GS can do not relax at all for at any time Harwood can close the range and engage. By the time the net finally closes GS will be run ragged and totally out gunned.
GS's only chance is to mission kill all three cruisers quickly then run and Hide, Harwood was aware of that and fought accordingly in OTL.
GS's only chance is to mission kill all three cruisers quickly then run and Hide, Harwood was aware of that and fought accordingly in OTL.
Outnumbered, out gunned, low on fuel and in need of a refit. Langsdorf's only asset to possibly save his ship would be the P.O.W's on board, and the Admiralty would consider them an unfortunate but acceptable sacrifice to end the threat to the convoys.