Es Geloybte Aretz - a Germanwank

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.... Story wise there needs to be an antagonist.

I don't put much weight on that. Story here includes many levels. On the level of geopolitics, who was the antagonist the USA needed to have in 1910 for story purposes? A nation state's internal politics is quite likely to prioritize naming some other nation a rival and the most important one, but this is not absolutely bound to happen. A state might be in such a strong position they do not fear anyone rationally challenging them on any front, and thus turn attention to other matters not bound up with international competitive politics. For instance I'd say that in 1910 the preoccupation in the USA was class struggle--lots of ragtag radical groups cropping up or left over from prior cycles pointing fingers at crooked elites, lots of well off people fearing the uprising of the ragtag mob. Very very few people running around denouncing Germany, or France, or Japan, or even superpower Britain, as the enemy, fear of which must dominate the national narrative. I'd say by far and away if you took a poll, more people would list Britain than any other foreign power as the one to fear and oppose. And yet US policy hardly took a hard line against Britain, unless you consider the slogan of "a Navy second to none" as a threat aimed at Britain--even so, our pursuit of that policy did not cause undue alarm in London nor poison relations generally. Despite more Americans agreeing that Britain is the worst in terms of "who should we worry about?" US policy was more favorable than not to Britain.

So it may be true that as in drama, so in real life, nations collectively have a narrative going in which conflict is the essence of story. (People challenge that Aristotelean idea that story is all about conflict, see Ursula LeGuin's "carrier bag theory of the novel" for instance as a fine deconstruction. But this gets pretty deep into literary, cultural and feminist theory after all). But given there must be CONFLICT, the antagonist need not be another nation-state. Given that few nations enjoy the sort of complacent security the USA of the 1900's did , fear of some foreigner or other is quite likely to be high on the list, especially because it is a very convenient distraction from issues some might argue ought to be more salient, such as the plight of the working class or the imminent danger of the rising tide of democracy subverting civilization to pick two sides of another argument. But there is no guarantee a nation will in fact be determined to pick a top foe and then systematically work to spite them.
 
Seriously the thing tying US policy to working with rather than against Britain was the deep level of mutual investment they had in each other; something similar worked between France and Russia OTL--as we've seen it isn't enough to drag France into a murderous war, not at any rate in the moral circumstances where the Russians are deemed to have started it and have made other enemies highhandedly as well. (In strict fairness, Wilhelm started it by giving a green light to Japanese special ops and cheering, but I can't say I think stirring up Poland to rebel against the Tsar was the morally wrong thing to do either, and it was after all the Japanese, not Germany, doing it. Enough of a gray area for one to understand a Russian point of view, but then again I don't think the Romanov regime was worth losing any sleep over either. Too bad the house did not fall if you ask me). So when the British did things like the Second Boer War there was some reticence in America. And plenty of Americans were still waving the Fourth of July Bloody shirt, especially in Irish neighborhoods with more of the same on St. Patricks Day, and at least once a highly organized Irish rebel organization ran raids into Canada with the US not visibly moving heaven and Earth to stop them.

Yeah, shared culture was a thing. But a very optional, easily jettisoned thing should any serious issue have arisen leading to conflict, and aside from the Fenian raids there were issues such as the above mentioned conflicts over should dominate in Latin America. The answer in this era was largely still "Britain," especially the farther south you went. But none of these were allowed to cloud relations too badly because mutual investment was just too deep for either to rip away from the other without a lot of internal pain resulting. That was far more important than cultural sentimentality or the real conflicts that tended to divide them.

The question to focus on here is, what concrete reasons for Germany and Britain to get at odds with each other so any continental alliance has a prayer to check Germany with British help? When Germany knows in its deeply wounded gut, and the British public can at least read second hand the horrible woes of the brutal front, that war is a costly solution to problems that probably aren't that terrible if someone isn't pulling sneak terror attacks and then declaring war while you reel from it. That's what it took to get one Great Power attacking another in this ATL; what will motivate Germans to do the like to Britain, or Britons to do something like that to Germany again? The option of Britain allying with France is discredited by the French failing to come to Russia's aid; the option of aiding Russia (Britain's enemy at least as much as anyone else on the Continent) is out of the question for a generation or so to come; Japan is already Britain's ally, the USA sits fat and happy off to the side with more sympathy for Germany (and more dollars invested in it) than OTL. Why should Britain pick any fights?
 
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Seriously the thing tying US policy to working with rather than against Britain was the deep level of mutual investment they had in each other; something similar worked between France and Russia OTL--as we've seen it isn't enough to drag France into a murderous war, not at any rate in the moral circumstances where the Russians are deemed to have started it and have made other enemies highhandedly as well. (In strict fairness, Wilhelm started it by giving a green light to Japanese special ops and cheering, but I can't say I think stirring up Poland to rebel against the Tsar was the morally wrong thing to do either, and it was after all the Japanese, not Germany, doing it. Enough of a gray area for one to understand a Russian point of view, but then again I don't think the Romanov regime was worth losing any sleep over either. Too bad the house did not fall if you ask me). So when the British did things like the Second Boer War there was some reticence in America. And plenty of Americans were still waving the Fourth of July Bloody shirt, especially in Irish neighborhoods with more of the same on St. Patricks Day, and at least once a highly organized Irish rebel organization ran raids into Canada with the US not visibly moving heaven and Earth to stop them.

Yeah, shared culture was a thing. But a very optional, easily jettisoned thing should any serious issue have arisen leading to conflict, and aside from the Fenian raids there were issues such as the above mentioned conflicts over should dominate in Latin America. The answer in this era was largely still "Britain," especially the farther south you went. But none of these were allowed to cloud relations too badly because mutual investment was just too deep for either to rip away from the other without a lot of internal pain resulting. That was far more important than cultural sentimentality or the real conflicts that tended to divide them.

The question to focus on here is, what concrete reasons for Germany and Britain to get at odds with each other so any continental alliance has a prayer to check Germany with British help? When Germany knows in its deeply wounded gut, and the British public can at least read second hand the horrible woes of the brutal front, that war is a costly solution to problems that probably aren't that terrible if someone isn't pulling sneak terror attacks and then declaring war while you reel from it. That's what it took to get one Great Power attacking another in this ATL; what will motivate Germans to do the like to Britain, or Britons to do something like that to Germany again? The option of Britain allying with France is discredited by the French failing to come to Russia's aid; the option of aiding Russia (Britain's enemy at least as much as anyone else on the Continent) is out of the question for a generation or so to come; Japan is already Britain's ally, the USA sits fat and happy off to the side with more sympathy for Germany (and more dollars invested in it) than OTL. Why should Britain pick any fights?

Regarding the lack of wars between the US and Britain for 200 years in spite of such things as Trent- what Shevek said, plus the sheer exposed vulnerability on both sides from that long, long, undefended border at the 49th parallel.
 
The question to focus on here is, what concrete reasons for Germany and Britain to get at odds with each other so any continental alliance has a prayer to check Germany with British help? When Germany knows in its deeply wounded gut, and the British public can at least read second hand the horrible woes of the brutal front, that war is a costly solution to problems that probably aren't that terrible if someone isn't pulling sneak terror attacks and then declaring war while you reel from it. That's what it took to get one Great Power attacking another in this ATL; what will motivate Germans to do the like to Britain, or Britons to do something like that to Germany again? The option of Britain allying with France is discredited by the French failing to come to Russia's aid; the option of aiding Russia (Britain's enemy at least as much as anyone else on the Continent) is out of the question for a generation or so to come; Japan is already Britain's ally, the USA sits fat and happy off to the side with more sympathy for Germany (and more dollars invested in it) than OTL. Why should Britain pick any fights?
OK. So the single most important thing from the perspective of the foreign office and British politicians more directly is trade. Britain is currently in a deep bind over it's free trade policy with many Tories favouring a move to imperial preference and taffif raises. But it is unlikely Britain switches for political reasons.

If Germany however turns Mittleeuropa into a strong united economic block with high tariff entry Britain would be very concerned. The larger the block the more concerned. If this includes the low countries and Denmark say, Britain could really worry. This is plausible considering the economic trade between the Netherlands and the German Empire being crucial their economy.

Britain would want to see a Mittleeuropa as open as possible. If Germany closes it down Britain would become much more invested in both retaining their empire at all costs (hello Ireland) for markets if nothing else, and far more hostile to Germany.

The UK does hold immense amounts of German debt which could be used as a bargaining tool to keep British entry in these markets. I'm not sure that the Kaiser and company would be particular keen on massive inflation of the Deutschmark.
 
Of course, if Germany turns Mitteleuropa into a trading block and offers British Empire tariff free access in return for tariff free access to the Empire, then that could work very nicely for everyone.
Britain maintains soft power with regards to the finances, Germany expands it's trade and gains "acceptance" for it's European position, lpeace reigns because no one else can afford to go to war, (thank you for that lesson Mr Pratchett's), and everybody wins.

Well, in theory anyway.
 
I am confused, Kvasir: You almost sound as if you would like to join Mitteleuropa.
No Britain wouldn't want to join Mittleeuropa but they would definitely like as much access into that market as possible. The more Germany closes it down the more British exports are hurt.

Technically Germany doesn't need the British market. Russia will be llowing Germany with raw materials as war reparations and the new eastern countries provide a market for the German goods as well as stronger domestic demand.

But German colonies can only produce so many goods, even factoring in the Dutch East Indies there would be a shortage of goods from outside that block which raises their price and would be come items of status.

If both sides could overcome their rivalries then it would be in both Germany and the UK's interest to engage in tariff free trade across both blocks. Whether they would or not is a different question.
 
If not entirely tariff free, might low tariff be good enough?
I mean it's all interdependent. How many countries are in Mittleeuropa. How high are the tariffs. How steep are the non-tariff barriers to trade like regulations and protected industries and state aid. How weak is British manufacturing post war. How low does Germany allow the Deutschmark to fall.

If Germany inflates the Deutschmark with a high tariff and extensive Mittleeuropa block with weak British exports then Britain and Germany are on a collision course.

If Germany holds on to a strong Deutschmark with either a special relationship with the British Empire or low tariffs for Mittleeuropa more generally and British manufacturing is robust then Britain and Germany can quite easily coexist.
 
Seriously the thing tying US policy to working with rather than against Britain was the deep level of mutual investment they had in each other;

There "aristocracys" for lack of a better term intermarried, a penniless aristocracy gold digging over the pond to put it crassly. Royal Marriage alliances are one thing, but when whole subsections mix it gets harder to knoife a lad when he's your yank brother in law.
 
I thnk that the part about Russia post-War is a bit under-developed. Can we get a map of new borders? Also, who is ruling? I know Alexei is Czar, but who's the Prime Minister, Cabinet members, Regent? Also, is there some sort of Constitution or Russia remains Czarist autocracy as before OTL 1906? Who'se in power, Czar/Regent/aristocracy as before OTL 1906 or Patriotic Union?
 
P.O.E.

There have been various attempts at maps in the past and you can find them in the 347 back-pages. I do not necessarily agree with them but Carlton has kind of tacitly blessed them. In view of the discussion of Anglo-Saxon relations, we must perhaps re-examine the Venezoela - Guyana border line. Further, there is no point in calling on the author to commit to a distinct outcome --I have been guilty of this myself-- it would merely hamstring his liberty to spin a good yarn in the future. To quote Boris Johnson:

"Here the silence hung so heavy you were half afraid to speak"
 
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Random thought, but does it strike anyone else that ITTL, it seems like there won't be any "true" world wars? Obviously, the Russo-German war was very bloody but it (and its followup, Russo-German War 2.0) are demonstrably regional wars, albeit extremely bloody ones. There are secondary fronts in Africa and Asia, but the truly *global* scale of violence (industrial war by the millions in France, Russia, North Africa, China, Indonesia and New Guinea, both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans) of WWII it seems will never come about. Hell, even ITTL WWI is substantially less bloody than WWI.

Which leaves...the Napoleonic Wars, as being the last *true* global multi-front war? whereas this Russo-German war seems to be more like a Crimean War that spun out of control very very fast.
 
I've been reading this story for about six years now, and finally got an account to comment. I regret I never did earlier and missed out on commenting on many earlier events in the story and engaging with the other readers in discussions about the story and the history.

Something that occurred to me recently while rereading (I had this idea when reading about the fractured manner rationing was introduced, around page 130ish) is that without the 4 or so times Germany's government was dismembered and reconstructed IOTL, ITTL the German state could enter the new millennium with a government structure and constitution based on the imperial jumble they had in the 1800s, including democratically distorted apportionment. I really admire the German parliamentary system in place today, so it's a bit sad to think that will never be created. My amateur opinion is that constitutions written hundreds of years ago can get out of date, and reflect priorities and structures that are very at odds with modern values.
 
"The later the evening, the dearer the guests."

Indeed having your nation brought to the brink of debellation concentrates its minds wonderfully on a new constitution.

Still, from my reactionary vantage, I feel it all went downhill when the Constitutional Court allowed the Chancellor to ask his own majority for a vote of non-confidence in order to bring about early elections and a popular mandate.
 
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