Es Geloybte Aretz - a Germanwank

[Faeelin]

Heh, cute touch to have them drinking Rhenish.

 

[Tibi088]

The british wont let the french sail in the straits so thats out of question.

But France has other much more likely to succed scenarios that they could try to accomplish:
- The goal is that the straits remain open
- To do this the french have to make sure no military action takes place there and trade can continue.
- One way to accomplish this would be the french sailing in the staits.
- But the british sailing to the staits or a british-french joint action could do the same
- France should push for one of the latter 2 options
- Why would the british want to sail?
- The british wouldnt like the Italians near there (and the Italians expanding the war theatre has that danger) neither the french so its better if they do it. This makes it likely that they would agree to something like this.

So France best bet would be making the UK sail alone or together with France. That would accomplish their goal and if its UK alone it would alienate the british and the italians. Two birds with one stone. Not to mention that it has a good succes chance.

 

[Shevek23]

...{Clemenceau} also fails to consider that if the Ottomans are forced to cede Libya to the Italians, they more-or-less have to go to war against Russia to maintain some degree of credibility as an independent power. Especially given that at present the Italians are losing....

This confuses me; could you elaborate? Clemenceau proposes to secure the Ottomans' cooperation in selling Libya to the Italians. Under the table arms are being twisted and more money perhaps changing hands than is seen above the table, but officially speaking, the Sultan out of a clear blue sky just decides to offer Libya to Italy for a fair price, much as Napoleon offered Jefferson Louisiana. Or more aptly much as Spain agreed to sell Florida to the USA--unspoken was the threat of Yankee invasion that was clearly present.

Now the Sultan will be reluctant to do this because his credibility depends on being the champion of Muslim interests; now all of a sudden not only is he helpless to do anything for the Algerians under French rule, he just hands over more North African Muslim people to subjugation and degradation under the Italians, for money.

So I suppose what you might be saying is, to redeem himself in Muslim eyes, he must seek to gain hegemony over more Muslims somewhere else--somewhere he can conquer and then subsequently hold. After all he'd suddenly have the cash from the Libyan sale in his coffers, so that ought to help--and Russia is terribly distracted and going down, so perhaps he would figure that an invasion of the Caucasus might go well? Or inciting revolt in the central Asian provinces east of the Caspian would be likely to pay off?

If he did this and did well out of it, that would perhaps help redeem him somewhat in Muslim eyes. It might do more to raise the esteem of Western powers of his tenacity and relevance.

But another way for him to go is to refuse to consider the French mediation. If by now he is aware the Germans have promised the Italians they will ignore whatever they try in Libya, he also knows that on their own, the Italians are not winning there. The British have made no promises to anyone and will follow their interests. He might dare the Italians to do their worst with all the help Greece can give them, and retaliate against Italy at sea and the Greeks wherever he finds them. (Hopefully he will judiciously distinguish between soldiers and partisans of the nation of Greece, and presumably loyal Ottoman subjects who happen to be ethnically Greek. But I suppose the latter will inevitably be under some suspicion).

There's no reason to think in this timeline that the Ottomans are any stronger than OTL and so this might be the last gasp of the Sick Man of Europe. The Ottoman Navy probably won't do well on its own against the Italian Navy. But presumably the Italian Army is doing its level best in Libya and still not winning; even with Greek help I suspect the Ottomans can hold off invasion pretty well on land, even with the Italian Navy bombarding them.

Unless and until their foes can take the Dardanelles, which includes taking or destroying Constantinople itself, the Ottomans can meanwhile keep the Straits closed to all traffic. The way this works, I'm told, is that they and their approaches are mined as a military measure, and this de facto stops all foreign trade, since foreign ships will not be allowed to learn where the safe lanes are. In the long run the Italians might conceivably win, but the immediate effect is to isolate Russia from trade, which suits the German powers just fine and is bad news for the French.

So the question is--will the French jump in on the Italian side? I think if they do, the Latins can win, perhaps spectacularly--but it will surely cost a lot of lives. The French goal is to keep the Straits open and any open war the Ottomans are caught in closes them until the Ottomans either end the war or are defeated utterly. What do the French have to offer the Sultan, other than a whole lot of money, to give him a face-saving way of surrendering Libya? Conversely if they decide they have to help Italy fight, soon it will be France doing all the heavy lifting--and dying. If the Ottomans collapse the outcome might be deliriously gratifying to the Latins--conceivably they might draw the map between Austria-Hungary and Greece in the Balkans almost at will and set up Latin puppet states there; Greece might gain the entire north shore of the Straits, Constantinople might become a "free city" in some sense part of Greece but also run under a Franco-Italian condominium. If they can control or overawe the south shore they'd own the Straits and might be in a position to keep the British out. South of Anatolia the Sultan's authority might evaporate, leaving the whole Fertile Crescent up for grabs...

But I think they'll have mighty tough sledding, particularly in Anatolia and the lands just north of the Straits, to fight their way to Constantinople; they'll have a hell of a time trying to take that city, and Anatolia will stubbornly resist for the most part. It would be very bloody.

And looking at the best-case wins, the British won't want to see most of that happen.

Neither Clemenceau nor the British leadership wants to be caught up in any war; if they did there are wars aplenty for them to jump into lying near to hand. Even if the Sultan calls the French bluff, they will probably have to devote themselves to getting Italy to stand down (or continue being ground down in the Libyan meatgrinder, their choice), rather than double down with a naval war.

I don't see anything in the course of likely events in the Eastern Med that compels the Sultan to turn on the Russians. Russian weakness might tempt him, and the offer of cash for Libya might seem opportune and the ceding of Libya not too high a price to pay to get it. But I think the window of opportunity to rip territory off of Russia at bargain prices is more likely closing than opening; it would take time to raise and dispatch an army to strike there and before it is ready, Russia's war with Germany might be over and with it, the chance to grab without getting mauled.

If the Sultan stands pat on Libya then there is no connection between what happens in the Med and in the Caucasus whatsoever, unless the Russians decide to make one by attacking there.

 

[Monty Burns]

That new French scheme will backfire spectacularly. Let's assume that the French succeed in forcing the Sultan to sell Libya. It will cost them dearly. The Sultan on the other side is left with troops prepared against Italy, the need of a foreign policy success, a deep hatred against the French and quite likely British backing for other adventures. The logical solution for the Sultan is to join the Germans against the Russians, close the Straits and compensate himself through the Caucasus for things lost in Africa.

The French intervening openly is unlikely, as Britain will see a French strike at the Straits in similar light as a Russian strike at the straits - Britain would IMHO declare war.

Ultimately, this should therefore increase the likelihood of the Ottomans joining the war against the Russians. Question is that "window of opportunity" Shevek cites. How fast will the negotiations/the blackmailing over Libya be concluded, how fast can the Ottomans prepare for war against Russia. I would estimate another year until the Ottomans attack, and I guess the Russians fight on that year.

 

[BlondieBC]

Ultimately, this should therefore increase the likelihood of the Ottomans joining the war against the Russians. Question is that "window of opportunity" Shevek cites. How fast will the negotiations/the blackmailing over Libya be concluded, how fast can the Ottomans prepare for war against Russia. I would estimate another year until the Ottomans attack, and I guess the Russians fight on that year.

Probably Spring, the next year. Lets look at OTL, and assume the mobilization plan is much the same. And no one loans the Ottomans a navy for amphib assaults in the Black Sea, which is what they wanted to do OTL.

- Winter is a bit early in 1914, but the Ottomans ran into weather. While it ok to assume an a average winter, it is better to have a buffer. We leave decide to go to war date the same month as OTL. Risky, but doable.

- The Ottomans launch the attack without all forces in place. They are still moving up the forces and need more days to get ready IOTL. Really need to more time. So now the Decision moves to July 1 of any given year for a fall offensive from August 1. Yes, the Ottomans are this slow in ability to mobilize due to Railroads, structural issues, command issues, etc. If the French mobilized at the pace the Ottomans did in WW1, the Germans would be sipping wine in Paris while the French were finishing mobilization.

So, they have 26 days to make the decision ITTL for war this year. It will be a spring attack. Now you can safely declare war in winter and use winter to mobilize, but it is logistically harder is some ways.

Also, the Ottomans have no navy at this point. And they had not spent the 1908 to 1914 time frame with German land advisers. And they need the Black Sea supply lanes since no good RR or road network in what is now NE Turkey. I guess we could have the Dutch sell the Russian warships to the Ottomans. Or maybe the Germans could send enough warships. But there are treaty issues here with the UK related to treaty ending the Crimean War.

 

[Stendhal]

If we assume that Art. 19, Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (now delayed) represents legal thinking OTL/TTL, then I still do not see why the Russians could not resupply at Diego Suarez ?

 

[rad_vsovereign]

Things are getting interesting. I really can't see OE "selling" Libya, that would be a tremendous blow to the Sultan's image. He can't be seen selling muslims to the infidels

On the other hand, what is the military capability of OE ITTL? I mean, is it stronger than the OTL? If OE is caught at war with Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, what are the chances of it winning the war by not losing? Kind of, white peace.

 

[Shevek23]

Probably Spring, the next year. Lets look at OTL, and assume the mobilization plan is much the same. And no one loans the Ottomans a navy for amphib assaults in the Black Sea, which is what they wanted to do OTL.

- Winter is a bit early in 1914, but the Ottomans ran into weather. While it ok to assume an a average winter, it is better to have a buffer. We leave decide to go to war date the same month as OTL. Risky, but doable.

- The Ottomans launch the attack without all forces in place. They are still moving up the forces and need more days to get ready IOTL. Really need to more time. So now the Decision moves to July 1 of any given year for a fall offensive from August 1. Yes, the Ottomans are this slow in ability to mobilize due to Railroads, structural issues, command issues, etc. If the French mobilized at the pace the Ottomans did in WW1, the Germans would be sipping wine in Paris while the French were finishing mobilization.

So, they have 26 days to make the decision ITTL for war this year. It will be a spring attack. Now you can safely declare war in winter and use winter to mobilize, but it is logistically harder is some ways.

Also, the Ottomans have no navy at this point. And they had not spent the 1908 to 1914 time frame with German land advisers. And they need the Black Sea supply lanes since no good RR or road network in what is now NE Turkey. I guess we could have the Dutch sell the Russian warships to the Ottomans. Or maybe the Germans could send enough warships. But there are treaty issues here with the UK related to treaty ending the Crimean War.

I'm a military ignoramus so I'm too thick to see how we get from all these liabilities the Ottomans must work with to "The Ottomans are logically compelled to attack Russia!"

There would be some temptation, if they can settle with the Italians and French first. They most certainly don't owe the Germans any favors, and neither Germany, Austria, Britain, or for that matter France wants to get bogged down in an Eastern Med war just now--certainly not if it leads to the Great Powers being sucked into war against each other across the board!

It looks more and more to me like the smart thing for the Sultan to do is defy the Italians on the theory that France will not come in against them and that if the French don't the Italians will not dare the naval threats against the Straits for fear of Britain's reaction to that. And that the French don't want the Straits closed even for the perhaps brief time it would take for them to seize them.

I say perhaps but I actually think it will take a whole lot of time and bloodshed--not just Turkish but French and Italian blood and treasure--to open the Straits on their term, if the British would even stand for it. These are the higher cards the Sultan holds, and they suggest his strategy should be to humiliate an admittedly second-rank European power by denying them an easy conquest, perhaps denying it period, thus upholding his honor and retaining the status of the wronged party as well as the defender of Muslims. It won't gratify the Germans the way closing the Straits might, but that's the price Wilhelm and his Austrian ally pay for neutralizing Italy as a threat against Austria.

I don't think it would be smart for the Sultan to be thinking of backing down in Libya (not as long as his armies and native resistance are doing well against the Italian armies anyway) only to attack the Russians.

In fact, I think that in this timeline, most of the world has a rare chance to get a preview of what general and total war would look like, in the spectacle of the front between Russia and the two German empires. OTL it was an ugly sight and it is not prettier here. If the hair-triggered alliance systems of the OTL 1910s had not committed all the Great Powers of Europe to mobilize and attack in unison in 1914, and the horror show of the Franco-German front had time to set up its tents before say Russia and Britain were fully committed, is it not reasonable to suppose they'd think twice about jumping in themselves? So much depends on circumstances--I know full well for instance Russia was in the war before France was OTL--but in the circumstances carlton_bach has written, which seem to have unfolded plausibly enough to me, I do believe the responsible leaders of both France and Britain have taken a good hard look and will only risk entering such a meatgrinder war for the most compelling of reasons. I suspect the Sultan is smart enough to learn the sobering lesson as well. He's at war, but he didn't choose to be and the longer it takes the Italian aggressors to win their goal the less reasonable they will look and the more reasonable the Ottomans will. Win or lose in Italy I don't think he'll want to start another war against a larger and more proximately threatening foe than Italy. And the French and British will both be looking for ways to avoid more war.

As I've said, maybe the Ottoman Empire's days are just plain numbered in this timeline. They have none of the advantages over their situation OTL they do in some other timelines I and many of us here are also following that might be confusing us (well, me anyway) about the situation in this timeline. They aren't economically or militarily better off than OTL, they have no more territory than they did at this point in OTL, and their relations with many of their subjects, particularly in the Balkans, are as bad as OTL. Their international reputation is the same as OTL too. It could be that no matter what the Sultan does the thing is going to crumble around him.

None of that strikes me as a good reason for him to therefore contemplate throwing in with the Germans and attacking Russia out of a blue sky. If he did, I suppose the two German empires would give him what aid they could, but considering their commitments that is not a tremendous lot. What territorial gains the empires might hope to get from Russia are in Europe; I don't think either of them contemplates crushing the Tsarist empire completely and that's what it would take to give the Ottomans their share of the spoils at the peace table--that or the Ottomans being strong enough to take what they want themselves. In Malê Rising or even in With the Crescent Above Us I might believe they could take the Caucasus on their own, at least while Russia is critically engaged elsewhere; here there is absolutely no reason for them to have that kind of optimism.

The Sultan has in his gift a tremendous favor he can do the Germans, but the Germans are not even in a position to reward him for it any time soon, or help fight off the enemies the Sultan already has.

I'd say both wisdom and honor give the same advice--fight in Libya, try to win or at least lose honorably there, and keep as much peace as they can get with everyone but Italy. If things get bad they can simply close the Straits on the pretext of the war with Italy, whether there is an enemy fleet there or not--no one can say there cannot be one soon but Italy, and if the British or French want to suggest otherwise it would behoove them to get the Italians to stand down.

It's possible this Sultan is a dishonorable fool and will take Italian money, supplemented by French bribes, abandon the Libyans to their fate and go off after Russian territory instead. But I still don't see the iron logic that says he must do this, and if there is someone with brains at the Sublime Porte I would bet they talk him out of it.

 

[The Sandman]

What I'm saying is that if the Ottomans are forced to hand over Libya by French threats, especially given that the Ottomans are currently winning the war (IIRC, the Italians are already fighting the Ottomans in Libya), the Sultan has to have a victory for the government to retain credibility. It was bad enough when Crete was stripped from the Ottomans despite the Greeks losing that war; to have another war little more than a decade later end with Ottoman military victories turned into utter defeat at the negotiating table would be disastrous as far as keeping the jackals in the Balkans from going after the provinces there, or keeping the Arabs from seeing the Empire as doomed and rebelling.

Grabbing something from Russia would be necessary to prevent major political turmoil in the Empire.

If the Ottomans tell the French to get stuffed, of course, this isn't necessary, but then the Italians attack the Dardanelles, closing the area to shipping for the duration of the war (while the Italians are probably going to lose, the Ottomans aren't going to remove the minefields until after the fighting stops).

No matter what the French do, the Black Sea route to Russia is getting cut off. The only thing they can do is change things so that the route gets cut off later, but when it closes down it does so because the Ottomans are actively invading Russia instead of just being a hostile neutral.

At this point, rational French policy would be to recognize that Russia is doomed, they aren't getting any of their money back, and they might as well abandon Russia and start making nice with the British under the assumption that Britain will want a continental ally as a balance against Germany after the Germans win the war. This won't happen, of course, but anything France does to help Russia or hurt Germany now would be a waste, and one that makes the Germans far more likely to look for some way to punish France for their role in supporting the Russian war effort.

 

[Tyr Anazasi]

The French will pay. But I guess the Brits will not be very keen to see the Italians attacking the straits. They might even intervene.

 

[Monty Burns]

The French will pay. But I guess the Brits will not be very keen to see the Italians attacking the straits. They might even intervene.

In fact one has to wonder how the French are going to negotiate with the Ottomans without pissing off the Brits.

 

[Stendhal]

There are too many wildcards in the OE: the Young Turks, Mustafa Kemal, the Bosnian annexation. Neither the Dardanelles not the Caucasus mountains are easily breached.

 

[Tyr Anazasi]

French Ambassador (FA): Would you please so kind to give Libya to the Italians?

Sultan: No.

FA: We will pay you 1 million Franc and a nice Chateau in the Loire valley...

Sultan: No. I can't be bribed, at least not with such a ridiculous low sum!

FA: If you don't hear, we will force you!

British ambassador (BA) entering the room: No, you won't!

FA: Why should we don't do so?

BA: Because of our fleet and our empire...

FA: Okay, I back down. Have a nice day.

 

[carlton_bach]

06 June 1907, Bialystok

“It's here!” Colonel Repin beamed with relief as he handed the telegram to his commanding officer. They had pressed for permission to attack for many a week, and finally, Moscow had relented. The text was as brief as it was noncommittal:

To: General Brusilov, Army of the Bug

Request to conduct offensive operations approved. Direction towards XVII Corps, Bug Salient. All operations to be conducted with due caution and not endanger cohesion of defensive front. Be advised it may not be possible to support breakthroughs immediately due to superior needs of other fronts. Expenditure of munitions is to be limited to regular quantities alotted.

Toujours l'audace

Sukhomlinov, Chief General Headquarters

The general sighed gently. These were indeed unimpeachable orders, radiating the wisdom that general headquarters dispensed to the army. If only they could limit their unconscionable expenditure of ammunition to the regular allowance when pursuing the offensive with all due caution and irresistible elan, the German defeat would be a matter of weeks. But at least they had the permission from on high to do what they were paid to do. For the past few weeks, the collective leadership seemed to have become so mesmerised by the threat of more German attacks that they would not allow any offensive operations. For all the effort to eschew responsibility for a possible failure, they were willing to let others run that risk now. Brusilov snorted derisively. And all it had taken was losing practically all of Galicia.

“It's going to be a challenge.” Repin said. “Without extra artillery ammunition, we'll be hard pressed to find enough for even one bombardment. But I suppose they need all of it down south.”

“We'll have to do without bombardments, then.” Brusilov replied. “I've been doubting their efficacy for a while anyway. Let the infantry gop in under cover of darkness, and bring along their guns where they can.” They had been trying that kind of thing a few times, with promising results. If you attacked a position from three or four directions simultaneously instead of telegraphing your intention by a concerted shelling days in advance, you had a good chance that one prong would penetrate. That was the one you reinforced. The artillery were, of course, horrified at the thought of dragging their field guns forward theough the mud of trenches and craters, but their colleagues handling the heavy mortars and gigropirs had far less of a problem with that. And if everything worked out as it was supposed to, there would be roads for the horse guns to use on the other side.

“Even so, it's not going to take us far. At least we have enough bullets.” Repin had fought hard to secure their store of rifle ammunition and defend it against the depredations of the Army of the Niemen's supply officers, secure in the knowledge that they were commanded by Prince Mikhail Romanov. Without occasional appeals to Grand Duke Nikolai, he knew, things would have gone differently. Having a protector in the capital mattered. And even so, they would be lucky to issue every man a full bandolier. If you could trust rumour, new units down in Wolhynia were sharing a rifle between two men now. The survivor got to keep it. Colonel Repin was truly grateful for his general's good connections to the high and mighty.

“Victory will do wonders for the men's morale.” General Brusilov pointed out quietly. “Sitting around here so long has been bad for them.”

“I don't think they'll need much encouragement to get tro grips with the Germans.” Repin pointed to a page of the field paper printed by the Patriotic Union for the northern front. “Not with stories like these.”

The general picked up the paper. Plastered across its front page was a photograph, apparently made with one of those portable American cameras that every officer seemed to carry. Its resolution was poor, the image grainy, but what it showed could not be in doubt: a man, naked except for his military jacket, was hanging from of a barn door, his arms spread out, crucified to the wood with heavy iron spikes. The face was almost invisible, obscured by the unruly mop of hair that betrayed him for a Union man – regular army soldiers would not get away with such extravagance. The editor or censor had mercifully cropped the image so as to hint at more than reveal the bloody horror of his groin. If you read the story carefully, you could figure out that this had, in fact, been done by Austrian franc-tireurs in Galicia, but they knew not many would. It was the work of the enemy, that would be enough for most of them. Brusilov himself was undecided whether publicising such events was a good idea. Discipline was often tenuous enough, and even without such prompting, many of his men were quite sufficiently terrified of the Germans. He felt sure that a few miles of advance, seeing enemy trenches taken and prisoners brought in, would do more to stiffen their sinews than any amount of atrocity stories.

“Disgusting.” he remarked. “What kind of people would do such a thing?”

 

[Vingilótë]

Heh, I seem to recall that there was a similar incident OTL, though OTL's is closer to legend than fact, IIRC.

But I actually was curious about something; seeing as to how the German 'alliance' is increasingly being made up of 'Germanic' nations (right now, in war are Germany, Austria-Hungary (though they'd be wise to not play that card), and the Netherlands), with Britain friendly, and Sweden non-committal and sympathetic, is there any uptick of 'Germanicism' ITTL? Because I seem to recall that even OTL, as late as the Titanic, there were asses in the British press who were eager to point out how Germanic Britons behaved with more compunction than South Europeans and other non-Germanics, and ITTL, there's been no or little souring of relations with Germany in Britain, or vice versa. And if so, is this having any effect on the distinctly non-Germanic members of the coalition (Poles, the A-H minorities, Finns, etc., none of whom have much reason to look on such developments with any fondness)?

 

[carlton_bach]

Finally time to do some writing. The computer ate a long reply to a number of posts in the thread and I will try to reformulate it a little shorter later tonight. Until then, a little more of the story

08 May 1907, London

“A for-real diplomatic crisis.” Emperor Wilhelm sighed, cradling his forehead in his right. He had adopted the gesture in lieu of rubbing his temples while the inflammation made this painful, and it had stuck. “And they just had to have it now.”

Ambassador Paul Metternich nodded gravely. He had been called to attend his emperor at his temporary residence in London's Savoy Hotel and brought along capacious files on the negotiations that were devouring his time and effort. “It certainly came at an inopportune time, Your Majesty.” he agreed.

“Well, I suppose it had to happen after we sold out the sultan.” the emperor said bitterly. He raised his hand to head off protest. “No, ambassador, I realise there was no other choice. I authorised the treaty myself. But we all knew there would be a price. It could have fallen due at a better time is all I am saying.” He paused and shifted in his heavy armchair, impatiently brushing at his cuff to remove an imaginary piece of lint. London had freed him from the punishing schedule and comparatively spartan lifestyle of the Berlin court, but Society came with its own demands, even of a ruling monarch. Wilhelm was unused to sartorial extravagance and spent most of his time at home in regimental undress. The exquisite suits he wore now still made him self-conscious.

“How do you read the British stance on the issue?” he finally asked.

“It's hard to say, Your Majesty.” Metternich began. “There is no real interest of theirs immediately at stake. I believe they are mainly using the opportunity to demonstrate their power in the Mediterranean and take the French down a peg. Certainly I cannot detect any great appetite for war here.”

Wilhelm gave a sigh of relief. Thank heavens for small mercies. A Franco-British war would have meant war with France, and if the French army had marched east – well, von der Goltz was confident they would be able to stop them on the Rhine, but it would have required denuding the Russian front of troops and jeopardising the outcome of that war. And of course, British bond buyers would be far less profligate with their own country clamouring for cash. It was a nightmarish scenario that the German government was willing to go to great lengths in preventing.

“So it will be possible to settle the matter?” he asked. “What will it take of us, in your estimation?”

Metternich cleared his throat nervously. “It's not a given, Sire.” he cautioned. “In truth, there is not a lot we can do. We would be countering the Russian embassy, but the impression I get is that they do not know what they want to do at all, really. Half the time the ambassador is sounding conciliatory notes, and then he is going full-throated for battle. Of course objectivewly, a war cannot be in their interest even if it frees them from their immediate worries. A closure of the Straits would strangle them.”

Privately, Wilhelm was less certain on that count. He had read parts of the Principles of Integralism and been filled in by Groener and Rathenau. Even without the French-sold supplies, Russia had been building up an impressive productive capacity and was not running short of cash the way he was. They might not have the artillery tubes or naval might to sustain an assault, but they had ample supplies of riflemen with an infuriating propensity to sell their hides dearly. It would take moire than this to knock out the Russian bear. “I can see that.” he said, forcing a smile. “But looking at the resolution of the immediate question. What kind of agreement do you envision?”

“It's not a question that the Ottomans will lose the Cyrenaica.” Metternich said matter-of-factly. “The main issue is the duration of the conflict. I believe the British are more interested in prolonging it than in preventing an Italian conquest. There is nothing to be gained from a continuing Ottoman presence on their flank, and the Italians are not the worst of neighbours. Certainly preferable to the French. But they will not countenance a French naval presence off the Straits, far less in them. That will be the main bone of contention. I think they will come to some agreement neutralising the waters, and then the Turks will agree to a face-saving treaty selling Libya after a decent interval. It is the only thing they can do. Even the Italian navy can easily enough blockade the Syrte against them.”

With the peace party in the ascendant at the Sublime Porte, there seemed to be little enough reason to expect anything else, at any rate. Wilhelm sipped lemonade from a heavy crystal glass and stared out of the window into the sunlit street for a moment. The noise of urban traffic rose up to the balcony, wagons, cabs, omnibuses, automobiles and tramcars. It was hard to imagine this hive of activity, this enormous metropolis ever dedicating its apparently limitless wealth and power to the defeat of an equal enemy. What would the world look like if Britain went to war? It had taken two decades and untold amounts of blood and treasure to defeat Napoleon. With today's technology, the cost did not bear thinking about.

“Sound and fury, then? All for show?”

“Not necessarily.” the ambassor pointed out. “The French government is certainly provoking the British with its Mediterreanean plans. If they really succeed at prising Italy out of the alliance...”

“At this point, we should take that as a given.” the emperor said resignedly.

“With Italy in the French camp, the British will have to cultivate either Greece or the Ottomans. I am betting on the Ottomans. But they will not risk war over the Syrte. It is too inconsequential.” Metternich adjusted his glasses. “I hope.”

A knock on the door interrupted them. Secretary von Ammersleben entered, accompanied by one of the Viennese ladies-in-waiting, a charming girl dressed now in the latest fashionable riding gown. “Your Majesty, the empress has asked me to convey her request to be joined for a ride before tonight's concert.”

Wilhelm set down the glass harder than he had intended. Damn Elisabeth and hger interminable pleasures. All those people to meet! Still, it was a duty, just like his. Smiling sourly, he nodded. “I will be in the foyer presently. Riding clothes will be needed, I suppose?”

Von Ammersleben nodded calmly. “The valet has prepared everything, Your Majesty.”

“All right then. Please inform General Emmich there will be no briefing. I suppose we might as well do some shopping.”

The secretary smiled with relief. “I will have a carriage ready at your command, Sire.” he said. “Perhaps a visit to the Natural History Museum? It is within easy reach from Hyde Park.”

Wilhelm's face brightened. “Capital idea! Pack my camera.”

 

[carlton_bach]

11 May 1907, Tokay Military Hospital

The eyes would be with him as long as he lived, Szandor Ferenczi was certain. Medical detachment could insulate you effectively from the sense of disgust and terror that assailed the noninitiated in this world. Blood, pus, shit and gangrene were things that you bore with professional equanimity. Horrible mutilations were simply a fact of life, no different from the pedestrians who fell under streetcars or the workers who had their limbs caught in machinery in peacetime. But peace had nothing comparable to the men that Dr Ferenczi was treating here: men whom war had turned into soulless, witless automata, robbed of control over their own bodies, of their speech, their rationality, or their very identity. Men who compulsively repeated the same pointless exercises, who sat listlessly in their chairs, incapable of even the most basic functions, or were mortally terrified of the most trivial things.

“Any change?”

Dr Hollos sadly shook his head. “Nothing.” he admited tiredly. “No memories. He still argues that he is due back home for leave. No memory of anything that happened.”

Their latest patient, Lieutenant Czermak, had been brought in from the Carpathian front by military police. He had simply stopped acknowledging the existence of the war, insisting that he was due leave and would go home to his parents in Lemberg. Only his rank hads saved him from the firing squad. Isolated in a tiny cell of the hospital, he refgused to wear any kind of shoes, kept his uniform immaculate and politely insisted on being allowed to go home. The only reaction they had ever had out of him was when Hollos had mentioned the battle of Sarnok: He had hotly denied any such thing had occurred before breaking down in tears. That was when his eyes had taken on that look – that stare so many other of their patients had all day. Ferenczi still found it impossible to adequately describe, though he would never forget it. To see it in the innocent, angelically beautiful face of their patient was heartbreaking. He nodded to his colleague. “All right then. You should get to bed, Istvan. I'll leave soon, too.”

With another heavy sigh, he made a note in the patient file and turned back to his desk. A thin manuscript lay ready for despatch to Zurich for publication. With nimble fingers, Ferenczi made a few quick additions before sealing the whiole inside a heavy manila envelope. His eyes scanned the title. “On the Traumatic Aetiology of Neuroses. A Contribution to the Study of Mental Diseases based on Case Studies from the Neurological Wing of Tokay Military Hospital”.

Freud would savage him. But Freud had not seen what he had seen. Freud was wrong.

 

[HanEmpire]

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder?

 

[kalamona]

Hungarian names:

Szandor is Sándor - Sandor, with english alphabet.
And Tokay is Tokaj.

just to meddle wwith you

 

[carlton_bach]

If we assume that Art. 19, Convention (XIII) concerning the Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War, The Hague, 18 October 1907 (now delayed) represents legal thinking OTL/TTL, then I still do not see why the Russians could not resupply at Diego Suarez ?

THis was a contentious point IOTL, actually. The intent was that warships caught abroad should be anabled to go home and join hostilities. There was never the intent of using neutral ports to keep the seas. It was also a provision Britain disliked. The general agreement is that a neutral country is not allowed to supply a belligerent ship for action, which is what this would have constituted.

Things are getting interesting. I really can't see OE "selling" Libya, that would be a tremendous blow to the Sultan's image. He can't be seen selling muslims to the infidels

He may have to. It's not as though it's unprecedented. But there are enough people out there who dislike the idea immensely, a very real hawk party in court and parliament. Nobody knows as yet how much it will take to provoke a reaction, but it would probably be unwise to presume too far on their patience.

On the other hand, what is the military capability of OE ITTL? I mean, is it stronger than the OTL? If OE is caught at war with Italy, Greece, Bulgaria, Serbia and Montenegro, what are the chances of it winning the war by not losing? Kind of, white peace.

Serbia and Montenegro are quite busy at the moment. A war against Greece, Italy and Bulgaria would be one the Ottomans could win, though only under favourable circumstances. It depends primarily on the strategic decisions other powers make. If the Italians and Greeks are allowed to use their naval power unrestricted, they would most likely humiliate the Turks into surrender. That is not in the cards, though. Nobody wants fighting around the Straits. On land, the Ottomans can bog down the Italians in Libya, but not stop them. The question here is cwho tires first, and very likely it would be the Porte. But in the Balkans, with Serbia, Montenegro and most likely Bulgaria out of the equation, Greece would be hard pressed to hold its own. Not that that means much for Libya.

Heh, I seem to recall that there was a similar incident OTL, though OTL's is closer to legend than fact, IIRC.

But I actually was curious about something; seeing as to how the German 'alliance' is increasingly being made up of 'Germanic' nations (right now, in war are Germany, Austria-Hungary (though they'd be wise to not play that card), and the Netherlands), with Britain friendly, and Sweden non-committal and sympathetic, is there any uptick of 'Germanicism' ITTL? Because I seem to recall that even OTL, as late as the Titanic, there were asses in the British press who were eager to point out how Germanic Britons behaved with more compunction than South Europeans and other non-Germanics, and ITTL, there's been no or little souring of relations with Germany in Britain, or vice versa. And if so, is this having any effect on the distinctly non-Germanic members of the coalition (Poles, the A-H minorities, Finns, etc., none of whom have much reason to look on such developments with any fondness)?

That is a good point. I hadn't thought of that, but of course the newly emerging Nationalvölkische Bewegung is very much invested in this angle. The Hugenberg press loves the idea that their fellow Nordic races are fighting alongside Germany (German Austria, Netherlands) or tacitly supporting it (Britain, Sweden, Norway) while its enemies and opponents are all of the lesser races (Russians, Serbs, French, all Slavs and Latins). It's not a tenable position, of course (the Baltic and Volga Germans are loyal to the Czar despite overt discrimination, and Germany's allies include Finns, Romanians, Poles, Czechs, Cropats, Slovakls and Ruthenians). But it's a popular delusion in Germany itself, and a lot of Germans are used to treating Poles like shite as a matter of habit. It's liable to become an issue.

Post Traumatic Stress Disorder?

I'm not up to date with the definition, but basically what they called shell shock in WWI and battle fatigue in WWII. If PTSD covers symptoms of such severity, then that's what it is.

Hungarian names:

Szandor is Sándor - Sandor, with english alphabet.
And Tokay is Tokaj.

just to meddle wwith you

OK.... I'm really at sea with spellings most of the time. My usual approach is to adopt the forms in my two roughly contemporary atlases for geographic names and those from English wikipedia for personal ones (Rabinovicz and Ferber are special cases, they move between various spellings depending on their context). Not that those are consistent, but then again, neither am I.