Essai en Guerre: an FFO-inspired TL

Really strong start to the TL @spkaca I really like it so far, especially the research you're doing alongside economic dimensions such as North African iron ore and infrastructure.

I wonder what the consequences on British aviation will be, FFO's take on this was an earlier development of high altitude strategic bombers which implied more experience on metal fatigue, pressurised cabins etc which could be handy post-war.
 
I'd guess here, the gold reserve is still in the possession of the "FFO" French authorities, which should simplify and speed up any financial deals.
Certainly. Lend-Lease is coming too, I suspect if anything it might pass even sooner than OTL. The main point is the Allies have the wherewithal to get American kit on the scale they need. Most of it, though, will go to the French, so the RAF (for example) will use relatively fewer American aircraft.
Well, with your permission OFC, I would like to take the design mentioned here and bring it to the Alt.AFV thread, to see just how viable the idea is, what further changes and evolutions the design could go through, and lastly to get some pictures of the AFVs in qeustion?
I'd be delighted to see this.
If the French tank plant in the US were to get built and come into operation, (under this new situation) how long might that take?
I'm assuming that negotiations got underway in the aftermath of The Setback. Once the decision was made (probably autumn 1940), actual useful numbers of S41s might reach the active theatre probably in late summer 1941.
Just as important as the S41 is the gun it's carrying, the 6-pounder. OTL production of this was delayed partly because of the need to re-equip the Army after losing its equipment. Here that decision might not happen, so possibly a somewhat earlier production & deployment of the 6-pounder.
With the disaster of Strage d'Epifania, and the decision to stop further Africa deployment would the Germans also pull the Luftwaffe from Sicily? Or would some elements remain to create havoc around Malta and further drain Allied resources?
Fliegerkorps X will stay in Sicily for the time being - in Berlin's view, they have nothing much better to do elsewhere until the Real War starts. The Malta Blitz will still happen, but as the RAF can reinforce Malta much more easily, the Germans will achieve less and lose more than OTL.
I wonder what the consequences on British aviation will be, FFO's take on this was an earlier development of high altitude strategic bombers
Thanks for the comment - please excuse my ignorance: what would be the driver for this?
 
Really strong start to the TL @spkaca I really like it so far, especially the research you're doing alongside economic dimensions such as North African iron ore and infrastructure.

I wonder what the consequences on British aviation will be, FFO's take on this was an earlier development of high altitude strategic bombers which implied more experience on metal fatigue, pressurised cabins etc which could be handy post-war.

No/reduced invasion scare means no more resources for research/development/production of the next generation of equipment e.g. 6 Pounder anti tank guns or aircraft engines. FFO had a successful Vulture engine but I can't think of any OTL examples of a successful X 24 arrangement engine in this period, so I'd probably say the Griffon engine enters service earlier.

Maybe have Lord Beaverbrook sort out the shipping industry rather than aircraft production or head up OTL's Tizard meeting, better business arrangements for licence built allied technology.

Access to French and Allied gold reserves through the combined purchasing commission means Britain doesn't go broke in 1941. Invest some of that in modernising Britain's industrial base meaning reduced dependency on American aid such as lend lease? The other allied powers have practically no production industries to speak of, but resource extraction efforts could further reduce the need for resources and materials from the US.
 
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to nder what the consequences on British aviation will be, FFO's take on this was an earlier development of high altitude strategic bombers which implied more experience on metal fatigue, pressurised cabins etc which could be handy post-war.
Thanks for the comment - please excuse my ignorance: what would be the driver for this?
Having keep in word format the APOD paper on British aircraft development, I can comment.

The English speaking contributors (actually Australians) wrote up an alternate development of British aircraft and engines. The original work was done in 2005/06 so I assume was part of FFO, but was later expanded in APOD.

Without the Emergency Program set off by the Battle of Britain/invasion scare, Vickers quickened production of the High Altitude Wellington Mk VI, and Barnes-Wallace convinced the Air Ministry (no Ministry of Aircraft Production) that high altitude bombers could fly above enemy defences, still hit targets with specially designed bombs, and were worth investing in.

One needs a copy of Tony Buttler's British Secret Projects 4: Bombers 1939-1950 to properly follow what happened next.

Either accidently or deliberately the APOD authors misquoted a series of dates from 1941 to 1940, which results in the RAF having something like a high altitude Vickers Windsor called the Victoria in limited squadron service by March 1943. Seems a bridge too far.
 
the APOD authors misquoted a series of dates from 1941 to 1940, which results in the RAF having something like a high altitude Vickers Windsor called the Victoria in limited squadron service by March 1943. Seems a bridge too far.
Thanks - it seems to me that the RAF might pursue this angle slightly more than OTL but at any rate during the present war it would have only a marginal effect on Bomber Command capabilities. I don't propose to spend much time on strategic bombing; as it stands this TL neglects a lot of very important themes and theatres, for reasons of focus and practicality.
 
Part 3.3
Extract from The Gray Waves: a history of the Battle of the Atlantic by Walter Schluter, ch.4

The Kriegsmarine’s surface raiding operations of the autumn and winter had exacted a heavy toll on Allied shipping, but the time now came to pay the bill. The Hipper, making a second sortie into the Atlantic, after sinking some unescorted ships, fell in with convoy SLS64 on 11th February. This appeared a perfect target, but turned out to be escorted by the old battleship Resolution. After a brief exchange of fire the Hipper retreated north, easily outpacing the old battlewagon.
However, the Resolution engagement report reached the Coquelicot convoy, bringing aircraft, railway material and fuel from the US, plus numerous American engineers, to Casablanca. This convoy, like several before it, was considered of very high importance, and accordingly Admiral Godfroy, now commanding the fleet, had assigned the Force du Raid to its distant protection. It also had a strong close escort, including the cruisers Duquesne, Montcalm and Gloire. These ships now detached and intercepted the Hipper east of the Azores. A furious fight followed, Duquesne taking much of the fire (rather as Exeter had done in the River Plate battle) and suffering heavy damage. However, the light cruisers managed to manoeuvre into a favourable position and hit the Hipper with two torpedoes, slowing her significantly. They then drew off to screen the stricken Duquesne with smoke and enable her disengagement, then began to shadow their adversary.
The Hipper now had no chance to escape. Dunkerque caught up the following evening, and after an hour’s fight it was all over. The French took on board some 400 survivors, but then left the scene fearing U-boats. Many more survivors were picked up over the next two days by U-boats and neutral ships. The Duquesne limped into Casablanca, so badly damaged that no-one could quite believe she had not sunk, and indeed repairs were so extensive and prolonged as to be virtually a new ship. But Admiral Godfroy considered this a price well worth paying, commenting: ‘The Hipper was a powerful ship, and a great threat to us. I would have been content to lose all three of our cruisers to sink her. Now the moral effect of this will be even greater than the material.’
He proved correct. At the same time as these events, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were in the North Atlantic as part of operation Berlin. When news of the Hipper’s loss came through, Kriegsmarine HQ ordered their immediate withdrawal. However, Admiral Tovey anticipated the German reaction and ordered units of the Home Fleet to cover the likely routes. The Richelieu and Renown came close to an interception, but only managed to fire a few salvoes in fading light as the German ships headed east at high speed. Owing to a signals error, the position and bearing were misreported, so that an attempted air strike by torpedo aircraft from the Ark Royal failed to find the targets, instead attacking the Richelieu and Renown in error, fortunately without hitting. Once the mistake was realised, a second strike was sent which caught the twins just before they reached land-based air cover. For the loss of two aircraft, two hits were scored, one on each ship, though the damage did not prove fatal. Within a few hours both ships came safely under an air umbrella and were escorted into port.
The fallout from these events was considerable. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would need prolonged repair, and no-one of the Kriegsmarine high command was eager to repeat the experience of their narrow escape. More importantly, Hitler became very agitated at the risk of further losses, as the sinking of the Hipper received considerable favourable coverage in the US, and was a staple of Allied propaganda for months. He directed the suspension of all further Atlantic sorties by major surface units. Although the new battleship Bismarck joined the fleet later that spring, for the time being it was confined to port, acquiring the nickname ‘Graf von Heimat-hafen’.
 
Overall, the Battle of the Atlantic will be easier for the Allies. Dakar and Casablanka are very useful ASW bases. Moreover, by the Armistice there were 54 destroyers both large and small. There were also the 12 La Melpomène-class torpedo boats that could act as coastal escorts. By the Armistice there were 72 french submarines and the Surcouf. Even the short-range italian convoys to Sardinia and Albania will suffer. The value of the 19 french cruisers can be seen already with sinking the Hipper and put a stop to cruiser raids by the Kriegsmarine. All this tonange saved in the Atlantic and the Med will fuel a self-enhancing cycle of Allied logistics.

In the mid term, I can see the French building the 8 infantry and 3 armoured divisions of their OTL 1943 plan. Perhaps one additional infantry division as their garrisons in Magadascar and the Levant are intact.
 
With the addition of the French vessels to the BotA -does the RN still get the ships for bases deal from the US, or is this not needed and not requested.

Have I missed it - what happened to the raid on Taranto in November 1940? Were French ships involved? How did the RAF do recon of the area without the Maryland?

At least the RAF without the influx of aircraft from ex-French US orders, will be wanting more Mustangs from North American!
 

Driftless

Donor
Extract from The Gray Waves: a history of the Battle of the Atlantic by Walter Schluter, ch.4

The Kriegsmarine’s surface raiding operations of the autumn and winter had exacted a heavy toll on Allied shipping, but the time now came to pay the bill. The Hipper, making a second sortie into the Atlantic, after sinking some unescorted ships, fell in with convoy SLS64 on 11th February. This appeared a perfect target, but turned out to be escorted by the old battleship Resolution. After a brief exchange of fire the Hipper retreated north, easily outpacing the old battlewagon.
However, the Resolution engagement report reached the Coquelicot convoy, bringing aircraft, railway material and fuel from the US, plus numerous American engineers, to Casablanca. This convoy, like several before it, was considered of very high importance, and accordingly Admiral Godfroy, now commanding the fleet, had assigned the Force du Raid to its distant protection. It also had a strong close escort, including the cruisers Duquesne, Montcalm and Gloire. These ships now detached and intercepted the Hipper east of the Azores. A furious fight followed, Duquesne taking much of the fire (rather as Exeter had done in the River Plate battle) and suffering heavy damage. However, the light cruisers managed to manoeuvre into a favourable position and hit the Hipper with two torpedoes, slowing her significantly. They then drew off to screen the stricken Duquesne with smoke and enable her disengagement, then began to shadow their adversary.
The Hipper now had no chance to escape. Dunkerque caught up the following evening, and after an hour’s fight it was all over. The French took on board some 400 survivors, but then left the scene fearing U-boats. Many more survivors were picked up over the next two days by U-boats and neutral ships. The Duquesne limped into Casablanca, so badly damaged that no-one could quite believe she had not sunk, and indeed repairs were so extensive and prolonged as to be virtually a new ship. But Admiral Godfroy considered this a price well worth paying, commenting: ‘The Hipper was a powerful ship, and a great threat to us. I would have been content to lose all three of our cruisers to sink her. Now the moral effect of this will be even greater than the material.’
He proved correct. At the same time as these events, the Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were in the North Atlantic as part of operation Berlin. When news of the Hipper’s loss came through, Kriegsmarine HQ ordered their immediate withdrawal. However, Admiral Tovey anticipated the German reaction and ordered units of the Home Fleet to cover the likely routes. The Richelieu and Renown came close to an interception, but only managed to fire a few salvoes in fading light as the German ships headed east at high speed. Owing to a signals error, the position and bearing were misreported, so that an attempted air strike by torpedo aircraft from the Ark Royal failed to find the targets, instead attacking the Richelieu and Renown in error, fortunately without hitting. Once the mistake was realised, a second strike was sent which caught the twins just before they reached land-based air cover. For the loss of two aircraft, two hits were scored, one on each ship, though the damage did not prove fatal. Within a few hours both ships came safely under an air umbrella and were escorted into port.
The fallout from these events was considerable. Scharnhorst and Gneisenau would need prolonged repair, and no-one of the Kriegsmarine high command was eager to repeat the experience of their narrow escape. More importantly, Hitler became very agitated at the risk of further losses, as the sinking of the Hipper received considerable favourable coverage in the US, and was a staple of Allied propaganda for months. He directed the suspension of all further Atlantic sorties by major surface units. Although the new battleship Bismarck joined the fleet later that spring, for the time being it was confined to port, acquiring the nickname ‘Graf von Heimat-hafen’.

Overall, the Battle of the Atlantic will be easier for the Allies. Dakar and Casablanka are very useful ASW bases. Moreover, by the Armistice there were 54 destroyers both large and small. There were also the 12 La Melpomène-class torpedo boats that could act as coastal escorts. By the Armistice there were 72 french submarines and the Surcouf. Even the short-range italian convoys to Sardinia and Albania will suffer. The value of the 19 french cruisers can be seen already with sinking the Hipper and put a stop to cruiser raids by the Kriegsmarine. All this tonange saved in the Atlantic and the Med will fuel a self-enhancing cycle of Allied logistics.

In the mid term, I can see the French building the 8 infantry and 3 armoured divisions of their OTL 1943 plan. Perhaps one additional infantry division as their garrisons in Magadascar and the Levant are intact.

These posts highlight a big operational challenge for both sides. With French convoys largely heading towards North Africa, that implies that Allied naval resources have an immense area to protect, against both u-boats and surface raiders. That dispersion also creates some challenges for the U-boats too - where do you hunt?

A common knock on the French destroyers on this site is the comparatively limited range, but that doesn't mean they run out of fuel as soon as they leave sight of land. Even for the wide Atlantic, if they're operating out of Martinique, Casablanca, or Dakar, that gives them a pretty good area of coverage. Plus, for those French destroyers optimized for the Med, means British destroyers can be released for work elsewhere.

Another set of Allied pluses: No Mers-el-Kebir...., and no Madagascar operations. Both were destructive to Allied efforts and Madagascar was a diversion of attention and resource.
 
A common knock on the French destroyers on this site is the comparatively limited range, but that doesn't mean they run out of fuel as soon as they leave sight of land. Even for the wide Atlantic, if they're operating out of Martinique, Casablanca, or Dakar, that gives them a pretty good area of coverage. Plus, for those French destroyers optimized for the Med, means British destroyers can be released for work elsewhere.
These are the sinkings during 1941 according to Wikipedia. https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/e/ec/The_battle_of_the_Atlantic_1941_map.svg

The cluster close to Dakar will be much easier to deal with in TTL. The same applies to the approaches to the Gibraltar Strait. The large contre-torpilleurs are ideal for the Mediterranean. I imagine a squadron based at Bizerte, a-la Force K. Night dashes to the east against the Tripoli convoys will be lethal. The same applies for another squadron based at Souda Bay (after october 28th) that can raid against the Cyrenaica convoys.

The small 600series submarines are ideal for the Mediterranean. The large submarines can support the RN effort against the german lines of communication in Norway. In past threads I have seen posts that claimed that without the french industrial base, the MN ships will face innumerable challenges. Frankly, I don't see it. The Greek Navy operated with 5 old french-built submarines and 2 italian-built destroyers from Alexandria for the duration of the war. The greek boats had pretty good availability. The French operate their own ships, they have shops and base personel in Mers-el Gebir and half a dozen other bases and possibly a lot of the Brest and Toulon personel got away as well.
 
All this tonange saved in the Atlantic and the Med will fuel a self-enhancing cycle of Allied logistics.
Yes, with effects that will build over time: "compound interest is the most powerful force in the universe".
In the mid term, I can see the French building the 8 infantry and 3 armoured divisions of their OTL 1943 plan.
Sounds about right - at this point they have about 9 divisions (III, XV, XIX Corps, each with three divisions), as you note they can expand this somewhat, though they will be cautious not to out-run their ability to maintain them.
With the addition of the French vessels to the BotA -does the RN still get the ships for bases deal from the US, or is this not needed and not requested.
Good question, I hadn't considered this. Possibly the latter, as here there will be negligible fear of invasion; possibly a smaller deal in return for other economic aid, some of it to go to the French, in accordance with the principles of the Union idea. London (and Algiers) would be keen for some kind of deal, simply for its diplomatic implications, almost regardless of the substance.
Have I missed it - what happened to the raid on Taranto in November 1940? Were French ships involved? How did the RAF do recon of the area without the Maryland?
I mentioned it in passing, but didn't give details. I think French ships would certainly be invited to join the party. Maybe some luckless crew had to do the recon in a Blenheim, and got shot down; or maybe some hotshot French crew did it, since they actually have Marylands (GM167s). Who would be the French equivalent for Adrian Warburton? We should assume something JUDGEMENT-ish happened, but in this TL, the Strage d'Epifania has an even bigger effect (in morale terms) on the Supermarina. It's possible Matapan is butterflied.
At least the RAF without the influx of aircraft from ex-French US orders, will be wanting more Mustangs from North American!
Yes - I haven't explored whether this TL would mean an earlier development of the Merlin-engined Mustang.
That dispersion also creates some challenges for the U-boats too - where do you hunt?
Yes - some I'm assuming, very roughly, that merchant ship losses will be about 10% lower in 1941; a consideration so important that by itself would bring enormous butterflies.
Plus, for those French destroyers optimized for the Med, means British destroyers can be released for work elsewhere.
Also yes, so I'm also assuming that U-boat losses might be about 10% higher in 1941.
Another set of Allied pluses: No Mers-el-Kebir...., and no Madagascar operations.
No CATAPULT, no MENACE, no EXPORTER, no IRONCLAD, no TORCH. This liberates a lot of Allied assets. The reason Resolution was in place to scare off the Hipper from the convoy (that OTL suffered heavy losses) is because she hasn't been torpedoed by a French sub off Dakar.
In past threads I have seen posts that claimed that without the french industrial base, the MN ships will face innumerable challenges. Frankly, I don't see it.
Agreed. I think the North African facilities and American supplies will mean the MN will manage pretty well.
Night dashes to the east against the Tripoli convoys will be lethal.
I doubt if the Supermarina will send any more convoys to Tripoli. They had concluded pre-war that they could not maintain North Africa by sea against Franco-British hostility, and they'll see the Strage (correctly) as confirming that theory.
 
Frankly, I don't see it. The Greek Navy operated with 5 old french-built submarines and 2 italian-built destroyers from Alexandria for the duration of the war. The greek boats had pretty good availability. The French operate their own ships, they have shops and base personel in Mers-el Gebir and half a dozen other bases and possibly a lot of the Brest and Toulon personel got away as well.
What sorts of shipyard facilities did France have in Algeria?

Anyway, any and all British facilities are available, and any shortfall the French have in personnel or machinery to upgrade their own facilities are again supplemented by British help; surely the British would quite like a major shipyard facility or three on the African coast of the Med! (Which by the way makes me wonder, what kind of shipyards might exist already in Egypt, associated with the Suez canal perhaps?)

Once the USA enters the war openly, French operations in the Caribbean region can be supported by US ports in the southeast; in addition to New Orleans, there's whatever is at Corpus Christi, Galveston, Biloxi, Mobile, Pensacola, Tampa, Key West, Miami, Savannah, and Charleston before we get to the major facilities on the Cheseapeake at Norfolk and Newport News. Then of course the major ports of the US industrial northeast and on to Halifax--I just want to focus on what is in theater, and we are talking west Atlantic operations already. And of course beyond CONUS ports, which are the most secure and best supplied to be sure, aside from whatever Britain maintains in the Caribbean there is the US Panama Canal Zone; surely the USN has major facilities there too. And in this day and age, well shoot I forgot Puerto Rico, and was going to mention Cuban harbors too.

Too bad none of that (except maybe Havana, though I don't suppose the Cuban government will be persuaded to risk a DOW by the Germans nor do I suppose Cuban facilities are all that capable) is available yet, but anyway whatever the British have to support their Caribbean operations normally are on hand. French Guiana is there, but not developed to any great degree. I wonder now if France fighting on might influence some Latin American nations to come in openly on the Allied side even before the USA does, which might offer the French and RN ports in Brazil or Argentina--Brazil would generally be the most useful, between French and British possessions in West Africa and the northeast bulge of Brazil, they could make it very very hot for U-boats trying to sortie into (or return home from) the South Atlantic and beyond. Sadly both Brazil and Argentina had pre-war contacts with the Germans and movements and leaders flirting with fascism. But I do wonder what the state of relations was between Paris and these nations, especially Brazil. I would fear the northern Brazilian ports aren't much better facilities wise than any of the Guiana ports (British Guiana, Dutch Surinam) that are available already. But anyway it would be nice to set up bases there.

I would wonder if either Britain or France would consider the idea of purchasing blimps from Goodyear, but I suppose not as the US is cagey with helium to lift them. (OTL, wartime produced Goodyear blimps designed for inflation with helium have in fact been operated by German operators who substituted hydrogen for helium, and there was never a fire. But of course the Germans are shooting back at any blimps they see (not actually their general inclination but they were ordered to do so OTL and did so) and would be more likely to consider trying to shoot down a blimp cost-effective if they knew it was lifted with hydrogen and therefore more vulnerable than was the case OTL when the USN operated them all.

Anyway if they could have the blimps and Brazilian bases, they are pretty wonderful for detecting U-boats--or even more so, scaring the subs into diving and trying to hide, which immobilizes them and neutralizes their threat pretty effectively, just by being seen. (Diving and hiding is the U-boat captain's impulse and instinct, knowing that even if they can send the blimp down in flames in very short order with their deck guns, they have sent up a flare telling the Allied combined ASW forces just where to look for them. It doesn't matter whether a blimp can sink a sub by itself or not; what matters is finding the sub. A blimp and even its crew is a good tradeoff for neutralizing a U-boat).

OTL once the USA was in the war and Goodyear production lines were ramped up to capacity, and meanwhile Brazil was persuaded to join as a nominal ally and thus permit USN operations, blimps were in fact based there, as well as at British bases in the Caribbean, and from Brazil a blimp had range to ferry itself all the way to West Africa, which is how a number of them wound up in the Mediterranean, doing minesweeping as well as ASW work.

So that's my excuse to ask these things. Realistically even if the US government were open handed with helium, and/or the British or French were willing to cross their fingers and operate with hydrogen instead (extra risky as the Goodyear designs assumed helium and thus did not take the same sorts of design precautions they would if planning to inflate with hydrogen, but as noted safe operation can be done, at least if one is not shot at too much--furthermore shooting even a hydrogen inflated airship is less likely to set it afire than one might think, most WWI Zeppelins shot down came down because their hydrogen leaked away and they had insufficient lift, not because they caught fire--sometimes they did and that was spectacular, but less often than one might guess. Anyway, it would take a while for Goodyear to ramp up production, and a while for French or British operators to gain proficiency and invent the tricks USN operators did over the course of the war OTL; by the time a serious number of purchased blimps are in operation in the appropriate theaters, the US is likely to have entered and to largely take over these operations complete with helium in trainload lots.

However if even a small scale practical operation hunting U-boats is going the day the USA does enter, perhaps it would save time, accelerating the USN operations getting up to speed. Certainly if Goodyear is already placing orders for dozens of blimps for France or Britain, production for the USN should start rolling out faster.
 
With the addition of the French vessels to the BotA -does the RN still get the ships for bases deal from the US, or is this not needed and not requested.

Good question, I hadn't considered this. Possibly the latter, as here there will be negligible fear of invasion; possibly a smaller deal in return for other economic aid, some of it to go to the French, in accordance with the principles of the Union idea. London (and Algiers) would be keen for some kind of deal, simply for its diplomatic implications, almost regardless of the substance.
Neither RN nor French navy needs the old destroyers--and OTL I doubt they were all that valuable to the RN even under exaggerated fears of invasion.

No, as you note, the Union leaders like Britain OTL mainly wants to draw the USA into the war on their side, and therefore the bases, presented as a "trade," are something the British (and here France can throw in some Caribbean islands of her own) were pretty keen to see Americans develop. Provided the Yankees gave the Allies some aid and cover (and just having a nominally neutral power operating out of a given base tended to divert the KM from risking triggering an unwanted war near those ports) and entered the war fairly soon, the US having those bases was all to the good. Push comes to shove, Churchill and the delegation from Algiers is going to offer them as a free gift. It makes excellent sense to ask for something useful in return of course, but I do wonder how useful the destroyers were to the RN OTL anyway despite the keener need for them than here. In the ATL it might be some other thing (some blimps, perhaps?:p) or it might still be the destroyers just because they are in effect Monopoly money just as I suspect they mainly were OTL--it looked better before the War Cabinet and the virtual Parliament of British public opinion that Britain got "something," never mind what, and pawning off the old destroyers, when FDR had every intention of getting the construction of new shiny modern ones approved in gross lots as fast as he could get it through Congress, was cheap for the US. But in fact both FDR and Churchill would be well satisfied to have the USA simply gifted the bases I suppose. Quid pro quo looks better though, and made it easier for the USA to claim to still be neutral.
 
Anyway, any and all British facilities are available, and any shortfall the French have in personnel or machinery to upgrade their own facilities are again supplemented by British help; surely the British would quite like a major shipyard facility or three on the African coast of the Med! (Which by the way makes me wonder, what kind of shipyards might exist already in Egypt, associated with the Suez canal perhaps?)
Well, the British lost a great opportunity to move the Admiralty Floating Dock no 8 to ALexandria before Italy entered the war...

They still have AFD no 5 in Alexandria as their main dock.

What sorts of shipyard facilities did France have in Algeria?
Not just in Algeria but in general:

There was a 250m long dry dock in Dakar.

From the book "French Cruisers 1922-1956) I recall that there were small floating docks in Mers el Kebir to accomodate submarines and destroyers and another small floating dock in Casablanca. At least for the light fleet, there is the infrastructure to support it. The cruisers and battleships can be serviced in UK and US.
 

Driftless

Donor
Under the heading of "be patient".... I know the difficulties of completing MN Jean Bart as designed have been briefly mentioned earlier (possible conversion of the hull). Also, a common thought on this AH forum is what to do with the MN Bearn. Even by 1940, it was too slow and too cramped to be a modern fleet carrier, but any flight deck should have some utility.

From a purely sentimental symmetry. an early appearance of a US built Essex class MN Bonhomme Richard would be nice
 
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I think in OTL the MN Bearn acted as an aircraft transport, in TTL that's likely to continue, otherwise at best a training ship similar to HMS Argos. Hopefully some of the French orders can be rationalised - some of the aircraft IMHO weren't fit for purpose!

Staying with aircraft - I believe the French in French North Africa had aircraft assembly plants - capable of putting together US deliveries of dis-assembled aircraft. Even if they have plans for the Bloch MB-157 and Arsenal VG-30 series how are they going to build them? Though Gnome-Rhone aero-engine specialist can give the people at Alvis a hand with their adaptations.
Also with the RAF - no Bostons means at last a Blenheim replacement - Buckingham comes early. OTOH with no meaning ful opposition in the Middle-East, a Hurricane replacement may not be needed to be rushed - options - Tornado, Boulton-Paul P.94 (s/s Defiant), Martin-Baker MB.3.
I can see India producing more arms than OTL (in a Sterling area).
 
@spkaca

WRT Franco-British tank development, I did post on Alt.AFV thread, and it seems I was mistaken in regards to proposed Savannah Somua. It seems that its turret ring is too narrow to fit a turret large enough to accomodate 3 men and 6pdr gun. Somua S40 is 2.12m wide, which does seem rather narrow and limiting, and would require much wider hull (wider by half) which means that it would need a substantial redesign.

Just my opinion, but maybe the best compromise, if they do not want to be completely reliant on USA for tanks, is the Ram Tank? It uses M3 chassis, which is already in production and in use, so there are certainly benefits there, French probably have the most experience in regards to cast hulls in the world at this point in time, so that should also be factored in. It is not M4 Sherman, but it is perhaps the best option they have, and that allows them to field a tank which would remain competitive for the duration of the conflict.
 
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