Cold War Canada Wank?

[Riain]

I recently watched a YouTube video on Canada's CF5, in particular the story behind it's selection. I don't know much about Canada's defence policy overall, but from this video it looks like Canada changed what it wanted to do from defending Europe to mobile operations in support of peacekeeping in about 1968. To this end they bought C130s for mobility and the CF5A to provide air support in low threat environments, but apparently some time later earmarked the CF5A to deploy to Norway in WW3. Apparently this was a controversial decision, the RCAF looked at building the Spey Phantom in conjunction with Britain and selected the A7 which they would have liked to fly from their carrier as well.

• Does anyone know much about Canada's defence policy/strategy that drove these and other decisions?
• Could it be changed?
• If so, what would it be and what gear would Canada have acquired to discharge the policy/strategy?

 

[Gunnarnz]

My understanding is the the CF5 decision was driven in part by the need to keep the Quebecois happy, which meant shunting work towards the aviation industry in the province. The F-5 offered work that could be done in Quebec, and sufficient quantities of it to keep the grumbling to a minimum. Note that Canada ended up with far more F-5s than it wanted or could even use, and many of them got sold off to other countries in a disgracefully short time.

 

[Riain]

Yes, apparently the Spey Phantom would have been built by Canadair withe Rolls Royce supplying the engines. The CF5A was seen as a real downgrade for Canadair which were experienced at building far more capable aircraft.

 

[tomo pauk]

Jumping on the F-4 bandwagon ASAP would've been a prudent move IMO, started by early 1960s. A combination of US and Can production of parts with final assembly done in Can should be a non-problematic thing.

Low-threat work does not warrant a supersonic A/C, and can be undertaken by A-4s, A-7s, Fiat G.91, or by an armed jet trainer.

 

[Riain]

From what I understand from the video the responsible Minister was hell bent on the F5A and changed the rules to make sure it happened.

However the real kicker is that Canada had a Defence policy that allowed this, which is what needs to be changed. I've read other, disjointed stuff about Canada that suggests if Defence policy was lacking a serious purpose.

Firstly let me say I understand why the Arrow was cancelled, by 1959 it was clear the Ballistic missile had reduced the importance of the manned interceptor, in the same period British defence planning went from 20 Lighting sqns in 1957 to defend the V Bomber bases down to 5 sqns to intercept snoopers, decoys and recce aircraft. Obviously it's not worth putting the Arrow into production for 75 aircraft and no firm export orders.

However the submarine acquisition trajectory appears to be quite instructive on how Canada saw it's strategic situation in the 60s.

• 1957-59 Canada looking to acquire its own submarines to replace the RN 6th submarine divisions based in Novia Scotia.
• June 1959 Nuclear Submarine Survey Team recommended 5 Skipjack class SSNs
• 1960 proposal to Cabinet to buy 12 submarines, Navy offered the alternative to buy conventional subs
  • expensive Barbel-class submarines or six cheaper Oberons as part of a larger package of vessels
    • 3 Oberons is only enough to provide targets for ASW training, 6 in an offensive force
• August 1960 the nuclear-powered submarine option was passed over for conventionally-powered subs
• March 1962, Cabinet recommended the purchase of three Oberons and eight frigates
  • on the condition that the cost of acquiring the submarines from the United Kingdom would be offset by British defence purchases in Canada
• Conservative government postponed the acquisition of the Oberons due to the slow speed of the United Kingdom's attempt to offset the acquisition
• April 1963 Conservative government was defeated, the incoming Liberal government suspended all major defence procurement projects
• The United Kingdom offered the hulls of Ocelot and Opportune, but Canada passed on them.
• 1963 Onyx became available, Canada took up the offer. The final price of $40 million for the entire contract was agreed upon

Even before the 1968 shakeup it appears as if Canada was not interested in being a serious player in the world, passing on the opportunity to create an offensive submarine arm and then delaying the acquisition for political reasons several times. Funnily enough I can't find the surface ships referred to in the sub deal; Canada built 2 Annapolis class in 1960-64 and 4 Iroquois class 1969-73, which further adds credence of Canada withdrawing from being a serious player as early as 1960-62.

 

[Bougnas]

It's too old for me to remember and I will need time to find the book again, but I recall Canada heavily considering a lot of different things compared to OTL such as:
- acquisition of new tanks in the late 60s, apparently M60A1 but maybe there would have been a competition with Leopard 1 too
- creation of an airmobile unit on the same pattern as the Americans, including the acquisition of AH-1G Cobras on top of transport Hueys
- serious interest in the F-105, A-7 and F-4C in the late 50s and then in the 60s before the CF-5 buy, including even the option of selling the CF-104s (due to them becoming "useless" with the rapid abandonment of nuclear weapons by Canada after their acquisition) to buy F-4s, probably with the Voodoos being replaced by F-4s for the NORAD role as well.
IIRC, the RCAN had severe problems getting its plans for frigates and submarines through as well.

I fully agree that Canada withdrew from being a serious player and basically "hit well below its weight". Military spending as a proportion of GDP was already low by NATO standards even before Trudeau came in, and then fell below 2% from 1973 to 1982 (below 3% since 1965) when NATO average was closer to 3%. The Canadian population and especially GDP were greater than the Netherlands (GDP per capita was similar), yet NL only dipped below 3% in 1969 and stayed above 2% for the rest of the Cold War.
Canada was barely able to match NL when it came to the Navy (albeit with arguably older ships) and Air Force, but its ground forces were absolutely tiny in comparison even accounting for Canadian soldiers having high training by NATO standards.

Even ignoring the idea of a more normal budget, Canada could absolutely have sustained a more coherent commitment if it limited itself to only one on the ground. That is either the CAST aeromobile force for Norway (which OTL was anything but fast since its equipment was never prepositionned as intended), or the force in Germany. Canada could have either consolidated on a well equipped aeromobile force of preferably 2 well-equipped brigades with prepositionned gear and sufficient airlift capacity to be available early in WW3, or it could have consolidated a three-brigade heavy armored/mechanized division in Germany.
OTL late Cold War Canada was looking at buying 250 to 300 Leopard 2s or M1A1s, which were much more expensive than the Leopard C1s they got only 116 of, so realistically they could have easily paid for 250-300 Leopards, enough to equip said division AND keep training tanks at home instead of buying the AVGP Cougar as a training tank and glorified FSV for CAST.

Note that the Netherlands sustained a force of over 800 tanks after 1972, then got 445 Leopard 2s, paid for a Leopard 1 upgrade AND still wanted to pay to upgrade them again since the first upgrade failed, to the point where they calculated they could actually have got some an additional 332 Leopard 2s instead. I would be asking Canada to get only a third of that amount.

In any case, with more normal spending I think Canada could easily have retained its OTL airforce AND got a more potent navy AND got either the stronger CAST or the armored/mech division, which would have been of much greater value to NATO since this could have been enough to essentially replace or add one naval battlegroup (ASW or submarine), an armor/mech division or a significant portion of the planned NATO reinforcements for Norway*. This would have been especially interesting to the US who was willing to remove 2ID from Korea to get another airmobile or mech division for NATO commitments, and the UK which was always cash strapped.


*Ignoring the fact that IMO NATO was overcommitting or committing inefficiently to Norway but that's another topic

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Thread title made me expect something more substantial. Nope, just more brit planes...

I don't know much about Canada's defence policy overall, but from this video it looks like Canada changed what it wanted to do from defending Europe to mobile operations in support of peacekeeping in about 1968.

Canadian politicians* weren't really that interested in the Cold War during the late 60s and 70s. Defence procurement largely became a matter of pork barrel politics rather than best practices. Others have mentioned that the CF-116 was basically a make work project for Quebec, I'll add that this was also partially an effort to avoid repeating the loss of talent and prestige that had followed the CF-105's cancellation.

*I would specify the Trudeau government, but if you rewatch the electoral debates from the period it really was all the parties, even the Tories. In 1968 the defence debate wasn't over how prepared Canada was for WWIII, it was over whether or not NATO had outlived its utility.

Could it be changed?

That much is in the hands of the Soviets. The post Cuban Missile Crisis detente is what allowed this relaxation by Canadian law makers.

 

[Riain]

I think I've figured out what happened.

In 1968 Pierre Trudeau did a major re-org of the Canadian Armed Forces, in Europe this meant taking the Canadian Army out from BAOR, moving it to southern Germany and cutting it in half. The Air Force was to decline (taking advantage of attrition) from 8 CF104 sqns to 6 immediately then 3 by 1970 and abandoning the nuclear role. As a compensation in 1968 Canada formed the The Canadian Air-Sea Transportable Brigade Group (CAST) to reinforce Norway, with Army Units and a pair of CF5A sqns. The NORAD role remained pretty much constant with the Voodoos being swapped out for different Voodoos 1970-72 and BOMARCs being retired in 1972.

So there's the environment I think: tightening purse strings throughout the late 50s and 60s followed by a major re-orientation in 1968.

 

[Riain]

Thread title made me expect something more substantial. Nope, just more brit planes...

I don't think Brit planes are suitable, I think US kit is probably better suited for the RCAF.

I'm not a big fan of BOMARC, but it and the VooDoos are tied in with a deal with the US about manning the Pine Tree line, so there's probably not much that can be done there.

Canadian politicians* weren't really that interested in the Cold War during the late 60s and 70s. Defence procurement largely became a matter of pork barrel politics rather than best practices. Others have mentioned that the CF-116 was basically a make work project for Quebec, I'll add that this was also partially an effort to avoid repeating the loss of talent and prestige that had followed the CF-105's cancellation.

The whole CAST vs forces in Germany thing is interesting. Others have also said the CF5 build was about giving Canadair in Quebec work as well, which doesn't surprise me, but surely giving Quebec/Canadair work doesn't require a major shift in defence policy? Perhaps they could have built the A7 or something in Quebec for conventional attack in Germany and for the Navy on the Bonny and re-roled the CF104s for air to air.

*I would specify the Trudeau government, but if you rewatch the electoral debates from the period it really was all the parties, even the Tories. In 1968 the defence debate wasn't over how prepared Canada was for WWIII, it was over whether or not NATO had outlived its utility.

The tightarsing of the Navy prior to PT becoming PM bears this out.

That much is in the hands of the Soviets. The post Cuban Missile Crisis detente is what allowed this relaxation by Canadian law makers.

Even with the procurement tail wagging the policy/strategy dog OTLs decisions could possibly be changed.

IIRC a justification for scrap the Bonny was that since the Navy had recently done without it for a year while it was in a major refit they could do without it permanently. However if Quebec/Canadair was pacified with A7s instead of F5As then the Bonny might survive for a while to give the A7s something to do.

 

[jsb]

From what I understand from the video the responsible Minister was hell bent on the F5A and changed the rules to make sure it happened.

Is that not more that F5 was the only one that was sufficiently cheap to avoid drastically cutting numbers on OTL budgets? With hindsight, they should have cut numbers and gone with F4s as they could have been kept and cut all the F104s that could have been sold off moving to a single type of combat aircraft.

 

[TheCoolCucumber]

IIRC a justification for scrap the Bonny was that since the Navy had recently done without it for a year while it was in a major refit they could do without it permanently. However if Quebec/Canadair was pacified with A7s instead of F5As then the Bonny might survive for a while to give the A7s something to do.

It's important to understand that there were a lot of people in the RCN that wanted the carrier gone with no replacement. The RCN in the early 60s can basically be divided into three groups; the carrier faction, the guided missile destroyer faction, and the submarine faction. There was an understanding that even with 1950s levels of defence spending only one of the capabilities could be obtained. The submarines were probably the least popular of the three, because they didn't fulfill the requirement of providing air defence to Atlantic convoys in the event of WW3. It seemed as if the guided missile destroyer had won the battle, but then the 1963 election happened, the program was gutted , and what was left eventually resulted in the Iroquois class destroyers.

 

[Bougnas]

It's important to understand that there were a lot of people in the RCN that wanted the carrier gone with no replacement. The RCN in the early 60s can basically be divided into three groups; the carrier faction, the guided missile destroyer faction, and the submarine faction. There was an understanding that even with 1950s levels of defence spending only one of the capabilities could be obtained. The submarines were probably the least popular of the three, because they didn't fulfill the requirement of providing air defence to Atlantic convoys in the event of WW3. It seemed as if the guided missile destroyer had won the battle, but then the 1963 election happened, the program was gutted , and what was left eventually resulted in the Iroquois class destroyers.

Ah, loved when Western procurement completely missed what the Soviets were actually going to do.

 

[Riain]

It's important to understand that there were a lot of people in the RCN that wanted the carrier gone with no replacement. The RCN in the early 60s can basically be divided into three groups; the carrier faction, the guided missile destroyer faction, and the submarine faction. There was an understanding that even with 1950s levels of defence spending only one of the capabilities could be obtained. The submarines were probably the least popular of the three, because they didn't fulfill the requirement of providing air defence to Atlantic convoys in the event of WW3. It seemed as if the guided missile destroyer had won the battle, but then the 1963 election happened, the program was gutted , and what was left eventually resulted in the Iroquois class destroyers.

The overall theme appears to be that cutting capability and therefore saving money is fine with the electorate, except where there's a need to do some pork barreling.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

The whole CAST vs forces in Germany thing is interesting. Others have also said the CF5 build was about giving Canadair in Quebec work as well, which doesn't surprise me, but surely giving Quebec/Canadair work doesn't require a major shift in defence policy? Perhaps they could have built the A7 or something in Quebec for conventional attack in Germany and for the Navy on the Bonny and re-roled the CF104s for air to air.

What was the production cost of an A7 vs an F5A? Remember it's not just about procuring from Quebec it's about a relatively large production volume (to keep those jobs for a while) as cheap as possible (pocket book).

 

[Riain]

What was the production cost of an A7 vs an F5A? Remember it's not just about procuring from Quebec it's about a relatively large production volume (to keep those jobs for a while) as cheap as possible (pocket book).

I don't know, I suspect more expensive. The video also mentioned the obsession with numbers, for the reason you mention.

The whole thing is a shitshow, it looks as if a Canada-wank is difficult to impossible due to indifference on both sides of politics.

 

[Legofan4]

I don't know, I suspect more expensive. The video also mentioned the obsession with numbers, for the reason you mention.

The whole thing is a shitshow, it looks as if a Canada-wank is difficult to impossible due to indifference on both sides of politics.

I would assume that much of that is because they can always fall back on America's military. America will defend Canada because it is their own interest.

 

[Not James Stockdale]

Ah, loved when Western procurement completely missed what the Soviets were actually going to do.

Would carriers or SSNs have been the best tool for hunting Soviet SSBNs in the central North Atlantic?

 

[Riain]

I would assume that much of that is because they can always fall back on America's military. America will defend Canada because it is their own interest.

That and a lack of a direct threat.

In the same time period as Canada was reducing defence spending Australia was dealing with the Indonesia Confrontation of Netherlands and invasion of West Papua, trouble in Thailand leading to a deployment of RAAF Sabres, Indonesian Confrontation with the Commonwealth over Malaysia which lead to combat deployments and the deployment of substantial force to Vietnam. In 1963 Australia bought F111s, DDGs, M113s, all of which served well over 30 years, with the M113s still in service.

 

[Riain]

Would carriers or SSNs have been the best tool for hunting Soviet SSBNs in the central North Atlantic?

Obviously SSNs, but in the early 60s Canada had no submarines and SSNs were hard to come by and extremely expensive*. In contrast Canada did have an aircraft carrier that could easily have served into the 80s if the willpower and therefore money was available.

*HMS Valiant cost 24 million pounds, HMS Warspite cost 21 million pounds, the 3 Oberons ordered by Canada cost CAD$40 million or 24 million pounds including spares and setup costs.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

The whole thing is a shitshow, it looks as if a Canada-wank is difficult to impossible due to indifference on both sides of politics.

If your scope for a Cold War era Canada wank is limited to plane procurement in the 60s and 70s, sure.

Now let's instead go back to Dief the Chief and his efforts to revive the National Policy. Let's discuss northern development and an economic Commonwealth.