We are talking about the 19th century. Both of your examples were in the 20th century, when that practice had been normalized.
Not really king Muhammed Ali started with doing it even before he was king.
We are talking about the 19th century. Both of your examples were in the 20th century, when that practice had been normalized.
Not quite as much as you might think, since this is a common pattern in industrial development--think of Silicon Valley or Shenzhen today, for other examples (albeit not as extreme). There tends to be a kind of positive spiral effect from an industry becoming important in an area, where it drives the concentration of that industry and related industries in that same area. After all, a prominent industry being in a given area means that there are lots of workers that are experienced in working in that industry in that area (so that a new competitor can easily gain access to a skilled workforce), that suppliers of capital goods, raw materials, of components needed by the industry are already well-represented in the area (so that it is easy to get the things needed to make the whatever--and of course this has a reciprocal effect on those industries, which benefit from a concentrated and substantial customer base), and property owners, cities, regulators, and other entities are familiar with the needs of the industry (so there is less difficulty in setting up new factories or other facilities). The degree of consolidation is a bit high, but the overall pattern is nothing special.True! The namesake of the Springfield rifle, if I recall. It is curious, though, that basically all the rifle manufacture came from just a handful of cities in tight proximity to one another…
Detroit between 1910-1970ish would be another prime exampleNot quite as much as you might think, since this is a common pattern in industrial development--think of Silicon Valley or Shenzhen today, for other examples (albeit not as extreme). There tends to be a kind of positive spiral effect from an industry becoming important in an area, where it drives the concentration of that industry and related industries in that same area. After all, a prominent industry being in a given area means that there are lots of workers that are experienced in working in that industry in that area (so that a new competitor can easily gain access to a skilled workforce), that suppliers of capital goods, raw materials, of components needed by the industry are already well-represented in the area (so that it is easy to get the things needed to make the whatever--and of course this has a reciprocal effect on those industries, which benefit from a concentrated and substantial customer base), and property owners, cities, regulators, and other entities are familiar with the needs of the industry (so there is less difficulty in setting up new factories or other facilities). The degree of consolidation is a bit high, but the overall pattern is nothing special.
The CSA was also a major producer of rice too and some sugar caine.There was also a severe wartime paucity in edible food, despite the South's prestige as an agricultural powerhouse. The majority of acreage, after all, had been reserved for the cash crops -- cotton and tobacco -- and the more feudal areas of the country had traditionally been sustained by the Midwest for dietary needs, including "beef, pork, corn, flour, fruits, butter, [and] cheese" in the Antebellum. These commodities had been previously shipped by steamboat from the Upper Mississippi or by rail. Now, in wartime, this was impossible.
As the blockade intensified and the Union Armies occupied important counties, the Confederate Congress passed a resolution in 1862 pressing for the planting of consumer crops rather than export-bound staples. Some States made it illegal for farmers to "plant more than two bales of cotton per field hand." The Columbus Sun trumpeted "Plant corn and be free, or plant cotton and be whipped!" Other newspapers likened the planting of corn with patriotism and that of cotton with demonic intent. The majority of States, in order to insure supply of grain for food production, also stifled distillation of alcoholic products.
Some of the millionaire planters, however, argued that cotton-harvesting ought to be intensified for the purpose of diplomacy, the (in)famous 'King Cotton' strategy. Indeed, in 1861 there was in place a voluntary embargo of products in order to incite fiber-starved Anglo-French intervention and/or pressure from Yankee mill owners to recognize the Confederacy in order to resume normal trade relations. It proved a total failure in the aftermath of Sharpsburg/Perryville, even though the cloth-manufacturing sectors of the affected were seriously disrupted, forcing England and France to attempt to develop inferior sources in Egypt/India, which may prove to be more temporary than anything in the ATL. The Lincoln Administration was also pressured to undertake disastrous campaigns in the trans-Mississippi for the same purpose.
Naturally, Davis' government has received significant criticism over this since the beginnings of ACW scholarship, with the notion that Richmond could have directed the exportation of such an abundance of cotton in 1861 as to provide for the foundation of a sound financial system remaining ever-popular. This is wishful-thinking and largely improbable. De Bow himself recommended that the Confederate Government acquire ownership of at least a "million" bales of cotton, purchased with paper, and form a federal bureau in Montgomery to "arrange, order, and organize" its exportation. Already, at the end of 1860, British textile-mills were some four months behind their supply. The planters, with secession imminent, were rushing to sell. Since the crop of 1860-61 had indeed "broken records", many sources inform us that the market was so inundated with cotton that many mills suspended operation and prices were brought to a "standstill". The UK purchased 1,650,000 bales before Fort Sumter and Lincoln's subsequent proclamations of rebellion, volunteers, and blockade. By the conclusion of the fiscal year on August 31, 1861, an estimated 3,127,568 bales had been imported into England and Continental Europe. Thus, even with the increasing accuracy of the Union Navy blockade, the idea that the majority of cotton had been forlornly-withheld and not sold abroad in 1861 is sheer myth. Even so, 'cotton famine' was in progress by Summer 1862, rendering Anglo-French interest in mediation, at the Cabinet level, following Second Manassas all the more potent.
Jeff Davis himself provided an answer to this everlasting conundrum in a letter of his, addressed to his Treasury Secretary, C. G. Memminger, featured in a March 27, 1874, edition of the Charleston News and Courier, which provides the following quote:
"The Confederate Government was organized in February, 1861. The blockade was instituted in May, thus leaving a period of three months in which the whole cotton crop on hand, say 4 million bales, ought, according to this military financier, to have been shipped abroad. This would have required a fleet of four thousand ships, allowing one thousand bales to the ship! Where would these vessels have been procured in the face of the notification of the blockade? And was not as much of the cotton shipped by private enterprise as could have been shipped by the government? When so shipped, the proceeds of the sale were in most cases sold to the government in the shape of bills of exchange..."
He further quoted George A. Trenholm in that by the end of February 1861 some 3 million bales had been received at Southern seaports.
"... the great bulk of it had been exported to Europe or sold to the New England spinners. By the 1st of May, 586,000 bales more had been received and sold. England and the Continent took 3,127,000 bales; the New England spinners 650,000. It will thus be seen that before the new government was fairly organized the entire crop was already beyond its reach! Another crop followed, but the exportation in any quantity was an absolute impossibility..."
The first blockade-runner under government authorization was the SS Fingal, in the autumn of 1861, secured through the representation of J.D. Bulloch. It brought cargo of weaponry, Enfield rifles, ammunition, and such matérial to port at Savannah, causing popular elation throughout the South. Nonetheless, the Fingal would soon find it impossible to return to Britain with her exchanged cotton. She was then refitted as an ironclad-ram, redesignated the Atlanta, with her subsequent military attempts to punch-through Welles' naval siege resulting in disablement and capture.
The more I read the Confederacy was defeated largely, in part, due to its abysmal transportation system, not to mention a few gubernatorial fellows who willingly deprived the national effort. 1864 ironically witnessed several improvements and such, causing me to review Davis with more admiration than before.
More cotton and agrarian business to follow...
Many NA tribes in Oklahoma sided with the CSA hoping to get a better deal. Jefferson Davis also had an impeccable record with dealing with Native Americans going back to the Black Hawk War when he personally prevented the mistreatment of captives.When was this?
The CSA was also a major producer of rice too and some sugar caine.
In terms of education and literacy, I've read the War caused essential abandonment of planned libraries, college and university expansion, as well as for hospitals and other charitable institutions. Existing schools fell into disrepair, leaving thousands of children without proper instruction.
Why? That doesn't make any senseThe large planter class could actually be something of a benefit for future industrial growth in the South. With the old elites occupying a lot of the land, their well-off children could thus be attracted to investing in manufacturing, mining, oil, etc. as ways to earn money after being shut out from agriculture. Certainly this is a trend that was beginning as early as the 1830s with the development of works such as the ones around Etowah and Chattanooga (which granted saw considerable investment from Northerners), and there's no reason it wouldn't continue after the war.
The South was literally founded against centralization,We also have to remember that ITTL the South is an independent nation, and thus can pursue its own economic/trade policy separate from the North. The South can enact protectionist measures like the US did IOTL to foster the growth of a manufacturing base. A tariff or the added costs/hassle of international trade on imported fabric, for example, might compel planters in South Carolina to fund the construction of a domestic textile mill, which is something that happened IOTL anyways without the added barrier of international borders. Contrary to what most people might think, Southern leaders demonstrated a surprising willingness to exercise centralized control over industrialization efforts, albeit under the extenuating circumstances of war. The Augusta, GA powder works (one of the largest in the world at the time) was done almost entirely at the government's behest, just as one example. So, there is precedence for Southern leaders being willing to enact measures/policy designed to foster domestic industrial self-sufficiency, especially in the face of an external threat (like a revanchist North might pose postwar).
Stop being an apologist.The issue of education is a little murkier, since much of the effort towards establishing public schools in the South came on the part of Northern Reconstruction governments. However, there were many domestic advocates for the expansion of education opportunities in the South, at least at the collegiate level. Many universities were founded in the South before and immediately after the Civil War, and the South saw an expansion in new colleges in the 1880-1940 timeframe as a result of growing demands from agriculture, textile manufacturing, and later heavy manufacturing. Mississippi State, Clemson, Auburn, the University of Georgia, etc. were founded in large part due to the initiative of Southern leaders (although with the caveat that much of the money for their construction came from federal funds. A lot also came from the states and private investors, however, so it's a very nuanced scenario. It's likely without those federal funds many of those schools would not have existed, or would be smaller than IOTL, but it's always possible the Confederate government might set up its own version of the Land Grant system, if only to compete with the North). As for primary and secondary schools I personally think it's inevitable the South develops a public system. Increasing industrialization, the mechanization of agriculture, and rural development throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s would pretty much necessitate it.
Amazing that you only seem to care about the slave issue when it's about wanking the Confederacy.4) You can't just ignore the slave population since although the Confederacy did not allow them to serve in a combat role until very late in the war, slaves were still used to dig fortifications, provide war materiel, act as orderlies and general laborers with the armies, etc. In the North those roles were all taken by Union soldiers, so in effect this meant that the South could use a far greater proportion of their men under arms in combat roles.
How does talking about public education in the south make someone an apologist?Stop being an apologist.
He's basically arguing from a "The South will be literally like the North" perspective, ignoring all of the Southern issuesHow does talking about public education in the south make someone an apologist?
Yes, however, as the war went on, they had experienced centralization and its merits and decided to weaponize centralization to a much greater extent than the Union as a desperate efforts to salvage their sorry war economy (well, and to thoroughly suppress internal dissents and abolitionism).The South was literally founded against centralization
I see no sign of being an apologist. Indeed I see a rather well thought out factual examination.Why? That doesn't make any sense
The South was literally founded against centralization,
Stop being an apologist.
Amazing that you only seem to care about the slave issue when it's about wanking the Confederacy.
There are things like a new nation facing the difference between the ideals and cold hard reality. Look at the US of 1776 when it was against centralization and 1800 where it was MUCH less so There's is no reason the Confederacy wouldn't evolve once it won its independence and a lot of varied views within it to suggest it would.Why? That doesn't make any sense
The South was literally founded against centralization,
Stop being an apologist.
Amazing that you only seem to care about the slave issue when it's about wanking the Confederacy.
What does that even mean?they're a bunch of stupid people we don't like than who want to wank them.
When your country is built off white supremacy (Something that Confederate-wankers sweep under the rug or think it's good) , that's what you get.The op's entire question is based of this.
If you really want to have an honest discussion about the Confederacy, there's only one possible way of doing it. Analysing the suffering of the Black population in that country. Really go fucking deep on how each decision the CSA did affected its Black folks. Any other way is turning an eye from what the Confederacy was always meant to be.There are things like a new nation facing the difference between the ideals and cold hard reality. Look at the US of 1776 when it was against centralization and 1800 where it was MUCH less so There's is no reason the Confederacy wouldn't evolve once it won its independence and a lot of varied views within it to suggest it would.
There are also more people on these boards who assume the Confederates will make every stupid mistake, never reconsider anything or evolve and fail miserably because they're a bunch of stupid people we don't like than who want to wank them.
The op's entire question is based of this.
It is a strawman argument. The technical term 'stupid' also describes this type of argument.
Cato did an admirable of bringing a ton of evidence to the argument to combat stupid.
As a brazilian i always liked the idea of an independent confederacy becuse of how it would parallel latin american countries in many different ways, really shows how impactful the settler/exploitation colony divide is.I think the Confederacy would be less of a pariah and more of just “not particularly popular.” They’d be an Anglophone Brazil, basically.
(yes this is the premise of my TL)
The issue of education is a little murkier, since much of the effort towards establishing public schools in the South came on the part of Northern Reconstruction governments. However, there were many domestic advocates for the expansion of education opportunities in the South, at least at the collegiate level. Many universities were founded in the South before and immediately after the Civil War, and the South saw an expansion in new colleges in the 1880-1940 timeframe as a result of growing demands from agriculture, textile manufacturing, and later heavy manufacturing. Mississippi State, Clemson, Auburn, the University of Georgia, etc. were founded in large part due to the initiative of Southern leaders (although with the caveat that much of the money for their construction came from federal funds. A lot also came from the states and private investors, however, so it's a very nuanced scenario. It's likely without those federal funds many of those schools would not have existed, or would be smaller than IOTL, but it's always possible the Confederate government might set up its own version of the Land Grant system, if only to compete with the North). As for primary and secondary schools I personally think it's inevitable the South develops a public system. Increasing industrialization, the mechanization of agriculture, and rural development throughout the late 1800s and early 1900s would pretty much necessitate it.