Introduction
Part 1 - Introduction:
Though often considered little more than a footnote in the grand sweep of World War 2, Sweden’s participation in the last 7 days of the conflict in Europe would have significant repercussions on Nordic and European history in the decades that followed.
The Swedish Intervention (“Interventionen” as it is termed in Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia), as it is generally termed, marked the end of the prolonged period of neutrality or “The Policy of 1812”, which had been the cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy since the disasters of the Napoleonic Wars.
Sweden had avoided the first World War without too many problems but with the war between Russia and Finland in November 1939 and the escalation of the conflict between Nazi Germany and the Western Allies in the spring of 1940, the war came uncomfortably close to Stockholm. The manoeuvrings of the western allies and Germany ended with the latter seizing Denmark on April 9th and invading Norway the same day. By the end of May, the last allied troops had been evacuated from Narvik leaving Sweden surrounded by the Axis powers (the USSR was still in alliance with Germany at this point).
The subsequent fall of France in June left Sweden a neutral island in a sea of Axis satellites or conquered countries. It was clear in Stockholm that Hitler was the master of the European continent and future policy actions would have to be seen in the context of not wishing to antagonise Berlin.
The German invasion of Russia on June 22nd, 1941 changed the dynamic completely. Finland remined in the pro-German camp seeking revenge for the humiliation of spring 1940 and the loss, amongst other territory, of its then second city, Viipuri. Initially, the Finns helped the Germans push the Russians back to the edges of Leningrad.
Pressure grew from the West with the entry of the United States into the conflict in December 1941 and with the reverses at El Alamein and Stalingrad, it was clear to most in Stockholm by the spring of 1943, the fortunes of war had turned decisively against Berlin and its allies.
Sweden had preserved its neutrality by agreeing to continue the provision of iron ore to the Germans via transports through its territory to German occupied Narvik. In addition, the transportation of the 163rd Infantry Division and the permittentraffik of German soldiers travelling from Norway to Germany on leave had been examples where expediency had forced Sweden to bend the rules of neutrality to accommodate Germany’s wishes.
As the fortunes of war changed, so did the Swedish stance. German soldiers ceased being allowed to use Swedish trains in 1943, intelligence sharing with the western allies increased, and in 1944 the Swedes allowed the western allies to use its airbases. This was as much as previous policy a recognition of the realpolitik that was emerging.
Though often considered little more than a footnote in the grand sweep of World War 2, Sweden’s participation in the last 7 days of the conflict in Europe would have significant repercussions on Nordic and European history in the decades that followed.
The Swedish Intervention (“Interventionen” as it is termed in Sweden and the rest of Scandinavia), as it is generally termed, marked the end of the prolonged period of neutrality or “The Policy of 1812”, which had been the cornerstone of the country’s foreign policy since the disasters of the Napoleonic Wars.
Sweden had avoided the first World War without too many problems but with the war between Russia and Finland in November 1939 and the escalation of the conflict between Nazi Germany and the Western Allies in the spring of 1940, the war came uncomfortably close to Stockholm. The manoeuvrings of the western allies and Germany ended with the latter seizing Denmark on April 9th and invading Norway the same day. By the end of May, the last allied troops had been evacuated from Narvik leaving Sweden surrounded by the Axis powers (the USSR was still in alliance with Germany at this point).
The subsequent fall of France in June left Sweden a neutral island in a sea of Axis satellites or conquered countries. It was clear in Stockholm that Hitler was the master of the European continent and future policy actions would have to be seen in the context of not wishing to antagonise Berlin.
The German invasion of Russia on June 22nd, 1941 changed the dynamic completely. Finland remined in the pro-German camp seeking revenge for the humiliation of spring 1940 and the loss, amongst other territory, of its then second city, Viipuri. Initially, the Finns helped the Germans push the Russians back to the edges of Leningrad.
Pressure grew from the West with the entry of the United States into the conflict in December 1941 and with the reverses at El Alamein and Stalingrad, it was clear to most in Stockholm by the spring of 1943, the fortunes of war had turned decisively against Berlin and its allies.
Sweden had preserved its neutrality by agreeing to continue the provision of iron ore to the Germans via transports through its territory to German occupied Narvik. In addition, the transportation of the 163rd Infantry Division and the permittentraffik of German soldiers travelling from Norway to Germany on leave had been examples where expediency had forced Sweden to bend the rules of neutrality to accommodate Germany’s wishes.
As the fortunes of war changed, so did the Swedish stance. German soldiers ceased being allowed to use Swedish trains in 1943, intelligence sharing with the western allies increased, and in 1944 the Swedes allowed the western allies to use its airbases. This was as much as previous policy a recognition of the realpolitik that was emerging.