Did the German military get amnesia in the interwar period?

After some examination, I noticed that the German military seemed to have learned almost lessons from WW1.
Some things they should have taken note of when prepping for WW2.

1. Combat Shotguns
What if the Germans made a copy of the Winchester M1897 Trench model shotgun after seeing it's success in WW1? (captured examples were used extensively by German troops in WW1, mostly Sturmtruppen)

2. Inefficient aircraft production for much of the early war (till late 1941)
"The Army closely cooperated with industry, especially in the World War, with particular focus on the very rapidly changing aircraft industry. The Army set prices and labor exemptions, regulated the supply of credit and raw materials, limited patent rights so as to allow cross-licensing among firms, and supervised management–labor relationships. The result was very rapid expansion and a high output of high quality aircraft, as well as high wages that attracted the best machinists. Apart from aircraft, the Army's regulation of the rest of the war economy was inefficient.[15]"
What if the person in charge of the Luftwaffe (my choice would be Wever) remembered these lessons?

3. Sturmtruppen tactics for regular Heer infantry divisions
What if the Germans trained their regular infantry divisions in Sturmtruppen tactics and equipped them in the same ratios as Sturmtruppen (LMGs, SMGs, flamethrowers, mortar squad. etc.) instead of equipping them with a shit load of K98ks (it's actually cheaper to make MP40s than K98ks because of all the wood and stuff needed).

4. Better SMG earlier (Wa Pruf holds secret competition for new SMG in 1934 because the MP 28 is too expensive)
IMHO the ideal German WW2 SMG would be a modified MP 40 with the magazine well on the left (slightly offset to the front like the Austrian Steyr MP 34 as long as it doesn't increase the cost too much), spent cartridges ejected to the right, a foregrip like the Erma EMP, and a bayonet lug on the right that's fitted for the K98k bayonet (because the MP40's doesn't have a solid wood stock to use as a club).

5. Better MG earlier (because the MG 08 just doesn't cut it)
What if the Germans realized the MG 34 was too expensive and complicated for infantry use when it came out? (It would be retained as a vehicular weapon because you can't change barrels easily on a Panzer's hull MG and the MG 81 version for Luftwaffe would be in service earlier, because the mud and water problem is none existent on a aircraft. Also the Luftwaffe replaces their MG 15s and MG 17s before the war with MG 81s, which are lighter, smaller, and thus can carry more ammo.)

There are definitely more stuff, but this is it for now.
What are your thoughts?
 
Umm I dont think it was so much that the German military leadership had amnesia so much as they massively underestimated the type of war they were fighting until it was to late, took all the wrong lessons from WWI, or their efforts were less than they could have been due to issues outside military matter. Such as politics, productions bottlenecks, or other issues.

1)most German lessons from the war amounted to trench warfare being bad, to be avoided at all costs, and a decent SMG would have been more versatile in a wider variety of circumstances. That being said a shotgun would not have been totally useful, and anything to further hamper German logistics in WWII with more ammunition types can only be a good thing.

2)in the early war Hitler, and most of the NAZI leadership did not want to put Germany on a war footing. As a result German production across the board was less than stellar in its output. There were also deep rooted inefficiencies in German manufacturing in general. Factories across the country were not set up for mass production in the same way as American or Soviet factories. And thats not even mentioning the competition and rivalries between different companies which made army procurement even more difficult.

3)that would have required major changes to German infantry training, yes the mp40 is cheaper than a typical rifle of the period. But it goes through more ammunition typically, and was likely less reliable (not certain on this though) also training of troops to use the different tactics would have taken longer and required more instructors. And for an army interested in rapidly increasing its numbers before the war the added cost of such instruction, and the addition of specialist equippment to divisions which would need to be supported by logistics this was likely enough to turn them away from it.

4)a better SMG should have certainly been possible, though existing types were doing their role just fine so it would be difficult to get such a weapon to pass. Though not impossible and it would not have hurt the Germans to much.

5)Again it was possible, though difficult to pass through the army at the time.
 
The biggest piece of amnesia the Germans suffered from was forgetting that facing mutiple major powers at once was going to end in tears for them
I think their takeaway was actually more akin to, "well we nearly managed to win last time, so if we just try harder next round we will win."

Basically they had beaten Russia, and in their eyes very nearly beaten the Anglo-French entente. And the only reason they had lost was due to the home front stabbing them in the back.

It was actually something most German generals post war sincerely believed. Just as their armies stood on the verge of final victory the population at home had betrayed them.

In German eyes they had performed very well, fighting a close run war. And so in many ways the German leadership was blinded to how things had changed. Especially the immense industrial potential at the fingertips of Soviet and Imperial British leadership. Not to mention the absolute overkill industry that was the US.
 
German Army was the best performer among the armies in ww2. As noted above and elsewhere, they can't win the ww2 just by themselves.

Amesia was present in highest ranks of German government, including Hitler.
 
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Just a few thoughts on the points mentioned

After some examination, I noticed that the German military seemed to have learned almost lessons from WW1.
Some things they should have taken note of when prepping for WW2.

1. Combat Shotguns
What if the Germans made a copy of the Winchester M1897 Trench model shotgun after seeing it's success in WW1? (captured examples were used extensively by German troops in WW1, mostly Sturmtruppen)


A combat shotgun is a weapon that is extremely limited in use (trench clearing in WW1, the marines found them somewhat useful in island hopping/jungle warfare). But these are specific contexts. And as well as being a wepoan you might not need It has the problems all extra weapons at squad level have. It's another thing to carry and support. If you make it someone's primary weapon that is one less rifle/SMG in the squad. Shotgun shells are pain in the arse to carry lots off in terms of weight and bulk. And even if you can carry it, it's always replacing something else you could carry instead. How many belts of 7.92 for the MG34 can you carry amongst the squad instead of a Shotgun and shells?


2. Inefficient aircraft production for much of the early war (till late 1941)
"The Army closely cooperated with industry, especially in the World War, with particular focus on the very rapidly changing aircraft industry. The Army set prices and labor exemptions, regulated the supply of credit and raw materials, limited patent rights so as to allow cross-licensing among firms, and supervised management–labor relationships. The result was very rapid expansion and a high output of high quality aircraft, as well as high wages that attracted the best machinists. Apart from aircraft, the Army's regulation of the rest of the war economy was inefficient.[15]"
What if the person in charge of the Luftwaffe (my choice would be Wever) remembered these lessons?


The issue here is Air forces in WW1 and Air forces in WW2 is really two very different things. In WW2 it going to be much larger and have to be capable of meeting a much wider range of roles with much wider range of solutions and tactics. Plus it's going to have to fight the Heer for resource allocation. That said I agree better economic integration earlier one will help every armed force in Germany.


3. Sturmtruppen tactics for regular Heer infantry divisions
What if the Germans trained their regular infantry divisions in Sturmtruppen tactics and equipped them in the same ratios as Sturmtruppen (LMGs, SMGs, flamethrowers, mortar squad. etc.) instead of equipping them with a shit load of K98ks (it's actually cheaper to make MP40s than K98ks because of all the wood and stuff needed).

Tactics had changed from 1917/18 Sosstruppen / Sturmtruppen tactics. Plus those tactics even during WW1 were very specific in use. Basically "here take all this kit and as much ammunition as you can carry.... can you still walk? Good, get as far into the enemy lines as you can and go and raise hell in small* numbers, all the guys with rifles will catch you up". And it kind of worked, but remember these tactics didn't win. What won? Combined arms with mechanisation, armour and artillery and infantry all working together. That's the lesson the Germans learned and to be fair they put that into practice very well in WW2 with having PanzerGrenadier forces with Panzers and assault guns and all the rest, and then foot based infantry coming along behind. On top of this you had German troops with flame throwers and SMGs. But the basic German squad became rifles with a static MG that could be quickly relocated to do the killing. and let's face it that worked. Obviously they still kept the idea of even small unit commanders having tactical initiative and enough nous to decide and act and not freeze and wait for orders in a changing situation. (this predates WW1 but the sturmtruppen in WW1 were run on this basis).


*the numbers increased but what happened they ended up losing their best chaps with ultimately little to show for it. because these troop formations were glass cannons.

4. Better SMG earlier (Wa Pruf holds secret competition for new SMG in 1934 because the MP 28 is too expensive)
IMHO the ideal German WW2 SMG would be a modified MP 40 with the magazine well on the left (slightly offset to the front like the Austrian Steyr MP 34 as long as it doesn't increase the cost too much), spent cartridges ejected to the right, a foregrip like the Erma EMP, and a bayonet lug on the right that's fitted for the K98k bayonet (because the MP40's doesn't have a solid wood stock to use as a club).

Honestly a slightly better SMG is not going to give big results and will be a resource drain at a time when they can least afford it. So long as the SMG shoots straight and doesn't jam all the time you are going to reach the point of diminishing returns quite quickly after that!

Plus the Germans have a lot of K98's and 7.92mm hanging about. Never underestimate how important that it is when you are trying to form large armies to go and attack countries and you are resource strapped. Also on the SMG vs. rifle question. Yes we know the engagement stats, a lot of the time you don't need to engage at 500m, but well even at 200m a SMG is not great! Sometimes you will want your basic chaps to be firing 7.92mm at 760m/s not 9mm at 400m/s


5. Better MG earlier (because the MG 08 just doesn't cut it)
What if the Germans realized the MG 34 was too expensive and complicated for infantry use when it came out? (It would be retained as a vehicular weapon because you can't change barrels easily on a Panzer's hull MG and the MG 81 version for Luftwaffe would be in service earlier, because the mud and water problem is none existent on a aircraft. Also the Luftwaffe replaces their MG 15s and MG 17s before the war with MG 81s, which are lighter, smaller, and thus can carry more ammo.)

I think that's going to mess with the supply chain when you most need it. I'd rather have a slightly* expensive M34 in manufacture pre-war than try and upgrade at the last minute. (The MG34 was manufactured from 1934 onwards assuming it's going to take a bit of time to realise it's deficiencies and then you are going to have to decide and trial what you will replace it with and manufacture that replacement all the while war production is increasing on everything else). Also I think you will run into the "the perfect being the enemy of the good" pretty quick in that the MG34 isn't perfect but I think it's good enough!

If nothing else there weren't enough MG34's to entirely remove earlier guns from service (and similarly there weren't enough MG42s to replace the MG34 later as well). Trying to cram another development cycle in there in time for early war is only going to compound this.



*and ultimately the MG42 is still 4/5th's the cost of the MG34
 
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The German Army digested the lessons from WW1 far better than the British or French did.

At the end of WW1, General Hans von Seeckt as Chief of the General Staff and as C-in-C of the Army was able to shepherd post war change through the German Army. He had a big challenge, in addition to a defeated nation, collapsing economy and the threat of civil war, there were a number of constituancies in the existing army that had claim to control the new army. These composed:
  • the front line officers who had borne the brunt of the fighting,
  • another was the traditionalists, the nobility who had maintained a powerful lock on decisions during the war and the same ones who would have retained control if Germany had won.
  • Seeckt selected the third group, the General Staff. This created a very different Officer Corp to the pre war nobility whose cultural ethos emphasised intellectual awell as tactical and operational excellence.
Seeckt initiated a comprehensive program to examine the lessons of the war. He established 57 committees formed of General Staff officers and experts in particular areas to examine the broad and specific questions that the war had raised.

Each committee was to produce short concise studies on newly gained experiences of the war and consider the following questions:
  • What new situation arose in the war that had not been considered before the war?
  • How effective were our prewar views in dealing with the above situations?
  • What new guidelines have been developed from the use of new weaponary in the war?
  • Which new problems put forward by the war have not yet found a solution?

Over 400 officers became involved in this process and Staff officers facilitated the sessions.

Staff Officers facilitated the workshops. The result of this was the new tactical doctrine H. Dv.487, Führung und Gefecht der verbundenen Waffen published in 2 parts in 1921 and 1922. It emphasised conceptions starkly different from French and British. It developed doctrine based on evidence, not what generals thought had happened. It placed emphasis of an offensive mindset, a belief in manoever, officers were to use their judgement, leadership at all levels was to show initiative and that all officers to be thoroughly familiar with doctrine and that doctrine was to form a coherent framework within which the whole army operated. Decisions were to be devolved down to the lowest level as opportunities on the battlefield were fleeting. Officers needed to be cross functional and aware of the other fields outside their specialty.

In 1925 von Seeckt said: "The principal thing now is to increase the responsibilities of the individual soldier, particularly his independence of action, with the profitable result of increasing the capability of the individual."

In contrast, the British Army had a 24 year old Infantry Captain rewrite the 1913 Infantry manual, an evangelist approach. The French went the opposite way, all doctrine was from the top. You couldn't express an idea or write a paper without General Staff approval. Everyone got the message and independent thought stopped.
 
After some examination, I noticed that the German military seemed to have learned almost lessons from WW1.
Some things they should have taken note of when prepping for WW2.

1. Combat Shotguns
What if the Germans made a copy of the Winchester M1897 Trench model shotgun after seeing it's success in WW1? (captured examples were used extensively by German troops in WW1, mostly Sturmtruppen)

2. Inefficient aircraft production for much of the early war (till late 1941)
"The Army closely cooperated with industry, especially in the World War, with particular focus on the very rapidly changing aircraft industry. The Army set prices and labor exemptions, regulated the supply of credit and raw materials, limited patent rights so as to allow cross-licensing among firms, and supervised management–labor relationships. The result was very rapid expansion and a high output of high quality aircraft, as well as high wages that attracted the best machinists. Apart from aircraft, the Army's regulation of the rest of the war economy was inefficient.[15]"
What if the person in charge of the Luftwaffe (my choice would be Wever) remembered these lessons?

3. Sturmtruppen tactics for regular Heer infantry divisions
What if the Germans trained their regular infantry divisions in Sturmtruppen tactics and equipped them in the same ratios as Sturmtruppen (LMGs, SMGs, flamethrowers, mortar squad. etc.) instead of equipping them with a shit load of K98ks (it's actually cheaper to make MP40s than K98ks because of all the wood and stuff needed).

4. Better SMG earlier (Wa Pruf holds secret competition for new SMG in 1934 because the MP 28 is too expensive)
IMHO the ideal German WW2 SMG would be a modified MP 40 with the magazine well on the left (slightly offset to the front like the Austrian Steyr MP 34 as long as it doesn't increase the cost too much), spent cartridges ejected to the right, a foregrip like the Erma EMP, and a bayonet lug on the right that's fitted for the K98k bayonet (because the MP40's doesn't have a solid wood stock to use as a club).

5. Better MG earlier (because the MG 08 just doesn't cut it)
What if the Germans realized the MG 34 was too expensive and complicated for infantry use when it came out? (It would be retained as a vehicular weapon because you can't change barrels easily on a Panzer's hull MG and the MG 81 version for Luftwaffe would be in service earlier, because the mud and water problem is none existent on a aircraft. Also the Luftwaffe replaces their MG 15s and MG 17s before the war with MG 81s, which are lighter, smaller, and thus can carry more ammo.)

There are definitely more stuff, but this is it for now.
What are your thoughts?

The Winchester M1897 was not that successful, they had horrible reliability as the cardboard cartridges would swell up in wet trench conditions making feeding and extraction difficult it also led to failure to fire , they later changed to a brass cartridge which had issues in its own right.

KAR 98's are an excellent weapon, you can't just swap them out for for SMG's though. SMG's are not designed for accuracy they are intended to provide overwhelming short range firepower in an assault or in defence, a rifle is intended to reach out and hit people at a distance accurately. The Germans had a lot of sunk costs in machinery and tooling for the KAR 98, by WW2 they were only paying for materials and labour, they certainly could have economised by reducing the quality of finish and applied some of the later simplifications to the rifle.

The MG34 was an excellent MG and it wasn't really that complex compared to other contemporary MG's and because of it's barrel change system it could be used in a AFV without difficulty. It was clearly an expensive gun to make but it could be field stripped without difficulty.

 
After some examination, I noticed that the German military seemed to have learned almost lessons from WW1.
Some things they should have taken note of when prepping for WW2.

1. Combat Shotguns
What if the Germans made a copy of the Winchester M1897 Trench model shotgun after seeing it's success in WW1? (captured examples were used extensively by German troops in WW1, mostly Sturmtruppen)

2. Inefficient aircraft production for much of the early war (till late 1941)
"The Army closely cooperated with industry, especially in the World War, with particular focus on the very rapidly changing aircraft industry. The Army set prices and labor exemptions, regulated the supply of credit and raw materials, limited patent rights so as to allow cross-licensing among firms, and supervised management–labor relationships. The result was very rapid expansion and a high output of high quality aircraft, as well as high wages that attracted the best machinists. Apart from aircraft, the Army's regulation of the rest of the war economy was inefficient.[15]"
What if the person in charge of the Luftwaffe (my choice would be Wever) remembered these lessons?

3. Sturmtruppen tactics for regular Heer infantry divisions
What if the Germans trained their regular infantry divisions in Sturmtruppen tactics and equipped them in the same ratios as Sturmtruppen (LMGs, SMGs, flamethrowers, mortar squad. etc.) instead of equipping them with a shit load of K98ks (it's actually cheaper to make MP40s than K98ks because of all the wood and stuff needed).

4. Better SMG earlier (Wa Pruf holds secret competition for new SMG in 1934 because the MP 28 is too expensive)
IMHO the ideal German WW2 SMG would be a modified MP 40 with the magazine well on the left (slightly offset to the front like the Austrian Steyr MP 34 as long as it doesn't increase the cost too much), spent cartridges ejected to the right, a foregrip like the Erma EMP, and a bayonet lug on the right that's fitted for the K98k bayonet (because the MP40's doesn't have a solid wood stock to use as a club).

5. Better MG earlier (because the MG 08 just doesn't cut it)
What if the Germans realized the MG 34 was too expensive and complicated for infantry use when it came out? (It would be retained as a vehicular weapon because you can't change barrels easily on a Panzer's hull MG and the MG 81 version for Luftwaffe would be in service earlier, because the mud and water problem is none existent on a aircraft. Also the Luftwaffe replaces their MG 15s and MG 17s before the war with MG 81s, which are lighter, smaller, and thus can carry more ammo.)

There are definitely more stuff, but this is it for now.
What are your thoughts?

I think this is yet another example of people overestimating the affect that small arms had on the Second World War. Every change to the Heer's infantry kit was going to require massive amounts of material and man hours that Germany could not afford.

As an example let's say that the Wehrmacht somehow decided that every soldier was to be equipped with an STG-44. What are the Germans now not producing as they refit their entire military with new small arms?

As for Stormtrooper tactics, well, one should remember how many casualties those units suffered in Operation Michael.
 
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Coulsdon Eagle

Monthly Donor
German Army was the best performer among the armies in ww2. As noted above and elsewhere, they can't win the ww2 just by themselves.

Amesia was present in highest ranks of German government, including Hitler.
I would agree on a tactical level, and at an operational level most of the time, but theatre-wide they made far too many mistakes as the war went on.

German rank-&-file v good.
NCOs excellent
Junior officers v good.
 
The Winchester M1897 was not that successful, they had horrible reliability as the cardboard cartridges would swell up in wet trench conditions making feeding and extraction difficult it also led to failure to fire , they later changed to a brass cartridge which had issues in its own right.
Yes, the paper cartridges were a problem but they switched to brass quickly (in WW1) which solved pretty much all problems. Brass doesn't rust and it's a pretty solid metal.
The M1897 or M1912 itself is a perfectly reliable weapon.

KAR 98's are an excellent weapon, you can't just swap them out for for SMG's though. SMG's are not designed for accuracy they are intended to provide overwhelming short range firepower in an assault or in defence, a rifle is intended to reach out and hit people at a distance accurately. The Germans had a lot of sunk costs in machinery and tooling for the KAR 98, by WW2 they were only paying for materials and labour, they certainly could have economised by reducing the quality of finish and applied some of the later simplifications to the rifle.
This is one of my big questions. Why develop a bolt action rifle that's literally a carbon copy of the G98 except being a few inches shorter when you have enough time to develop a good semi-auto rifle.
The German military mission in China could have easily bought a couple samples and the blueprint of the General Liu rifle and used it to help accelerate the development of a good semi-auto rifle.
The restrictions placed upon the development of the OTL G41 were all present in the Liu rifle, the precise reasons why the Liu rifle was pretty crap.
  • no holes were to be bored into the barrel for tapping gas for the loading mechanism;
  • the rifles were not to have any moving parts on the surface;
  • and in case the auto-loading mechanism failed, a bolt action was to be included.
Now after seeing a rifle with all these features turn out to be absolute shit, the Heer might get smarter (hopefully for the Germans) and revoke their idiotic restrictions. IMHO this leads to the Germans developing the OTL G43 before the war and it enters production in 1936 (in comparison to the K98k's entry in 1935).


The MG34 was an excellent MG and it wasn't really that complex compared to other contemporary MG's and because of it's barrel change system it could be used in a AFV without difficulty. It was clearly an expensive gun to make but it could be field stripped without difficulty.
It used far too many machined parts, which made it expensive and time consuming.

Overall, I wonder why German weapons development did not use the cycle that Apple uses for it's iPhone.
As soon as a new iPhone model is ready to be produced, the design process for the new iPhone begins, using the existing model as the base. As reviews and criticism flow in, they incorporate those in the new model. And then once the new model is ready to produce, the process starts all over again.
This is how they can literally release a new iPhone model each year.
Germans on the other hand waited forever to get the development of something new going, and only after the
 
A combat shotgun is a weapon that is extremely limited in use (trench clearing in WW1, the marines found them somewhat useful in island hopping/jungle warfare). But these are specific contexts. And as well as being a wepoan you might not need It has the problems all extra weapons at squad level have. It's another thing to carry and support. If you make it someone's primary weapon that is one less rifle/SMG in the squad. Shotgun shells are pain in the arse to carry lots off in terms of weight and bulk. And even if you can carry it, it's always replacing something else you could carry instead. How many belts of 7.92 for the MG34 can you carry amongst the squad instead of a Shotgun and shells?
Stalingrad and Leningrad come to mind here.
A couple extra belts of 7.92x57mm isn't going help you're fighting for the living room of a house in Stalingrad.
Slamfiring a M1897 and spraying buckshot all over helps though. A lot in fact.
And slugs can be used to blow the lock off a door.

And those are only 2 cases where a shotgun would have helped a lot.
They would have been useful for any urban engagement the Germans fought in WW2.
 
Overall, I wonder why German weapons development did not use the cycle that Apple uses for it's iPhone.
As soon as a new iPhone model is ready to be produced, the design process for the new iPhone begins, using the existing model as the base. As reviews and criticism flow in, they incorporate those in the new model. And then once the new model is ready to produce, the process starts all over again.
This is how they can literally release a new iPhone model each year.
Germans on the other hand waited forever to get the development of something new going, and only after the
Production techniques have changed a little in the intervening years. Not sure it is fair to say that they were amnesiacs for not following the production cycle of a company whose primary product would not be invented for decades.
 
Production techniques have changed a little in the intervening years. Not sure it is fair to say that they were amnesiacs for not following the production cycle of a company whose primary product would not be invented for decades.
The concept is not hard to grasp and I'm pretty sure someone else has already thought of it by 1933.
 
The concept is not hard to grasp and I'm pretty sure someone else has already thought of it by 1933.
True, the British (and almost certainly others) were using it in aircraft manufacturing during the 30's (though they didn't always stick to it). However, that production cycle is used, then and now, in industries where the pace of technological change is very fast. Small arms technology is a little slower changing at this point. So iterative improvements such as seen in the service assault rifles of most major nations today as well as WW2 small arms, are typically more useful.
 

marathag

Banned
A combat shotgun is a weapon that is extremely limited in use (trench clearing in WW1, the marines found them somewhat useful in island hopping/jungle warfare). But these are specific contexts
More useful in urban combat, MOUT or whatever the Army is calling it(I liked FISH-Fighting In Somebodies House)

All combat is specific. Shotguns used in the Malaya Emergency , and thru encounters thru the current Iraq and Afghanistan Not Wars

If troops didn't think them worthwhile, they won't use them- but they do

But they didn't need to be 12 gauge: 16 or long 20 shells would work as well, with less recoil, and slugs give longer range
 

Deleted member 1487

1. Combat Shotguns
What if the Germans made a copy of the Winchester M1897 Trench model shotgun after seeing it's success in WW1? (captured examples were used extensively by German troops in WW1, mostly Sturmtruppen)
Shotguns have very limited utility in combat and the Germans had an SMG, which does everything the shotgun does, but is more versatile, simpler, cheaper, easier to make and use.

2. Inefficient aircraft production for much of the early war (till late 1941)
"The Army closely cooperated with industry, especially in the World War, with particular focus on the very rapidly changing aircraft industry. The Army set prices and labor exemptions, regulated the supply of credit and raw materials, limited patent rights so as to allow cross-licensing among firms, and supervised management–labor relationships. The result was very rapid expansion and a high output of high quality aircraft, as well as high wages that attracted the best machinists. Apart from aircraft, the Army's regulation of the rest of the war economy was inefficient.[15]"
What if the person in charge of the Luftwaffe (my choice would be Wever) remembered these lessons?
That was a function of the Nazi bureaucracy, not the military. Wever did remember that, but he died in a plane crash in 1936 and Goering took over the Luftwaffe's internal organization and put Udet in charge specifically so Goering could have more ability to interfere with production as he saw fit (he was being bribed by industry for contracts). In addition Erhard Milch was sidelined from production until 1941 for the same reason and because he was so good as his job that Goering was afraid of being fired in favor of him.

3. Sturmtruppen tactics for regular Heer infantry divisions
What if the Germans trained their regular infantry divisions in Sturmtruppen tactics and equipped them in the same ratios as Sturmtruppen (LMGs, SMGs, flamethrowers, mortar squad. etc.) instead of equipping them with a shit load of K98ks (it's actually cheaper to make MP40s than K98ks because of all the wood and stuff needed).
They did all that. It's just that 'strumtruppen' had a very specific role, it wasn't a general infantry tactic. STs were only organized ad-hoc for assault missions and given special training for it as needed; some special assault pioneer units also were permanently stood up for the role as well. One such unit is famously depicted in the 1993 German film Stalingrad.

Otherwise the regular German infantry platoon had all of the above weapons for normal combat minus the flamethrower, which really is a specialist weapon and not really useful for the average line unit.

4. Better SMG earlier (Wa Pruf holds secret competition for new SMG in 1934 because the MP 28 is too expensive)
IMHO the ideal German WW2 SMG would be a modified MP 40 with the magazine well on the left (slightly offset to the front like the Austrian Steyr MP 34 as long as it doesn't increase the cost too much), spent cartridges ejected to the right, a foregrip like the Erma EMP, and a bayonet lug on the right that's fitted for the K98k bayonet (because the MP40's doesn't have a solid wood stock to use as a club).
Better how? The MP40 was a good weapon, it just needed a better magazine. The left fed magazine mount wouldn't have fixed anything, see the Sten. Plus they were trying to make the smgs cheaper not more complex. Why would you even bother putting a bayonet on an SMG or plan on using it as a club??? The weapon was not designed or intended for that role, it was meant to be very compact. Historically they just issued it with a lot of ammo when it was going to be a used on the front lines rather than as a PDW.

5. Better MG earlier (because the MG 08 just doesn't cut it)
What if the Germans realized the MG 34 was too expensive and complicated for infantry use when it came out? (It would be retained as a vehicular weapon because you can't change barrels easily on a Panzer's hull MG and the MG 81 version for Luftwaffe would be in service earlier, because the mud and water problem is none existent on a aircraft. Also the Luftwaffe replaces their MG 15s and MG 17s before the war with MG 81s, which are lighter, smaller, and thus can carry more ammo.)
The problem again was production. They were rearming and didn't have the ability to disrupt production since they were already short of MGs. As it was without taking over Skoda and other Czech arms when they took over the country, they'd have been short 22 full divisions, because they managed to capture enough arms there to fully or partially equip that many; since they were so short of arms during rearmament a bunch of division ended up fighting into 1941 with captured MGs and the like. The MG42 only came about when they managed to convert the Czech MG factories over to MG34 production (for vehicles, the MG42 wouldn't work right in the mountings) and start phasing in the new MG since they got the buffer room thanks to all the captured French and whatever else MGs they ended up pressing into service.

The MG81 wasn't something that sprang out of nothing. It was the culmination of development of the MG34 for aircraft use.

Overall, I wonder why German weapons development did not use the cycle that Apple uses for it's iPhone.
As soon as a new iPhone model is ready to be produced, the design process for the new iPhone begins, using the existing model as the base. As reviews and criticism flow in, they incorporate those in the new model. And then once the new model is ready to produce, the process starts all over again.
This is how they can literally release a new iPhone model each year.
Germans on the other hand waited forever to get the development of something new going, and only after the
You don't think they did where appropriate? There is a bit of a difference here though: military tech is not a civilian phone and we have computers to design things, plus Apple has engineers from all over the world with unlimited funds, Germany was restricted to a narrow pool of German engineers, some of how are being conscripted to the army. And yes there is war on as well or would be and men are being conscripted. Not only that, but the interwar was a really bad economic time, WW1 demographic losses really hurt the pool of manpower for the next generation, and education was disrupted by all the problems that happened in WW1 and the interwar, so the generations doing all the work for WW2 weren't as large as previous ones. Plus the Nazis chased off a bunch of scientists and put a huge cloud of secrecy and competition over every project, making collaboration difficult.

You're comparing very different things and wondering why they aren't exactly the same.

I would agree on a tactical level, and at an operational level most of the time, but theatre-wide they made far too many mistakes as the war went on.
Every major power did. The difference is that Germany and other Axis powers had much less room to make those mistakes and survive. No one else could have made the mistakes the Soviets did and survive, but they had unlimited strategic depth (arguably) and the deepest manpower pool of any major combatant to soak up insane losses that no one else could handle. Even on the strategic level most of that really fell on Hitler, because even if it was the generals that convinced him of something, you have to remember Hitler handpicked yes-men to be his generals and purged those who disagreed with him (Blomberg-Fritsch affair is the most prominent example, but hardly the only one) or bribed people into doing what he wanted like Guderian:
 
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McPherson

Banned
After some examination, I noticed that the German military seemed to have learned almost (no) lessons from WW1.
Some things they should have taken note of when prepping for WW2.

They learned the wrong lessons from WW1.

1. Combat Shotguns
What if the Germans made a copy of the Winchester M1897 Trench model shotgun after seeing it's success in WW1? (captured examples were used extensively by German troops in WW1, mostly Sturmtruppen)

A point blank weapon that jammed, had to be reloaded due to small magazine size and at pistol range, the Luger was going to win?

2. Inefficient aircraft production for much of the early war (till late 1941)
"The Army closely cooperated with industry, especially in the World War, with particular focus on the very rapidly changing aircraft industry. The Army set prices and labor exemptions, regulated the supply of credit and raw materials, limited patent rights so as to allow cross-licensing among firms, and supervised management–labor relationships. The result was very rapid expansion and a high output of high quality aircraft, as well as high wages that attracted the best machinists. Apart from aircraft, the Army's regulation of the rest of the war economy was inefficient.[15]"
What if the person in charge of the Luftwaffe (my choice would be Wever) remembered these lessons?

In a German system of industrial process... never going to happen. Look at Krupp and the way they screwed up armor plate or Porsche and how he screwed up tank production or "Pretty Boy Willy" Messerschmidt and how he screwed up German aircraft production.

3. Sturmtruppen tactics for regular Heer infantry divisions
What if the Germans trained their regular infantry divisions in Sturmtruppen tactics and equipped them in the same ratios as Sturmtruppen (LMGs, SMGs, flamethrowers, mortar squad. etc.) instead of equipping them with a shit load of K98ks (it's actually cheaper to make MP40s than K98ks because of all the wood and stuff needed).

And how would that work out? Intensive leadership cadre loss (Killed off early.) and the quality of small unit leadership evaporates.

4. Better SMG earlier (Wa Pruf holds secret competition for new SMG in 1934 because the MP 28 is too expensive)
IMHO the ideal German WW2 SMG would be a modified MP 40 with the magazine well on the left (slightly offset to the front like the Austrian Steyr MP 34 as long as it doesn't increase the cost too much), spent cartridges ejected to the right, a foregrip like the Erma EMP, and a bayonet lug on the right that's fitted for the K98k bayonet (because the MP40's doesn't have a solid wood stock to use as a club).

MORTARS damnit.

5. Better MG earlier (because the MG 08 just doesn't cut it)
What if the Germans realized the MG 34 was too expensive and complicated for infantry use when it came out? (It would be retained as a vehicular weapon because you can't change barrels easily on a Panzer's hull MG and the MG 81 version for Luftwaffe would be in service earlier, because the mud and water problem is none existent on a aircraft. Also the Luftwaffe replaces their MG 15s and MG 17s before the war with MG 81s, which are lighter, smaller, and thus can carry more ammo.)

There are definitely more stuff, but this is it for now.
What are your thoughts?
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And the artillery gets ignored? Way to go, Hans and Gunther. Ever hear of operations research? Artillery, followed by tanks, is the main killer on the battlefield as a WWI lesson learned.

Umm I don't think it was so much that the German military leadership had amnesia so much as they massively underestimated the type of war they were fighting until it was to late, took all the wrong lessons from WWI, or their efforts were less than they could have been due to issues outside military matter. Such as politics, productions bottlenecks, or other issues.

Keep it simple. They were romantics fighting industrialists and they got their asses kicked. They stayed romantics and they WILL get their asses kicked by those same industrialists.

1)most German lessons from the war amounted to trench warfare being bad, to be avoided at all costs, and a decent SMG would have been more versatile in a wider variety of circumstances. That being said a shotgun would not have been totally useful, and anything to further hamper German logistics in WWII with more ammunition types can only be a good thing.

Amend that to... avoid casualty intensive tactics and preserve the cohorts, or fight a very short war. If the enemy forces the other results, then Germany loses through attrition.

SMGs are not as useful as MORTARS.

2)in the early war Hitler, and most of the NAZI leadership did not want to put Germany on a war footing. As a result German production across the board was less than stellar in its output. There were also deep rooted inefficiencies in German manufacturing in general. Factories across the country were not set up for mass production in the same way as American or Soviet factories. And that's not even mentioning the competition and rivalries between different companies which made army procurement even more difficult.

Stop being romantics, or allowing romantics to be in charge of things. Industrialists win wars, not delusional dreamers.

3)that would have required major changes to German infantry training, yes the mp40 is cheaper than a typical rifle of the period. But it goes through more ammunition typically, and was likely less reliable (not certain on this though) also training of troops to use the different tactics would have taken longer and required more instructors. And for an army interested in rapidly increasing its numbers before the war the added cost of such instruction, and the addition of specialist equippment to divisions which would need to be supported by logistics this was likely enough to turn them away from it.

The Americans had 1/3 the infantry and went through .250 billion tonnes of material, a LOT of it ammunition. They supplied British, Russian and other allied armies The Germans went through .500 billion tonnes of material and a lot of it was ammunition. The difference was the Germans emphasized bullets. The Americans emphasized bombs and shells. Who won?

4)a better SMG should have certainly been possible, though existing types were doing their role just fine so it would be difficult to get such a weapon to pass. Though not impossible and it would not have hurt the Germans to much.

The Russians were faced with the problem. They did SMGs to simplify their infantry. BUT they made mortars out the wazoo, cause that killed German infantry more efficiently than SMG armed Private Ivan Snafu. Lesson Learned during the Battle of Moscow.

5)Again it was possible, though difficult to pass through the army at the time.

Mortars versus a new machine gun? The Russians got around to a new machine gun by 1943. It was necessary; but not vital. By 1942 they had mortars as a high priority because they knew that separating the panzer grenadiers from the panzers was the key to small unit tactics on the eastern front, barring their shortage of antitank weapons. They could not get their own infantry in near to close assault German tanks as long as German bodyguard infantry protected those machines.

Killing German infantry also bled the German army out by attrition and mortars did that better for the Russians better than machine guns.
 
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This is one of my big questions. Why develop a bolt action rifle that's literally a carbon copy of the G98 except being a few inches shorter when you have enough time to develop a good semi-auto rifle.
You already have the tooling and it's going to be ready immediately with no real development risk......seriously you can't compare "developing" a new 98 version and "developing" a brand new semi auto as similar....

Also note that time wise you really don't have time, look at the date that the M1 started and then got into full service and ask what that does to German plans....... even without looking at the cost....
 
Stalingrad and Leningrad come to mind here.


OK but that means the German army pre1939 is making decisions based on knowing that was going to happen (Stalingrad as it was OTL was never the plan)

A couple extra belts of 7.92x57mm isn't going help you're fighting for the living room of a house in Stalingrad.

a couple of extra belts of 7.92 will help the army in most other situations though.

a M1897 and spraying buckshot all over helps though. A lot in fact.
And slugs can be used to blow the lock off a door.



Shot doesn't actually spread that much, it's a bit of misnomer how much it does in fact help with room clearance at such close ranges. The idea of clouds of shot splattering everything in close vicinity is a bit of a Hollywood trope. Irony is the spread increases at range. A shotguns main benefit is it's a damn site handier in tight quarters than a WW1 era bolt action rifle (possibly with a bayonet). But SMGs do the job fine, and do things shotguns can't

Slugs on doors, maybe, but again that's now introducing a new ammunition to the squad level supply chain.

Plus think about that for a second, your going to have a shotgun (capacity what 6-7 at most) with say two slugs for the hinges, you going to go in with what's left in the tube. or are you going to pause to top up. You might have the kind of shotgun that allows you to manually load a slugs directly into the gun for the hinge while keeping a tube of shot for whats behind it. could work but seems fiddly that in the middle of intense room to room firefight. Or do you use the shot gun just for breaching doors and then swap to something else. OK cool but you will need to carry something else and the shot gun in then just s fancy door opener.

Another issue with Stalingrad is as well as the doors was the difficulty of supply, if I'm in the German army in Stalingrad I'm going to be a bit annoyed if the LW start dropping crates of shot gun slugs for all the doors I may need to blow the hinges off!

And those are only 2 cases where a shotgun would have helped a lot.
They would have been useful for any urban engagement the Germans fought in WW2.

Think of it like this, shogun technology is old in terms of firearms. and everyone has it. By WW2 slide mechanisms are not new. Shot guns are simple and cheap to make, the ammunition might be heavy and cumbersome but it's also easy and cheap to make. But barring some very fringe and limited use the shot gun has never been heavily used weapon in war. This includes armies that fought in urban areas. At most they've been limited to very specialised formations in very specific roles, or a lack of anything better, or special forces that have far more leeway in what they carry.

Basically shotguns might have a couple of advantages in very specific circumstances over some other weapons but have far too many disadvantages to ever be general issue.
 
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