German victory WW1 - How different from Nazi Germany would it actually be?

That's right, but after WW2 that changed. In this world there probably isn't a WW2 so the big blocks hold together for a much longer time and the barriers remain in place.

A persistent war aim of the civilian politicians and industrialist groups was that punitive trade barriers not be erected against Germany due to her conquests and annexations, they knew that MittelEuropa was no substitute for access to global markets. They were likely to make concessions on things like the status of conquered territory in the west to keep markets accessible, they won't want to be fostering isolationism and trade barriers.
 
The idea that Germany "sells" its colonies to Japan is often flouted, to save face for both sides and end their part of the war, i don't know how realistic that is, but it's rather unrealistic for Germany to claim back the Japanese colonies as it's just so far away, fighting for it would be really infeasible as the Russians demonstrated in 1905.
How realistic is the legation cities actually becoming a thing? Germany decides to save face by selling Japan those holds but they try to add a extension to it. Germany doesn’t want to lose any footing out in the Pacific and Far East. They are able to convince British of maintain status quo between themselves or “peace with honor”(Britain gives back anything they took from Germany and recognize their gains but Britain gets Congo and Ottoman lands. Germany and Britain also agree to provide aid to Belgium for the war destruction. Germany does this to lessen tensions with the west and Britain provides additional aid and money in exchange for Congo which Belgium accepts. Germany can only provide resources and money in the reconstruction. Belgium doesn’t accept any help from Germany in form of actual people).

In the Far East they are somewhat forced to give Japan what it gained but doesn’t want to really say so due to not wanting to appear weak to an Asian empire so they agree to “sell” it for cheap price but add in other things to help ease imperialist who are against losing anything(since Germany won many of them will be stubborn about giving up anything so exchange or compromise is preferable). The legation cities center in Shanghai region and maybe few other coastal cities would be a example of that. Cities mostly on the coast of China controlled by Western powers and interest plus Japan. These cities protected by international laws and any aggressive action against them is a act of war on everyone. They are place for commerce and diplomacy for everyone and guaranteed that. Great powers don’t trust China to stay stable or always “cooperative” with them always. All of them want some guarantee for benefits of exploiting China. And no one really cares about China input especially Japan. The only issue is China might or most likely oppose this but that doesn’t end well for them. Britain and Germany are too exhausted to do anything their or push it with the exception of maybe navy but Japan is very willing and both Germany and Britain give them the go head on making China obey the new treaty in exchange Japan recognizes and help establish some of these new things. Japan stomps China into submission and force them to agree to the legation cities and for refusing western powers allow Japan to add more concussions to China for themselves(Japan did most of the work for them and seeing opportunities they accepted it). Legation cities have American, British, Japanese, and German military forces there but most are navy or private interest groups from these nations. They are their to make sure trade between their nations and China stays secure.

Germany also breaks a deal with Britain and Portugal. Both recognize Portugal current holds in Africa but convince Portugal to sell both of them the rest of their empire at a set rate. Britain gets Portugal small holdings in India and also remaining bits of French India for free by the Germans to sweetened the deal. Germany gets their port in China and islands in Indonesia(they also buy the rest of the island and some around it from the Dutch). This is to make up for the lost to Japan(eases imperialist and saves some face). It also gives the German direct bases and islands to use to project in the region.

Britain true colors might show more here. They will be doing anything to give off the appearance to the public this war was not a complete failure or defeat. That’s why they might go hard with getting concessions out of the Germans and the Germans use countries they occupy as leverage for that so they don’t have to give up what they want. Belgium wrecked by war. Makes it easy to get Congo out of them. Congo gives the British the ability to build the Cape to Cairo railroad. Arabia just for land and ports. It also gives them more control of the Red Sea and Persian gulf. It’s more to say “we at least beat those ottomans and destroyed them”. Basically taking out the failure of the war on them and Germany letting them as long as they get there Baghdad railroad still. That genocide in Turkey is the only excuse Germany needs to throw the Ottomans under the bus without people looking negatively at it. British public could be much more bitter towards Continental Europe after the war due to the defeat. The British could very well direct the failures on the western front on France. Labeling the French military as incompetent cowards who lost the western front to the Germans while “brave and noble” Brits held the line as long as possible against “impossible odd”. Britain probably doing all it can to calm down resentment at home, in the dominions, and in the colonies as well. With Europe under German control they would be more focused on the dominions and it’s overseas empire then Europe.

I’m assuming Italy and US stayed out of the war. That seems like the most realistic way for them to win without changing the war too greatly. That actually might benefit Italy well especially if they fix relations with Germany by the time Austria-Hungary falls(they could maybe be given lands to make them loyal to Germany). Even if Germany is still kind of piss Italy didn’t join the war they might give them parts of France and its colonies just for the sake of weakening France more. Corsica, Nice, Savoy, and Tunis could be given to Italy. Also getting the Libyan border adjusted in their favor. Italy isn’t a threat to them and didn’t join the war in this pod. They might actually invest in Italy and build it up as a dependent ally(Italy can’t do much on their own and Germany winning only makes them kiss up to them that much more). Italy and Germany would be very friendly after Austria gone. Maybe give Italy Dalmatia in exchange for recognition of their now touching border with Germany(I imagine Germany rather have a direct port in the mediterranean after Austria joins them. They likely don’t give them those other claims with exception of maybe some slight border adjustment to put more Italian regions in Italy).
 
When it comes to German domination over eastern Europe, one has to take into account that Germany’s relations with the newly independent states carved out from the Russian Empire will differ from case to case. I think that German relations with Lithuania and Finland for example would have been pretty good, even if they were ruled by German princes. I also think that relations with Rumania could have been fairly decent, especially if the Germans grant Rumania Bessarabia (which means Rumania would have gained territory, despite being on the losing side).

Poland would have been more difficult, since Germany had a sizable Polish minority in the east. But I think German-Polish relations could be improved should A-H break up, since Poland would then most likely be allowed to annex Galicia. Estonia and Latvia would also be difficult, since they would not only be part of the United Baltic Duchy, but also had sizable German minorities which made up most of the regional elite.

As far as Ukraine is concerned, I think it mainly depends on its internal situation. If the Germans and their local allies manage to defeat the various Red and Black forces in the region, and some manner of stability is reached, then I see no reason why Germany and Ukraine couldn’t establish a decent relationship. It’s not like the Germans are keen on a permanent military occupation. They will probably want to establish some military bases, and make sure that eastern Europe stays in the German orbit economically. But other than that, I don’t think they would care too much about what Poland, Ukraine etc. would do domestically. Unlike the Russification policies that Russia pursued prior to WW1 for example, there would be no ‘Germanization’ or anything like that (unless you believe Germany actually planned to annex all of eastern Europe).

Also, not only could the Germans try to bring rebellious eastern European countries in line by pointing to the big scary Russian/Soviet bogeyman in the east, they would also have the option of playing the various countries against each other. There will likely be territorial disputes between Poland and Lithuania over Vilnius for example, or between Poland and Ukraine, which the Germans could exploit if necessary.

Overall I don’t see any reason why we should expect eastern Europe to share the fate it suffered OTL under the Nazis in the case of a German victory in WW1. I think a possible OTL comparison could be the relations between Russia and its former Soviet republics. Today most of them are still in the Russian orbit, and Russia gets along pretty well with most of them, though there are some cases where relations have turned sour (Ukraine, the Baltics and Georgia especially). I think it will be similar for Germany and eastern Europe: most eastern European countries will be fine with the new status quo, but there are some cases where there might be problems.
Germanization would happen out east but it won’t be as blunt as Russification. It will be much more subtle. I think Kaiserreich if it can keep control over most of Europe will develop into a conservative type of EU minus Britain and Russia. You would not have nations as liberal as otl Sweden. Your most liberal nation would likely be otl Britain at best while conservative nation would be current otl Russia or Hungary at worse for comparison. The social values will be different but not full on authoritative. Conservative is the best term I think because they won’t be oppose to change but I think you would end up in a society that values community over individualism. American influence and world wars did greatly change attitudes in Europe greatly. I don’t think that would stop reform but it will be different. Maybe otl Japan right now is a good comparison on how Europe culture might be by the modern day. Kaiserreich and central powers did represent the more conservative side of Europe.
 
That’s true, but the question is, how exactly would we describe ‘puppet regimes’? Do they receive all their orders directly from Berlin, without any agency of their own? Would the Germans even want to permanently micromanage the affairs of all of eastern Europe? ‘National liberation’ is kind of a vague term. Obviously, the Germans wouldn’t allow any of the countries within their sphere of influence to become outright communist. But other than that, I’m not sure how much they would be involved in the domestic affairs of those countries.

If we look at the OTL situation, Germany is economically dominating eastern Europe right now, it just doesn’t have any military presence there. But let’s imagine if all those American bases in eastern Europe were actually German bases; wouldn’t that be how the situation would look like today if Germany had won WW1? Economic domination+military presence?

Well, if we look at what german politicians planned for Europe it would be the following: The local governments are autonomous if (and that's a big if) they don't do an independent foreign policy, accept the german economic dominance and don't go too much to the left. Imagine the Warsaw Pact but in Monarchist.
 
Well, if we look at what german politicians planned for Europe it would be the following: The local governments are autonomous if (and that's a big if) they don't do an independent foreign policy, accept the german economic dominance and don't go too much to the left. Imagine the Warsaw Pact but in Monarchist.
What would be the in between of EU and Warsaw pack but conservative? Isn’t that a good comparison?
 

BooNZ

Banned
And for the rest of Europe I think Germany would try to impose the "Mitteleuropa" concept after a few annexations.

This could lead to a heavy block building: Mitteleuropa versus the Empire versus the US-dominated Americas versus whoeve gets the upper hand in East Asia.
Sorry, the traditional concept of Mitteleuropa was not compatible with annexations and puppets.

Poland would have been more difficult, since Germany had a sizable Polish minority in the east. But I think German-Polish relations could be improved should A-H break up, since Poland would then most likely be allowed to annex Galicia. Estonia and Latvia would also be difficult, since they would not only be part of the United Baltic Duchy, but also had sizable German minorities which made up most of the regional elite.
In any [late] Imperial German victory scenario, Poland is the elephant in the room. A-H had already developed a robust relationship with the Poles, but Germany would have been doing the heavy lifting and be expecting the spoils. Further, a strong independent Poland as a neighbor becomes problematic if you happen to have significant numbers of discontent Polish minorities...

As far as Ukraine is concerned, I think it mainly depends on its internal situation. If the Germans and their local allies manage to defeat the various Red and Black forces in the region, and some manner of stability is reached, then I see no reason why Germany and Ukraine couldn’t establish a decent relationship. It’s not like the Germans are keen on a permanent military occupation. They will probably want to establish some military bases, and make sure that eastern Europe stays in the German orbit economically. But other than that, I don’t think they would care too much about what Poland, Ukraine etc. would do domestically. Unlike the Russification policies that Russia pursued prior to WW1 for example, there would be no ‘Germanization’ or anything like that (unless you believe Germany actually planned to annex all of eastern Europe).
I agree German influence on recently 'independent' states would often be somewhat subtle, but I could imagine some rather heavy handed domestic Germanization policies in states like Posen. As an aside, I doubt German decision makers would have the will to ultimately keep Ukraine from the warm embrace of mother Russia.

Well, if we look at what german politicians planned for Europe it would be the following: The local governments are autonomous if (and that's a big if) they don't do an independent foreign policy, accept the german economic dominance and don't go too much to the left. Imagine the Warsaw Pact but in Monarchist.
What German politicians are you referring to? You appear to be referencing the hardline German military thinkers rather than the politicians - as previously outlined, the German military leadership would rapidly lose influence as the fighting faded...
 
Just for context, in 1914 the British Empire Dominions didn't have an independent foreign policy. If the states of ME don't have an independent external foreign policy, particularly with great powers, it wouldnt be as unusual as it sounds to 2019 ears.
 
You've weaved there half a TL already, what happens to China is imo a thing that's decided like in reality in the 30s, the European powers are far too exhausted to attempt anything, Japan is simply not ready for any big adventures, and China not at rock bottom yet. By the 30s, as in reality, the European powers will be back in business again which means Japan doesn't really have a free hand in China, only if there's renewed conflict in Europe that ties British/German efforts there, which as many have already laid out is rather unrealistic as France or Russia would not be powerful enough to do a reverse Axis-powers.

The Kanto Earthquake of 1923 will still happen and Japan will be in no condition for any foreign adventures for some time, and imo post war there will be renewed naval construction as i just don't see naval treaties happening, which will also be a huge burden on Japan as despite all efforts it was still very underindustrialized and poor yet had expensive ambitions.

China, barring a Japanese invastion that mortally wounds the republic, would not go communist as Mao would not get the opportunities created by the total breakdown of the state during the war, it still might be popular among the rural population and farmers but the true power is in the unexhausted and undestroyed cities.
 
You've weaved there half a TL already, what happens to China is imo a thing that's decided like in reality in the 30s, the European powers are far too exhausted to attempt anything, Japan is simply not ready for any big adventures, and China not at rock bottom yet. By the 30s, as in reality, the European powers will be back in business again which means Japan doesn't really have a free hand in China, only if there's renewed conflict in Europe that ties British/German efforts there, which as many have already laid out is rather unrealistic as France or Russia would not be powerful enough to do a reverse Axis-powers.

The Kanto Earthquake of 1923 will still happen and Japan will be in no condition for any foreign adventures for some time, and imo post war there will be renewed naval construction as i just don't see naval treaties happening, which will also be a huge burden on Japan as despite all efforts it was still very underindustrialized and poor yet had expensive ambitions.

China, barring a Japanese invastion that mortally wounds the republic, would not go communist as Mao would not get the opportunities created by the total breakdown of the state during the war, it still might be popular among the rural population and farmers but the true power is in the unexhausted and undestroyed cities.
Couldn’t Japan benefit more from Russian Civil War? Wouldn’t Germany actually support Japan taking some Russian lands in the Far East? Japan is kind of a natural ally for Germany if anything goes wrong with Russia or Britain. When Japan was westernizing they did take a bit from Prussia/Germany. German and Japanese culture actually do share many similarities especially if you compare Japanese and Prussian culture.

Also could Japan give Germany back its holdings in the pacific and Far East in exchange for Russian lands? That would be good trade by both sides and Germany can pressure Russia to do it especially if they are helping white army in Russia keep control of the country. That would help settle Japanese aggression/militarism and warm them up to the Germans. Instead of being called “Yankees of East” they might be called the “Prussia of the East”. Germany could invest and prop up Japan in the long run. Japan could become open to a mix of German and US influences but more in the way of culture changes. Japan could develop similar to South Korea where it starts out as economically behind and politically oppressive but rapidly westernize at some point. I could still see Japan become a economically strong nation like otl but more spread out over time but once it finishes they aren’t paper tiger like otl China but one of the top military and economic powers in the world. Modeling themselves a bit after Germany more so then the US might help them out. Those Russian lands especially on the coast could quickly be turn majority Japanese due to the high amount of people on the home island which are pretty overcrowded. I think the islands and urban preferences of Japanese society will make urbanization almost natural. Once agriculture practices and technology improves they won’t really need that many people in the rural areas. Japan would want more people in highly dense cities on the homeland or settling in colonies. The homeland cities could become large industrial cities and they could start passing the west given long enough especially with German and American invest. Much of the future will be in the focused towards the East like otl. Japan been one of the most complex and educated civilizations on the planet for hundreds of years. But unlike China its rather homogeneous and has well educated population(they had incredibly high literacy rate for underdeveloped nation. Didn’t they have one that was higher then many places in the west?). Japan can rapidly catch up and surpass the west given the right circumstances. It’s kind of insulting to compare them to Mexico or to say they will stay backwards. Without extreme militarism and more focus on economics Japan can rapidly develop due to having a educated and skilled population and government sponsored programs.
 
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No. The Entente shipping losses in the months leading into the USW were already not sustainable. Without the OTL wider introduction of the convoy system, the British war effort might not have even survived 1917. The convoy system itself might not have been introduced without US advocacy, resources and logistics - and the imperative provided by the USW.

What are your sources regarding the Entente shipping losses not being sustainable before USW was re-introduced?

What also needs to be realized is that the USW policy in and of itself wasn't the full reason why America joined the Entente anyways. From Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality by Patrick Devlin pg 675-676
What he [Wilson] said both in public and in private before 31 January 1917 makes it certain that he regarded Germany as no worse menace to America than Britain and the war as no concern to America except in so far as it brought her opportunity to remake the world in her likeness. What Germany did on 31 January was what in April 1916 she had warned Wilson she would do if he allowed the British blockade to continue. He preferred to treat a warning of what she would do as a pledge of what she would not do. This would make it possible, but not very convincing to argue that the supposed breach of pledge opened his eyes to her wickedness, were it not that he told the Cabinet on 2 February that his attitude was unchanged. He did not care, he said then, which side won and the only menace he talked about was the yellow peril.

A good question is which would have benefited Germany more: not enacting USW and letting the USA put increasing pressure on the Entente or implementing it, improving Anglo-American relations but increasing shipping losses. I personally prefer the former, however it seems unclear to what exactly would have happened with Anglo-American relations had Germany avoided the Zimmerman fiasco but still implemented USW. Most definitely an improvement, but how much? I'm unsure.
 
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What are your sources regarding the Entente shipping losses not being sustainable before USW was re-introduced?

What also needs to be realized is that the USW policy in and of itself wasn't the full reason why America joined the Entente anyways. From Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality by Patrick Devlin pg 675-676

A good question is which would have benefited Germany more: not enacting USW and letting the USA put increasing pressure on the Entente or implementing it, or implementing it, improving Anglo-American relations but increasing shipping losses. I personally prefer the former, however it seems unclear to what exactly would have happened with Anglo-American relations had Germany avoided the Zimmerman fiasco but still implemented USW. Most definitely an improvement, but how much? I'm unsure.

BlondieBC did a lot of research on this stuff for his Prince Henry timeline, and his conclusion as best as I remember it was that USW didn't significantly increase the effectiveness of the shipping attacks. Looking at the monthly tonnage, there was already a steadily increasing amount of shipping sunk as the war progressed, even before USW in 1917. They were totaling roughly 350k tonnes a month and climbing before February 1917. Granted, there was a huge spike after that, and I don't remember all of his reasoning here.
 

BooNZ

Banned
What are your sources regarding the Entente shipping losses not being sustainable before USW was re-introduced?
I have nothing at hand, but I recall a general shortage of shipping was already a serious consideration towards the end of 1916 and the tempo of shipping losses continued to lift even before the USW was introduced. The shortage of tankers was on a long list of imminent crises facing the Entente and was ultimately not resolved until late 1918. I understand the retasking of double hulled vessels during 1917 averted projected fuel crises before 1918.

What also needs to be realized is that the USW policy in and of itself wasn't the full reason why America joined the Entente anyways. From Too Proud to Fight: Woodrow Wilson's Neutrality by Patrick Devlin pg 675-676
Your reference suggests, whatever Wilson's sympathies, he was sufficiently neutral that USA might have remained on the sidelines without good cause to do otherwise. USW was that 'good cause'.

A good question is which would have benefited Germany more: not enacting USW and letting the USA put increasing pressure on the Entente or implementing it, or implementing it, improving Anglo-American relations but increasing shipping losses. I personally prefer the former, however it seems unclear to what exactly would have happened with Anglo-American relations had Germany avoided the Zimmerman fiasco but still implemented USW. Most definitely an improvement, but how much? I'm unsure.
Almost certain victory v almost certain defeat - tough call!
The Question now would be :
Can Britain
without US-american help regarding ships as well as finance as well as raw materieals as well as food
replace about 150.000 tons of ship-space every month ?​
I suspect the absence of unsecured US credit in 1917 would free up a lot of Entente shipping capacity...
 
Your reference suggests, whatever Wilson's sympathies, he was sufficiently neutral that USA might have remained on the sidelines without good cause to do otherwise. USW was that 'good cause'.
I'm not sure how you came to this conclusion with the quote I provided. It seems to in fact suggest the opposite
 
BlondieBC did a lot of research on this stuff for his Prince Henry timeline, and his conclusion as best as I remember it was that USW didn't significantly increase the effectiveness of the shipping attacks. Looking at the monthly tonnage, there was already a steadily increasing amount of shipping sunk as the war progressed, even before USW in 1917. They were totaling roughly 350k tonnes a month and climbing before February 1917. Granted, there was a huge spike after that, and I don't remember all of his reasoning here.
Yeah reading Koerver this seems correct, that is that there was a steady but very large increase in the amount of operational U-boats marked for the merchant war. Here are some graphs from Hans Joachim Koerver's German Submarine Warfare 1914-1918 in the Eyes of British Intelligence

koerver1.PNG
koerver2.PNG
koerver3.PNG



It seems that the U-boats were such a threat before the resumption of USW that the British were already freaking out. Jellicoe wrote to the Admiralty in October 1916
“a serious danger that our losses in merchant ships, combined with the losses in neutral merchant ships, may by the early summer of 1917, have such a serious effect upon the import of food and other necessaries into the allied countries, as to force us into accepting peace terms which the military position on the Continent would not justify, and which would fall far short of our desires

The Admiralty had this to say to "His Majesty in November 1916 [Why could the British not implement the convoy system?]
“No conclusive answer has as yet been found to this form of warfare; perhaps no conclusive answer ever will be found. We must for the present be content with palliation.


Finally it's worth noting Koerver's opinion on the subject
From the middle of September the Flanders and High Seas Fleet submarine force resumed the commercial war in accordance with the rules of cruiser warfare.59 This worked well for the next four and a half months. There were no new, distracting diplomatic problems and the tempo of merchant vessel sinkings around the British Isles was high. This was proof that restricted submarine warfare was tactically and strategically successful.

It seems that had USW not been declared, the U-boats themselves (even without US pressure or refusal to grant unsecured loans to the Entente or other butterflies) may have been enough to drive Britain from the war.
 
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Your reference suggests, whatever Wilson's sympathies, he was sufficiently neutral that USA might have remained on the sidelines without good cause to do otherwise. USW was that 'good cause'.

I'm not sure how you came to this conclusion with the quote I provided. It seems to in fact suggest the opposite


Seems clear enough to me. See the following from Devlin, pp676-8

Why in Wilson’s mind was there no alternative? “He does not mean to go to war, but I think he is in the grip of events.” So Lodge wrote to Roosevelt on 2 March 1917. It is true, if it be remembered that the events were of his own making and that he could unmake them. What had him in their grip were his own pronouncement - - and, perhaps the most fprmidable obstacle of all, his letter to Senator Stpne.

“If the clear rights of American citizens should unhappily be abridged or denied by any such action we should, it seems to me, have in honor no choice as to what our own course should be.”

Could he go back on these words? - - - He was not caught in any mesh that was not woven of his own words. Politically a retreat into an anti-war position was open. [but] if he and America with him chose the path of submission, his ideal, his hopes and his dreams of bringing in the new world to regenerate the old would be destroyed.- - If Wilson turned back now, the ambition which, whether noble and universal or selfish and personal, he had now made a part of himself would perish miserably and he would be left a frustrated man.

In short, Wilson had backed himself into a corner. If he now acquiesced in USW, he would be eating every word he had said or typed since May 1915 – something he was about as likely to do as he was, two years later, to rewrite the League Covenant at the behest of Republican Senators.

This was the danger which William Jennings Bryan had foreseen at the time of the first Lusitania note – that Wilson’s stand would inexorably draw him into a position where once he was defied, as sooner or later he probably would be, he would face a straight choice of war or humiliation. Bryn is often dismissed as a naïve fool, but on this point at least he was more far-seeing than was the President himself.
 
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