If A-H suffer a revolution it will be a bloodbath due to the variouis ethnic problem adding to the political factionalism
German victory WW1 - How different from Nazi Germany would it actually be?
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If A-H suffer a revolution it will be a bloodbath due to the variouis ethnic problem adding to the political factionalism
It's difficult to consider the counterfactual, as I am personally not well-versed in the domestic Germany political forces that may constrain it's geopolitical aims and goals.
However, one need only look at the Septemberprogramm, drafted in the early weeks of the war to see the true scope of German expansionist aims in the West. The effective annexation or vassalization of the Benelux, the loss of the western Voseges and Briey (vital strategic and economic locations for long-term French military capacity), attempted economic vassalization of France, the annexation of the channel ports, etc. Such demands and gains will undoubtedly sow the seeds of a 2nd General European War, as the terms of 1871 already left a huge mark of national trauma on France, and the demands does nothing to alleviate other geo-strategic concerns for the vanquished; Russian security will be perceived as threatened by the buffer states that the Germans will set up, and Britain now has a continental hegemon with direct control of many of the Channel ports, now free to shift defense spending to it's navy as opposed to army. While there is an argument to be made that a German-led mitteleuropa would be too strong to fight, that's...not quite borne out with the results of WWII and the Eastern front, and ignores centrifugal forces in this enforced European order (creaks in AH now that the main proponent for imperial liberalization remains dead, and AH likely to take a more reactionary stance to nationalism), German political battles between the reactionaries and liberal/socialist anti-war parties, etc, that will necessarily lead to a weakening of German defense spending (as the defeated Entente embrace revanche). Where this all leads is not certain, but anyone saying that a German victory in WWI would undoubtedly be better than an Entente one is dreaming. There's certainly room for doubt. , and on the whole I doubt it'd be significantly better or worse either way.
As noted by others, trying to wage a war of defense by conquering and subjugating your neighbors, e.g. Napoleon, is not the solution to long-term stability and peace in a multi-polar geopolitical system.
1) Largely been benign and benevolent. I do stress LARGELY, but the liberal economic/geopolitical world order spearheaded by the US effectively providing global security/stability has facilitated the tremendous economic growth seen in the world today. To be sure, the US benefits greatly, but the spirit of liberalism has allowed formerly colonized nations to rapidly spring up and rebuild, and the best case studies for that were formerly defeated enemies in Japan and West Germany, though also much of East Asia today. Granted, Japan and West Germany were propped up due to geopolitical concerns about the Soviets, but the funds poured out to help rebuild Europe and the West was quite remarkable.
2) Been largely achieved primarily through economic means and soft power, not military coercion, and was passed on essentially willingly, as Britain effectively ceded it's role to the US.
Again, I don't want to say it was totally benign, as the US has quite a long and sordid history, e.g. Iran or Latin America, and I'd be the first to criticize, but in comparison to previous hegemonic systems, the current US-led geopolitical order has been exceptional in how markedly peaceful it's been. Yes, there is quite a lot of hypocrisy baked in still, Chile, Iran, and Guatemala are testaments to it, but still.
If I wanted to speculate, I personally think the best outcome for Europe would have been for a swift Entente victory in 1914, but that requires some fundamental changes and reforms in the French and Russian armies.
However, one need only look at the Septemberprogramm, drafted in the early weeks of the war to see the true scope of German expansionist aims in the West. The effective annexation or vassalization of the Benelux, the loss of the western Voseges and Briey (vital strategic and economic locations for long-term French military capacity), attempted economic vassalization of France, the annexation of the channel ports, etc. Such demands and gains will undoubtedly sow the seeds of a 2nd General European War, as the terms of 1871 already left a huge mark of national trauma on France, and the demands does nothing to alleviate other geo-strategic concerns for the vanquished; Russian security will be perceived as threatened by the buffer states that the Germans will set up, and Britain now has a continental hegemon with direct control of many of the Channel ports, now free to shift defense spending to it's navy as opposed to army. While there is an argument to be made that a German-led mitteleuropa would be too strong to fight, that's...not quite borne out with the results of WWII and the Eastern front, and ignores centrifugal forces in this enforced European order (creaks in AH now that the main proponent for imperial liberalization remains dead, and AH likely to take a more reactionary stance to nationalism), German political battles between the reactionaries and liberal/socialist anti-war parties, etc, that will necessarily lead to a weakening of German defense spending (as the defeated Entente embrace revanche). Where this all leads is not certain, but anyone saying that a German victory in WWI would undoubtedly be better than an Entente one is dreaming. There's certainly room for doubt. , and on the whole I doubt it'd be significantly better or worse either way.
As noted by others, trying to wage a war of defense by conquering and subjugating your neighbors, e.g. Napoleon, is not the solution to long-term stability and peace in a multi-polar geopolitical system.
No. The US-led hegemony in the post-WWII era has:
1) Largely been benign and benevolent. I do stress LARGELY, but the liberal economic/geopolitical world order spearheaded by the US effectively providing global security/stability has facilitated the tremendous economic growth seen in the world today. To be sure, the US benefits greatly, but the spirit of liberalism has allowed formerly colonized nations to rapidly spring up and rebuild, and the best case studies for that were formerly defeated enemies in Japan and West Germany, though also much of East Asia today. Granted, Japan and West Germany were propped up due to geopolitical concerns about the Soviets, but the funds poured out to help rebuild Europe and the West was quite remarkable.
2) Been largely achieved primarily through economic means and soft power, not military coercion, and was passed on essentially willingly, as Britain effectively ceded it's role to the US.
Again, I don't want to say it was totally benign, as the US has quite a long and sordid history, e.g. Iran or Latin America, and I'd be the first to criticize, but in comparison to previous hegemonic systems, the current US-led geopolitical order has been exceptional in how markedly peaceful it's been. Yes, there is quite a lot of hypocrisy baked in still, Chile, Iran, and Guatemala are testaments to it, but still.
If I wanted to speculate, I personally think the best outcome for Europe would have been for a swift Entente victory in 1914, but that requires some fundamental changes and reforms in the French and Russian armies.
As to the thread title, of course it would be different from Nazi Germany. You would have a victorious power operating as a functional constitutional monarchy instead of an angry revanchist totalitarian gangster state. Even if we grant the extremely tendentious claim that the upper tier of government would be populated by Jew-haters, the impetus for a pogrom just isn't there.
On colonialism, being as the most likely peace involves Germany losing most if not all of its colonies, they could easily adopt an anti-colonialist attitude out of pure cynical calculation. "Native peoples should be free (to buy German products) and given the right of self-determination (to lease naval bases to Germany)." It worked for the US.
Would the world be a happy clappy utopia? No. But the idea that the results of a German win in WWI would be remotely similar to the results of a German win in WWII is absurd.
On colonialism, being as the most likely peace involves Germany losing most if not all of its colonies, they could easily adopt an anti-colonialist attitude out of pure cynical calculation. "Native peoples should be free (to buy German products) and given the right of self-determination (to lease naval bases to Germany)." It worked for the US.
Would the world be a happy clappy utopia? No. But the idea that the results of a German win in WWI would be remotely similar to the results of a German win in WWII is absurd.
I mean, can't Germany do this former nations that were formerly part of Russia?
Riain
Banned
A few facts to interject, although some have been alluded to.
Hindy and Ludy never staged a coup, they were the Silent Dictatorship and merely the most powerful of the power factions in late war Germany. The basis of their power was the 1851 Prussian Siege Law that gave Corp area commanders great latitude over the civilian economy etc, H & L used this and coordinated it centrally. When the war ends and demobilization occurs the Siege Law is no longer in effect and H & L will have to stage an actual military coup, which I seriously doubt they could pull off, so power will revert to the civilian government again.
Political liberalization had already been publicly promised by the Kaiser, in the form of changing the voting rules in Prussia the biggest state and where Imperial Secretaries were drawn from. This alone, and the example will surely be followed by other German states, would take most of the revolutionary heat out of Germany and ensure a 'normal' government postwar.
The treaty of Brest Litovsk was amended in August, after H & L moved west, to make the terms of reparations payments easier and weaken the language around Ukrainian independence. This is the sort of thing German politicians did when they took control of the peace in the absence of the Silent Dictatorship.
The Polish Strip was an essentially contested concept in the German halls of power. Ludy wanted the big strip, but the Kaiser directly 'your supreme warlord' asked Hoffmann and lil' Max suggested much smaller annexation, to get 2 or 3 railway stations (one was at Thorn) needed for mobilisation out of artillery range and Willy liked the idea. When Willy put this to Ludy Ludy yelled at Willy and laid down the law to him. However, as pointed out earlier once peace is declared Ludy will be shunted from power and its just as likely that Hoffmann's tiny annexations will be pursued rather than the big border strip, even if only our of spite by Willy for being disrespected by Ludy.
As is usually the case the devil is in the details.
Hindy and Ludy never staged a coup, they were the Silent Dictatorship and merely the most powerful of the power factions in late war Germany. The basis of their power was the 1851 Prussian Siege Law that gave Corp area commanders great latitude over the civilian economy etc, H & L used this and coordinated it centrally. When the war ends and demobilization occurs the Siege Law is no longer in effect and H & L will have to stage an actual military coup, which I seriously doubt they could pull off, so power will revert to the civilian government again.
Political liberalization had already been publicly promised by the Kaiser, in the form of changing the voting rules in Prussia the biggest state and where Imperial Secretaries were drawn from. This alone, and the example will surely be followed by other German states, would take most of the revolutionary heat out of Germany and ensure a 'normal' government postwar.
The treaty of Brest Litovsk was amended in August, after H & L moved west, to make the terms of reparations payments easier and weaken the language around Ukrainian independence. This is the sort of thing German politicians did when they took control of the peace in the absence of the Silent Dictatorship.
The Polish Strip was an essentially contested concept in the German halls of power. Ludy wanted the big strip, but the Kaiser directly 'your supreme warlord' asked Hoffmann and lil' Max suggested much smaller annexation, to get 2 or 3 railway stations (one was at Thorn) needed for mobilisation out of artillery range and Willy liked the idea. When Willy put this to Ludy Ludy yelled at Willy and laid down the law to him. However, as pointed out earlier once peace is declared Ludy will be shunted from power and its just as likely that Hoffmann's tiny annexations will be pursued rather than the big border strip, even if only our of spite by Willy for being disrespected by Ludy.
As is usually the case the devil is in the details.
Potentially, but I think unlikely. There are fundamentally different geopolitical and geo-economic realities at play here that make it unlikely for Germany to pursue a "liberal" hegemony, and instead a more traditionally militaristic, coercive one.
First, the United States is on another hemisphere from the nations it supported economically. Balance of threat means that due to geographic proximity, there's no real question about building up a friendly nation on the other side of the hemisphere; direct (or indirect) control is costly, and moreover even if they build up their offensive military capabilities (instead of strictly defensive ones), it is highly unlikely for them to have any offensive intentions against the US; what business does a rebuilt Japan have to fight with the US? It's lost all of it's geo-political/strategic/economic incentives to do so, as the factors leading to a Japanese declaration of war on the US is gone entirely. On the other hand, given Germany's own ethnic issues and geographic proximity to the powers in question, the threat of any military build-up from newly formed satellite states goes up unless the Germans are confident of their control of those countries are puppets, which naturally predisposes them to be heavy-handed in their intervention in aforementioned countries' affairs, and thus increases the likelihood of built-up resentment against the Germans. For instance, take a decision to create a rump Poland: will that Poland remain eternally content with German overlordship and nominal independence (because that's what they'll get), when Germany (and Austria-Hungary) now hold territories with the greatest Polish minorities? Obviously, the Germans can only doubt that, and thus will try to keep them firmly aligned with German policy, which means economic support for Poland is unlikely; rather, they'll force Poland into an unequal/extractive economic relationship (particularly since Poland will have no choice but to trade with Germany/AH, due to a lack of actual ports) and exert heavy-handed interventions to keep Poland friendly, a move that will only antagonize it, thus forming a self-defeating spiral, similar to that which ultimately ejected the Soviet Union from Eastern Europe. Similar rationales are there for other states/territories Germany intends to peel off and either annex/vassalize, and to say nothing of Germany literally coming to dominate the entirety of Europe through conquest.
The German Mitteleuropa project can similarly be seen in this lenses as being a means to economically dominate Europe. I can't imagine such an economic union being anything but a naked German attempt to dominate the economies and politics of Europe through it. While people make comparisons to the EU, it's fundamentally different, given how decidedly democratic and cooperative it is (at a state-level), even if some states (Germany, France) hold a greater share of the clout, and honestly, was designed originally to constrain Germany and prevent it from ever launching an aggressive war against its' neighbors again. Since then, it's moved away from that purpose, and the European project is something fascinating and leaves me hopeful, speaking from across the Atlantic, but I digress. Mitteleuropa is only the means, in a CP WW1 victory, through which Germany can fully dominate the continent economically to the detriment of smaller European states.
Moreover, US foreign policy, despite many flaws, has always had an idealistic edge to it, one afforded by its isolation from any real competitors or threats after the Mexican-American war. The idea of American exceptionalism and that it's the "city on the hill" balances pragmatic power politics, and US foreign policy, though theoretically "high politics" and not constrained by popular opinion, is in reality quite held in check by Congress at the very least (if not the electorate), and democratic countries tend to be more risk adverse (Democratic Peace Theory comes into play here). US motivations for the Marshall Plan were less about resource extraction (the US had no need for it), but more liberal (needing strong partner nations to trade with) and ideological (Democracy vs. Communism). The US was ALREADY the economic superpower of the world, and instead of seeking to increase it's already significant hard power metrics (economics and military might), it took a softer approach to governance, relying on predominantly liberal institutions such as the IMF or the Bretton-Woods to build up goodwill and soft power, and taking a view of supporting Europe/the world against Communism, vs. dominating Europe for America's benefit.
In comparison, Germany's political system was an ailing hodgepodge of Bismarckian compromises that was barely creaking along, but was decidedly less democratic and liberal despite the growth of the socialists and liberals, as evidenced by them having no say in constraining German foreign policy and in effectively escalating and sparking WW1. Moreover, Wilhelmine Germany's foreign policy was just straight up terrible, self-encircling, and self-defeating. The Triple Entente did not form out of a conspiracy to destroy Germany (I mean, maybe France, but I'm pretty sure they'd satisfied with A-L and not worrying about the German juggernaut on their borders), but formed due to Germany's own deeply flawed bellicosity in foreign policy. Wilhelm's foreign policy blunders basically spawned the bipolar European alliance system, and thus the whole basis of WW1, really. Certainly, Germany's a revisionist power in the early 20th century and naturally seeks to build up stronger position in world affairs commensurate to it's hard power capabilities, but so is Russia, Italy, and Japan. Japan, at least, played it smart (well, until the 2nd Sino-Japanese War, then all sanity was thrown out the window).
Do you think a victorious Wilhelmine Germany will change from its aggressive expansionist and revisionist aims to a more liberal, cooperative one focused on soft power, particularly after a major victory that requires them to rely on hard power to maintain its new empire? That's rather unbelievable for me personally, and instead it seems more likely for them to double down on their policies.
1) While political liberalization was promised, typically governments are more wont to cede economic, domestic power over foreign policy. Unless the latter is firmly controlled by the liberals and socialists, it doesn't change how Germany governs it's new empire; and even then, the damage is probably still done given what happened in Belgium already, and the resentment already sown.
2) Ukraine and the other rump states formed by B-L were still used as puppets to extract wealth/value for the Germans (notably grain, which Germany understandably desperately needed), and changing that requires a paradigm shift in German foreign policy thinking.
tl;dr; while the liberals and socialists will get more power, I contest how much it would change German foreign policy, given the Septemberprogramm was the blueprint supported by its economic and military elites.
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Deleted member 1487
Contrary to Fritz Fischer's belief, the Septemberprogramme was just an idea floated internally to figure out what they should ask for and it never was adopted as policy.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Septemberprogramm
AussieHawker
Banned
France was defeatist after winning the first world war. Here they have lost both major recent wars vs Prussia/Germany. Their demographic divergence is clear and German industrial power is superior, even without factoring in possible peace deals that take Briey Longwy. Even a stalemate on the western front doesn't give France good odds for round two, as Russia has actually fallen apart, while AH is only tettering and there are no other real continental allies to draw on.
Kaiserreich TLs that just try to mirror OTL WW2 don't really work. Germany is naturally stronger then France. That is why it took two World Wars to knock Germany down to size, and into a collective security arrangement. Germany winning one of the wars would Finlandize France into neutrality in Europe. It either props up AH to go back to its fast growth, or it annexes half of it and spins the rest off at allies. Germany after a long but victorious WW1 is in a position of potential hegemony.
Anyway, people seem to be backwards justifying.
Imperial Germany was an imperfect democracy, but so was everybody bar France. Germany at least had universal male suffrage unlike Britain, and the three-tier system wasn't in place in all the states.
Racism was rife everywhere, it wasn't a uniquely German phenomenon.
German colonial policy had improved greatly with actual government oversight through the colonial office, and none of the powers could really claim they were benevolent. Colonialism cracking is only going to happen if the European powers damage each other enough to be too exhausted to hold on. Or an anti-colonist power willing to put effort into uprooting colonies. OTL had both. A quick Entente victory would still have colonialism locked down, but even more extensive since they operated much vaster colonial enterprises than the Central Powers.
And claiming that the Central Powers were bellicose more then the Entente is a bit much. France had clear aims in actually revisionist policies. All the major Entente Powers made it clear they wanted to totally dismantle the Ottomans, and each had various aims they wanted to push as well. The German war aims people are referring to, are ones largely created mid-war and by various planners not working with each other, or in consultation with the power brokers. It wasn't an iron clad manifesto. In A DBWI, we would be discussing how the Entente aims made them incompatible with a peaceful Europe, as France aimed to reverse the clock back to when it outweighed Germany, that Russia wished to destroy the other Empires of Eastern Europe, that Italy wanted its Medditerrian empire carved out and that Britain wanted to keep snatching up colonies and contributing to see-sawing wars.
The Central Powers military spending also significantly lagged the Entente counterparts, and by 1914 was mainly catching up. WW1 happened because both sides ratcheted up the tension. Wilhelm putting his foot in his mouth didn't have to mean anything, and there was a long peaceful period before ww1 where it was ignored. With Germany self-assured in its geopolitical safety, it really doesn't need to gin up tension.
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This is actually a pretty good explanation. Thanks for that. And this is a bit off topic, and probably requires an earlier POD, but is there a way for Germany to have any type of long term, and more or less stable hegemony on Europe? Like, what would it take, for it to have as much a dominant hand in Europe, as the US has historically had?
Kaiserreich TLs are quite bad agreed, but I disagree in that France would necessarily be Finlandized. It is a potential outcome, but does not prevent radicalized governments from coming to power in France (the 3rd Republic being a notoriously unstable and increasingly radicalized affair in the inter-war years). I can see a similar myth coming into play in France, though it cannot go it alone if it wants to overturn the political order in Europe.
All agreed. As for a quick Entente victory, I believe it's likely to end up better for European affairs (no comments on the rest of the world). Colonialism is a blight, but the collapse of the colonial system without a responsible transition, as happened OTL, is just as detrimental. It's certainly better that it collapses rather than remains, but responsibly building up nation-states and institutions, as opposed to building up extraction-oriented indirect despotism is better than both options. That being said, none of the European powers were really interested in the latter.
That's not what a revisionist power, in classic Power Transition Theory, means. It has no bearing on territorial acquisitions, so much as the geopolitical intent of different countries. Yes, the Entente did seek additional imperial acquisitions, but doesn't really impact their status in Power Transition Theory. Power Transition Theory predominantly looks at which powers currently hold power/influence in the international system (status quo powers) and which ones are seeking to overturn the current hierarchy (revisionist powers). Not all rising powers are revisionist, but they tend to be.
France and Great Britain in the Belle Epoque era are pretty much the textbook definitions of status quo powers, seeking to maintain their own position and influence within the geopolitical system (particularly Europe). France, after 1871, is trying to desperately come to terms with German ascendance (and ultimately wanted to preserve what it could in terms of its standing in European politics, despite German-imposed isolation), and while Germany held significantly greater hard power metrics (military and economic potential), it lacked the same sort of global geopolitical influence France and Britain traditionally had, which allowed the latter two to build up their colonial empires. The Ottomans and Austria-Hungary similarly are status quo powers, seeking mostly to preserve their influence and power position and keep chugging along. The revisionist powers, in the early 20th century, were Germany, Japan, Italy, and Russia. A Bismarckian Germany could have been a status quo power, seeking to maintain its' favorable balance in Europe as opposed to needless self-aggrandizement, but Wilhelm threw it all away for his "place in the sun". With that, Germany would directly challenge Britain and France globally and committed itself to revising the international order, with Germany as its' leader (and hegemonizing Europe).
The tragedy of it all is that you're right, Germany didn't need to gin up tension. Had it remained secure and focused on its' own development and maintained the status quo in Europe, WW1 and the formation of the Triple Entente could've been avoided. However, Germany ultimately did, everything from the Naval Race (sparked by the [in hindsight, insane] desire to exert diplomatic leverage on the UK) to the commitment to basically a short, aggressive war with the Schlieffen Plan through the violation of neutral powers. The Moroccan Crises were both utterly idiotic and unnecessary, for instance.
That Germany ultimately got Russia, the United Kingdom, and France to coalesce into an ostensibly anti-German bloc together is, contextually, mildly impressive given their wildly conflicting geopolitical aims. It really speaks to how badly they needed to bungle their diplomacy for it to happen.
More or less a continuation of Bismarckian policies seeing to be a balancing/friendly European power, as opposed to Wilhelm bascially making a giant fudge out of it and abandoning the Bismarckian goal of preventing a 2-front war for Weltpolitk and the pursuit of national glory and colonies, ultimately alienating Great Britain and Russia. Taking such a bellicose policy towards colonies and Britain, particularly with the Anglo-German Naval Race (plus his multiple gaffes) meant that Germany was committing to overturning the status quo fully.
Not taking Alsace-Lorraine and making eternal enemies out of France might also be helpful, but is not necessary. It does make it much more difficult, however, as a Franco-German alignment is probably necessary for a stable, continental Europe long-term. It denies the need for Germany to fully isolate France (which prompted the War Scares of 1875/6 and ultimately Franco-Russian rapproachment).
AussieHawker
Banned
I find it a bit hard to see how France is somehow in the status quo boat since they were actively cultivating alliances to beat Germany and reverse the power imbalance. That sure isn't the status quo, unless you mean the status quo before 1871. That is inherently a hierarchy change. And they actively encouraged the Russian efforts to weaken Austria-Hungary.
Or that destroying the Ottomans somehow counts as the status quo, since that upends the entire middle east policy. And Germany was seeking to maintain favourable balance in Europe. WW1 didn't start because of prestige. Germany was seeking to bust the constricting alliances arrayed against it, which had a greater power potential. Russia was growing rapidly and wasn't allied with France because of anything Wilhelm said. Its alliance with France was because France was willing to dump nearly all available capital into Russia. Good for getting an alliance, but it left a lot of French investors very reliant on Russia being stable and paying its debts. Serbia armies were rapidly growing. German influence was also fading in other powers, with Romania drifting from their camp and Italy of course seeking gains against AH.
Germany only creates a real hegemon, because of two qualifiers I mentioned. A victorious war of course. But also a long one. Before that Germany was only seeking security for its alliance partners and minor corrections. A short war leaves Germany as the largest single power, but not one able to dominate all of Europe. But it will seek such aims after a long war, not wanting to waste all that carnage and not repeat it again.
All the flashpoints before WW1 got focused on because it is easy to teach history as a timeline of large events. But they ultimately didn't create the war, because there were greater factors working below the surface and these flashpoints are normally murkier then pop history. The German naval program was encouraged as a threat beyond its reality by the British naval interest. There are also plenty of flashpoints spurred on by the Entente Powers, but the narrative of Prussian militarism overrides. WW1 was not something created by Germany, it took active interest by both sides.
Power Transition Theory, and state classification of different states, has nothing to do with how aggressive a country is. Status quo powers can be just as, if not more, aggressive as revisionist powers, as they seek to curtail a challenge/threat to their own positions within the geopolitical power structure. I am also not saying that being a status quo power is good and being a revisionist power is bad, and I am not saying either is right or wrong. I am not making any moral judgments about their actions as I suspect you are ascribing to me, only outlining the geopolitical power structure and power transition that was occurring during the early 20th century, and how it ultimately led to the Great War. The classification is to note that power transition, when a rising, revisionist power overtakes or begins to overtakes status quo powers, is when Great Power wars, are most likely to occur and tensions to flare, with either the revisionist power launched a hegemonic war to seize dominance, or a status quo power launching a preventative war. Or at the very least the threat of either occuring.
France and Britain are considered classic status quo powers during this period because they are already at the top of the system in terms of global geopolitical power, and are seeking to maintain it. Both had already amassed great influence globally in the way no other power really had. Britain is essentially the hegemon during the 19th/early 20th century, and thus has no need to buck the system, and France after the Napoleonic Wars, outside a few hiccups like Fashoda, would eventually commit itself from Napoleon III, to explicitly not challenging British dominance writ large. Compete, like at Fashoda? Yes, but not buck the system entirely. Did France invade a good chunk of Africa and Asia? Yes, but the fundamental geopolitical landscape did not change, nor did it seek to overturn British hegemony. Yes, the Entente carved up the Ottomans in WW1, and disrupted local stability within the region for basically at least the past 100 years or so. Being a status quo power doesn't mean you don't take land or do stupid ish with serious ramifications down the line (just look at the US track record w/ CIA "interventions"), and I am not justifying it at all as being correct, good, or smart. I mean, the Athenians did stupid ish too that caused them to be defeated by Sparta, and they/the Delian League are the classic, classical Greek example of a status quo power. Does not change their status in a structural geopolitical analysis.
Both of them also ended up as declining powers, as Germany, Russia, and Italy began to eat away at their influence, and the share of the global economy that belonged to the UK and France began to relatively decline. This doesn't consign the former to being revisionist: the USA was a rising, status quo power in the early 20th, and would assume effective global hegemony (with the USSR challenging) after WW2, but these ambitions for a "place in the sun", from multiple powers and competing interests heightened the chances of a European conflagration, with the scrapping of the Congress of Vienna by the birth of Germany and Italy, launched paradigm shifts that ultimately destabilized the fragile balance that was achieved despite the Band-Aids to it Bismarck and others tried to put on it.
Locally, yes, Germany felt threatened by Russia's growing economic and military power, and there were at least a vocal few within the German military, iirc, seeking a preventative war to curtail the Russian threat. Essentially, Russia was rising faster than Germany.
Final note, German hegemony is also at best regional, and, like all hegemonies, ephemeral. Particularly when won by conquest in a post-nationalist era. It does not bode well as a recipe for long-term European stability.
Edit: also, France was finding alliances to defend its own security. The War Panic of 1875, where Germany threatened War with France because it was recovering too quickly, ring a bell? This does not have any bearing on their status in power transition Theory however.
Also, the express purpose of the German naval program was to exact diplomatic leverage against a hegemonic power that expressly depends upon naval power has its lifeblood. Do you say that the threat was drummed up by British naval interest is irrelevant. The purpose was idiotic and needlessly antagonizing, and created an actual threats to Britain, one that can be portrayed as existential, when entirely unnecessary.
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Riain
Banned
As @wiking said, the Septemberprogramm was never official government policy, it was a wish list appropriate for the first weeks of the war. German war aims waxed and waned according to the fortunes of the war, nailing down specific war aims if difficult, the best I can come up with is creating MittelEuropa in the east and having accepted without punitive tariff barriers by the rest of the world. Gains in the west were negotiable in order to get this acceptance as industrialists and politicians knew that ME was no economic substitute for access to global markets.
Political liberalisation was for domestic purposes, however it does throw up different people for the Kaiser to choose as his Executive Cabinet. The best example of this is the Prussian PM being the Imperial Chancellor, with different voting rules its likely different people will be put before the Kaiser to be PM/IC and these people will guide foreign policy.
IIRC Ukraine wasn't part of ME, it was initially to be independent but this was very short lived. However the rest of ME was no great economic prize, ME was about political control rather than economic exploitation which was a bit of a mixed bag of benefits and drawbacks. I think Germany would be happy enough if ME was cost-neutral.
On the Septemberprogramm, I am aware it was not official government policy. However, it is a damning look at the goals and aims of the kaiserreich government, and explicitly shows lots German names for WW1 were not defensive, but bent on creating a new European order centered around Germany proper. Suction order cannot be maintained indefinitely through coercion, as the Soviets found out, and ultimately, with the seeds of anti-german sentiment sown already in places like Belgium or France, I do not believe a German lead Europe after world War 1 will be stable.
Riain
Banned
The late-war war aims were not all about France and Belgium, indeed I think that German politicians and industrialists were very worried that France and Britain would lock them out of world markets if they were heavy handed in the west. Further, the German electorate was more interested in gains in the east than the west so likely won't want to go for the throat in the west. If Germany isn't occupying France or Belgium what does it matter if there is anti-german sentiment?
Deleted member 1487
Not sure how those things are connected? If it wasn't official policy it wasn't the goals and aims the Kaiserreich, especially given that it was a sounding out effort to see what some groups in the country, not even necessarily in the government, thought should be the demands in the event of peace, as they went into war without any sort of terms for peace. In the end it was just shelved and not considered after the initial inquiry.
Doesn't its nature show that their aims were not clearly laid out beforehand, hence the informal discussions? And if they involved a lot of aggressive annexations, how many countries ever fight a war that big angling for a white peace afterwards?