Caucasus 1942: Was it possible?

[ivanotter]

Alexander Werth is going into detail in terms of the 1942 Caucasus offensive:

"Hitler had long had his eyes on the Caucasian oil and thought that, by cutting the Volga supply route and also capturing the three Caucasian oil cities, he could knock out Russia... The capture of Baku was scheduled for the middle or end of August.
""

"There is no doubt that the Germans again underrated the Russian capacity of resistance; In the Caucasus, as elsewhere, they tried to do too many things all at once: (a) in the east break through to Grozny and then along the Caspian, to Baku; (b) in the niddle, break through to Vladikavkaz; .. (c) in the west, to break through to the Black Sea"

""General Tyulenev, the commander of the Transcaucasian Front, has since writen that if, instead of trying to do too many things all at once, the Germans had concentrated the bulk of their forces in the east, they might have broken through to Grozny and even to Baku."

"The Russian command obviously felt that the danger of a German break-through to Grozny and Baku was very real. Throughout August and September 90,000 civilians were mobilised.... as well as Baku itself, round which ten defensive lines were built. In fact, however, the Germans were stopped at Mozdok".

"By the beginning of autum about 100,000 defence works were built, including 70,000 pill-boxes.. 500 miles of anti-tank ditches.. 200 miles of anti-infantry obstacles.. 1,000 miles of trenches.."

Now, facts done!

Tyulenev says that Grozny and Baku could have been taken despite all the efforts.

IF Germany had managed to take Grozny and Baku and by and large the entire Caucasus, how would it have impacted on Stalingrad?

Assuming that Stalingrad would not have been attempted, merely blocking Volga, then what?

80% of the Russian oil came from Caucasus and could not be found anywhere else.

Would it have been the end of it?

Stalin must have seen that one thing is to defend the Caucasus, but a counter-offensive at the Don bend or further West would tip the scales. Would that still have been possible? Without a Stalingrad, how successful would the winter 1942 offensives have been?

Mars was a disaster and Uranus had some "fumbling", Saturn had to be down-graded, so there is room for "WI's".

In the event Germany had maanged the Caucasus, could they have stayed without also taking Stalingrad?

IF Germany had managed to take Grozny and Baku, occupying for a limited number of months and then destroyed the entire oil area upon leaving, then what? The oil would not be available for Russia either. Would this be a more plausible WI?

Ivan

 

[Mike Stearns]

The question is not is it possible without taking Stalingrad. The question how do you avoid Stalingrad become personal for both Hitler and Stalin?

 

[ivanotter]

Thanks. Yes, that is a crucial thing to avoid.

Let us assume that the original Case Blue is followed, where Stalingrad is not an objective in itself.

That said, could Caucasus have been conquered without also taking Stalingrad, never mind the "personality issue"? Would Stalingrad have been too much of a springboard?

Ivan

 

[Mike Stearns]

Thanks. Yes, that is a crucial thing to avoid.

Let us assume that the original Case Blue is followed, where Stalingrad is not an objective in itself.

You probably have to take Stalingrad, as its major transportation hub, but what you do instead of allowing your self to get bogged down there, is to leave enough troops to seal off the city and let it starve, but the rest of your army keeps going.

 

[Catspoke]

The tricky part if regardless of Stalingrad, communications in the area is poor, there is the military road to Tiflis and the coastal road along the Black Sea, and the costal road/railway along the Caspian Sea. All three would be pretty easy for the Soviets to block.

It is possible for the Germans to take Grozny and even to get as far as Makhachkala on the Caspian. Once Makhachkala was taken the Germans had plans to put some gun boats on the Caspian to interdict traffic. (its still a pretty long way from the German furthest advance though OTL)

http://www.german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/landingcrafts/nal/index.html

Grozny is still only like 15% of the oil though. The main objectives of Baku, and Batum to dominate the Black Sea are just to far and to easy for the Soviets to defend.

However I think the Germans could get in a situation where they could interdict traffic on the Caspian by air and sea which could hurt the Soviets economically and while it might be hard to get at the Soviets across the mountains it would be hard for the Soviets to counterattack from there too.

So if the Germans could take and hold Stalingrad and somehow continue to hold it over the the Winter 42 / 43 you could possibly be in a situation where serious famine starts to occur in the Soviet Union due to lack of fuel for agriculture (OTL there was considerable famine in the Soviet Union anyway).

 

[ivanotter]

Stalingrad is a tough one: On one hand it was a transport and manufacturing hub, which had to be taken serious. 62nd Army is a force to be reckoned with and any encirclement might not be successful if 62nd army is in control of the Stalingrad area.

Getting bogged down in Stalingrad was the un-doing of it all of course, but how to prevent it?

Encirclement will require troops on the East bank as well and now it becomes another thing.

Stalingrad is not easy to neutralise.

Let us look at some of the objectives of Case Blue as I understand it. If the objective was to deny Russia the oil, anything less than occupation might not work. It is difficult to "destroy" oil wells by bombing as it is typically a rather big area to invest.

IFGermany had managed to get to the oil regions proper and destroyed it all, then what? would that have been just as good?

Are we in essence talking about a Case Blue with a focus on the oil, no splitting in AG A and B?

Full force towards Baku in August. Even if they had to pull out in November, could they have destroyed the area, thereby denying Russia the oil?

Would it have been over then?

Ivan

 

[Shaby]

The distances involved are almost beyond comprehension. Without Stalingrad, the left flank will be hanging in the air and the entire front line would stretch for literary 1000s additional kilometers across the steppes, where there are little to no natural obstacles for defense.

Even capturing Astrakhan would mean very little and would not isolate the Soviet forces in the Caucasus as they could always communicate through Iran or receive supplies from the Allies.

Capturing the Caucasus range is most likely beyond the ability of the Wehrmacht in 1942. They'd need at least an additional panzer army. I think even then they'd have trouble coming up sufficient reserves to anchor that huge flank.

The additional trouble is the nature of infrastructure in this part of the USSR, which is, AFAIK, oriented on north to south axis, rather than east-west that would be more useful to the Germans.

So, the German success in the Caucasus is unlikely and without Stalingrad, might even result in a worse disaster than OTL.

 

[kung Zog]

Indeed, without Stalingrad taken the Soviet will have an unmatched ability to strike against an extremely exposed flank. Given the inability of German command to foresee Soviet offensives, and the loooong flank with a lot of possible breakthrough points, Germany might face an enormous encirclement. Note, however that taking Stalingrad would only somewhat alleviate this issue. The main difficulties would still remain.

 

[Shaby]

Note, however that taking Stalingrad would only somewhat alleviate this issue. The main difficulties would still remain.

As it turned out, Stalingrad gave the German forces in Army Group A enough time to get out of potential encirclement.

 

[kung Zog]

yea, I just meant that taking Stalingrad would not guarantee a success in the Caucasus. The problem of the long front still remains.

 

[Shaby]

Exactly.

Fall Blau was simply an operation that has been executed with insufficient forces and based on invalid assumptions of both enemy capabilities and forces and own capabilities and forces. In the correlation of forces it could only succeed if the Soviets blundered. Which they did not.

 

[aktarian]

Interestingly enough there is a POD that is rarely, if ever, discused. That is after capture of Crimea German 11th Army is not shipped to Leningrad front but rather pushed east from Kerch. While this doesn't improve German logistics, and would in fact increase their problems as they'd have to be supplied part of the way across the sea additional forces so far SE would increase Soviet problems. Even if 11th army just sits there or conducts limited offensive operations due to logistics) Soviets simply can't ignore them and have to divert forces from further north and/or reinforce that area instead of north.

Granted it would require German seaborne offensive but it would be fairly limited, made across short distance and could be supported from forces on Crimea. and I don't think Soviets had much in terms of forces that could initially oppose them, not after being mauled at Crimea.

 

[ivanotter]

1942 also "wrong-footed" Stalin insofar as he presumed that Gremany would have another go at Moscow.

Case Blue is an interesting learnign curve. It sort of sets out that Germany would like to go from A to B. Hoever, to go to B, it is necessary to ensure that C is secured. C cannot be secured without having D involved, etc etc etc.

It does become a matter of enought troops and materiel.

Even with Stalin wrong-footed, it failed as Germany wanted to do too many things all at once. But could they have any better at all?

Looking at the map, there is plenty of room for a Soviet counter-attack to cut off any force in Caucasus.

Kerch could have been a starting point, but I think it could have been too limited.

German sea borne invasions of the Black Sea coast could be an option, but Germany did nt exactly have any tradition of those things (nor landing craft).

Would an alternative have been to start South of Moscow to eliminate a Northern Threat (unlikely as it might seem). Should Blue have been attempted in 1941 instead of Moscow?

Ivan

 

[ahunter951]

Mobile defence and attack is the key

The German forces were at their most successful when allowed freedom to manouvere. As soon as they became static they became vulnerable to a soviet counter attack. Soviet forces throughout the war preferred set piece battle with little room for initative below divisional level. This is understandable as the Soviet forces are made up of people from all over the USSR who often struggled to understand one another. Once the Germans stopped moving it gave time for large combined armies to be assembled with massive artillery and armoured forces to decend upon a fixed German position. Space is not problem trading it with a large light screening force over several hundred Kilometres (like the Afrika Korps did in Libya). The Germans could keep a reserve counter stroke force and the majority of the Luftwaffe available to destroy Soviet forces as they present themselves on masse. Von Manstein occasionally was allowed to use this in a limited way by defying Hitler. In most cases it was very successful. The Germans have to push for the Caucasus to deny the oil to the Soviets.The proposed tactics allow superior command and control of the German forces to continually out manouvere large inflexible Soviet forces. Whether they destroy the fields or simply destroy the distribution system whilst retaining and securing their own oil requirements is upto them. Once the Germans tie themselves to capturing cities they fight the battle the Soviets want and the better training of the commanders and soldiers is lost against the size of the Soviet forces. Oil if secured for the Germans means a far more powerful military force throughout Europe with which the allies and Soviets must contend. Could the soviets be knocked out of the war ? If they have little fuel then they will struggle to keep warm and feed themselves. Population starvation is a real possibility without fuel

 

[aktarian]

The German forces were at their most successful when allowed freedom to manouvere. As soon as they became static they became vulnerable to a soviet counter attack. Soviet forces throughout the war preferred set piece battle with little room for initative below divisional level. This is understandable as the Soviet forces are made up of people from all over the USSR who often struggled to understand one another.

Actually it was the quality of Soviet officer corps, first hit by purges then loses in 1941 combined with purging of those that didn't live up to expectations.

Once the Germans stopped moving it gave time for large combined armies to be assembled with massive artillery and armoured forces to decend upon a fixed German position. Space is not problem trading it with a large light screening force over several hundred Kilometres (like the Afrika Korps did in Libya). The Germans could keep a reserve counter stroke force and the majority of the Luftwaffe available to destroy Soviet forces as they present themselves on masse. Von Manstein occasionally was allowed to use this in a limited way by defying Hitler. In most cases it was very successful.

To do this requires Germany to switch from strategic offensive to defensive, which in 1942 they still didn't do.

And it requires Soviets to play along. It worked until Red Army got their shit together, got better at this whole logistics thing and improved overal mobility. Long front allowed Soviets to concentrate where they wanted and being Maskirovka experts they often hid that fro gemrans. They can be strong where they want, Germans have to be strong everywhere. Keeping large mobile formations behind front means you can't use them elsewhere. So during Blau they can be either operational reserve for Don front or fighting in Stalingrad but not both. And splitting them, part here part there will mean they are too weak in both places.

The Germans have to push for the Caucasus to deny the oil to the Soviets.The proposed tactics allow superior command and control of the German forces to continually out manouvere large inflexible Soviet forces. Whether they destroy the fields or simply destroy the distribution system whilst retaining and securing their own oil requirements is upto them. Once the Germans tie themselves to capturing cities they fight the battle the Soviets want and the better training of the commanders and soldiers is lost against the size of the Soviet forces. Oil if secured for the Germans means a far more powerful military force throughout Europe with which the allies and Soviets must contend. Could the soviets be knocked out of the war ? If they have little fuel then they will struggle to keep warm and feed themselves. Population starvation is a real possibility without fuel

Are you aware how well Soviets wrecked oil fields they suspected Germans might capture? I think those fields became operational at 1941 levels in mid-1950s. Plus look at the map, the further Germans advance the longer the flanks. Plus shitty strategic logistics mean point forces will be supplied worse and worse.

Soviets can trade space for time knowing Germans are extending their finite number of formations further and further and they can stop them at Caucasus at the latest since Germans have about 0 chance of forcing those passes. And they can strike at gemran flanks when and where they want, even localised attacks could create problems for Germans forcing them to keep back mobile formations (with similar results as above)

 

[ivanotter]

Now this becomes interesting.

If Germany had managed to push a bit further and the Soviets had destroyed the oil fields themselves, then the oil would still not flow to Russia.

How close a call was that actually?

Although the Caucasus is big and distance is massive, there were few roads and fewer passes across the mountain range.

Would any outflanking have any success in the Caucasus? after all, it is not the steppe as around Stalingrad.

IF Germany had got closer than Mozdok, could they have forced the issue in respect of the oil?

Wrecking the infra-structure might have been good enough, denying Soviet the oil.

How long could Ruissia have survived if only a trickle of the oil from Caucasus got through (bearing in mind that USSSR got 80% of the oil from Caucasus).

IF Germany had secured the oil or at least denyed USSR the oil in 1942 (assuming no Stalingrad), how would 1943 look?


Ivan

 

[Julian]

I'll need to check my sources when I get home, but I believe that in trying to occupy the Caucasus Army Group A faced insurmountable obstacles. The sheer size of the region it intended to occupy, and the distances involved, doomed any long term operation as long as the enemy could resist. The space the Soviets had in 1942 allowed them to partially refit, rebuild, and reinforce the forces destroyed in July and August. Despite the logistic problems involved enough men and material were fed in to slowly grind German forces to a halt. Finally the two Army Groups lacked the forces to operate on three strategic axis; Voronezh and the Don, Stalingrad, and the Caucasus. Sending 4th Panzer Army south causes as many problems as it resolves by unhinging 6th Army's right flank and leaving it isolated/vulnerable to future destruction.

 

[ivanotter]

I agree. If 4th Pz had been turned South and not available, 6th army would be rather unhinged.

So, we end up with a logistics train too long, too few boots on the ground and a very long front line.

I still believe that driving South and suficiently far west was the best option for Russia when we get to September. In hindsight, I believe that the 14 September and 30 September efforts in Stalingrad should, when they failed, have decided it. Pull back. But it is in hindsight as it was close all the time.

Ivan