a)yes but the key point is that they in fact only need to interdict a certain number of ports. In addition British bases are not merely arrayed handily around the US East and Gulf Coasts but also across every trade route globally...especially the most important ones from Europe
Yes, but only needing to interdict certain ports would have been true of the Union navy as well. More coast is going to mean more ports.
British ports around the world will no doubt be useful if interdicting US trade elsewhere, but that will have little impact on their ability to actually blockade the US coast (except inasmuch as it offers an additional deterrent to setting out at all). If anything, while these bases will no doubt be a net plus to the British war effort, they will be an obstruction to blockade efforts in that they will require some number of ships to be kept at these bases to do said interdicting.
b) The British have far more and far stronger ships than the US including as well as steam driven ships of the line (of which the USN is lacking), steam driven frigates also steam driven armoured floating batteries
Outside of perhaps a few ironclads, I don't think the advantage in quality was so serious that the British could disperse their navy over thousands of miles of coastline without making some effort to contain or destroy the US Navy to avoid being defeated in detail. And any effort to contain it will tie up a lot of ships - I would expect the British to want at least a 3:2 advantage or so.
This is not to say that the US Navy could defeat the RN and take control of the seas or that the British would be unwilling to enter battle without overwhelming odds. But any plan to blockade the US coast must account for the USN, and because the fate of the blockade will to some extent hinge on the fate of the USN, it would be foolish for the British to not want an overwhelming advantage there.
c) Conversely the US will be moving men and material by land which is anything from 10-100 times more energy intensive than sea travel and in addition will need to import large amounts of gunpowder and modern weapons if they are to face British reaction forces, the British had some 70,000 troops free to deploy in the home area backed by around 25,000 in depot companies and in addition had a scheme in the event of a major war to take up 22,000 men from the Militia to free regular troops from garrisons in the Empire. The Royal Marine Light Infantry and Royal Marine Artillery between them mustered 16,000 in 118 divisional companies and 17 artillery companies. Were the US to be starting from roughly the same starting position as ACW you might want to examine the lack of training provided to most of the State Militia and Volunteers as evidenced by Bull Run.
Pre-Civil War US weapons stocks consisted mostly of smooth bore weapons and most cannon were of a size suited to coastal defence or fortress emplacement not mobile use. The British on the other hand were introducing the Armstrong breech loader and had large numbers of bronze 9 pounders for field service. The Regulars, Royal Marines, Royal Navy personnel on landed service and by this stage the Militia and Volunteer Force were armed with the Enfield Rifle-Musket and mission specific variants and a surplus towards providing for war usage was being assembled.
This is all irrelevant to the ability of the British to blockade the US coast.
The British had possibly the largest merchant fleet in the world, not to mention ample funds to hire foreign shipping which would be unlikely to be required. Further a much greater proportion of the British fleet had steam as either auxiliary or primary propulsion while the US merchant fleet while of similar size IIRC at this time was still overwhelmingly wooden hulled sailing ships.
Canada is not going to be able to stand alone in this conflict. British population, British industry, and to some extent the British military are all overseas. These things will need to be shipped to Canada (well, the products of British industry will). I don't know who moves these things - I assume that it is some combination of the merchant fleet and the navy (even if the latter is only there in small numbers as escorts). Assuming that there is navy involvement, this will be some number of warships that are not able to be on blockade duty.
d) The Royal Navy had approaching 400 ships in commission most of which were in ordinary, once the Royal Navy mobilised for war there would likely be ample ships for the Empire and home defence and away matches in the Atlantic and Pacific.
As to blockade; a blockade is a formal notification to neutrals. To be legal it has to be effective. Effective suggests that a reasonable number of ships attempting to breach the blockade could be intercepted. The US blockade of ACW was able to work from early on because the British decided it was effective and pretty much everyone else in the 19th Century followed the rule of thumb that a blockade was defined by the Royal Navy. In addition a blockade need not be declared against a coast but against individual ports. This unlikely to be necessary for the RN but is an option.
[Bolding is mine] I don't believe that this is true in this case. The Paris Declaration is explicit in that it is only binding between signatories, of which the United States was not one. The US and the British Empire may agree to abide by it regardless (the US said that they would during the ACW regardless of not having signed), but that is not necessarily going to be the case.
The British may very well blockade individual ports, but my point is that I'm not sure that the British could effectively blockade the entire US coast, so that doesn't really conflict with my argument.
You say 400 ships in commission. That agrees with the number I see
here, so let's go with that. There's about 70 ships (those on harbor service, those under building, and the screw guardships that perhaps aren't useful for blockade service. So 330. Let's say that 20-25% of those ships on active duty are going to be kept abroad (either because they're busy there or for attacking US commerce overseas) - excluding the screw guardships, that brings us down to something like 300 ships in total. Wikipedia says that the Union had 160 ships blockading the south in early 1861, so let's go with that, and I frequently see people throw around the number of 60 ships to blockade the Union. I don't know if that counts the Pacific coast, but let's say it does. So that's 220 ships. It looks like the USN had about 80 warships or so in 1860, so let's say that the RN devotes another 80 ships to containing them. At this point, we have accounted for basically every ship in the RN. We didn't run out of ships, so maybe they can do it. But we're cutting it really close.
Further upon declaration of war the navies of both sides are free to attack, seize and burn enemy flagged shipping anywhere on the high seas or in belligerent waters. Even without a blockade the British have the greater ability to interdict the US merchant fleet than vice versa and the British had carried a significant proportion of US cargoes pre-war (they also did in the Civil War).
Now there are issues as the POD is so much earlier than the event under discussion and has a lot of potential oddball effects but given a pre-ACW US from OTL as a baseline and a pre-ACW British Empire from OTL as similar baseline the US would be in a lot of trouble without significant pre-war preparation. It should also be noted that Britain and the various Canadian colonies combined had a roughly equal population to the US and the British had roughly three times the industrial output by most measures and even greater advantages in ship building and armaments manufactures.
Please don't take me as arguing that the United States is going to come out on top in the conflict (or that they won't). The British certainly have a lot of advantages in military industry and overseas commerce. But I think that just assuming that the United States will be under blockade is risky - that's a big job, even for the RN.