Consequences of a Stalingrad breakout

[BlairWitch749]

I was talking about general attitudes toward breaking out. Prior to Stalingrad Germans were encircled several times and survived.

When did Seydlitz decide breaking out would be a good idea? Right after ring is closed (late November) or later when he took stock of situation and realized things were bad?

He agitated for a breakout as soon as the encirclement happened...now there where others who where calling for a withdrawal beforehand, notably gustav von weitershiem (who commanded the 14 or 16th I forget panzer corps on the 6th army's left flank at Rynok)... Weiternshiem who was a highly experienced armored commander was getting attacked by over 100 tanks a day, and wrote stinging memo's to the OKH and to Paulus himself that the left flank of the army was in severe jeopardy and calling for a general retreat back to the Mius to take up winter quarters whilst the army was still mostly in tact, Hitler fired him for being defeatist, threw him out of the army, and his next service assignment was as a buck private in a volksgenadier division (previously general of armored troops)

 

[Deleted member 1487]

He agitated for a breakout as soon as the encirclement happened...now there where others who where calling for a withdrawal beforehand, notably gustav von weitershiem (who commanded the 14 or 16th I forget panzer corps on the 6th army's left flank at Rynok)... Weiternshiem who was a highly experienced armored commander was getting attacked by over 100 tanks a day, and wrote stinging memo's to the OKH and to Paulus himself that the left flank of the army was in severe jeopardy and calling for a general retreat back to the Mius to take up winter quarters whilst the army was still mostly in tact, Hitler fired him for being defeatist, threw him out of the army, and his next service assignment was as a buck private in a volksgenadier division (previously general of armored troops)

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustav_Anton_von_Wietersheim
Could any of these men have influenced Paulus? Wietersheim sounds like a tragic figure who had a long record of opposing Hitler and was cashiered for being right. Who is to say Paulus couldn't grow a pair or eat a sniper's bullet at the right time?

 

[BlairWitch749]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Gustav_Anton_von_Wietersheim
Could any of these men have influenced Paulus? Wietersheim sounds like a tragic figure who had a long record of opposing Hitler and was cashiered for being right. Who is to say Paulus couldn't grow a pair or eat a sniper's bullet at the right time?

Wietersheim and Seydlitz did council Paulus that breakout was the only option and that he should bite the bullet and disobey orders... Manstein categorically ordered him to break out, putting the entire burden on his own shoulders, signing the order directly... Paulus instead relied on the council of his chief of staff Schmidt who was a hardcore Hitler buttboy nazi, and favored sitting put (as did a few of the division commanders)

Again Manstein being new to the theater, and being unsure of how far he could push Hitler (this being his first experience as army group commander) was critical, Manstein sent signals and physical orders (his intel officer Major Eisman was flown into the pocket) for Paulus to commence "Thunderclap" which would see him mass the remaining strength of the 6th army on the southwestern portion of the pocket and breakthrough towards Army Group Don. Paulus refused sitting on his higher orders from Hitler and dooming the army.

Wholer and Speidel both record that Manstein seriously considered relieving Paulus and appointing Seydlitz to command the army pending OKH approval... however he had been counciled on his way to take command of Army Group Don by Hans Von Kluge, that he couldn't move so much as a battalion without Hitler's permission, so he was very wary of the decision because he didn't know if OKH would accept it, or if he would have to threaten his resignation to get it done, or if Hitler would just fire him for overreaching

Paulus and Manstein prior to this engagement where long time fellow travelers in the general staff and had a relationship going back to at least 1934. Paulus misread Manstein's appointment as did Schmidtt, he took it as a sign that Hitler was wholey committed to reliving the pocket and that he should stand put and tie down as many Russian forces as possible... instead of realizing his friend had come to save him, but the only way out was if both armies attacked towards each other with all of their strength.

Now Manstein didn't fly into the pocket himself (it was freaking dangerous, and Eisman's aircraft was damaged by flak) but if he did, he could have made a serious personal plea to Paulus, or hell had him arrested on the spot and put Seydlitz in charge whilst clamping down on communications

Paulus growing a pair that late into the battle is ASB, but him being knocked off would be beneficial to the German cause

 

[Deleted member 1487]

Would anyone object to using Paulus' death as a POD for this one? Say a lucky (unlucky if you're Paulus) bomb falls on him during a sojourn outside the command bunker in October 1942. Seydlitz then gets appointed to command and when Uranus happens he breaks out early in the operation, late November, early December. This frees up a significant number of Soviet troops, who the attack in operation Saturn and suck in German reserves, who also need to hold the line to allow 6th army to recover and let the Caucasian detachment withdraw. Thoughts?

 

[jkay]

Case 1: would fail because they'd still have air inferiority.
Case 2: Torch would have to be delayed at least a month and a halfish - enough time for reinforcements to reach and have an effect before the airpower was sent off.

To my eye, success in the entire war correlates well to air superiority on the sides. At the start, the Axis was far ahead in both aircraft and success. At the end, the Allies were crazy far ahead in the air, and had no problems advancing even where tanks didn't work well. Tanks with air support were a vital combination, but tanks alone were less valuable than airpower alone. And, sure enough, I see from the wiki page that the Soviets were able to start a winning counterttack, hmm, less than two weeks after most of Luftwaffe 4 went away to resist Torch.