Could the Kriegsmarine have assembled a battlefleet for the Atlantic ?

[xerex]

Was it possible for the Kriegsmarine in WW2 to forgo the piecemeal surface raiding actions they did with only one or two ships and assemble a larger force to break into the Atlantic ?

Specifically could they have combined Bismarck, Gneisenau , Scharnhorst , Scheer, Lutzow , Hipper, Prinz Eugen and a number of destroyers into a single fleet and sent that out into the Atlantic ?

 

[kmmontandon]

To do ... what?

 

[RamscoopRaider]

To do ... what?

Make a demonstration to convince the British that they might go after a convoy, thus having the British keep a large fleet sitting in Scapa glaring angrily at Norway and not doing something useful against the Italians/Japanese?

 

[Korlan]

The entire Royal Navy fall on them like a ton of bricks, sink every single one of them (at the cost of a non-negligeable, but manageable, number of RN ships), and remove all threat from surface units in the Atlantic once for all.

Then the RN divide its forces in 2 :

- ASW Escort units in the Atlantic against U-boots

- everything else in the Pacific.

The problem caused by the German heavy surface units was the threat of a sortie, that forced the RN to keep a lot of heavies nearby to counter the threat.

If there is no Kriegsmarine heavy surface threat, all heavy surface units of the RN can go to the Pacific in a single fleet.

At the same times, all heavy USN surface units can also go to the Pacific (as they are not needed in the Atlantic), and as a result, the Imperial Japanese Navy would find itself facing the entirety of the USN and the entirety of the RN at the same time.

 

[Blue cat]

Make a demonstration to convince the British that they might go after a convoy, thus having the British keep a large fleet sitting in Scapa glaring angrily at Norway and not doing something useful against the Italians/Japanese?

Didn't the Germans more or less manage to do this historically with Tirpitz and various other ships ?

 

[Gokbay]

Make a demonstration to convince the British that they might go after a convoy, thus having the British keep a large fleet sitting in Scapa glaring angrily at Norway and not doing something useful against the Italians/Japanese?

As other people have stated if a large surface force sorties it sinks and Royal Navy now has no need to keep a large fleet in Scapa. This literally achieves the exact opposite of what you want.

 

[Anime Ninja]

If the Kriegsmarine is sunk that would create huge butterflies for the rest if the war.

When does it happen?

The lose of that many men and ship would be a huge moral blow to the German people and who ever ordered it might find themselves a traitor of the Third Riche, it could in fact quicken the end of the war.

If before fall 1941, Japan might see that striking south will be no match for what they have in the water or they might see a mulled RN and think that they can finish it off.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

As other people have stated if a large surface force sorties it sinks and Royal Navy now has no need to keep a large fleet in Scapa. This literally achieves the exact opposite of what you want.

Scharnhorst, Gniesenau and Prinz Eugen literally sailed through the English Channel in broad daylight and survived, Tirpitz sortied 3 times and survived, S&G sortied into the Atlantic multiple time without interception, including a loop that ended up in France before the aforementioned Channel Dash, and claimed an aircraft carrier, Lutzow and Admiral Scheer conducted multiple raids on the Arctic convoys without being sunk, and Hipper sortied into the Atlantic twice and got away clean both times. A large surface force sortieing is by no means guaranteed to be intercepted by the British, much less destroyed

For a fleet in being to work it has to be credible, hence the Germans have to show they are willing to leave port and "try" to break out into the convoy lanes for raiding, lest they be ignored. Of course they should not actually try to do so, but run for home upon sign of danger, to avoid being destroyed/damaged. However they have to be seen by the British to do something

 

[Gokbay]

Scharnhorst, Gniesenau and Prinz Eugen literally sailed through the English Channel in broad daylight and survived, Tirpitz sortied 3 times and survived, S&G sortied into the Atlantic multiple time without interception, including a loop that ended up in France before the aforementioned Channel Dash, and claimed an aircraft carrier, Lutzow and Admiral Scheer conducted multiple raids on the Arctic convoys without being sunk, and Hipper sortied into the Atlantic twice and got away clean both times. A large surface force sortieing is by no means guaranteed to be intercepted by the British, much less destroyed

For a fleet in being to work it has to be credible, hence the Germans have to show they are willing to leave port and "try" to break out into the convoy lanes for raiding, lest they be ignored. Of course they should not actually try to do so, but run for home upon sign of danger, to avoid being destroyed/damaged. However they have to be seen by the British to do something

1: The Channel Dash (Cerberus) did indeed work but they were not sortieing in force, they were returning home. Also RAF was pretty incompetent in that operation.
2: I don't have much information on Tirpitz so won't comment.
3: The Ugly Sisters and "Pocket Battleships" did go out into the Atlantic and raided successfully but a few large surface vessels raiding =/= a large fleet formation sortieing in force. The latter is much easier to find and would find it harder to run away (unless they scatter).
4: Ignore how? Hell, isn't it better if they are ignored? No RAF raids and if RN is stupid enough to leave to fight Japan without leaving sufficient forces home then Kriegsmarine will sortie and find much success. Which is why a fleet in being is not ignored. It might not achieve much but it ties up enemy forces.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

The problem with only having a small fleet is that a portion of it is always going to be in refit (warships of the day needed yearly minor refits and every few years a major one) and any use in a combat role no matter how small is likely to result in damage or even total loss (given the principle opponent)

So it is highly unlikely as OTL proved that the KM can amass so many units

Take for example Exercise Rhine - the Break out of Bismarck and Prinz Eugen - on or about 18–27 May 1941

They were the only 2 major surface units fit for combat at the time - Bismarck and Prinz Eugen

Sharnhorst and Gniesenau were both either damaged by RAF bombing or suffering from machinary issues in France

Tirpitz was still many months away from being ready for operations

Scheer had just returned from her epic raiding op into the southern oceans in March 1941 and was in dire need of a great deal of TLC (and would have slowed down any fleet to her top speed) and not ready until June 1941

Lutzow was rudely torpedoed by the British in 1940 during the Norway campaign she was not recommissioned until March 1941 and not ready for ops until June.....when she was 'again' rudely torpedoed off Norway - and again had a maximum speed of 28 knots which would have slowed any such fleet including her.

Hipper had conducted several Atlantic Sorties and had just returned to Germany for a major refit just before May 1941

German Destroyers were generally rather small and short ranged creatures intended for the North Sea and Baltic ops - not for them an Atlantic sortie.

The light cruisers were also on the small size and relatively short ranged.

So why not delay...until a large force could be 'grouped' and sortied together?

Well the British were also readying their new ships for combat to join the already very large fleet they had, by August 41 the 3rd KGV unit 'HMS Duke of York' would be ready and the other 2 in 1942 (not that the Germans would have been sure of those ships in service date) not to mention numerous cruisers.

As the year stretched into Summer conditions for aircraft reconnaissance improved, particularly near the Arctic circle what with the midnight sun etc (very spooky watching the sun not set!) and the longer they left it, the more air power was being amassed in Iceland, Greenland etc making any such sortie almost certain to be spotted.

So it makes some sort of sense that the KM sortied ships as and when they could.

 

[RamscoopRaider]

1: The Channel Dash (Cerberus) did indeed work but they were not sortieing in force, they were returning home. Also RAF was pretty incompetent in that operation.
2: I don't have much information on Tirpitz so won't comment.
3: The Ugly Sisters and "Pocket Battleships" did go out into the Atlantic and raided successfully but a few large surface vessels raiding =/= a large fleet formation sortieing in force. The latter is much easier to find and would find it harder to run away (unless they scatter).
4: Ignore how? Hell, isn't it better if they are ignored? No RAF raids and if RN is stupid enough to leave to fight Japan without leaving sufficient forces home then Kriegsmarine will sortie and find much success. Which is why a fleet in being is not ignored. It might not achieve much but it ties up enemy forces.

2 Battleships and a heavy cruiser do not count as in force? They certainly sortied as they did leave port on a mission

The larger formation is actually little if any easier to find than a small formation or a single ship, if the spotters are not in a position to find one ship or 3, they would rarely be in a position to spot say ten in close proximity. That is one of the reasons convoy's work, a big group of vessels is harder to find than a bunch of single ships or small groups

The bigger formation actually finds it easier to run away, as you need a bigger formation to engage it, thus there are fewer formations that can engage it, thus fewer threat vectors, thus it is harder to be boxed in. A large German fleet would only have to worry about home fleet out of Scapa, while singletons or small groups can be dealt with by detachments from home fleet possibly based in multiple locations

If they are ignored then those forces are doing something useful elsewhere. The German navy could not do enough damage to Britain on its own to really effect the course of the war, but it could tie up resources that could say keep Italy in the war longer, or let Japan do a bit better, or simply have the British waste resources on it rather than the more vital portions of the German war machine

As for how it would be ignored? If you think the enemy won't dare risk their ships, then you are more likely to think you can get away with leaving a brief window of vulnerability to do something else, divert some ships for a month or two to smack the Italian fleet before having them come back, or cover a major amphibious attack in the med, or say 3-4 months and hit Japanese logistics off Burma, gambling that the enemy won't realize your vulnerability in time to do something. You might also cut your margin of superiority down further, accept that 50% of the time you won't be able to crush them as some of your ships will be in refit. Whereas if you think you enemy will risk those ships and could sortie at any time, you are much less likely to make that gamble or cut your margins

 

[BlackDragon98]

German Destroyers were generally rather small and short ranged creatures intended for the North Sea and Baltic ops - not for them an Atlantic sortie.

15cm twin guns are not small.
Sure they were short ranged but the main problem was their absolutely shitty high pressure boilers.
And they were overall not very seaworthy until they were reworked and modified.

TBH the Germans should have used diesel fuel for all their naval vessels.
Extends range and German marine diesels were pretty good.
Just look at the U-boats and Deutschland class Panzerschiffes.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

15cm twin guns are not small.
Sure they were short ranged but the main problem was their absolutely shitty high pressure boilers.
And they were overall not very seaworthy until they were reworked and modified.

TBH the Germans should have used diesel fuel for all their naval vessels.
Extends range and German marine diesels were pretty good.
Just look at the U-boats and Deutschland class Panzerschiffes.

You only get 15 cm guns in the Narvik class and later -so for my example of vessels being ready for May 1941.....3 such vessels commissioned and worked up?

Range at '19 knots' is given as 2180 NMs (Tribal's by comparison had about twice the range) and the 1936 'Narviks' IIRC needed 'bunker-age' in order to retain stability

To put this into context Bergan (Norway) to Akureyri (Port in Northern Iceland) is about 950 NMs and given that the range is likely to be less given the need to operate at higher speeds than 19 knots they would just about make it to the Denmark straight but would be desperate for a drink - just when they needed to be cracking on.

 

[BlackDragon98]

You only get 15 cm guns in the Narvik class and later -so for my example of vessels being ready for May 1941.....3 such vessels commissioned and worked up?

Range at '19 knots' is given as 2180 NMs (Tribal's by comparison had about twice the range) and the 1936 'Narviks' IIRC needed 'bunker-age' in order to retain stability

To put this into context Bergan (Norway) to Akureyri (Port in Northern Iceland) is about 950 NMs and given that the range is likely to be less given the need to operate at higher speeds than 19 knots they would just about make it to the Denmark straight but would be desperate for a drink - just when they needed to be cracking on.

Overall the Kriegsmarine was a waste of money, minus the U-Boots, merchant raiders and some surface raiders.
The Nazis never had enough time or money to make a real navy, as the ships they could have used in WW2 were ironically, sitting at the bottom of Scapa Flow.

 

[McPherson]

Was it possible for the Kriegsmarine in WW2 to forgo the piecemeal surface raiding actions they did with only one or two ships and assemble a larger force to break into the Atlantic ?

Specifically could they have combined Bismarck, Gneisenau , Scharnhorst , Scheer, Lutzow , Hipper, Prinz Eugen and a number of destroyers into a single fleet and sent that out into the Atlantic ?

1. The destroyers do not have the range.
2. The Luftwaffe does not have the equipment, training, desire, or the BRAINS and never will to RIKKO or fight a naval war.
3. German admirals (aside from Marshall) are too inexperienced and clueless (especially Raeder) to know how to properly deploy and logistically support surface action groups.
4. Germans are clueless about naval and air geography.

Battle of the Atlantic sit-rep March 1942.

Source (McPherson's work on subject based on USNI and RN plans and dispositions from HYPERWAR.)

See MAP.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Overall the Kriegsmarine was a waste of money, minus the U-Boots, merchant raiders and some surface raiders.
The Nazis never had enough time or money to make a real navy, as the ships they could have used in WW2 were ironically, sitting at the bottom of Scapa Flow.

I blame the Anglo German Naval Act

 

[BlackDragon98]

I blame the Anglo German Naval Act

Hitler's stupid Anglophilia acting up.
AGNA was pretty stupid for Germany, but the loss of the High Seas Fleet hurt the most.

 

[1Big Rich]

The KM is a small navy on the strategic offensive. Guerre de course is its only option when facing the largest navy in the world.

Guerre de course has two goals: First, disrupt the stronger enemy's commerce, and deny him the supplies needed to prosecute the war, feed his population, etc.
Second, disperse the stronger enemy's strength, to prevent him from achieving his strategic objectives. You might recognize some of these objectives as Torch, Avalanche, Husky, Neptune/Overlord, Dragoon and Tungsten.

Submarines are the ideal weapon early in the war for guerre de course in the high-threat environment of the North Atlantic. Armed merchant raiders can do the job distant from friendly shores. They can prey on commerce nearly every where else on the globe. By definition, as merchants they are big, roomy and can carry enough supplies for an extended cruise. While they rarely have to deal with destroyers, cruisers are their natural predators. The release valve for the pressure cruisers can put on armed merchant raiders is surface warship raiders. A warship is more dangerous than an armed merchant raider,, faster, better protected, better armed, etc.

The surface warship raids of the early war not only destroyed commerce, they caused a lot of disruption (especially Operation Berlin, but I digress). Disruption can be just as important as destruction. Perishable cargoes spoil, time sensitive cargoes miss their delivery dates.

Concentration of force is in direct contrast to the second goal. The RN will gladly trade the KM capital ship for capital ship, cruiser for cruiser (or panzarschiffe, as the case may be) and will STILL come out with enough capital ships to counter the Italians and Japanese.

My thoughts,

 

[jsb]

2 Battleships and a heavy cruiser do not count as in force?

Not really against an RN battleline that did not need speed as the Germans are willing to fight all the old N&R/QE/Rs can join in.....

As for how it would be ignored?

The main issue is that KM can only realistically send such a force a few times a year so RN could just order all convoys home for the few weeks involved and then do anything it wants the rest of the year?

 

[Anarch King of Dipsodes]

RIKKO

???