D-Day in 1943: Plausibility and operations in France

[yulzari]

Peering through the fog of posts, it seems that 1943 is possible. As to whether it would be wise, or indeed successful, is a matter of debate and there are many possible scenarios with a variety of possible outcomes. As an AH all are viable and posters would choose different ones from the options offered so far. It would be ill to beat down a poster whose opinions differ just because you are convinced of a different outcome. The ‘joy’ of AH is to see how others see scenarios and outcomes.

Personally I would see 1943 as a possible choice but the route to Germany is through France from the north and I conclude that the best likely outcome of a Roundup in 1943 would be a successful lodgement which would be contained but allow an earlier 1944 campaign start and impact upon other potential operations elsewhere IOTL adversely, other than relieve the Soviets somewhat. The consequences of a failure are other operations elsewhere, cancelled and the war in Europe e tending into late 1945 at leat, if not 1946 and we should remember that Overlord planning expected spring 1946 for the drive into Germany proper.

 

[Belisarius II]

Peering through the fog of posts, it seems that 1943 is possible. As to whether it would be wise, or indeed successful, is a matter of debate and there are many possible scenarios with a variety of possible outcomes. As an AH all are viable and posters would choose different ones from the options offered so far. It would be ill to beat down a poster whose opinions differ just because you are convinced of a different outcome. The ‘joy’ of AH is to see how others see scenarios and outcomes.

Personally I would see 1943 as a possible choice but the route to Germany is through France from the north and I conclude that the best likely outcome of a Roundup in 1943 would be a successful lodgement which would be contained but allow an earlier 1944 campaign start and impact upon other potential operations elsewhere IOTL adversely, other than relieve the Soviets somewhat. The consequences of a failure are other operations elsewhere, cancelled and the war in Europe e tending into late 1945 at leat, if not 1946 and we should remember that Overlord planning expected spring 1946 for the drive into Germany proper.

Interesting that your taking a middle course. I would disagree on one point. Overlord expected a 1945 invasion of German. Although the campaign didn't go as expected, it lasted about as long as predicted. The war with Japan was expected to last till 1946. From what we know now Germany lasting longer then they did in the OTL is very hard to imagine.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

I'm not against the concept of the discussion, I'm engaging in it. The topic is

D-Day in 1943: Plausibility and operations in France​

What your talking about is only the second part of the question. Your saying yes they could land in France, and then go into great detail about what Allied divisions existed at the time vs. what the Germans had in France to fight them. Roundup was rejected for several reasons. First off events in the global war kept forcing the Allies to divert resources for other needs. The Battle of the Atlantic was still raging, and shipping shortages, and port limitations caused BOLERO to fall further, and further behind schedule. Then the British became more skeptical about the feasibility of the operation, and started suggesting alternatives. Finally FDR insisted that American Forces enter into combat in the European Area before the end of 1942. Together all these things killed Roundup.

Now in this debate your premise is that if the Allies made an unalterable decision in the Spring of the 1942 to launch Roundup in May 1943 they could've done it. The counter argument is that's not a realistic strategy. Too many other crisis intervened, and logistical limitations simply made Roundup impractical. Another issue is the Allied civilian, and military leadership was far more risk adverse then you are, in their planning. The Allies had suffered so many defeats, and setbacks up to 1942, that they needed to act with caution. It's one thing to sit in 2021 and just say they should've thrown the dice, and hoped for the best. They were risking the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, and the fate of nations.

FDR determined there could be no major failures in the war in Europe, because he feared a loss of public support. All major operations had to be systematically planned, and have a high probability of success. Roundup was a first draft strategy, that became more, more problematic as time went on, and was finally discarded in July 1942. Reviving it after Torch was never a serious option, that boat had sailed. As you say Roundup was Marshall's baby, and that he kept coming back to it, long after it was dead was wistful thinking. His heart was still in it, even after his head had moved on.

Besides all this you premise is improbable because it's based on something the Allies couldn't know in the Spring of 1942. First that the Germans would suffer a disaster at Stalingrad, and Hitler would strip France in reaction to it. Second that they would commit more reserves to North Africa to respond to Torch. The problem with that is that Torch precludes Roundup, and if you do Roundup, there is no Torch.

Then your fallback position is that if they committed to Roundup more intelligence assets would be devoted to France, that would detect how weak it's defenses were, and the Allies could launch a snap invasion. That goes back to the Allies being very systematic in their planning. They were not going to launch a snap invasion of France. Everyone knew France would the main event of the war, and they would never even think about doing it in a slipshod manor. You don't send off a million men in a snap invasion. So all this makes Roundup an implausible what if.

I did not ask you to discuss the topic, I asked you to discuss the thesis that is the core starting point of this thread. Changing my statement from thesis to thread is both deceptive and disingenuous.

I do not believe fair has a role here. Fairness is not a word I associate with the Second World War. The question is whether arguments are supportable by logic within the constraints of uncertainty inherent in any Alternative History discussion. The site is set up and maintained by better people than I to explore these "what ifs?" I do expect you to the best of your ability be accurate in presenting my arguments before attempting to refute them, but that has nothing to do with fairness.

You have made three fundamental changes to my thesis, two of which consist of eliminating two critical historical events. Making these changes renders your arguments devoid of accuracy in responding to my thesis. I will discuss the OTL changes you have made first.

Now in this debate your premise is that if the Allies made an unalterable decision in the Spring of the 1942 to launch Roundup in May 1943 they could've done it. The counter argument is that's not a realistic strategy.

The application of your argument of realistic strategy means that Roosevelt will not sign the Marshall Memorandum on 2 April 1942. Realistic strategy or not, Roosevelt did sign it . By signing it, Roosevelt implemented the Germany First Strategy by approving planning for three operations: a contingency 1942 landing in France, which became Sledgehammer; a buildup of US ground, air and naval forces in Great Britain which became Bolero; and an invasion of the Western European continent which became Roundup. Roundup is a natural transition from and culmination of, Bolero.
Strategy drives operational planning. Operational requirements drive a) logistical preparations and b) tactical battles and engagements. By eliminating Roosevelt’s approval of the Marshall Memorandum you have also eliminated the historical industrial production and logistical preparations generated by that memorandum. You have replaced these historical events with nothing – according to you doing anything is too risky. This may be akin to Hitler’s ad-hoc planning for Total War in 1938-41, but I do not find your application to Roosevelt to be credible.
I wonder if you thought at all about the Marshall Memorandum and the primary, secondary and tertiary effects of your decision to remove it from the record before posting your argument. You do not offer any other alternative decisions in the spring of 1942. If your argument were accepted, the United States will not order the construction of escort aircraft carriers, destroyer-escorts, LSDs, LSTs, and all variations of Eisenhower’s tribute to the Higgins boats, U.S. tank production would not explode in scale because there is no approved operational use of these resources. Sicily, Italy, Tarawa, Anzio, and yes, even Overlord could not take place because it is too risky to make a commitment to Roundup.

The Second World War could not be won by the Western Allies if your risk-adverse strategic vision and doctrine is correct. All I have done is take your argument to its logical conclusions. Other examples of logical application of your argument are:
Hitler could not make a decision to invade France after the conquest of Poland because that's not a realistic strategy.
Hitler could not make a decision to invade the USSR after the cancellation of Sealion because that's not a realistic strategy.

The second major historical change is your declaration that after July 1942 Roundup was a dead concept, abandoned even by its primary author and proponent GEN Marshall. I have read your postings from Hyper War, and as I have argued numerous times they are not significant for what they say than for what they do not say.
Marshall never abandoned his advocacy for Roundup in 1942, and as far as the United States was concerned it was not a dead issue. I cited this account of the Casablanca Conference previously and now quote more extensively from Mark Perry “Partners in Command” pages 147-149.

“Over a period of five days, Marshall and General Alan Brooke reopened nearly every topic having to do with the war that had been broached—and reputedly resolved—at Arcadia. The disagreements were as deep and bitter now as they had been in 1941, and while the British claimed the differences arose out of their experiences in fighting in Europe, the Americans suspected the British were sensitive about the increasing American domination in arms, men, and munitions. The US had nearly limitless resources. At the end of 1942, the US fielded 73 divisions and 176 air combat groups, was fighting Japan in the central and southwestern Pacific by deploying half a dozen new aircraft carriers, and was reinforcing the Nationalist Chinese Army by means of a tenuous air link with South Asia. But such massive resources did not come close to exhausting America’s potential: nearly one quarter of all military materiel destined for the war against the Axis was being shipped from American factories directly to the Soviet Union. The British were a weak partner by comparison: while the US was still dipping generously into its barrel of manpower, the British had already reached the bottom.

“The result of the resource chasm found its way into Marshall and Brooke’s arguments over strategy: the US saw no reason why the Allies should continue to postpone a direct assault on France, while the British disagreed—preparations for a full invasion took time and planning and could not be rushed. Meanwhile, the British argued, the Allies should capture North Africa and then turn their attention to Sicily, Sardinia, or Corsica. Marshall was exasperated but hardly surprised. Having seen Sledgehammer destroyed, he knew that the British had not set their sights on Bolero, hoping to divert its resources to Africa and the Mediterranean. But the Army chief was in no mood to concede the point and decided to change the topic. Intent on playing his “Pacific card,” Marshall asked Ernie King to present his views on the Allied war against Japan. Marshall’s message was hardly subtle: if the British did not want to use the Americans against the Germans in France, they could be shipped to the Pacific, where they would be only too happy to take on the Japanese. King understood Marshall’s ploy and laconically reviewed American naval operations in the Pacific. At the end of his presentation, the chief of naval operations almost casually argued that the Allies should increase their focus on building up their forces in Southeast Asia, where there was a good prospect for success in an American-led offensive in Burma. The British chiefs were aghast, wondering aloud if the American chiefs were as committed to a Europe First strategy as they claimed. Marshall smiled: If it’s a Europe First strategy you want, he said, then why are you objecting to an early invasion of France? The meeting at once turned stormy—“

“After six tense days, the British and Americans finally reached a compromise. The final strategy document of the Casablanca Conference said that the Americans and British would destroy the Germans and Italians in North Africa before invading Sicily. The Europe First strategy would not be abandoned, and an increasingly large number of Allied resources would be shipped to England, where the buildup for an invasion of France would keep pace with Allied efforts in the Mediterranean. The Allies would continue the offensive in the Pacific, but not to the point where any future operations against Germany might be jeopardized. The compromise did not satisfy Marshall, who now knew that a European invasion could not be launched until 1944, but his disappointment was modest. The United States was now in charge of the war effort, with the Army Chief of Staff the acknowledged “organizer of victory” and the Allies most important war strategist. Marshall’s standing was enhanced by the Casablanca Conference, for while he did not get everything he wanted, he could leave Casablanca knowing that nothing would go forward without his approval. Brooke had not been defeated, but he was in retreat, having conceded that America’s military resources would now dictate the future course of the war.”

You do not have six full days of bitter argument over an operation that was dead six months previously.

The third change is that Roosevelt and Churchill could not come to an agreement in June 1942 regarding Roundup. While they did not, that does not mean they could not. The cost to the British Empire, and to Churchill’s “special relationship” with Roosevelt was horrific.
By imposing these three critical changes, you have created an entirely new thread. Fine. It belongs in a new POD, in as it is too different in purpose, scope and sequence than this thread.

Then your fallback position is that if they committed to Roundup more intelligence assets would be devoted to France, that would detect how weak it's defenses were, and the Allies could launch a snap invasion. That goes back to the Allies being very systematic in their planning.

This is crap. Nothing I posted treats Roundup as a snap decision. Nothing. I don't ask you to be fair, but I do ask you to be accurate. The intelligence is the logical result of the decision made.

It's one thing to sit in 2021 and just say they should've thrown the dice, and hoped for the best. They were risking the lives of hundreds of thousands of men, and the fate of nations.

This is also crap. I wrote this thesis for C&GSC in 2004, and revised it extensively in 2007 after LTC John Frenzel published his argument. My peers and superiors considered the thesis valid then - this is not some 20-20 hindsight from this past summer. The "lives of hundreds of thousands of men, and the fate of nations" was the very reason Marshall so fiercely pressed for Roundup. Marshall believed the best way to save lives was to end the war quickly. Anything else is a libel on a man no longer alive to defend his reputation. Marshall was proven right. Overlord, not Husky, Avalanche or Shingle was the significant blow laid by the Western Allies in forcing the collapse of Nazi Germany. One year later. After millions, not hundreds of thousands of additional lives were lost by not ending the war sooner. And the fate of Eastern European nations was far worse. Not to mention the British Empire.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

As an aside, the original title of this POD was:
D-Day-in-1943-consequences-on-the-rest-of-the-war-and-immediate-postwar-period.
Remember?

 

[Belisarius II]

I did not ask you to discuss the topic, I asked you to discuss the thesis that is the core starting point of this thread. Changing my statement from thesis to thread is both deceptive and disingenuous.


You have made three fundamental changes to my thesis, two of which consist of eliminating two critical historical events. Making these changes renders your arguments devoid of accuracy in responding to my thesis. I will discuss the OTL changes you have made first.

The application of your argument of realistic strategy means that Roosevelt will not sign the Marshall Memorandum on 2 April 1942. Realistic strategy or not, Roosevelt did sign it . By signing it, Roosevelt implemented the Germany First Strategy by approving planning for three operations: a contingency 1942 landing in France, which became Sledgehammer; a buildup of US ground, air and naval forces in Great Britain which became Bolero; and an invasion of the Western European continent which became Roundup. Roundup is a natural transition from and culmination of, Bolero.
Strategy drives operational planning. Operational requirements drive a) logistical preparations and b) tactical battles and engagements. By eliminating Roosevelt’s approval of the Marshall Memorandum you have also eliminated the historical industrial production and logistical preparations generated by that memorandum. You have replaced these historical events with nothing – according to you doing anything is too risky. This may be akin to Hitler’s ad-hoc planning for Total War in 1938-41, but I do not find your application to Roosevelt to be credible.
I wonder if you thought at all about the Marshall Memorandum and the primary, secondary and tertiary effects of your decision to remove it from the record before posting your argument. You do not offer any other alternative decisions in the spring of 1942. If your argument were accepted, the United States will not order the construction of escort aircraft carriers, destroyer-escorts, LSDs, LSTs, and all variations of Eisenhower’s tribute to the Higgins boats, U.S. tank production would not explode in scale because there is no approved operational use of these resources. Sicily, Italy, Tarawa, Anzio, and yes, even Overlord could not take place because it is too risky to make a commitment to Roundup.

The Second World War could not be won by the Western Allies if your risk-adverse strategic vision and doctrine is correct. All I have done is take your argument to its logical conclusions. Other examples of logical application of your argument are:
Hitler could not make a decision to invade France after the conquest of Poland because that's not a realistic strategy.
Hitler could not make a decision to invade the USSR after the cancellation of Sealion because that's not a realistic strategy.

The second major historical change is your declaration that after July 1942 Roundup was a dead concept, abandoned even by its primary author and proponent GEN Marshall. I have read your postings from Hyper War, and as I have argued numerous times they are not significant for what they say than for what they do not say.
Marshall never abandoned his advocacy for Roundup in 1942, and as far as the United States was concerned it was not a dead issue. I cited this account of the Casablanca Conference previously and now quote more extensively from Mark Perry “Partners in Command” pages 147-149.

“Over a period of five days, Marshall and General Alan Brooke reopened nearly every topic having to do with the war that had been broached—and reputedly resolved—at Arcadia. The disagreements were as deep and bitter now as they had been in 1941, and while the British claimed the differences arose out of their experiences in fighting in Europe, the Americans suspected the British were sensitive about the increasing American domination in arms, men, and munitions. The US had nearly limitless resources. At the end of 1942, the US fielded 73 divisions and 176 air combat groups, was fighting Japan in the central and southwestern Pacific by deploying half a dozen new aircraft carriers, and was reinforcing the Nationalist Chinese Army by means of a tenuous air link with South Asia. But such massive resources did not come close to exhausting America’s potential: nearly one quarter of all military materiel destined for the war against the Axis was being shipped from American factories directly to the Soviet Union. The British were a weak partner by comparison: while the US was still dipping generously into its barrel of manpower, the British had already reached the bottom.

“The result of the resource chasm found its way into Marshall and Brooke’s arguments over strategy: the US saw no reason why the Allies should continue to postpone a direct assault on France, while the British disagreed—preparations for a full invasion took time and planning and could not be rushed. Meanwhile, the British argued, the Allies should capture North Africa and then turn their attention to Sicily, Sardinia, or Corsica. Marshall was exasperated but hardly surprised. Having seen Sledgehammer destroyed, he knew that the British had not set their sights on Bolero, hoping to divert its resources to Africa and the Mediterranean. But the Army chief was in no mood to concede the point and decided to change the topic. Intent on playing his “Pacific card,” Marshall asked Ernie King to present his views on the Allied war against Japan. Marshall’s message was hardly subtle: if the British did not want to use the Americans against the Germans in France, they could be shipped to the Pacific, where they would be only too happy to take on the Japanese. King understood Marshall’s ploy and laconically reviewed American naval operations in the Pacific. At the end of his presentation, the chief of naval operations almost casually argued that the Allies should increase their focus on building up their forces in Southeast Asia, where there was a good prospect for success in an American-led offensive in Burma. The British chiefs were aghast, wondering aloud if the American chiefs were as committed to a Europe First strategy as they claimed. Marshall smiled: If it’s a Europe First strategy you want, he said, then why are you objecting to an early invasion of France? The meeting at once turned stormy—“

“After six tense days, the British and Americans finally reached a compromise. The final strategy document of the Casablanca Conference said that the Americans and British would destroy the Germans and Italians in North Africa before invading Sicily. The Europe First strategy would not be abandoned, and an increasingly large number of Allied resources would be shipped to England, where the buildup for an invasion of France would keep pace with Allied efforts in the Mediterranean. The Allies would continue the offensive in the Pacific, but not to the point where any future operations against Germany might be jeopardized. The compromise did not satisfy Marshall, who now knew that a European invasion could not be launched until 1944, but his disappointment was modest. The United States was now in charge of the war effort, with the Army Chief of Staff the acknowledged “organizer of victory” and the Allies most important war strategist. Marshall’s standing was enhanced by the Casablanca Conference, for while he did not get everything he wanted, he could leave Casablanca knowing that nothing would go forward without his approval. Brooke had not been defeated, but he was in retreat, having conceded that America’s military resources would now dictate the future course of the war.”

You do not have six full days of bitter argument over an operation that was dead six months previously.

The third change is that Roosevelt and Churchill could not come to an agreement in June 1942 regarding Roundup. While they did not, that does not mean they could not. The cost to the British Empire, and to Churchill’s “special relationship” with Roosevelt was horrific.
By imposing these three critical changes, you have created an entirely new thread. Fine. It belongs in a new POD, in as it is too different in purpose, scope and sequence than this thread.


This is crap. Nothing I posted treats Roundup as a snap decision. Nothing. I don't ask you to be fair, but I do ask you to be accurate. The intelligence is the logical result of the decision made.


This is also crap. I wrote this thesis for C&GSC in 2004, and revised it extensively in 2007 after LTC John Frenzel published his argument. My peers and superiors considered the thesis valid then - this is not some 20-20 hindsight from this past summer. The "lives of hundreds of thousands of men, and the fate of nations" was the very reason Marshall so fiercely pressed for Roundup. Marshall believed the best way to save lives was to end the war quickly. Anything else is a libel on a man no longer alive to defend his reputation. Marshall was proven right. Overlord, not Husky, Avalanche or Shingle was the significant blow laid by the Western Allies in forcing the collapse of Nazi Germany. One year later. After millions, not hundreds of thousands of additional lives were lost by not ending the war sooner. And the fate of Eastern European nations was far worse. Not to mention the British Empire.

Defending your Thesis is obviously a deeply emotional issue for you. That you were praised for it gives you a great sense of authority in the objective truth of it's premise. Well no one can have that degree of moral certainty about something that didn't happen. What we can know with a high degree of certainty is why it didn't happen. The Marshall Memorandum did layout the basic strategy of the war, but events effected the fate of particular operations, and Roundup was one of them. Your contention that cancelling Roundup somehow unravels everything in the Marshall Memorandum, leaving Allied Strategy in total chaos is illogical. Roundup stands on it own as a single operation.

What I quoted from Hyper War stated that Bolero was falling further, and further behind schedule, because of shipping shortages, port limitations, and British shipping having to be diverted to Egypt, because of the crisis there. So in the Summer of 1942 Roundup was looking less likely for logistical reasons. Marshall did have a stubborn, emotional commitment to Roundup, but FDR didn't. He decided that American Forces needed to enter into combat in the European Area by the end of 1942. Marshall sent a memo to the president making it clear to him that approving Torch ruled out Roundup. FDR was ok with that. We can accept with a high degree of certainty that those where the reason why Roundup didn't happen.

Now your premise is the Allies should have stuck with Roundup, no matter what events, or changing priorities intervened. So with Bolero far behind schedule Roundup would have to be modified because it would be weaker, and less sustained logistically. How much weaker we don't know, because it didn't happen. What we do know is that it would be weaker then it was planned for when it was drawn up in the Spring of 1942. Your Thesis is based on a hypothetical Roundup as envisioned in the Spring of 42, but that couldn't happen for logistical reasons.

On the German side without Torch the Germans haven't sent troops from France to Tunisia, along with all the air assets, and Italy is still in the war. The Vichy Government is still in control, and the Germans don't have to control the Southern Coast of France. This means the Germans have more forces in France to fight Roundup then they had in May 1943 in the OTL. So the your assumptions about the strength, and location of German Forces in France have to be changed.

So you really need to rework your Thesis to take into account a weaker Roundup, and a stronger German garrison in France. Also that you have the Germans launching a May Citadel offensive, but after Roundup started has never made any sense. It's based on an assumption that the Germans would say, "Well we can't change anything now, so we need to do what we were going to do anyway. The army in France is on it's own, and we just need to hope for the best." That assumes a level of dull stupidity of comic opera proportions. When the Allies invaded Sicily Hitler pulled out of Citadel, and sent heavy reinforcements to Italy. France was an even more sensitive area, but you have the Germans having no reaction to it.

 

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

Well both sides would be weaker in 1943. The 1943 plan was to be triggered by a collapse in the east. A lodgement could have been established. Would it have devolved into a static trench war?

 

[Belisarius II]

Well both sides would be weaker in 1943. The 1943 plan was to be triggered by a collapse in the east. A lodgement could have been established. Would it have devolved into a static trench war?

I'm sorry I don't understand why the Germans would be weaker in France in 1943? Roundup would be weaker then planned, because the buildup of forces for it was falling behind schedule. The Germans would be stronger because without Torch they didn't send troops from France to Tunisia, and they wouldn't have to occupy Vichy France. No Sledgehammer was to be triggered by a Russian collapse, not Roundup. Roundup was intended to gain a lodgment in France, to force the Germans to divert forces from the Eastern Front. While Sledgehammer was a desperation play Roundup was intended hold a permanent foothold in France, but not liberate the country. Overlord was about liberating France.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Defending your Thesis is obviously a deeply emotional issue for you. That you were praised for it gives you a great sense of authority in the objective truth of it's premise.

I am not emotional about defending my thesis. I have not had a chance to. It has not been discussed, each time i try to move on there is always the cry of it can't happen. I am frustrated with the tactics you employ, and that frustration clearly shows.
The first tactic is refusing to accept my position we should just agree to disagree, and you take the offer to start your own POD. It appears you have a deep emotional issue against allowing me the chance to proceed unhindered. Why? It's a question I've asked you numerous times before.

What we can know with a high degree of certainty is why it didn't happen.

Correct. Roundup did not happen because the British did not make the same commitment to Roundup as the Americans did. Thoroughly discussed in previous posts. An agreement by Churchill rectifies the historical issues you bring up; but again that possibility is a taboo subject for you.
I quote again from Mark Perry. For Eisenhower. "it had been easy enough to find divisions and ships for the buildup (Bolero), but it had been much more difficult to find the necessary British support for the planned cross-channel invasion in 1943." That issue is resolved by the taboo subject cited above.
Bolero fell behind schedule because Marshall believed that adding the logistical burden of supporting American troops in Great Britain without a firm British commitment those troops would be used in France. Likewise, a non-issue if I am allowed to include the taboo subject.

The second tactic is your refusal to provide specific details supporting your arguments. Because of that lack of specificity, each boils down to Belisarius II, God of War decrees it cannot happen . Absent specific facts, data or other information, I do not accept arguments on faith alone. This is not inflexibility on my part. I was forced to remove a German withdrawal from Finland because specific facts made that part of my thesis untenable. Likewise, I do not rule out your argument that a modified Torch will end without a Tunisian Campaign. I made a judgement call that weather would impede that as a more likely course of action. I believe adopting your argument strengthens the case for Roundup.

Well no one can have that degree of moral certainty about something that didn't happen.

Agreed. Which is why I am astounded with the absolute moral certainty you have that Roundup will fail, without specific reasons as to why, and without the changes wrought by the effects brought about by taboo subject. After all, a Roundup failure never happened.

The third tactic is a refusal to take ownership for your own postings:

Your contention that cancelling Roundup somehow unravels everything in the Marshall Memorandum, leaving Allied Strategy in total chaos is illogical. Roundup stands on it own as a single operation.

This is not my argument. It is your contention that the Marshall Memorandum would be unraveled.

Now in this debate your premise is that if the Allies made an unalterable decision in the Spring of the 1942 to launch Roundup in May 1943 they could've done it. The counter argument is that's not a realistic strategy.

It is your argument the Marshall Memorandum is not a realistic strategy. You had two options. You could defend your assessment it is not realistic strategy, You could also make a graceful correction that this was not what you meant. You chose to do neither, and made the claim this is my contention, not yours. Take ownership of what you write.
It was the same with your claim that Marshall would refuse to execute both Torch and Roundup if ordered to do so based on Marshall's professional advice. You made this argument, not I. And you still do not offer any clarification to what you really meant.

This coalesces with the fourth tactic I find distasteful and frustrating. It is your refusal to accurately describe my arguments.

 

[Eric C Johnson]

While Sledgehammer was a desperation play Roundup was intended hold a permanent foothold in France, but not liberate the country. Overlord was about liberating France.

Where do you get the idea Roundup was limited to a foothold?
The Marshall Memorandum included: With a war now forced upon it, the United States was required to engage the enemy in the shortest amount of time with the largest force possible - with a concentration of men and materiel in Great Britain which, when landed on the northwest coast of France , would engage Germany's greatest military resource, its panzer divisions, and destroy them on the plains of northern Europe. This was the mission statement for what became Roundup.
Again from Mark Perry pages 77-79, not a direct quote. When Marshall met with Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff on 14 April 1942, the British were astounded Marshall's plan for Bolero included an American contribution of 5,800 combat aircraft and 48 divisions. In Marshall's view, this was the force necessary to destroy the German Army once Roundup was executed. The British would commit only 12 divisions. The British were shocked by the sheer breadth of the America's war plans.
What makes you think Marshall's plans did not include the liberation of France. If the German Army were destroyed, isn't the liberation of France a natural result?
The following is a direct quote: "Our American friends went happily homewards under the mistaken impression that we had committed ourselves to both Sledgehammer and Roundup, British Major General Hastings Ismay later admitted. This misunderstanding was destined to have unfortunate consequences.... They felt we broke faith with them."

My thesis is the British made a huge mistake not throwing their full weight behind Roundup. You counterarguments boil down to what happened in the OTL stays in the ATL.

 

[Belisarius II]

I am not emotional about defending my thesis. I have not had a chance to. It has not been discussed, each time i try to move on there is always the cry of it can't happen. I am frustrated with the tactics you employ, and that frustration clearly shows.
The first tactic is refusing to accept my position we should just agree to disagree, and you take the offer to start your own POD. It appears you have a deep emotional issue against allowing me the chance to proceed unhindered. Why? It's a question I've asked you numerous times before.

Only you can really say what emotional attachment you have for you Thesis, I can only comment on what it seems like. This discussion isn't about your own POD, it's about Bougnas's question. If your writing a story about your vision of what would happen if they launched Roundup, I haven't hindered you in anyway.

Correct. Roundup did not happen because the British did not make the same commitment to Roundup as the Americans did. Thoroughly discussed in previous posts. An agreement by Churchill rectifies the historical issues you bring up; but again that possibility is a taboo subject for you.
I quote again from Mark Perry. For Eisenhower. "it had been easy enough to find divisions and ships for the buildup (Bolero), but it had been much more difficult to find the necessary British support for the planned cross-channel invasion in 1943." That issue is resolved by the taboo subject cited above.
Bolero fell behind schedule because Marshall believed that adding the logistical burden of supporting American troops in Great Britain without a firm British commitment those troops would be used in France. Likewise, a non-issue if I am allowed to include the taboo subject.

No Roundup wasn't cancelled just because the British lacked the same commitment to it, as Marshall had. First off when you say the American's commitment to Roundup what you mean is Marshall's commitment. FDR, and the rest of the JSC didn't have the same level of commitment he did. Bolero lost British shipping because they had to make emergency shipments to the Middle East in the Spring, and Summer of 1942. American Shipping losses in the Spring of 1942 were very serious, and effected the capacity to meet world wide commitments, including Bolero. Port limitations have nothing to do with will. It was simple a physical bottleneck they didn't anticipate. No Marshall didn't hold back forces for Bolero, because the British didn't commit to invade France. From Hyper War

In London, Mr. Hopkins and General Marshall found the British delighted that the United States was ready to commit itself to a major offensive against Germany in 1943. The British readily agreed that preparations should begin immediately for an invasion the following spring, and they undertook to provide more than half the shipping needed to move about a million American troops and immense quantities of materiel to the United Kingdom. They warned, however, that their first concern at present was to maintain their position in the Middle East, where, late in January, Rommel's revitalized Africa Korps had inflicted a serious reverse on the Eighth Army. Both sides were now feverishly building up for a new offensive. The British also expressed deep misgivings over the proposed emergency cross-Channel operation in the fall. Nevertheless, the British approved the American plan, essentially the War Department's plan, "in principle"--a phrase that was to give much trouble in the coalition war. The immediate relief felt by General Marshall's staff in Washington was reflected by General Eisenhower, then Chief, Operations Division, War Department General Staff, who noted: ". . . at long last, and after months of struggle . . . we are all definitely committed to one concept of fighting If we can agree on major purposes and objectives, our efforts will begin to fall in line and we won't just be thrashing around in the dark."

--441--

---

But on the American side, too, there were strong reservations. Admiral King did not contest in principle the "Germany first" strategy. But he was determined not to allow preparations for the cross-Channel invasion to jeopardize "vital needs" in the Pacific, by which, as he candidly stated early in May, he meant the ability of U.S. forces "to hold what we have against any attack that the Japanese are capable of launching." Only the President's peremptory order on May 6 that the invasion build-up in Britain must not be slowed down (it had, indeed, scarcely begun) prevented a large-scale diversion of forces and shipping to the Pacific to counter the Japanese offensive that culminated in the great naval battles of the Coral Sea and Midway. The President himself made it clear, on the other hand, that aid to the Soviet Union would have to continue on a mounting scale, whatever the cost to Bolero (the American build-up in the United Kingdom) in materiel and shipping. And even Army leaders were unwilling to assign shipping for the movement until the scheduled build-up of garrisons in the Western Hemisphere and various other overseas stations had been completed, which, it was estimated, would not be until August at the earliest. Until then British shipping would have to carry the main burden.

By the time Marshall agreed to ship more divisions to the pacific Roundup was already dead, and Torch had been agreed to.

The second tactic is your refusal to provide specific details supporting your arguments. Because of that lack of specificity, each boils down to Belisarius II, God of War decrees it cannot happen . Absent specific facts, data or other information, I do not accept arguments on faith alone. This is not inflexibility on my part. I was forced to remove a German withdrawal from Finland because specific facts made that part of my thesis untenable. Likewise, I do not rule out your argument that a modified Torch will end without a Tunisian Campaign. I made a judgement call that weather would impede that as a more likely course of action. I believe adopting your argument strengthens the case for Roundup.

Do you really think I'm the god of war? What more specific details would you like? What I've posted was pretty specific. I provided sources that showed that Roundup was becoming less likely for logistically reasons by the late Spring of 1942. Also that Marshall thought Torch would preclude Roundup. Even if a modified Torch ended the Tunisian Campaign early you still can't do Roundup in May 43. The North African Campaign lasted longer then anticipated, but Marshall thought even a shorter campaign would preclude Roundup, and FDR was ok with that.

Agreed. Which is why I am astounded with the absolute moral certainty you have that Roundup will fail, without specific reasons as to why, and without the changes wrought by the effects brought about by taboo subject. After all, a Roundup failure never happened.

I've never said Roundup would fail, I said it was problematic. I also pointed out that Roundup would be mostly weaker then what was originally planned in it's inception in the Spring if 1942, and without Torch the Germans in France would be stronger. I've also pointed out that Roundup wasn't Overlord. It wasn't designed to liberate France just establish a Lodgment area that would force the Germans to pull forces off the Eastern Front.

The third tactic is a refusal to take ownership for your own postings:

What posting are you talking about?

This is not my argument. It is your contention that the Marshall Memorandum would be unraveled.

What? No, I said the Marshall Memorandum set the basic strategy for the War in Europe, and that Roundup was just a standalone operation. You said abandoning Roundup would mean forgetting the Memorandum. The Allies did abandon Roundup, and it didn't mean removing the Marshall Memorandum from the public record. I don't need to provide an alternate strategy from the Spring of 1942. My position is what they did in the OTL was the right thing to do.

The application of your argument of realistic strategy means that Roosevelt will not sign the Marshall Memorandum on 2 April 1942. Realistic strategy or not, Roosevelt did sign it . By signing it, Roosevelt implemented the Germany First Strategy by approving planning for three operations: a contingency 1942 landing in France, which became Sledgehammer; a buildup of US ground, air and naval forces in Great Britain which became Bolero; and an invasion of the Western European continent which became Roundup. Roundup is a natural transition from and culmination of, Bolero.
Strategy drives operational planning. Operational requirements drive a) logistical preparations and b) tactical battles and engagements. By eliminating Roosevelt’s approval of the Marshall Memorandum you have also eliminated the historical industrial production and logistical preparations generated by that memorandum. You have replaced these historical events with nothing – according to you doing anything is too risky. This may be akin to Hitler’s ad-hoc planning for Total War in 1938-41, but I do not find your application to Roosevelt to be credible.
I wonder if you thought at all about the Marshall Memorandum and the primary, secondary and tertiary effects of your decision to remove it from the record before posting your argument. You do not offer any other alternative decisions in the spring of 1942. If your argument were accepted, the United States will not order the construction of escort aircraft carriers, destroyer-escorts, LSDs, LSTs, and all variations of Eisenhower’s tribute to the Higgins boats, U.S. tank production would not explode in scale because there is no approved operational use of these resources. Sicily, Italy, Tarawa, Anzio, and yes, even Overlord could not take place because it is too risky to make a commitment to Roundup.

It is your argument the Marshall Memorandum is not a realistic strategy. You had two options. You could defend your assessment it is not realistic strategy, You could also make a graceful correction that this was not what you meant. You chose to do neither, and made the claim this is my contention, not yours. Take ownership of what you write.
It was the same with your claim that Marshall would refuse to execute both Torch and Roundup if ordered to do so based on Marshall's professional advice. You made this argument, not I. And you still do not offer any clarification to what you really meant.

Again you don't seem to understand what military advice means. Marshall telling FDR that approval of Torch would preclude Roundup isn't an act of insubordination. I never said if FDR ordered Marshall to do both he would he would disobey the order, that was something you pulled out of Left Field. What I did say was FDR would never order a major military operation against military advice. I base that opinion on the fact that FDR wasn't stupid, or reckless.

This coalesces with the fourth tactic I find distasteful and frustrating. It is your refusal to accurately describe my arguments

I don't know you arguments keep shifting, so as to provide a moving target. Everything I say about your arguments you claim is a distortion. I have to say many times in this debate I've been left scratching my head about many of the things you've said, especially about what you think I said. I think if most people on the board read our posts they would agree that the meaning of my posts were clearer then yours. That is of course just my opinion, I'm sure what you write makes sense in your own mind.

 

[Aber]

The compromise did not satisfy Marshall, who now knew that a European invasion could not be launched until 1944, but his disappointment was modest.

And yet the memo Marshall wrote in July 1942 approving Torch said that doing Torch "in all probability" (IIRC) precluded Roundup.

Bolero fell behind schedule because Marshall believed that adding the logistical burden of supporting American troops in Great Britain without a firm British commitment those troops would be used in France.

Source for Marshall saying this?

 

[Belisarius II]

Where do you get the idea Roundup was limited to a foothold?
The Marshall Memorandum included: With a war now forced upon it, the United States was required to engage the enemy in the shortest amount of time with the largest force possible - with a concentration of men and materiel in Great Britain which, when landed on the northwest coast of France , would engage Germany's greatest military resource, its panzer divisions, and destroy them on the plains of northern Europe. This was the mission statement for what became Roundup.
Again from Mark Perry pages 77-79, not a direct quote. When Marshall met with Churchill and the British Chiefs of Staff on 14 April 1942, the British were astounded Marshall's plan for Bolero included an American contribution of 5,800 combat aircraft and 48 divisions. In Marshall's view, this was the force necessary to destroy the German Army once Roundup was executed. The British would commit only 12 divisions. The British were shocked by the sheer breadth of the America's war plans.
What makes you think Marshall's plans did not include the liberation of France. If the German Army were destroyed, isn't the liberation of France a natural result?
The following is a direct quote: "Our American friends went happily homewards under the mistaken impression that we had committed ourselves to both Sledgehammer and Roundup, British Major General Hastings Ismay later admitted. This misunderstanding was destined to have unfortunate consequences.... They felt we broke faith with them."

My thesis is the British made a huge mistake not throwing their full weight behind Roundup. You counterarguments boil down to what happened in the OTL stays in the ATL.

Because as we've been going over Roundup was a more limited concept then Overlord. Yes the initial conception involved 5,800 American aircraft, and 48 divisions, but that was a fantasy. Nothing close to that was possible in 1943. Later planning was far scaled back. https://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/ww2/ww2-op-roundup.htm Roundup was really never more then a series of broad sketches. It would've had to assume a more solid form as the time of May 43 came closer, which is why some board members are just assuming it would Overlord 1943, because we know where that landed, and what the strategy was. What strategy do you follow if you only have around 20 divisions?

 

[Eric C Johnson]

Only you can really say what emotional attachment you have for you Thesis, I can only comment on what it seems like. This discussion isn't about your own POD, it's about Bougnas's question. If your writing a story about your vision of what would happen if they launched Roundup, I haven't hindered you in anyway.

No Roundup wasn't cancelled just because the British lacked the same commitment to it, as Marshall had. First off when you say the American's commitment to Roundup what you mean is Marshall's commitment. FDR, and the rest of the JSC didn't have the same level of commitment he did. Bolero lost British shipping because they had to make emergency shipments to the Middle East in the Spring, and Summer of 1942. American Shipping losses in the Spring of 1942 were very serious, and effected the capacity to meet world wide commitments, including Bolero. Port limitations have nothing to do with will. It was simple a physical bottleneck they didn't anticipate. No Marshall didn't hold back forces for Bolero, because the British didn't commit to invade France. From Hyper War




--441--

---

By the time Marshall agreed to ship more divisions to the pacific Roundup was already dead, and Torch had been agreed to.

Do you really think I'm the god of war? What more specific details would you like? What I've posted was pretty specific. I provided sources that showed that Roundup was becoming less likely for logistically reasons by the late Spring of 1942. Also that Marshall thought Torch would preclude Roundup. Even if a modified Torch ended the Tunisian Campaign early you still can't do Roundup in May 43. The North African Campaign lasted longer then anticipated, but Marshall thought even a shorter campaign would preclude Roundup, and FDR was ok with that.

I've never said Roundup would fail, I said it was problematic. I also pointed out that Roundup would be mostly weaker then what was originally planned in it's inception in the Spring if 1942, and without Torch the Germans in France would be stronger. I've also pointed out that Roundup wasn't Overlord. It wasn't designed to liberate France just establish a Lodgment area that would force the Germans to pull forces off the Eastern Front.

What posting are you talking about?

What? No, I said the Marshall Memorandum set the basic strategy for the War in Europe, and that Roundup was just a standalone operation. You said abandoning Roundup would mean forgetting the Memorandum. The Allies did abandon Roundup, and it didn't mean removing the Marshall Memorandum from the public record. I don't need to provide an alternate strategy from the Spring of 1942. My position is what they did in the OTL was the right thing to do.

The application of your argument of realistic strategy means that Roosevelt will not sign the Marshall Memorandum on 2 April 1942. Realistic strategy or not, Roosevelt did sign it . By signing it, Roosevelt implemented the Germany First Strategy by approving planning for three operations: a contingency 1942 landing in France, which became Sledgehammer; a buildup of US ground, air and naval forces in Great Britain which became Bolero; and an invasion of the Western European continent which became Roundup. Roundup is a natural transition from and culmination of, Bolero.
Strategy drives operational planning. Operational requirements drive a) logistical preparations and b) tactical battles and engagements. By eliminating Roosevelt’s approval of the Marshall Memorandum you have also eliminated the historical industrial production and logistical preparations generated by that memorandum. You have replaced these historical events with nothing – according to you doing anything is too risky. This may be akin to Hitler’s ad-hoc planning for Total War in 1938-41, but I do not find your application to Roosevelt to be credible.
I wonder if you thought at all about the Marshall Memorandum and the primary, secondary and tertiary effects of your decision to remove it from the record before posting your argument. You do not offer any other alternative decisions in the spring of 1942. If your argument were accepted, the United States will not order the construction of escort aircraft carriers, destroyer-escorts, LSDs, LSTs, and all variations of Eisenhower’s tribute to the Higgins boats, U.S. tank production would not explode in scale because there is no approved operational use of these resources. Sicily, Italy, Tarawa, Anzio, and yes, even Overlord could not take place because it is too risky to make a commitment to Roundup.

Again you don't seem to understand what military advice means. Marshall telling FDR that approval of Torch would preclude Roundup isn't an act of insubordination. I never said if FDR ordered Marshall to do both he would he would disobey the order, that was something you pulled out of Left Field. What I did say was FDR would never order a major military operation against military advice. I base that opinion on the fact that FDR wasn't stupid, or reckless.

I don't know you arguments keep shifting, so as to provide a moving target. Everything I say about your arguments you claim is a distortion. I have to say many times in this debate I've been left scratching my head about many of the things you've said, especially about what you think I said. I think if most people on the board read our posts they would agree that the meaning of my posts were clearer then yours. That is of course just my opinion, I'm sure what you write makes sense in your own mind.

Nowhere here is the there any mention of the Taboo Subject - an agreement between Churchill and Roosevelt to execute both Torch and Roundup in June of 1942. How much does that agreement change the ensuing sequence of events?
Roundup was not a stand alone operation. It was fully dependent on successful completion of Bolero.
I will be out of the net for a while. I'll comment further when I return.

 

[Finbarr the Fair]

Nowhere here is the there any mention of the Taboo Subject - an agreement between Churchill and Roosevelt to execute both Torch and Roundup in June of 1942. How much does that agreement change the ensuing sequence of events?
Roundup was not a stand alone operation. It was fully dependent on successful completion of Bolero.
I will be out of the net for a while. I'll comment further when I return.

An agreement to do something doesn't automatically "make it so". As a later British PM said "Events, Dear Boy, Events". The Enemy can foil your plans.

The WAllies failed to establish the conditions needed for a successful invasion of France in 1943. Winning the Battle of the Atlantic by mid 1942, clearly stopping the Japanese expansion in the SW Pacific or clearing North Africa quickly. These failures delayed the necessary build up of US forces in the UK and diverted Commonwealth resources elsewhere (including India). The Combined Bomber Offensive didn't do as much damage to German industry as hoped.

When, realistically, could Torch be launched without major changes to the Theatres I've mentioned. How quickly could the land, naval and air forces be brought back to the UK?

Then we can look at German responses to these developments to try to game out the invasion. Getting ashore might be easier with no beach defences, capturing defended ports would not be. No mulberries so supply over beaches - what forces could be maintained? For how long.

It's a very interesting hypothetical "What If". I liked the John Grigg (?) book on it. But the drawbacks as well as advantages need to be faced.

 

[yulzari]

A passing thought that I have not seen mentioned. At the time of Roundup planning there was no certainty that the Soviet Union might not fall or come to some accommodation with the Germans so the possibility existed then that Roundup might be the sole major front by the time or was launched. By the time of Overlord this risk was very unlikely.

 

[Belisarius II]

Nowhere here is the there any mention of the Taboo Subject - an agreement between Churchill and Roosevelt to execute both Torch and Roundup in June of 1942. How much does that agreement change the ensuing sequence of events?
Roundup was not a stand alone operation. It was fully dependent on successful completion of Bolero.
I will be out of the net for a while. I'll comment further when I return.

Again you don't seem to understand what military advice means. Marshall telling FDR that approval of Torch would preclude Roundup isn't an act of insubordination. I never said if FDR ordered Marshall to do both he would he would disobey the order, that was something you pulled out of Left Field. What I did say was FDR would never order a major military operation against military advice. I base that opinion on the fact that FDR wasn't stupid, or reckless.

I guess you didn't read this part of my reply. Or the part were I posted a source talking about Bolero hardly starting before Roundup was replaced by Torch. If Bolero had hardly started by August 1942, when was it going to get in gear for a May 1943 Roundup?

 

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

I'm sorry I don't understand why the Germans would be weaker in France in 1943? Roundup would be weaker then planned, because the buildup of forces for it was falling behind schedule. The Germans would be stronger because without Torch they didn't send troops from France to Tunisia, and they wouldn't have to occupy Vichy France. No Sledgehammer was to be triggered by a Russian collapse, not Roundup. Roundup was intended to gain a lodgment in France, to force the Germans to divert forces from the Eastern Front. While Sledgehammer was a desperation play Roundup was intended hold a permanent foothold in France, but not liberate the country. Overlord was about liberating France.

Basically they moved troops from the Balkans, Germany proper and even the Eastern front in late 43 and 44.

 

[Belisarius II]

Basically they moved troops from the Balkans, Germany proper and even the Eastern front in late 43 and 44.

That's true, but I was talking specifically about France, in the context of resisting Roundup. Although they were clearly losing the war, the German Army was stronger in 1944 then it was in 1943. Erick C Johnson is right that the Spring of 1943 was a crisis period for the Germans. Unfortunately for them the Allies, and Soviets had gained even more strength during the same period. 1944 was the peak year of the war, for all the belligerents. War production peaked, and everyone was at maximum mobilization levels, and the biggest battles were fought.

 

[Neutrino 123]

The possibility of Roundup has interested me for quite a while. I made some rules for in in the game Liberty Roads (http://talk.consimworld.com/WebX?8@@.1dd317cd - post 1918) that I finally got around to posting. It doesn't necessarily present the most optimal invasion or response or even the most plausible scenario (which I'm increasingly convinced is an invasion in May or June), but the system is quite nice for actually gaming out the result and can readily adapted to other situations.

I support the notion that a 1943 invasion would result in faster defeat of Germany. In general, I don't think there would be any huge setbacks for the Allies (though probably some nasty Salerno/Bulge-like costly victories). Thus, the general principle of bringing more available combat power (which is concentrated in ground forces) to bear on the enemy in a better arena (the plains of France versus the mountains of Italy) would be the key factor in expediting the German defeat.

Regarding amphibious shipping, the Allies were able to bring in many divisions in Sicily in 1943, just like Overlord the next year. Thus, the initial invasion would be approximately the size of Overlord. This is easily enough to establish a beachhead in Normandy or even Calais. However, the lack of shipping would reduce follow-on forces compared to Overlord in 1944. It was be easier than Italy, where multiple invasions took place further from Allied logistical centers, but still less than 1944. No doubt the Allies could reduce north/south Pacific operations to get some additional life compared to historical 1943 Europe, though. They could also add a bit more amphibious shipping to their built schedule with a firm commitment in mid 1942, though this would likely be small due to the perceived need to build more antisubmarine forces.

The submarine menace was not a big deal by May 1943, in terms of ultimate outcomes. It never interfered with troop transports, at any rate. It would certainly make Roundup appear like more of a gamble to planners in 1942, but arguments could go either way, especially with an analysis in 1942 indicated that the menace could be resolved. Regarding Bolero, there might be less stuff available in the UK, but that may not slow things down much if there is not enough amphibious shipping to move them anyway. In Overlord, many US divisions came from the UK, but tons of logistic support came directly from the continental United States. Even if only the initial landing and followup forces were in the UK from mini-Bolero, the campaign could still be conducted with shipping form the US coming in at the maximum rate that French ports could handle. At the big conferences, lots of people had opinions on things, but I think it was rare that people actually sat down and crunched numbers for different variants. The conferences could also get very political. Thus, I would put much weight on what any of them say at any given time. This applies to commanders and political leaders that were optimistic OR pessimistic about Roundup. All their proceedings are of course very historically important, but humans are far to complicated for us to just identify prominant figures and take their opinions at face value. Warfare is complicated, and there is a lot that they didn't know. I expect that even with a January 1943 decision, there could have been a strong Roundup (though obviously a commitment earlier would be better since it would allow proper coordination with Torch and PLUTO construction).

The Luftwaffe would certainly be more dangerous than in 1944, but I can't see it being even as bad as Italy in 1943, where the Luftwaffe achieved some notable successes. Even in Italy, the Luftwaffe did not have a large impact, though. In Roundup, Allied fighters would be closer to their main bases than the Luftwaffe (Luftwaffe would be closer than in Italy, but the Allies get a bigger advantage here). There would also be a lot more of them. It doesn't matter if the Luftwaffe has a temporary qualitative advantage. The odds in the air are simply better than historical for 1943 because of better basing, and the Luftwaffe still lost in 1943. It would be even better for the Allies, since the invasion would result in heavy bombers doing fewer longer range missions into Germany where they were unescorted. Thus, the Luftwaffe would be depleted more quickly than historically, even though they would do somewhat more damage than in 1944. Even more so since by winter, most of France would be occupied, giving Allied bomber many more protected routes into Germany

As others have noted, both the US and Britain did not do a good job of getting lessons learned to green divisions. The Allies would probably still suffer a bit from not having gotten rid of bad generals in 1943. Still, there would be no great change in performance. At the tactical level, the Allied tanks would better stack against German tanks. The Germans would still have a little more of a tactical edge than in 1944, though, because of lower reductions in manpower. However, their industry had not yet reached the peak. Thus, the initial "odds" of the Allies would be lower after the Germans brought in sufficient forces from Russia to stabilize the line, but the German replacement rate would be lower than 1944. Further, the Allies would soon be able to bring in new forces nearly as quickly as in 1944 after they capture some ports and need to rely less on amphibious shipping. Thus, the overall balance of power would move more quickly in favor of the Allies on average than Overlord.

I don't think the Allies could politically abandon lend lease, though I can certainly see the increase in lend-lease slowed down compared to historically. Additionally, the Soviet Union would be able to advance more quickly than historically, even received less lend lease. They would still have obtained many trucks, and it is much easier to advance an army when there is less opposition. Opposition is part of the difficulty of logistics (bullets, shells, and equipment needs to be moved just as much as gas). The Germans would certainly use the room in the east to retreat after having moved more forces to the west, which is in more immediate danger, though there would be limits (both political and practical) on how far this could go. Thus, it is likely overoptimistic to say that the Western Allies could get to Warsaw before the Soviets. Getting to Berlin first seems fairly likely, though. Perhaps Austria and the Czech Republic (sans Slovakia) would be mostly in the Western Sphere in this timeline. On the flip side, the Soviets would still no doubt move against Japan, perhaps almost a year early. This could result in a more rapid victory for communist China and a fully communist Korea. There might even be a communist Hokkaido, though this might be a difficult prospect for the Soviets if the Japanese determinedly oppose them.

Regarding Mediterranean operations, things could be highly varied. I'd have trouble seeing more than a few divisions in Africa moved to France. The rest would probably be sent on invasions as soon as enough ports were captured in France to permit dispersal of the amphibious force (perhaps even before for small landings like Sardinia/Corsica). The idea of Italy going neutral is interesting, but I'm not sure if either side would really make optimal moves here. At any rate, if there was an Italian campaign, it would be even more of a sideshow, and the Italians would certainly be even less motivated. A Greek campaign is also certainly possible at some point when the Germans decide to pull out. Getting further than North Macedonia and Bulgaria is probably not possible due to bad terrain and logistics, though, at least until the Ruhr is cut off and the Rich starts to crumble.

Regarding Kursk, it is interesting to consider the Germans quickly launching a successful early Citadel before reinforcing the west. The couple weeks delay would be more than made up for by the eased situation on the east front. However, even in this situation, I have a little bit of trouble seeing the Allies checked on the Seine for any length of time. The front is just too big and open. There would likely be a more harsh check of the Allies at the Siegfried line, though. However, I'm not convinced that the Germans wouldn't just cancel Citadel. They might make this move and prepare three panzer corps to be sent west, only to cancel the order for one of them when the Soviets launch powerful early attacks at Orel and Kharkov.

Regarding deception, this was something the Allies were particularly good at for invasions. I could easily see the original poster's scenario playing out with an identical German deployment in May 1943. Maybe a couple divisions would be moved around if the Germans caught wind of something, but I have trouble imagining the Germans actually being well-prepared for Roundup. They would no doubt transfer most (but not all) of their Italian mechanized forces and some miscellaneous infantry units, though, as soon as they heard about the landing. Probably not much from Norway, though, for the same reasons as historically. Neither these forces nor transfers from the east would likely arrive in time to contain the Allies like they were historically in Normandy until Cobra. In a worst case scenario for the Germans, these German forces get wrecked in a series of meeting engagements in France, as some historically did in 1944 (though I can see some of these going in favor of the Germans due to surprise, the Allied command of the air and far greater mechanization just gives them an overwhelming advantage in this situation).

I don't think the British would be in a much better place after a 1944 victory than 1945. Their losses would probably be similar due to the greater intensity of fighting and greater initial proportion of British troops, maybe a little less, and the extra year of peace would allow for a slightly faster recovery. Still, this isn't a fundementally different situation. I'd expect the postwar to be similar for them.

Overall, I think that this means the Allies get ashore easily and expand the bridgehead quickly, despite a weaker for than Overlord. Powerful German forces cause some setbacks around Paris and points east, but by this point, the Allies have ports, and new forces are pouring in rapidly. The front line stabilizes along the Siegfried line (a little further west than historically) and the Allies are slowed greatly at this point. They need time to recover from losses from battles with strong German reinforcements. Hitler will want to do some Bulge-like attack, which could be in winter or spring before the weather becomes good. It will fail, of course, since by this point, Allied logistics and forces are almost equal to the historical level a year later. It might get a little further, depending on how much the Germans denude the east front. When the weather is good, the Allies will launch a big attack. It was be much tougher than historically at first (a greater proportion of German reinforcements are now going to the west because of immediate danger), but they will probably breakout in summer 1944, with the war ending in fall at latest.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I recently bought Fortress Europa by compass games a few weeks ago and really need to have a go a playing it

One of the things that drew me to the game was this thread and I wondered if it would serve as a good war game to try out this 1943 scenario

To that end I would be interested in hearing from anyone who has played it and then any suggestion around a 1943 Order of battle for both sides as well as ability for both sides to surge reinforcements etc.