Gang of 25 revolt/Tory split in 81

[David Flin]

As we now know, the Alliance won a landslide 423 seats, Labour held 169 and the Conservatives just 35. Margaret Thatcher lost her own seat of Finchley by over 5,000 to the Alliance and most of her Cabinet also lost their seats.

Yeah, right, there is no way this result comes about under the British electoral system. There are sufficient Tory safe seats that winning just 35 is a nonsense. If the assumptions you make lead to this result, then your assumptions are wrong. Labour holding 169 is a bit over-egging. Even the disaster of 1983 OTL saw them winning 209 seats, and the 2019 disaster led to 202 seats. Getting down to 169 is going to be tough.

Getting the Conservatives down to 35 is just ridiculous. The disaster for the Tories that was 1997 saw them collapse to 165, and that was in a perfect storm situation.

200 is pretty much the minimum Labour will fall to absent some major constitutional change, and 165 is pretty much the minimum the Conservatives will fall to absent a major constitutional change.

 

[sarahz]

Very intriguing take as ever @stodge!

However I doubt the willingness of the entire Gang of 25 to breakaway or the likeliness of their deselection. Fourteen MPs did abstain and to the best of my knowledge, did not face any major repercussions from their local associations or from the parliamentary party. While humialiating the government would certainly would incur a much different response, I doubt it would go as far as that extent.

Furthermore I really couldn’t see the formation of an Independent Conservative faction, which would further evolve into a Reform party. A breakaway from the Tories simply wasn’t an option for many “Wets” due to a variety of factors, including quite interestingly the societal status being a Tory MP gave in certain constituencies. Quite a few took a Hattersley type approach, believing they could win back the party from Thatcher and the monetarists, indeed that was the motivation behind the potential revolt.

On the other hand, a precedent does exist with the suspension of the whip from 21 rebel Tory MPs in 2019. Assuming a breakaway does happen, I doubt the Independent Conservatives would perform that well. The Tory vote would most likely be so split that we could have bizarre Labour victories in safe seats, indeed having two parties with virtually the same name competing for the same voter base is hardly a recipe for immediate electoral success. While breakaway momentum is certainly a factor, so are the potentially negative effects of appearing to revolt against the Conservatives in many safe Tory constituencies. The SDP-Liberal Alliance certainly did soften the Tory vote in many areas during the peak of their momentum, however a rigid base of Tory voters still existed, who may find little enticing in supporting the “rebels” in a Tory civil war. It is possible the government could successfully position the Independents as serving to the benefit of Labour. At best I could see the Independents narrowly edging above the Goverment (a ratio of maybe 14-11 seats maybe), at worst hardly scraping 5. It must be noted that even despite the media coverage and widespread fame of the Gang of Four, only two of them actually held their seats for the SDP. A bulk of the SDP defectors did not enjoy such limelight and lost their seats. One can imagine that a cohort relatively unknown Conservative MPs (besides Gilmore, Pattern etc) would suffer similar defeat.

Indeed the formation of the Reform Party seems a tad unnecessary, at this point the SDP was actively courting liberal Tories. Surely it would make more sense to gravitate towards joining the SDP rather then forming a new party from scratch. Indeed they would most presumably be welcomed with open arms. An influx of Wet defections would benefit the SDP immensely.

What I envision occurring (also brainstorming for my TL) is a larger revolt including the Gang of 25 + Wets such as Prior and Heath etc. Should it be successful, the brutal infighting that plagued the Tories at the time becomes an utter clusterfuck. A heavy handed response from the government (potentially yet another purge of Wets from the Cabinet) ensues, pathing the way for Thatcher to be challenged for the leadership. For the sake of the butterflies, let’s imagine Thatcher narrowly wins against a candidate such as Pym. That, coupled with a better Thatcherite performance in the 1922 Committee elections, may be the straw that breaks the camels back for many Wets.

By late 1982 (the Falklands has been butterflied away) the Tory civil war is still raging. Senior Wets such as Gilmour and Prior have endured the same agonizing process of despair at the party’s situation, believing it to have become helpless, much alike that of what the SDP defectors experienced. One must remember, Rodgers and Williams where avid Labourites, the process of divorce from Labour was described as “severe mental pain,” (indeed the notion of them splitting from the party would have been laughed at during the 70s).

A Wet “Gang of Eleven” defectors could emerge, I could see it comprising of:

• Jim Prior
• Nicholas Scott
• Hugh Dykes
• Stephen Dorell
• Robert Hicks
• Chris Patten
• Keith Stainton
• John Wells
• David Knox
• Jim Lester
• Richard Needham

John Wells Er noj' A mzn of zero talent and no obvious Liberal views whose only motive could only be that he was seen as so useless that the majority was feared to be in danger' i think people just thought this would make a funny story as he was originally selected in preference to Thatcher in the constituency selection contest

 

[marktaha]

Actually in current Japan for eg creating Inflation might actually be a good idea. A worse problem than inflation is a sustained delfationary period. With most Western societies now past the demographic transistion thie prospect of a long term deflation across the western world is far from unlikely.

As a saver who doesn't like change I hope you're right!

 

[stodge]

Yeah, right, there is no way this result comes about under the British electoral system. There are sufficient Tory safe seats that winning just 35 is a nonsense. If the assumptions you make lead to this result, then your assumptions are wrong. Labour holding 169 is a bit over-egging. Even the disaster of 1983 OTL saw them winning 209 seats, and the 2019 disaster led to 202 seats. Getting down to 169 is going to be tough.

Getting the Conservatives down to 35 is just ridiculous. The disaster for the Tories that was 1997 saw them collapse to 165, and that was in a perfect storm situation.

200 is pretty much the minimum Labour will fall to absent some major constitutional change, and 165 is pretty much the minimum the Conservatives will fall to absent a major constitutional change.

Completely and totally wrong, my friend.

Let's take it nice and slowly - the figures you quote for the Conservatives in 1997 and Labour in 1983 or 2019 are based on one of the two parties being at the height of its power and the other being at its depth.

However, this is also predicated on the central tenet of British electoral politics - people generally don't vote either Conservative or Labour because they are staunch supporters of one but more because they are staunchly opposed to the other. If the only two options are a Conservative Government or a Labour Government, and you don't want a Labour Government, you vote Conservative to prevent it happening and the opposite is true if you don't want a Conservative Government.

The Alliance offered the tantalising possibility of a third credible option - at the Greenwich by-election in 1987 (where I worked as a Liberal activist), what we saw was, when confronted with the truth the Alliance candidate could beat Labour, the Conservatives were happy to vote Alliance and when Labour voters were confronted with the truth the Conservatives couldn't win, they voted Alliance as well.

Put that on the national scene and once voters realised the options weren't just Conservative or Labour but Conservative, Labour or Alliance, I suspect you'd have seen a collapse in support for both Conservative and Labour as the principal reason for supporting them (fear of letting the other side in) disappeared.

The numbers I quoted weren't entirely arbitrary - they were a study carried out in the mid 1980s based on polling numbers - Alliance 44%, Labour 27%, Conservative 24%. The Alliance vote was evenly distributed in the 1983 election - that's why so many votes bought so few seats - but electoral statisticians worked out at from about 38%, seats would start falling to the Alliance in large numbers (mainly from the Conservatives).

To be fair, 44% (or thereabouts) won Thatcher 397 seats and Blair 419 seats so why couldn't it win the Alliance 423?

That's the thing with FPTP - if you get the right numbers of votes in the right places, a huge landslide is perfectly possible.

 

[sarahz]

Completely and totally wrong, my friend.

Let's take it nice and slowly - the figures you quote for the Conservatives in 1997 and Labour in 1983 or 2019 are based on one of the two parties being at the height of its power and the other being at its depth.

However, this is also predicated on the central tenet of British electoral politics - people generally don't vote either Conservative or Labour because they are staunch supporters of one but more because they are staunchly opposed to the other. If the only two options are a Conservative Government or a Labour Government, and you don't want a Labour Government, you vote Conservative to prevent it happening and the opposite is true if you don't want a Conservative Government.

The Alliance offered the tantalising possibility of a third credible option - at the Greenwich by-election in 1987 (where I worked as a Liberal activist), what we saw was, when confronted with the truth the Alliance candidate could beat Labour, the Conservatives were happy to vote Alliance and when Labour voters were confronted with the truth the Conservatives couldn't win, they voted Alliance as well.

Put that on the national scene and once voters realised the options weren't just Conservative or Labour but Conservative, Labour or Alliance, I suspect you'd have seen a collapse in support for both Conservative and Labour as the principal reason for supporting them (fear of letting the other side in) disappeared.

The numbers I quoted weren't entirely arbitrary - they were a study carried out in the mid 1980s based on polling numbers - Alliance 44%, Labour 27%, Conservative 24%. The Alliance vote was evenly distributed in the 1983 election - that's why so many votes bought so few seats - but electoral statisticians worked out at from about 38%, seats would start falling to the Alliance in large numbers (mainly from the Conservatives).

To be fair, 44% (or thereabouts) won Thatcher 397 seats and Blair 419 seats so why couldn't it win the Alliance 423?

That's the thing with FPTP - if you get the right numbers of votes in the right places, a huge landslide is perfectly possible.

Or to give another eg in Canada the then progressive Conservative Government once won 19 per cent of the vote and precisely 2 Parliamentary seats. Once a FFTP system has more than 2 viable contenders odd results can and will occur

 

[stodge]

Very intriguing take as ever @stodge!

However I doubt the willingness of the entire Gang of 25 to breakaway or the likeliness of their deselection. Fourteen MPs did abstain and to the best of my knowledge, did not face any major repercussions from their local associations or from the parliamentary party. While humiliating the government would certainly would incur a much different response, I doubt it would go as far as that extent.

Furthermore I really couldn’t see the formation of an Independent Conservative faction, which would further evolve into a Reform party. A breakaway from the Tories simply wasn’t an option for many “Wets” due to a variety of factors, including quite interestingly the societal status being a Tory MP gave in certain constituencies. Quite a few took a Hattersley type approach, believing they could win back the party from Thatcher and the monetarists, indeed that was the motivation behind the potential revolt.

On the other hand, a precedent does exist with the suspension of the whip from 21 rebel Tory MPs in 2019. Assuming a breakaway does happen, I doubt the Independent Conservatives would perform that well. The Tory vote would most likely be so split that we could have bizarre Labour victories in safe seats, indeed having two parties with virtually the same name competing for the same voter base is hardly a recipe for immediate electoral success. While breakaway momentum is certainly a factor, so are the potentially negative effects of appearing to revolt against the Conservatives in many safe Tory constituencies. The SDP-Liberal Alliance certainly did soften the Tory vote in many areas during the peak of their momentum, however a rigid base of Tory voters still existed, who may find little enticing in supporting the “rebels” in a Tory civil war. It is possible the government could successfully position the Independents as serving to the benefit of Labour. At best I could see the Independents narrowly edging above the Government (a ratio of maybe 14-11 seats maybe), at worst hardly scraping 5. It must be noted that even despite the media coverage and widespread fame of the Gang of Four, only two of them actually held their seats for the SDP. A bulk of the SDP defectors did not enjoy such limelight and lost their seats. One can imagine that a cohort relatively unknown Conservative MPs (besides Gilmore, Pattern etc) would suffer similar defeat.

Indeed the formation of the Reform Party seems a tad unnecessary, at this point the SDP was actively courting liberal Tories. Surely it would make more sense to gravitate towards joining the SDP rather then forming a new party from scratch. Indeed they would most presumably be welcomed with open arms. An influx of Wet defections would benefit the SDP immensely.

What I envision occurring (also brainstorming for my TL) is a larger revolt including the Gang of 25 + Wets such as Prior and Heath etc. Should it be successful, the brutal infighting that plagued the Tories at the time becomes an utter clusterfuck. A heavy handed response from the government (potentially yet another purge of Wets from the Cabinet) ensues, pathing the way for Thatcher to be challenged for the leadership. For the sake of the butterflies, let’s imagine Thatcher narrowly wins against a candidate such as Pym. That, coupled with a better Thatcherite performance in the 1922 Committee elections, may be the straw that breaks the camels back for many Wets.

By late 1982 (the Falklands has been butterflied away) the Tory civil war is still raging. Senior Wets such as Gilmour and Prior have endured the same agonizing process of despair at the party’s situation, believing it to have become helpless, much alike that of what the SDP defectors experienced. One must remember, Rodgers and Williams where avid Labourites, the process of divorce from Labour was described as “severe mental pain,” (indeed the notion of them splitting from the party would have been laughed at during the 70s).

A Wet “Gang of Eleven” defectors could emerge, I could see it comprising of:

• Jim Prior
• Nicholas Scott
• Hugh Dykes
• Stephen Dorell
• Robert Hicks
• Chris Patten
• Keith Stainton
• John Wells
• David Knox
• Jim Lester
• Richard Needham

With Thatcher as leader and Parkinson as Chairman, a "heavy handed" response seems almost inevitable. You'd have Norman Tebbit and those like him actively calling for the expulsion or de-selection of the "wets" or "rebels" or whatever you want to call them.

The question is the degree to which local Conservative Associations would support the Party or the local MP and the degree to which CCHQ would try to enforce its writ on local Associations (the Conservative Party at the time had a very loose decentralised structure and the local Associations were more powerful than the Centre).

My theory is the clash of personalities and the swift deterioration of relations by dint of some "provocative" language from both sides would propel both to a schism neither had probably intended wanted or relished. That's what happens - the atmosphere becomes so poisonous as to preclude any efforts at compromise.

IF you get a "group" (11 or 25) defecting from the Conservative Party, my argument is they wouldn't rush to join the SDP in the same way the defecting SDP members didn't rush off to join the Liberals. The sense of "I haven't left the Party, the Party has left me" would be very strong and powerful. The defectors are not novices and they will have powerful friends and allies so setting themselves up as a group and then a separate organisation seems eminently plausible,

Once they leave, they get used to being on their own, being "free" and they like that so there's no question of them joining either the SDP or the Liberals but instead they become the third part of an electoral Alliance. Now, this is where it will get complicated as while there'll be little or no issue with SDP or Liberal candidates standing aside against sitting MPs, the question of contesting Conservative or Labour MPs will be harder. There will be a lot of hard bargaining over which of the three Alliance parties will contest these seats and it will need all the acumen and diplomacy in the three parties to get it done.

 

[V-J]

Completely and totally wrong, my friend.

Let's take it nice and slowly - the figures you quote for the Conservatives in 1997 and Labour in 1983 or 2019 are based on one of the two parties being at the height of its power and the other being at its depth.

However, this is also predicated on the central tenet of British electoral politics - people generally don't vote either Conservative or Labour because they are staunch supporters of one but more because they are staunchly opposed to the other. If the only two options are a Conservative Government or a Labour Government, and you don't want a Labour Government, you vote Conservative to prevent it happening and the opposite is true if you don't want a Conservative Government.

The Alliance offered the tantalising possibility of a third credible option - at the Greenwich by-election in 1987 (where I worked as a Liberal activist), what we saw was, when confronted with the truth the Alliance candidate could beat Labour, the Conservatives were happy to vote Alliance and when Labour voters were confronted with the truth the Conservatives couldn't win, they voted Alliance as well.

Put that on the national scene and once voters realised the options weren't just Conservative or Labour but Conservative, Labour or Alliance, I suspect you'd have seen a collapse in support for both Conservative and Labour as the principal reason for supporting them (fear of letting the other side in) disappeared.

The numbers I quoted weren't entirely arbitrary - they were a study carried out in the mid 1980s based on polling numbers - Alliance 44%, Labour 27%, Conservative 24%. The Alliance vote was evenly distributed in the 1983 election - that's why so many votes bought so few seats - but electoral statisticians worked out at from about 38%, seats would start falling to the Alliance in large numbers (mainly from the Conservatives).

To be fair, 44% (or thereabouts) won Thatcher 397 seats and Blair 419 seats so why couldn't it win the Alliance 423?

That's the thing with FPTP - if you get the right numbers of votes in the right places, a huge landslide is perfectly possible.

Your biases are showing massively here. 'Everyone loves the Liberals, and hates the two main parties, and are just waiting for the batsignal of electoral viability to completely ditch'. Okay Mister Liberal.

FPTP would work in favour of the Alliance on the figures you're giving, the issue is that the figures you're giving are literally at the ceiling of the popular vote share a party can realistically achieve in a general election in Britain. To assume that, from a very low third party level, the Alliance could achieve those figures, with absolutely no 'wasted vote' factor kicking in, and literally everything working in their favour and nothing working for the other parties - well, there's a word for that in AH.

I don't have a problem with wanks if people say they're wanks, but let's not pretend they're straight-down-the-line-level plausible.

 

[V-J]

For some perspective by the way, IOTL the Tories only consistently went below 30% (barely) and the Alliance above 40% (barely) for only about a month in late '81/early '82. The Alliance was already on the slide from that before the Falklands began - it was about a three-way tie in polling just before the junta invaded.

In any scenario, the Alliance will have to deal with one insoluble fact, that novelty is a finite resource and the Tories can go to the country as late as '84.

 

[David Flin]

For some perspective by the way, IOTL the Tories only consistently went below 30% (barely) and the Alliance above 40% (barely) for only about a month in late '81/early '82. The Alliance was already on the slide from that before the Falklands began - it was about a three-way tie in polling just before the junta invaded.

As evidence for @V-J 's statement above.

Takeaways from this:
When Foot became Labour leader, the Labour vote collapsed.
The Alliance had a sharp boost following the Limehouse Declaration, which lasted a year, and then their vote collapsed. 10-15% rises to 40%, then falls to 20-25%.
The Tories have a steady decline until the start of 1982, when they sharply rose, and then rose again on the Falklands factor.

If we eliminate the Falklands factor, and take the position at the end of March 1982, all parties are roughly equal. Because the Alliance votes are evenly spread, while the Tories and Labour have clumps which get them a disproportionate number of seats for their votes.

After this point, the Labour vote is declining, and will continue to decline at a rate to be determined with Foot as leader. The Alliance vote is collapsing as the novelty value is wearing off.

And, the key point - unless a Vote of No Confidence goes against the Government, the Conservatives can call the election whenever they like before May 1984. The entire cabinet could be caught in flagrante delicto with dead giraffes stolen from London zoo, and Cecil Parkinson could have sex with Princess Di live on the BBC, and you're still not going to get the Tories down to 35 seats.

If the assumptions say that they do, then the assumptions are gibberish.

 

[Deleted member 157939]

With Thatcher as leader and Parkinson as Chairman, a "heavy handed" response seems almost inevitable. You'd have Norman Tebbit and those like him actively calling for the expulsion or de-selection of the "wets" or "rebels" or whatever you want to call them.

The question is the degree to which local Conservative Associations would support the Party or the local MP and the degree to which CCHQ would try to enforce its writ on local Associations (the Conservative Party at the time had a very loose decentralised structure and the local Associations were more powerful than the Centre).

My theory is the clash of personalities and the swift deterioration of relations by dint of some "provocative" language from both sides would propel both to a schism neither had probably intended wanted or relished. That's what happens - the atmosphere becomes so poisonous as to preclude any efforts at compromise.

IF you get a "group" (11 or 25) defecting from the Conservative Party, my argument is they wouldn't rush to join the SDP in the same way the defecting SDP members didn't rush off to join the Liberals. The sense of "I haven't left the Party, the Party has left me" would be very strong and powerful. The defectors are not novices and they will have powerful friends and allies so setting themselves up as a group and then a separate organisation seems eminently plausible,

Once they leave, they get used to being on their own, being "free" and they like that so there's no question of them joining either the SDP or the Liberals but instead they become the third part of an electoral Alliance. Now, this is where it will get complicated as while there'll be little or no issue with SDP or Liberal candidates standing aside against sitting MPs, the question of contesting Conservative or Labour MPs will be harder. There will be a lot of hard bargaining over which of the three Alliance parties will contest these seats and it will need all the acumen and diplomacy in the three parties to get it done.

While you do raise an interesting point, I still disagree. While such a sentiment would exist, it is not too alien from the feelings of quite a few Labour defectors. Indeed during the inception of the SDP, many of those who wished it to be a “Mark II Labour,” felt the exact way described.

The formation of a Reform party makes little electoral sense. The Liberals and SDP found their common interests lay due to the fact there was little space for two parties occupying a similar position on the political spectrum. The formation of yet a third party may not be received to the same degree of hype or momentum. In fact I could plausibly see many channelling a certain Bristolian woman hearing of a new general election: “Another one?”

Furthermore I could see the breakaway party struggling with a voter base. While the Liberals had their electorate, the SDP attracted many that had never been affiliated with a party before, I doubt the rebels would attract more then disillusioned Tory voters. While this is a significant demographic and it could alternately be argued that the SDP comprising of Labour defectors did not result in an exclusively ex Labour supporter base, I believe the prevalence of the SDP-Liberal Alliance would reduce the breakaway party into being perceived as solely an anti-Thatcher Conservative party, thus mainly targeting anti-Thatcherite Tories.

Furthermore at least six members of the Gang of 25 where in active discussion with the SDP OTL, seriously considering defection should the circumstances worsen. Indeed it is surprising in OTL that the parliamentary SDP only received one Conservative defection considering the degree certain Wets where considering such. While breaking away from the Conservatives may give the rebels a separate identity and sense of independence, there’s no reason such feelings would prevent joining the SDP

 

[Deleted member 157939]

Speculating about an 81 leadership contest, I could see a Thatcher vs Pym contest. Is there any possibility of Thatcher prevailing if multiple Wets enter the race?

 

[David Flin]

Speculating about an 81 leadership contest, I could see a Thatcher vs Pym contest. Is there any possibility of Thatcher prevailing if multiple Wets enter the race?

The rules at the time were that a winner needed to have a 15% margin over their nearest rival based on the total number of MPs. If no winner, the bottom is knocked out, and voting again.

With multiple wets, it is quite possible this would split the anti-Thatcher vote sufficiently to enable her to get this. As the lame ducks get knocked out, victory becomes harder.

It is technically possible in a close two-horse race for there never to be a winner, which would be mildly amusing, but unlikely to happen in real life.

 

[Deleted member 157939]

The rules at the time were that a winner needed to have a 15% margin over their nearest rival based on the total number of MPs. If no winner, the bottom is knocked out, and voting again.

With multiple wets, it is quite possible this would split the anti-Thatcher vote sufficiently to enable her to get this. As the lame ducks get knocked out, victory becomes harder.

It is technically possible in a close two-horse race for there never to be a winner, which would be mildly amusing, but unlikely to happen in real life.

I wonder would Heseltine be a plausible candidate in 81? In such case his entry may be enough to fracture support for a Gilmour/Pym candidacy

 

[David Flin]

Bit early for him, I think. He might run, but that would be more as indicating his ambitions for the future rather than in hope of doing anything this time.

 

[Derek Jackson]

Had the goverment fallen in late 81 or early 82 I think the Alliance would have done VERY well. Unemployment of 2 million was not seen as acceptable. Plus if maybe Benn won the deputy leadership of Labourt

 

[David Flin]

I can certainly see it doing very well. I can easily believe it being a player in an coalition government. I can believe it getting a minority government. I can just about believe it getting a small majority.

I can not believe it getting a 200 seat majority.

 

[GeographyDude]

As a saver who doesn't like change I hope you're right!

And short-term and medium-term, a deflation period probably does help you most of all. With a government or corporate bond, you have an interest rate locked in. Plus, each pound sterling has slightly greater purchasing power.

But long-term, you might benefit more from a healthy and growing economy.

And for an investment, it’s hard to compete with a low-fee index fund. For example, a person retired might easily have ten years or more of life expectancy. I can see a recommendation of perhaps 60% in an index fund? I’d be interested in the range of standard recommendations.

 

[Deleted member 157939]

A little Brainstorm of ideas based on the discussion:

On the 8th of December, the Thatcher government faced a massive backbench rebellion over its economic policy in the Autumn Statement. Angered by the anti-deflationary monetarist policies of the government, twenty-one Conservative MPs would directly vote against the economic package, while thirteen others would abstain. The “Gang of 21” would humiliate the government, resulting in the defeat of the statement by 286-273 votes.

The subsequent events would send the Conservatives into an intensifying a spiral of brutal infighting. An ensuing power struggle would commence ensue, as CCHQ attempted to both punish the rebels, while paradoxically attempting to maintain party unity. In January 1982, following an arduous process, those who voted directly against the statement where suspended from the party and had their whips removed, reducing the Conservatives majority to 24 from 45, such a maneuver would be coupled by a further Cabinet reshuffle, essentially purging the Wets from government.

Five of the twenty-one rebels would immediately defect to the SDP. The remaining sixteen, led by Ian Gilmour, would caucus as Independent Conservatives. The mounting backlash against Thatcher would explode following the reshuffle in January. Thatcher would face a challenge for the leadership from Francis Pym. He and fellow senior Wets (such as Halisham, Carrington, Prior etc) had been plotting a contest for the leadership throughout the previous months. Having confronted Thatcher and demanded her resignation, they would resign from Cabinet, triggering a reshuffle in response. However the plot would backfire as Thatcher would narrowly defeat him in the second round of voting. The attempted Wet coup had failed, further striking yet another demoralizing blow.

Adopting a conciliatory approach, the sixteen Independent Conservatives would have their whips restored. While the backbench rebellion ha humiliated the government, it had backfired quite spectacularly on the Wets, emboldening Thatchers position. Over the course of next year, the brutal infighting would continue. The pervasive party environment coupled with the triumph of the monetarism, created a deep sense of hopelessness for many Wets such as Jim Prior.

Actively courted by the SDP, many Wets would undergo an agonizing process of slowly divorcing themselves from the Conservatives. The Treasury Papers Scandal in late 1982, revealing a series of major reforms which were described by Thatcher as entailing “The end of the NHS.” Serving as the final straw, Prior and seven Conservative MPs would defect to the SDP.

 

[Chris Nation]

And short-term and medium-term, a deflation period probably does help you most of all. With a government or corporate bond, you have an interest rate locked in. Plus, each pound sterling has slightly greater purchasing power.

But long-term, you might benefit more from a healthy and growing economy.

And for an investment, it’s hard to compete with a low-fee index fund. For example, a person retired might easily have ten years or more of life expectancy. I can see a recommendation of perhaps 60% in an index fund? I’d be interested in the range of standard recommendations.

The traditional rule of thumb recommendation has been to subtract your age from 100, and that's how much of your investment portfolio (e.g. at 70, you should have 30% of your holdings in equities). That's what I was taught in my few financial advising classes (I have a finance degree, but personal financial planning wasn't my focus).

That being said, almost no one follows that anymore in an age of rock bottom sovereign bond yields.

 

[V-J]

Copy-pasting the Cummings approach in the run-up to 2019 onto a situation nearly forty years beforehand is not a good extrapolation of this scenario.