BURNISHED ROWS OF STEEL: A History of the Great War (Foreward)

[TFSmith121]

Responsees III: Return of the Respondi

EnglishCanuck;10089381 - Well who is going to be calling it a slavers war? They certainly aren't fighting for the Confederacy or even with them. A war for national honor is much more popular, and if Union propoganda wants to call it a slavers war the British can shrug and point out they aren't allied with the Confederacy.

Well, the Americans, certainly; they had a way with words. There's this guy named Lincoln...

Well you did point out how some members of the British populace aren't doing well economically with the lack of trade ITTL, which would lead to some men going into the armed forces due to need. Then there's national pride on the line (something a Brit will fight for just as much as an American) so there is going to be incentive to join.

Yes; but mobilizing from civvy street takes time and money. I'm just trying to make it clear that the Operation Imperial Storm trope in 1861-62 has to face the same realities Britain had to deal with in 1854-56, 1899-1901, and 1914-18. Once the regulars start getting attrited (combat, illness, human factors, etc) the Hostilities Only types are not quite the Thin Red Line, generally.

As to the numbers well I think we'll have to agree to disagree there since we've probably hashed that out at least a dozen times now.

True. As ever, I'd love to see a muster list/roster/TO&E for the V&SM in the Province in 1861-62. My take on that is based on Chartrand, Hitsman, the 1867 List and going backwards, and I realize that is not as strong a method as using the 1861 and 1862 British Army Lists. However, it is what I have. I am trying to avoid handwaves.

Certainly true; there are those Europeans who will, however, applaud any crowned head dying under the guns of a republic, and there will be many more who don't care, one way or another.

Well the point is who do the Americans have to value more? The people wearing the pointy hats or the people not wearing them? Considering Nappy III was fickle at the best of times I imagine Lincoln is going to want to go out of his way to not antagonize his sensibilities at least

And that's fair; sort of hard to make that determination on a smoke-filled 1860s-era battlefield, at sea or ashore, however. The US does have an in with NIII that the British do not, however. More to come.

Well, they presented it, but it didn't go anywhere, did it? And the bill that failed was the one that called for 50,000 active service and 50,000 second line militia; that's the one that led to John A. being told to take a hike. John S.'s version cut those numbers in half, reduced the active component to staff, and reduced the actual expenditures by a large amount. Not quite the same...

Well reading the memoirs and notes John A's didn't go anywhere because quite frankly John S. felt it was expensive and left the militia fending for themselves and his own bill was passed basically as soon as he took office, and didn't exactly differ in any significant way from John A's save for taking on the cost of equipping and billeting the militia while shrinking the number to 35,000 (and not shrinking the number of second line units but shrinking their training time). So other than petty politicking (something Canada between 1840-66 is infamous for) that's not exactly a lack of will to spend on their own defense.

Understood, but again - it's what I have. There certainly seems to have been opposition from the Francophones, and some lack of enthusiasm even amongst Anglophones. Again, my point here has simply been to make it clear that 1862 is not 1914. Fair?

Pointless in terms of getting something through London, undoubtedly; with Grant, Heintzelman, et al present in force and making nice, who can say? It's certainly more plausible than the CEF of 1914-18, and even that was opposed tooth and nail by most of Francophone Canada - as witness Bourassa. Who was whose grandson, again?

Since said men signed it to make a point to London (which London read loud and clear) that actually speaks volumes for how willing the Colonial and Provincial governments were willing to cooperate in this period. In fact consider the biggest disagreement between London and Montreal in this period was Victoria choosing Ottawa of all places for the capital! (OK the lumber barons had a big say in that, but still! Ottawa!?).

Ah but Grant and Heintzleman aren't occupying them and making nice are they? That would be the unelected Provisional Government in Ottawa, who have zero chance of not inflaming the sensibilities of French speaking Catholics and English speaking Protestants who would want them gone

Grant and Heintzelman are exercising masterful inactivity. Perhaps the situation will get to the point where the Anglophones ASK for US intervention?

What is there to garrison? As long as the British regulars are gone, and the USN controls the lakes, and the US and CPG control the canals and railroads, what are the Anglophones going to attack? Their own cities?

Well point of fact the US has to garrison (at the very least) places like Cornwall, Kingston, Montreal, Richmond, Toronto, Hamilton, and London to insure that all the existing rail lines and supply bases (and honestly Toronto is the major hub on Lake Ontario) to keep their forces supplied are totally secure. The PG certainly isn't going to be doing that and the locals won't be over anxious to make the US supplies run smoothly either.

Undoubtedly; my only point here is the US in Upper Canada in 1862 is not going to be the Germans in Paris in 1942. Again, fair?

Richelieu River/Chambly canals, and the railroads from Plattsburgh to Montreal - hardly an exposed line of communication.

Railroads? The major one runs to Portland (under siege) and the other isn't exactly a major rail route. The rivers work, but all it takes is a few unhappy people to make using the canals difficult and the river will freeze over come winter. That is going to make supplies slow going and cause one hell of a bottleneck, which means controlling the supply routes and territories along the St. Lawrence and Lake Ontario.

Yes, but there's a nice line north from Plattsburgh to Montreal, and the GTR actually ran south from Montreal through Vermont and New Hampshire (including connections south) before it even got to Maine. The US has some options here, which, again, is all I'm trying to point out. They don't have to be jackbooted thugs, and given their record in 1861-62 regarding the rebels, will probably not be...

Well, by whom? The county sheriffs of Canada West? Basically, this is the Anglophones' sole opportunity to avoid the hard hand of war - do you really think there are that many who would say "huzzah" and try and fight a guerilla war against an occupier that, by the way, is not in occupation? I wasn't aware that bushido was a Canadian attribute. The Anglophones can go to Ottawa and jaw jaw with the PG all they want, establishing their loyalty in case things reverse on the battlefield, but absent control of Montreal (which controls the Ottawa River, the canals, the lakes, and the railroads north of the Saint Lawrence) it's pretty much moot.

The people who don't want to be ruled by illegitimate foreign stooges? Namely all of Canada West, the bastion of Canadian Loyalism and Conservative politics? Then you have the clergy and the economically powerful landed elites who know that many of the men who make up this government are hostile to their interests (something men like Molson would have to account for when asked why exactly they are supporting such a government). Why would they follow the orders of a government which is 100% illegitimate, one that by its very nature means their leaders and elites harm and one which by its very nature is going to be divisive?

What will the PG do if people just refuse to comply with any of their policies or continue trying to aid the British? Arrest them? With who? The local police? No a chance that Protestants will be willing to send their fellows off to jail at the behest of French Catholic radicals. Then what send the militia? That might cause a fight with the locals or the militia will just refuse. Who is going to sort that out? The PG then has to appeal to the US, which makes occupying the area necessary just to ensure that the PG is even complied with.

Even if the British are losing the Canadians aren't going to bend over backwards to work with the government you have set up, and will resist it since it is in their best economic and political interests. That means for the US to even have them as useful allies they are going to need to step in and support them otherwise all the PG is, is a bad joke and a weight around the Americans necks.

Then the point is what will the US do if people don't comply? Burn their villages? Hang them? Imprison them? In Canada East if the clergy extort people to resist what will the US do? Imprison bishops? That's going to lose them friends fast.

If the radicals couldn't win the support of the populace and elites on their own in 1839 how is the impression that they are foreign stooges kowtowing to the whims of a foreign regime (which apparently supports these radicals who have ideas that aren't quite what any of the local elites would like) going to win the support of the populace?

In short the US has to help them with troops, which makes it an occupation. There is zero way around that. It's handwavium otherwise.

To a degree - but it is also an exercise in (potentially) creative chaos. "Please don't throw me in that briar patch, Brer Denison!"... Too sneaky?

Um, between 1849 and 1860, 200,335 overland migrants headed for California (79% of the total population on the trails) while 53,062 headed for Oregon. Presumably Conestogas can go east as well as west, true? And while the USG would not redeem paper in specie until the Specie Redemption Act of 1875, it would certainly buy specie with greenbacks; and given the necessary pressure, mining by federal contractors would not be out of the realm of possibility, either.

Sure they can send gold west, in small amounts, in heavily guarded wagon trains, over territory which is unforgiving and which killed at least a few hundred people every year. These of course will be slow, and subject to all the hazards of people coming west. Hell an entire convoy might be killed off from disease if they're incredibly unlucky!

East, actually. The big advantage is the toughest part (crossing the Sierras) comes at the beginning of the trip east, rather than at the end of the trip west. Certainly easier to cross the Plains in the winter than crossing the Sierra Nevada or the Rockies (ask the Donner Party - don't take no cutoffs). Also, New Mexico and the Old Spanish Trail gives an option to cross south of the Rockies. Is it the Union Pacific? No, but it's also not insurmountable.

Fact is it will be a trickle, that (like OTL) won't make a dent in spending on the war and will do nothing to prevent greenback inflation. It will be even less of one which will make the inflation (combined with the loss of the nations major trading partner) worse!

Also contractors and new mining? With what supplies? I'd assume by this point (September) all the gunpowder not completely needed for the war effort is already being used. Not to mention many of the men necessary for such work are going to be in the army or competing with cheaper freedmen. A nasty little recipe there for sure.

The economic impacts are all very real; again, my point here is that with the resources of a continent at their feet, the Americans are not going to fold their tent - they did not in 1775-83 or 1812-15, after all. As far as mining goes, well, there's always pick and shovel work...and, of course, hydraulic mining in the Sierra foothills. That's not hard-rock, far from it; all placer.

The US will have a very centralized idea of federal administration when this is all over, certainly, but that is not a-historical for the period. The Freedmen's Bureau was totally new, but it was accepted as necessary; the Mining and Nitre Bureau does not seem like that much of a stretch, in terms of organizational theory and the construction of a bureaucracy. Certainly not in a country where national arsenals and naval shipyards were widely accepted.

Undoubtedly; tends to tick off various and sundry European powers, however. There's a reason there were two Leagues of Armed Neutrality, after all.

Why? What European countries will be so worried about trade with the US that they will take umbridge to their boats crossing the Atlantic being searched by a lawful British blockade?

Presumably, those who can make a (gold or silver) buck, but wait and see.

Certainly, but none of the above is free; there are opportunity costs (presumably at least the cost of the naval elements of the Russian war, if not greater, given the lack of the French alliance because they are neckdeep in the Big Muddy over in Mexico), and the Americans have the ability to inflict losses the Russians never had...

No, but it's pretty cheap for the largest ship building economy in the world. And I fail to see what ability to inflict losses the Americans have the Russians lacked. Ironclads? Not a trump card. Mines? The British were sweeping those in Crimea...

A Navy willing to fight? Both in the coastal/littoral zone and at sea raiding commerce? Neither was something the Russians really tried in 1854-56.

Well, there was Master Thomas Boyle and the good ship Chasseur, except their equivalents in 1862 would be all duly commissioned - and in terms of numbers, to the umpteenth power. And with steam. It's not going to be cheap for the British, by a long shot.

Well they could commission all the ships they want, where will these ships get supplies, how will they take on the convoys, how will they sneak past British squadrons, how are they going to arm/equip them?

Of course more importantly, how are they going to do what the American ships in the ARW and 1812 failed to do? Not one of them is going to stand up in even a short engagement with a British warship.

True, but they are not looking to fight British warships, they are looking to run down British merchant shipping, including the 90 percent of the merchant fleet that were still sailing vessels in the early 1860s. And maybe an unarmed steamer or two...the chapter on the raider USS Powhatan, for example, is an espy of the career of Alabama. Did that seem outlandish?

Again, thanks for all the help, the critical and informed read and comments, and the general courtesy; I appreciate it.

Best

 

[TFSmith121]

Yep, exactly...

The battle was quite good- seems even to me (although I must qualify that I'm never very good at reading deep into descriptions of battles). Perry slinks away and it seems the British lose more, although the Americans didn't pull off a total victory what with their losses.

Creagh's force - which, to be fair, is basically surprised at dawn by an unconventional attack, in very restricted waters, and with vessels that are meant to fight broadside in salt water - suffered 75 percent losses (the Chinese sank three similar gunboats at Second Taku Forts in 1858, and that was in response to a deliberate British attack, so that doesn't seem outlandish to me).

Stringham's force - despite the advantages outlined above - ends up suffering 66 percent losses, including one of the only two actual built for the purpose warships in the group.

Both squadrons end up losing their flag officers, and a number of useful professionals. The US can hold the river south of Lake Saint Pierre (which seems reasonable to me, especially given the combination of shore batteries and riverine forces); but the British still control the Lake.

Perry escaped, largely because of Escort's position in the line and his knowledge of the river; once I found him in the DCB, I figured I had to use him - plus, a "British" Perry just seemed a little too fortuitous. Stranger than fiction. I could have suggested he'd go with the Canadiens, I suppose, but I thought this seemed much more likely and offers yet another example of how likely divided loyalties would be in a Province of Canada that became a major battleground of an Anglo-American war.

Once I came across Alden et al, the oil boats sort of suggested themself; I was also trying to suggest that there is technical change in the offing even greater, in a lot of ways, than coal-fired steam...

All in all, it seemed like a fair outcome to me. Riverine/lacustrine warfare is different, and the US, historically, did pretty well at it.

Thanks for reading, and the post.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Thanks - I wasn't trying to be anachronistic, but

Excellent update! Loved the river action! The American attack on the British gunboats was most ingenious

However, two thoughts: One, why would Nelson make nice with Papineau? He certainly had a fairly low opinion of the man during and after 1838. He might be willing to do it if he had no other choice, but if he could make himself out as a better leader he probably would at this point.

Two, the sacking of Sorel is a tad unlikely. It's out of character for the British and even the Anglophone volunteers. While they might have no compunctions about setting the town ablaze in battle and then not putting it out the British wouldn't be incredibly likely to simply let a sack of the place go ahead, especially if the place is on fire and they'd already begun negotiations with the local elders.

Thanks - I wasn't trying to be anachronistic with the oil boats, but once the Western Pennsylvania oil boom hit, it just seems someone is going to see the possibilities - and when I found Alden and Brereton in Cullum's Register, and their post-Army (but pre-1861) careers, it seemed even more likely.

Ellet et al are historical as well, as are all my naval officers turned army officers turned riverine warfare specialists - faults and all. Chapman was a standout; Revere, not so much.

Nelson makes nice in the sense of not turning his back on the cause he was willing to fight and die for essentially his entire life; he and Pap would never be political comrades in arms, obviously, but necessity seems likely - and Sorel was his home town. Again, if it wasn't real life, people would say it was ASB.

My take on Sorel is a combination of York in 1813, the score settling likely in any "civil" war, and the simple reality that this sort of thing happens in wartime - and if it does not, there are always those who will suggest that it did.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

True - and, for what it's worth, consider the source:

I think it's more supposed to be a "this wasn't sanctioned but events got ahead of us/out of control" sort of thing.

True - and, for what it's worth, consider the source: although I may not be really good with the different voices, what "works" I am excerpting from is sort of calculated...

Some are, perhaps, more useful than others.

The first person sections I try and make completely straightforward. The various (fake) books? Um, need to be read critically...

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Certainly true, but if Christie/Cristie is KIA....

Well with orders given before the battle to avoid just such a debacle and negotiations with the local elders already underway it is something which should be rather easily avoided, especially since by the sounds of it most of the town was pretty badly banged up in the opening engagement.

While they might not stop the Anglophone volunteers from looting their way through some damaged houses, the British wouldn't be quite so stupid as to allow their men to intentionally sack the place.

Certainly true, but if Christie/Cristie is KIA.... and there are no Americans to surrender "officially"?

This is (obviously) based on York in 1813, down to Pike's orders to his troops (here, given to Christie/Cristie); yet, the Major/Major General was an Indian Establishment officer, and things were different in India...they did use the "blow them from the muzzle" method of execution, which even the US at its worse - Mankato, for example - used what was regarded as appropriate for anyone...

And, I tried to work enough fog of war into it that no one could accuse me of offering a mustache-twirling espy of Bansatre Tarleton as the villain with a capital V.

Best,

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Thanks - I wasn't trying to be anachronistic with the oil boats, but once the Western Pennsylvania oil boom hit, it just seems someone is going to see the possibilities - and when I found Alden and Brereton in Cullum's Register, and their post-Army (but pre-1861) careers, it seemed even more likely.

Ellet et al are historical as well, as are all my naval officers turned army officers turned riverine warfare specialists - faults and all. Chapman was a standout; Revere, not so much.

Nah it's just an insanely practical tactic in such confined spaces. Wooden ships still burn after all

Seems like the likely outcome there.

Nelson makes nice in the sense of not turning his back on the cause he was willing to fight and die for essentially his entire life; he and Pap would never be political comrades in arms, obviously, but necessity seems likely - and Sorel was his home town. Again, if it wasn't real life, people would say it was ASB.

He's an interesting figure for sure, but he hated Papineau (like many of the surviving radicals) for the very reason that he did stay and fight while Papineau fled, Wolfred and Robert Nelson would be amongst the first to denounce him as a coward. While they would pledge allegiance to the PG they would certainly demand Papineau's removal.

My take on Sorel is a combination of York in 1813, the score settling likely in any "civil" war, and the simple reality that this sort of thing happens in wartime - and if it does not, there are always those who will suggest that it did.

Certainly true, but if Christie/Cristie is KIA.... and there are no Americans to surrender "officially"?

This is (obviously) based on York in 1813, down to Pike's orders to his troops (here, given to Christie/Cristie); yet, the Major/Major General was an Indian Establishment officer, and things were different in India...they did use the "blow them from the muzzle" method of execution, which even the US at its worse - Mankato, for example - used what was regarded as appropriate for anyone...

And, I tried to work enough fog of war into it that no one could accuse me of offering a mustache-twirling espy of Bansatre Tarleton as the villain with a capital V.

Minor problem in comparisons though. Here the town seems to be half burnt to the ground already by the naval bombardment. Negotiations to surrender the city have begun and if the fighting continues the British can simply knock the town down and call it battle. There's no need for a 'sack' and if the British had their troops well enough in hand (unlike the idiots under Pike's command in 1813) that they can be negotiating there should be zero problem in continuing to flush the remaining insurgents out while also keeping the Anglophone volunteers in line.

That the town is already on fire and there's only a few scattered insurgents running around isn't likely to provoke a sack. Sure they might torch a few buildings to smoke out the remaining insurgents/spite the traitors, but there really isn't the possibility for anything like the two day looting of York in 1813.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Well, the Americans, certainly; they had a way with words. There's this guy named Lincoln...

And he is going to sway the Anglo-French-British populace with what exactly? He can't exactly call it a slavers war when Britain is pretty clearly not on the side of slavers. That would probably be laughed at since at this point its a bald faced lie.

Yes; but mobilizing from civvy street takes time and money. I'm just trying to make it clear that the Operation Imperial Storm trope in 1861-62 has to face the same realities Britain had to deal with in 1854-56, 1899-1901, and 1914-18. Once the regulars start getting attrited (combat, illness, human factors, etc) the Hostilities Only types are not quite the Thin Red Line, generally.

Not but it's not impossible to maintain their force levels either. Certainly not with what Palmerston has to work with.

And that's fair; sort of hard to make that determination on a smoke-filled 1860s-era battlefield, at sea or ashore, however. The US does have an in with NIII that the British do not, however. More to come.[/I]

That's going to take some fairly compelling evidence since the US had nothing in 61-65 that Napoleon wanted and he had huge opportunities to gain from allying with Britain and a very juicy economic incentive to recognize the Confederacy.

In fact the Americans are probably being played like violins by Nappy right now, he can trade with and arm the Confederate states with impunity, the Americans will be forced to sign a treaty recognizing his claim in Mexico, and he has nobody to tell him no. That's quite a bit of crow for the Americans to eat to keep him neutral...

Understood, but again - it's what I have. There certainly seems to have been opposition from the Francophones, and some lack of enthusiasm even amongst Anglophones. Again, my point here has simply been to make it clear that 1862 is not 1914. Fair?[/I]

Yes but can you say that George Brown, and John S might not be willing to pass such legislation and cooperate with MacDonald in the face of an American invasion? That's pretty unlikely, especially considering how important George Brown was to John S. and Brown's considerable distaste for both annexation and the US...

No one is asserting Canada of 1862 is Canada of 1914 of course. What I do maintain is it's not the Canada of 1838 either.

Grant and Heintzelman are exercising masterful inactivity. Perhaps the situation will get to the point where the Anglophones ASK for US intervention?[/I]

The point is that the Provisional Gov actually can't do that. That gives the lie to the idea they have any legitimacy other than American power and makes their rule totally unenforcible except on the back of American bayonets. If Buell is right then the Canadians can lynch the whole lot and there will be no consequences, except there will have to be consequences and Buell will be a liar...

Either they have to be removed by angry Anglophones and Francophones who then put a different government (which the Union would understandably not want) or they ditch any attempt at being legitimate and basically declare themselves there at the US request.

Either way, they need US troops to survive and the US needs them to survive since they're the only clowns willing to work with them that they know of.

I would sincerely like to hear a compelling reason why the elites and people in either of the Canadas would willingly accept an illegitimate government that is hostile to their interests.

Undoubtedly; my only point here is the US in Upper Canada in 1862 is not going to be the Germans in Paris in 1942. Again, fair?[/I]

Fair, but the Canadians still don't want them there. What will they do if someone derails a train? Sabotages a canal? A supply barge? Give them a stern talking to?

Like I've said they can't exactly rely on their local illegitimate allies to be able to enforce the law.

Yes, but there's a nice line north from Plattsburgh to Montreal, and the GTR actually ran south from Montreal through Vermont and New Hampshire (including connections south) before it even got to Maine. The US has some options here, which, again, is all I'm trying to point out. They don't have to be jackbooted thugs, and given their record in 1861-62 regarding the rebels, will probably not be...[/COLOR]

They don't but they still have to be occupiers. Which won't swing brilliantly with their allies or the other Canadians.

To a degree - but it is also an exercise in (potentially) creative chaos. "Please don't throw me in that briar patch, Brer Denison!"... Too sneaky?[/I]

It also doesn't make sense. Can you say why they're just going to sit back and let a farce of the PG stand? I mean Canadian's appreciated that they had a democratic process and political parties, a group of people just declaring themselves the new government is going to fly about as well in Canada as it would the US.

That is to say, badly.

East, actually. The big advantage is the toughest part (crossing the Sierras) comes at the beginning of the trip east, rather than at the end of the trip west. Certainly easier to cross the Plains in the winter than crossing the Sierra Nevada or the Rockies (ask the Donner Party - don't take no cutoffs). Also, New Mexico and the Old Spanish Trail gives an option to cross south of the Rockies. Is it the Union Pacific? No, but it's also not insurmountable.

It's not insurmountable, but it's a poor substitute, and it's still gold they can't spend. It has to be used as it was OTL, a hedge against inflation.

The economic impacts are all very real; again, my point here is that with the resources of a continent at their feet, the Americans are not going to fold their tent - they did not in 1775-83 or 1812-15, after all. As far as mining goes, well, there's always pick and shovel work...and, of course, hydraulic mining in the Sierra foothills. That's not hard-rock, far from it; all placer.

The US will have a very centralized idea of federal administration when this is all over, certainly, but that is not a-historical for the period. The Freedmen's Bureau was totally new, but it was accepted as necessary; the Mining and Nitre Bureau does not seem like that much of a stretch, in terms of organizational theory and the construction of a bureaucracy. Certainly not in a country where national arsenals and naval shipyards were widely accepted.

Problem. Having a continent at their feet didn't win the war for them in 1775-83 (that would be some generous French funding and supplies) and in 1812-15 the economy suffered quite nastily despite that continent...

The point on powder is that unless Dupont has worked a miracle and is supplying the Union with an amazing amount of nitre a month (which when you consider the excellent calculations Leconte did for the CSA that's not happening) the Union doesn't have an inexhaustible supply of the stuff and making enough to sustain all operations on two major fronts, all your coastal fortifications, and whatever Navy remains isn't cheap, and for all the Union's resources isn't possible either with what is available to them in 1862.

Put simply, there is either a powder shortage right now or something isn't right.

As to the huge national bureaucracy, that's more growth, more jobs, and more complexity that is going to be a challenge to the Union, not an immediate asset. It wasn't until 1863 they could even print enough greenbacks to meet demand OTL, now they need yet more greenbacks to supply and pay for all this. That money quite simply, doesn't exist yet and there's not enough gold in the Union to even make a dent in the amount that needs to be purchased.

These aren't minor problems either.

Presumably, those who can make a (gold or silver) buck, but wait and see.[/COLOR]

Who is going to give them a gold or silver buck? Not the US.

A Navy willing to fight? Both in the coastal/littoral zone and at sea raiding commerce? Neither was something the Russians really tried in 1854-56.

Well they had both in 1775 and 1812, for all the good it did them. This isn't exactly changed dramatically in 1862 either. They can certainly hurt the British more, but I don't think it's enough to seriously inconvenience them.

True, but they are not looking to fight British warships, they are looking to run down British merchant shipping, including the 90 percent of the merchant fleet that were still sailing vessels in the early 1860s. And maybe an unarmed steamer or two...the chapter on the raider USS Powhatan, for example, is an espy of the career of Alabama. Did that seem outlandish?

Not if it's only the Powhatan having that level of success. There's a reason the Alabama was famous. The remainder however are going to have to run into a British warship sometime, or go to port. Then it's on to a fairly tragic end when cornered by the RN, as happened in before.

Commerce raiding has never been a war winning strategy, and the US can't even touch the commerce that matters, the convoys going from Britain to North America. They can inconvenience British trade, but that didn't help them in 1775 (even with France, Denmark and Spain helping) or 1812. Nor did it help the Germans in 1914.

Commerce raiding is all well and good, but it doesn't get you supplies or break the blockade.

 

[TFSmith121]

Yep, they do...

EnglishCanuck - Nah it's just an insanely practical tactic in such confined spaces. Wooden ships still burn after all

Seems like the likely outcome there.

Yep, they do...

He's an interesting figure for sure, but he hated Papineau (like many of the surviving radicals) for the very reason that he did stay and fight while Papineau fled, Wolfred and Robert Nelson would be amongst the first to denounce him as a coward. While they would pledge allegiance to the PG they would certainly demand Papineau's removal.

Well, they served together in the legislature after the amnesty and the DCB suggests Nelson realized his attacks on Papineau were ultimately damaging to his cause, so there's that... politics makes strange bedfellows. Revolutionary politics even more so.

Minor problem in comparisons though. Here the town seems to be half burnt to the ground already by the naval bombardment. Negotiations to surrender the city have begun and if the fighting continues the British can simply knock the town down and call it battle. There's no need for a 'sack' and if the British had their troops well enough in hand (unlike the idiots under Pike's command in 1813) that they can be negotiating there should be zero problem in continuing to flush the remaining insurgents out while also keeping the Anglophone volunteers in line.

That the town is already on fire and there's only a few scattered insurgents running around isn't likely to provoke a sack. Sure they might torch a few buildings to smoke out the remaining insurgents/spite the traitors, but there really isn't the possibility for anything like the two day looting of York in 1813.

No, not two days long, but I also drew on the burning of Kola by Ommaney's squadron during the Russian War; basically this mirrors that incident, with the cavalry brigade along for the ride. I don't see it as that unlikely; the British happily burned Kola from the sea, so I don't know that having a ground force cooperating would make much difference.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Response IV: The Phantom Response

EnglishCanuck - And he is going to sway the Anglo-French-British populace with what exactly? He can't exactly call it a slavers war when Britain is pretty clearly not on the side of slavers. That would probably be laughed at since at this point its a bald faced lie.

Well, the British were certainly concerned about working with the rebels, historically; apparently they were not thrilled by the possibility, according to Bourne. I'd expect there were plenty in Britain and BNA who would rather not be allied with the CSA, in all it's glory.

Not but it's not impossible to maintain their force levels either. Certainly not with what Palmerston has to work with.

No, but mobilization in wartime takes time and tends to cost money, as well. Not every combatant is as fortunate as the US was in 1939-41.

That's going to take some fairly compelling evidence since the US had nothing in 61-65 that Napoleon wanted and he had huge opportunities to gain from allying with Britain and a very juicy economic incentive to recognize the Confederacy.

In fact the Americans are probably being played like violins by Nappy right now, he can trade with and arm the Confederate states with impunity, the Americans will be forced to sign a treaty recognizing his claim in Mexico, and he has nobody to tell him no. That's quite a bit of crow for the Americans to eat to keep him neutral...

Wait and see.

Yes but can you say that George Brown, and John S might not be willing to pass such legislation and cooperate with MacDonald in the face of an American invasion? That's pretty unlikely, especially considering how important George Brown was to John S. and Brown's considerable distaste for both annexation and the US...

No one is asserting Canada of 1862 is Canada of 1914 of course. What I do maintain is it's not the Canada of 1838 either.

I agree; however, the Canada of 1862 was a lot closer to that of 1838 (and 1849) than it was to 1914. About 24 years (1838-62), as opposed to about 54 (1862-1914); even closer, in terms of various unpleasantries in Montreal in 1849...I'd expect there are various scores to settle, and long memories, and general distaste for being someone else's battlefield. Especially among the Canadiens - je me souviens, after all.

The point is that the Provisional Gov actually can't do that. That gives the lie to the idea they have any legitimacy other than American power and makes their rule totally unenforcible except on the back of American bayonets. If Buell is right then the Canadians can lynch the whole lot and there will be no consequences, except there will have to be consequences and Buell will be a liar...

Either they have to be removed by angry Anglophones and Francophones who then put a different government (which the Union would understandably not want) or they ditch any attempt at being legitimate and basically declare themselves there at the US request.

Either way, they need US troops to survive and the US needs them to survive since they're the only clowns willing to work with them that they know of.

I would sincerely like to hear a compelling reason why the elites and people in either of the Canadas would willingly accept an illegitimate government that is hostile to their interests.

Well, are they illegitimate? There were - historically - more than a few sitting members of the legislative assembly in the Province in 1862 who had, over the course of their political lives taken actions that suggested they disagreed with British policy regarding BNA. If John A et al decamp for Quebec and the protection of British bayonets, who's to say that Abbot, Dorion, Redpath et al are MORE legitimate - they, after all, have stayed to try and protect the civilian population of Upper and Lower Canada from war's desolation, and keep the place going, so to speak.

Fair, but the Canadians still don't want them there. What will they do if someone derails a train? Sabotages a canal? A supply barge? Give them a stern talking to?

Like I've said they can't exactly rely on their local illegitimate allies to be able to enforce the law.

The US can certainly give the Canadiens the chance to take things up for 1762, can't they? Long memories, presumably.

They don't but they still have to be occupiers. Which won't swing brilliantly with their allies or the other Canadians.

It also doesn't make sense. Can you say why they're just going to sit back and let a farce of the PG stand? I mean Canadian's appreciated that they had a democratic process and political parties, a group of people just declaring themselves the new government is going to fly about as well in Canada as it would the US.

That is to say, badly.

Dunno, benign neglect worked pretty well in Mexico in 1846-48 in the areas outside of actual US military presence. Very little of Mexico, outside of the Veracruz to Mexico City proper region, and some parts of the northeast, were ever actually occupied. Didn't prevent the US from achieving their goals...

It's not insurmountable, but it's a poor substitute, and it's still gold they can't spend. It has to be used as it was OTL, a hedge against inflation.

Well, it certainly gives the US something to barter with. More than they had, for example, in 1812-15 or 1775-83.

Problem. Having a continent at their feet didn't win the war for them in 1775-83 (that would be some generous French funding and supplies) and in 1812-15 the economy suffered quite nastily despite that continent...

The point on powder is that unless Dupont has worked a miracle and is supplying the Union with an amazing amount of nitre a month (which when you consider the excellent calculations Leconte did for the CSA that's not happening) the Union doesn't have an inexhaustible supply of the stuff and making enough to sustain all operations on two major fronts, all your coastal fortifications, and whatever Navy remains isn't cheap, and for all the Union's resources isn't possible either with what is available to them in 1862.

Put simply, there is either a powder shortage right now or something isn't right.

Well, you will notice that the defenses of Sorel crumbled pretty quickly, true? But along those lines, there's a lot of cave nitre, there was a lot of powder and saltpetre in stockpile in March of 1861, more of each was pruchased and shipped in (historically) before Novemeber, and it's not just DuPont...there's also Hazard, Laflin and Rand, and Oriental Powder, among others.

As to the huge national bureaucracy, that's more growth, more jobs, and more complexity that is going to be a challenge to the Union, not an immediate asset. It wasn't until 1863 they could even print enough greenbacks to meet demand OTL, now they need yet more greenbacks to supply and pay for all this. That money quite simply, doesn't exist yet and there's not enough gold in the Union to even make a dent in the amount that needs to be purchased.

These aren't minor problems either.

They're not minor, but given the reality the rebels lasted until 1865, I'm thinking an economy and population more than four times that of the rebel states' can presumably last through to 1863...economies even smaller and weaker lasted through 1812-15 and 1775-83, as well.

Who is going to give them a gold or silver buck? Not the US.

Why not? Gold and silver can buy a lot of merde, literally... there's the other point that people like Cooke were very successfully selling bonds backed essentially by the power and prestige of the Lincoln Administration; if bonds are being offered that are backed by federal lands, there's a lot of money to be made there, as well. Say what you want about the NYSE, by the Civil War it was the second largest in the world, after London.

Well they had both in 1775 and 1812, for all the good it did them. This isn't exactly changed dramatically in 1862 either. They can certainly hurt the British more, but I don't think it's enough to seriously inconvenience them.

Anything that costs the City money is a good thing for the US, however.

Not if it's only the Powhatan having that level of success. There's a reason the Alabama was famous. The remainder however are going to have to run into a British warship sometime, or go to port. Then it's on to a fairly tragic end when cornered by the RN, as happened in before.

I came up with at least 40 steamships that would be available and suitable for commerce raiding in 1861-62 under the US flag; that's (sorry) four times as many as the rebels sent out through the course of the war (and with better crews, equipment, and shipyards), and the rebels' historical effort effort basically destroyed the US-flag sail merchant fleet, which was the second largest in the world, either directly or via re-registry. Additionally, more raiders could be built, as the "fast cruisers" were in 1864-65. Pretty clear who they were aimed at. All in all, a USN commerce raiding effort against the British MM is not something to shrug off...

Commerce raiding has never been a war winning strategy, and the US can't even touch the commerce that matters, the convoys going from Britain to North America. They can inconvenience British trade, but that didn't help them in 1775 (even with France, Denmark and Spain helping) or 1812. Nor did it help the Germans in 1914.

Didn't do wonders for the British, however, either. Ships were dispersed, warships sent out to patrol and chase the raiders, insurance and other costs went up...it all adds up.

Commerce raiding is all well and good, but it doesn't get you supplies or break the blockade.

No, but it helps stretch the RN's resources so the blockade can be broken and the supplies can be run in...


I mean, none of this is quantifiable - it is a fictional story, after all - but I think there's enough historical precedent to make clear the Operation Imperial Storm trope is totally off the beam. And remember, BROS is only up to September, 1862 (sixzmonths after the balloon goes up, essentially), operations in Virginia and Tennessee are largely stalemated (which may have been missed, given the focus I've had on Lower Canada the last few weeks), and the hazards to wooden coal-burners trying to blockade an industrialized power at oceanic distances have been demonstrated. And, of course, winter is coming...


Thanks, as ever, for the read and posts. I appreciate it.


Working on the next section... the XV Corps swings into action. More or less...


Best,

 

[Driftless]

Riverine warfare was/is different. It may be intuitively obvious but working with the current is certainly easier than fighting the current, even on a fairly slow moving stream. The current also provides the benefit of the added momentum for the kind of attacks described in the battle, and the inverse is true for ships attacking upstream. To be sure, if the current is slow, those differences are subtle.

Also, for most rivers, the bottom is not universally the same depth bank-to-bank, so the usable part of even navigable rivers may be quite narrow. Typically, unless artificially re-directed, most current and deeper water is more toward the outside bend and often quite shallow on the inside portion of the turn.

The Sam Clemens/Mark Twain autobiographical classic "Life on the Mississippi" gets into some of the finer points of steam powered river navigation in that era. The Mississippi and St Lawrence are two different streams, but there is considerable commonality in flatwater river behavior the world over.

 

[TFSmith121]

Very good points; appreciate them

Riverine warfare was/is different. It may be intuitively obvious but working with the current is certainly easier than fighting the current, even on a fairly slow moving stream. The current also provides the benefit of the added momentum for the kind of attacks described in the battle, and the inverse is true for ships attacking upstream. To be sure, if the current is slow, those differences are subtle.

Also, for most rivers, the bottom is not universally the same depth bank-to-bank, so the usable part of even navigable rivers may be quite narrow. Typically, unless artificially re-directed, most current and deeper water is more toward the outside bend and often quite shallow on the inside portion of the turn.

The Sam Clemens/Mark Twain autobiographical classic "Life on the Mississippi" gets into some of the finer points of steam powered river navigation in that era. The Mississippi and St Lawrence are two different streams, but there is considerable commonality in flatwater river behavior the world over.

Very good points; appreciate them. The current in riverine warfare functions somewhat like the weather guage in sailing actions; definitely a tactical advantage.

If the attackers are moving downstream, they get added momentum at no cost; if they are moving upstream and get into trouble, the current allows even damaged ships to drop back to safety.

My idea of the action at Ill Saint-Ours is based on the actions (Plum Point and Memphis, etc.) on the Mississippi during the Civil War and the riverine battles of the Triple Alliance War later the same decade; same for "my" version of Plum Point Bend.

Your points above are also why some of the "Imperial Storm" concepts of the RN simply steaming up the Potomac, Patapsco, Delaware, etc have always struck me as pretty questionable.

Everything is easy in war, but even the easy things are difficult?

Thanks for reading, and the post - anything in particular you thought was noteworthy in the latest section/discussion?

Best,

 

[Driftless]

Very good points; appreciate them. The current in riverine warfare functions somewhat like the weather guage in sailing actions; definitely a tactical advantage.

If the attackers are moving downstream, they get added momentum at no cost; if they are moving upstream and get into trouble, the current allows even damaged ships to drop back to safety.

My idea of the action at Ill Saint-Ours is based on the actions (Plum Point and Memphis, etc.) on the Mississippi during the Civil War and the riverine battles of the Triple Alliance War later the same decade; same for "my" version of Plum Point Bend.

Your points above are also why some of the "Imperial Storm" concepts of the RN simply steaming up the Potomac, Patapsco, Delaware, etc have always struck me as pretty questionable.

Everything is easy in war, but even the easy things are difficult?

Thanks for reading, and the post - anything in particular you thought was noteworthy in the latest section/discussion?

Best,

I think you covered the situation realistically.

The river bank-to-bank by Lanorie to Sorel was maybe 1000-1500 meters wide in most spots, with probably 500-700 meters maximum of navigable channel in that era. That was a comparatively narrower stretch of the river (above Lac St Pierre) so the speed of current was likely notable. Cripes, there's modern day discussion of underwater power generating turbines on the river near Montreal.

In this situation, the British starting from anchor, would need to overcome the current to gain operating headway while coming up to speed, while Canadian/US ships would use that same current momentum to their advantage - your comparison to the weather gauge is spot on. Also, you probably encounter similar challenges for tidal flow in some littoral areas

(A thousand years ago, in the days of my youth, I had a part time job piloting a shallow draft, scow hulled house boat used for excursions on the Mississippi where the river configuration is very similar to this stretch of the St Lawrence. The engines in that boat were ancient and tired, and when the river was running high, you barely made headway going upstream, 1-2 mph progress vs the shoreline. When you went downstream, the effect was remarkable in that apparent speed to shoreline picked up markedly. That's the experience that connected me to this portion of your tale.)

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Yep, they do...

Now I'm hoping they can find a way to do that to Sutlej

Well, they served together in the legislature after the amnesty and the DCB suggests Nelson realized his attacks on Papineau were ultimately damaging to his cause, so there's that... politics makes strange bedfellows. Revolutionary politics even more so.

Well they might work with him, but I can certainly see them doing their best to get rid of him. As I've said before, Papineau wasn't exactly beloved by the remaining radicals upon his return, for obvious reasons.

No, not two days long, but I also drew on the burning of Kola by Ommaney's squadron during the Russian War; basically this mirrors that incident, with the cavalry brigade along for the ride. I don't see it as that unlikely; the British happily burned Kola from the sea, so I don't know that having a ground force cooperating would make much difference.

Well that's my quibble, nobody is going to sack the town. Sure they'll torch it and call it battle, but like the sack of York? Unlikely.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

Well, the British were certainly concerned about working with the rebels, historically; apparently they were not thrilled by the possibility, according to Bourne. I'd expect there were plenty in Britain and BNA who would rather not be allied with the CSA, in all it's glory.

Not denying that, but Lincoln accusing them of working with slavers would cause umbridge in Britain since they would see it as him forcing them to do so. Perception is important after all.

No, but mobilization in wartime takes time and tends to cost money, as well. Not every combatant is as fortunate as the US was in 1939-41.

Yes but America of 1861-65 isn't that same US either.

I agree; however, the Canada of 1862 was a lot closer to that of 1838 (and 1849) than it was to 1914. About 24 years (1838-62), as opposed to about 54 (1862-1914); even closer, in terms of various unpleasantries in Montreal in 1849...I'd expect there are various scores to settle, and long memories, and general distaste for being someone else's battlefield. Especially among the Canadiens - je me souviens, after all.

But as one can plainly see, it wasn't. It wasn't even close to 1849 thanks to the phenomenal work done by the British and local politicians. The scale of cooperation by John A between the Parti Bleu and Liberal-Conservative Party was unprecedented in Canadian history, and even the laughably unworkable Clear Grits and Les Rogues government depended on cross aisle/language cooperation.

The people by this point had realized the necessity of cooperation, John A was basically the master of it alongside Cartier with brown being a close second, there's a reason they are the Father's of Confederation.

Well, are they illegitimate? There were - historically - more than a few sitting members of the legislative assembly in the Province in 1862 who had, over the course of their political lives taken actions that suggested they disagreed with British policy regarding BNA. If John A et al decamp for Quebec and the protection of British bayonets, who's to say that Abbot, Dorion, Redpath et al are MORE legitimate - they, after all, have stayed to try and protect the civilian population of Upper and Lower Canada from war's desolation, and keep the place going, so to speak.

I don't think you quite see the problem. The basis of every Canadian government between 1849 and 1866 was cooperation between the Assemblies of Canada East and Canada West. John A has legitimacy because he can still speak for the people of both provinces, and his government in exile was also elected.

The PG has an overwhelming number of men from Canada East while lacking even something resembling a pre-requisite of men from Canada West, this makes it egregiously unbalanced and points all its interests in one area (Montreal) which in OTL was divided enough between Loyalists more loyal to the Liberal Conservatives and the Parti-Bleu that it made it all but assured to help keep that alliance afloat. However, Dorion did control most of the votes in places like Beuharnois and Chateauguay thanks to their more radical French sympathies, which gave him a fairly uncontested voting block, but he could rarely muster a reliable vote in Montreal. Then the Clear Grits under Brown controlled basically Toronto and the furthest West of Canada, competing with the Liberal-Conservatives.

Basically the PG represents only one area of geography and barely 250,000 of over 3 million people and the men it has in power are either not elected politicians or were junior players in the old government. By every definition it lacks legitimacy in all of Canada West, and doesn't even represent all of Canada East.

That is not a government people from Toronto, Kingston, Ottawa, Hamilton et all will want to follow. Not even everyone in Canada East will want to follow them. The clergy will be denouncing them for their anti-clerical stance which at a stroke robs them of the greatest political tool in that region, and the powerful land owners would be very wary of working with them less it legitimize them and rob them of their status and businesses. They can claim all they like but they don't represent anything resembling a legitimate government and only a Patriote or one of the few Canadian republicans would think that. The vast majority of course, wouldn't be fooled or accepting.

It's not like I'm exaggerating this either. Look at why republican rebels and the Patriote rebels failed in 1838 and the only "major" annexation plan in Canadian history failed. They were unwanted by the majority, just like the Provisional Government would be.

Not to mention the platform they will be running on is almost the exact same platform which cost them the popular support of Canada East in 1838, and had sum zero support in Canada West ever.

They can't even claim to be 'keeping the place going' since without a central authority it either has to devolve to a military occupation, or the Americans simply leave the local leaders in place who would be more than willing to elect their own officials to do just that. Unless the provisional government has teeth (which it doesn't without American support) it can't stop anyone in Canada East or West from either straight up ignoring them or resisting them. Like I said earlier, what will they do when the clergy denounces them, arrest them? Losing proposition that.

The US can certainly give the Canadiens the chance to take things up for 1762, can't they? Long memories, presumably.

That's just a pipe dream. The vast majority of Canadiens did not want what the Americans had to offer and as I've stated innumerable times, all the important people in Canadien society don't want the people you've put in charge.

Dunno, benign neglect worked pretty well in Mexico in 1846-48 in the areas outside of actual US military presence. Very little of Mexico, outside of the Veracruz to Mexico City proper region, and some parts of the northeast, were ever actually occupied. Didn't prevent the US from achieving their goals...

Not even a remotely accurate comparison. The simple fact is the US has to prop up an illegitimate government or they basically don't have a secure supply line in the region. It's not like they had to prop up Santa Anna in 1846 to secure their supply routes or prevent interference with their trade.

Well, it certainly gives the US something to barter with. More than they had, for example, in 1812-15 or 1775-83.

They can't promise to sell France their gold since as I have said, they can't spend it since it has to be a hedge against the devaluation of the greenbacks and a potential decrease in the bonds or as emergency payments on projects if money can't be printed on time (which as per OTL and is worse here, it can't). This is with less to work with and more to pay for. It's not economically viable. Simply put the demand vastly outstrips the supply.

Well, you will notice that the defenses of Sorel crumbled pretty quickly, true? But along those lines, there's a lot of cave nitre, there was a lot of powder and saltpetre in stockpile in March of 1861, more of each was pruchased and shipped in (historically) before Novemeber, and it's not just DuPont...there's also Hazard, Laflin and Rand, and Oriental Powder, among others.

DuPont is the largest, and he had realized that there was a powder shortage brewing in the winter of 61-62 since the powder expenditure had begun eating into manufacturing stocks that autumn, hence why he made the enormous purchase of British nitre in November (which was blocked by the crisis until January and would not be shipped on the outbreak of war) and it was only when he returned and worked with Dahlgren that they managed to make a facsimile of the Southern project and had it tested by May then beginning production by June, but decent production did not even begin until nearly a year later in roughly March 1863. That whole time the Union was still buying outside sources of powder (read British) to supply the war effort, and it wasn't until that full scale production of Chilean guano could begin in 1863 that they became mostly independent of British sources.

Here none of those resources exist, DuPont is out 2000 tons (or roughly 4 million pounds) of nitre. Here they are also arming an army enourmously larger than the one built in 1862 OTL and fully stock, man, garrison every fort on the frontier, and supply a (admittedly smaller) navy which must combat the British at home and on the high seas.

None of the manufactures OTL had the domestic capacity to meet even just the needs of OTL in 1862, they certainly don't have it here, and they only broke the need for British supply by shipping supplies in from Chile.

They're not minor, but given the reality the rebels lasted until 1865, I'm thinking an economy and population more than four times that of the rebel states' can presumably last through to 1863...economies even smaller and weaker lasted through 1812-15 and 1775-83, as well.

On a prayer and sheer desperation. Which coincidentally is what happened in the previous two conflicts as well. 1815 didn't exactly leave the American economy swimming in gravy.

Why not? Gold and silver can buy a lot of merde, literally... there's the other point that people like Cooke were very successfully selling bonds backed essentially by the power and prestige of the Lincoln Administration; if bonds are being offered that are backed by federal lands, there's a lot of money to be made there, as well. Say what you want about the NYSE, by the Civil War it was the second largest in the world, after London.

Because they won, and those bonds were also being bought by foreign investors, and had no competition from an open market to the south and had unrestricted access to goods and trade from around the world with which to back this, and a reasonably stable currency. None of the above really exists here, instead it all depends on not suffering one major defeat for the bonds to be stable, and for greenback production to meet demand. Which it did not OTL (making the bonds sell pretty poorly through summer 62) and payments for essential war goods were constantly being delayed.

Here that problem is magnified at least twice over which would serve to slow the Union down a not an inconsiderable degree.

Anything that costs the City money is a good thing for the US, however.

And anything that costs the Americans money is a good thing for Britain even more. The economics are not balanced in the US favor when one considers the Pound was mightier than the Dollar at this time.

I came up with at least 40 steamships that would be available and suitable for commerce raiding in 1861-62 under the US flag; that's (sorry) four times as many as the rebels sent out through the course of the war (and with better crews, equipment, and shipyards), and the rebels' historical effort effort basically destroyed the US-flag sail merchant fleet, which was the second largest in the world, either directly or via re-registry. Additionally, more raiders could be built, as the "fast cruisers" were in 1864-65. Pretty clear who they were aimed at. All in all, a USN commerce raiding effort against the British MM is not something to shrug off...

Yes, but the US didn't have even a tenth of the resources the British and RN could throw at the problem. They can build raider hunters much quicker and vastly cheaper than the US can do the opposite. Britain depends on its trade and would pull out all the conceivable stops to do so, they can't militarily, economically, or politically do otherwise.

In the end it comes down to hulls and build times, which the US lags behind compared to the British. And without safe port in much of the world the raiders operate at a significant disadvantage, especially in the Pacific.

Didn't do wonders for the British, however, either. Ships were dispersed, warships sent out to patrol and chase the raiders, insurance and other costs went up...it all adds up.

No, but it helps stretch the RN's resources so the blockade can be broken and the supplies can be run in...

Except that in 1812-15 (the only real comparable scenario) the British merchant marine didn't exactly suffer, and insurance prices didn't exactly go crashing through the roof. Here it would be much the same, maybe higher insurance and colonial securities would certainly rise by an eyebrow raising degree, but these are not issues Britain hasn't faced before, and six months after the balloon has gone up London will be on its way to war footing if it isn't already.

EDIT: As an addendum to my point about the US needing to occupy and garrison territory, the Montreal-Plattsburgh railroad does not exist in 1862 (in a finished usable form, it only began operation in 1868) so that's out making the Montreal-Champlain one the only viable alternative.

 

[TheKnightIrish]

I have to say I am with EnglishCanuck on the politics of BNA in the 1860s; the comparative economic situations (I am fascinated the potential for an improved Confederate economic/currency position even if they are only marginally brighter than they were in OTL); and the nitre situation.

I have to say though the US going in big on commerce raiding will hit Britain where it hurts. The national merchant marine is a matter of pride. A flight from the flag would be a national humiliation.

The major difference between the US and UK though is that the UK may (only may) have the economies of scale to make convoying in certain areas work better for them.

 

[sloreck]

One of the difficulties for the UK, even in 1860, is that they relied on imports very heavily to keep their economy going and also for food, though not as bad as WWI/WWII. As of now (ITTL) the Uk will get zero food imports from North America, either BNA or USA (which continued to export foodstuffs to the UK during the ACW. The CSA cannot begin to export any significant quantities of food. While the CSA was agricultural, much acreage was devoted to cotton and OTL they had difficulties feeding their own population during the war. In some key areas, food production will be disrupted by the war, although not as much as OTL, and you'll have the reality of diminished production due to men in the army, the needs of the army which uses more food per person than peacetime (wastage, higher caloric needs etc), and there will be a small but real drain on food resources as RN & British merchant ships replenish supplies in southern ports.

I'm not sure that the sources other than North America can fulfill British food needs completely, and it is certain it will be more expensive which means that the great majority of Britons will have some degree of food stress. OTL while there was a fair amount support for the CSA among the British upper class, support amongst the middle and lower classes was much much thinner. Food stress due to (at a minimum) higher prices, will not result in more sympathy for the CSA.

The USA can make life more difficult for the UK with a "guerre de course". I expect that you won't see US privateers, though you may see private vessels commissioned, and crews enlisted although interestingly enough in 1861 the USA had not signed the international convention outlawing privateers/letters of marque & reprisal. You still have prize money distributed by the USN, so "private" vessels could still be profitable. In any case the odds are with the raiders - without radio, radar, and most merchant vessels sail as opposed to sail/steam for raiders uncovoyed vessels are very vulnerable. The RN can only run a limited number of convoys, as always these are limited to the speed of the slowest vessels, and since you need to gather them before any sail it results in overall slower transit times for goods. Even if not a single ship is sunk/captured, the flow of goods will slowed down, and there will be losses. Of course, another result will be a strain placed on the RN trying to keep enough ships on the America station to blockade the USA and conduct offensive operations.

 

[TheKnightIrish]

One of the difficulties for the UK, even in 1860, is that they relied on imports very heavily to keep their economy going and also for food, though not as bad as WWI/WWII. As of now (ITTL) the Uk will get zero food imports from North America, either BNA or USA (which continued to export foodstuffs to the UK during the ACW. The CSA cannot begin to export any significant quantities of food. While the CSA was agricultural, much acreage was devoted to cotton and OTL they had difficulties feeding their own population during the war. In some key areas, food production will be disrupted by the war, although not as much as OTL, and you'll have the reality of diminished production due to men in the army, the needs of the army which uses more food per person than peacetime (wastage, higher caloric needs etc), and there will be a small but real drain on food resources as RN & British merchant ships replenish supplies in southern ports.

I'm not sure that the sources other than North America can fulfill British food needs completely, and it is certain it will be more expensive which means that the great majority of Britons will have some degree of food stress. OTL while there was a fair amount support for the CSA among the British upper class, support amongst the middle and lower classes was much much thinner. Food stress due to (at a minimum) higher prices, will not result in more sympathy for the CSA.

The USA can make life more difficult for the UK with a "guerre de course". I expect that you won't see US privateers, though you may see private vessels commissioned, and crews enlisted although interestingly enough in 1861 the USA had not signed the international convention outlawing privateers/letters of marque & reprisal. You still have prize money distributed by the USN, so "private" vessels could still be profitable. In any case the odds are with the raiders - without radio, radar, and most merchant vessels sail as opposed to sail/steam for raiders uncovoyed vessels are very vulnerable. The RN can only run a limited number of convoys, as always these are limited to the speed of the slowest vessels, and since you need to gather them before any sail it results in overall slower transit times for goods. Even if not a single ship is sunk/captured, the flow of goods will slowed down, and there will be losses. Of course, another result will be a strain placed on the RN trying to keep enough ships on the America station to blockade the USA and conduct offensive operations.

Why wouldn't the British get American foodstuffs? Just use a foreign middleman unless of course you are going for a full blockade.

 

[EnglishCanuck]

the comparative economic situations (I am fascinated the potential for an improved Confederate economic/currency position even if they are only marginally brighter than they were in OTL); and the nitre situation.

The comparative economics is quite tricky and I'm operating on some fairly fuzzy knowledge since economics is such a controversial study. I am aware of the problems which arose printing greenbacks and the fact that gold didn't even make a dent in war spending OTL.

The nitre situation is however, much more depressingly clear cut. OTL the Trent Crisis woke the War Department up to how dependent they were on a foreign power for a crucial war resource, which is why DuPont took the lead in finding a way to remedy that. It's quite fascinating when you compare his work to Lecomte in the South.

I have to say though the US going in big on commerce raiding will hit Britain where it hurts. The national merchant marine is a matter of pride. A flight from the flag would be a national humiliation.

The major difference between the US and UK though is that the UK may (only may) have the economies of scale to make convoying in certain areas work better for them.

Convoying is certainly going to work from say, England to Halifax/St. Johns and Rivier du Loup, but it doesn't work from say, Mumbai to England. In the Pacific and the Bay of Bengal British trade will be quite vulnerable. From South America maybe not so much thanks to the British presence there.

However, I still think British yards are going to be able to outpreform American ones when it comes to equipping and building even ad-hoc raider hunters. Even just bringing the ships out of the steam reserve will make their problems slightly less.

America certainly has the capacity to hit Britain hard, the question is does she have enough ships to do so?

At least that's how I view it.

I'm not sure that the sources other than North America can fulfill British food needs completely, and it is certain it will be more expensive which means that the great majority of Britons will have some degree of food stress. OTL while there was a fair amount support for the CSA among the British upper class, support amongst the middle and lower classes was much much thinner. Food stress due to (at a minimum) higher prices, will not result in more sympathy for the CSA.

I think it's important to remember that the US wasn't a huge net food exporter at the time. IIRC US products accounted for just over a quarter of British food imports in the 1850s, while the Baltic, Europe, and South American picked up the remaining 3 quarters. There may have been a bit from the South Pacific colonies too, but couldn't be more than a trickle.

There will be food stress, but nobody in Britain is going to starve and you won't be seeing CSA style bread riots.

Also remember, perception. The British public isn't going to be seeing this as the CSA's fault. Patriotism over a snub to British honor and the death of one of the sovereigns sons (who were the celebrity's of their day) isn't going to subside very quickly thanks to the press. It can however, only last so far.

The USA can make life more difficult for the UK with a "guerre de course". I expect that you won't see US privateers, though you may see private vessels commissioned, and crews enlisted although interestingly enough in 1861 the USA had not signed the international convention outlawing privateers/letters of marque & reprisal. You still have prize money distributed by the USN, so "private" vessels could still be profitable. In any case the odds are with the raiders - without radio, radar, and most merchant vessels sail as opposed to sail/steam for raiders uncovoyed vessels are very vulnerable. The RN can only run a limited number of convoys, as always these are limited to the speed of the slowest vessels, and since you need to gather them before any sail it results in overall slower transit times for goods. Even if not a single ship is sunk/captured, the flow of goods will slowed down, and there will be losses. Of course, another result will be a strain placed on the RN trying to keep enough ships on the America station to blockade the USA and conduct offensive operations.

Fair point on the convoys, it does slow resources down but it ensures they get there. To be fair the shorter the supply lines get the less that matters while the reverse becomes true for the Americans.

On privateers, no. The US wouldn't want to be accused of piracy which would badly damage their foreign credentials. Far safer to just arm and swear in private ships and sailors who will then sail for plunder.

Though on hulls, the Britain has a larger capacity to throw at the problem than the US does. The Americans can't simply arm every steam ship they have and send them out commerce raiding, since you then lose anything which could engage the British blockade at home. Especially if the British just begin watching the ports and clamping down on the trade lanes.

Why wouldn't the British get American foodstuffs? Just use a foreign middleman unless of course you are going for a full blockade.

I think any supplies they can get they will get, and there will certainly be smuggling like there was in 1812 (if the RN doesn't have a few wink wink agreements with certain ports I'll eat my hat). This isn't money that would be going back to their enemies in full after all, or at least not in a large enough amount to matter.

 

[TFSmith121]

Glad to hear it resonated; sounds like an interesting job.

I think you covered the situation realistically.

The river bank-to-bank by Lanorie to Sorel was maybe 1000-1500 meters wide in most spots, with probably 500-700 meters maximum of navigable channel in that era. That was a comparatively narrower stretch of the river (above Lac St Pierre) so the speed of current was likely notable. Cripes, there's modern day discussion of underwater power generating turbines on the river near Montreal.

In this situation, the British starting from anchor, would need to overcome the current to gain operating headway while coming up to speed, while Canadian/US ships would use that same current momentum to their advantage - your comparison to the weather gauge is spot on. Also, you probably encounter similar challenges for tidal flow in some littoral areas

(A thousand years ago, in the days of my youth, I had a part time job piloting a shallow draft, scow hulled house boat used for excursions on the Mississippi where the river configuration is very similar to this stretch of the St Lawrence. The engines in that boat were ancient and tired, and when the river was running high, you barely made headway going upstream, 1-2 mph progress vs the shoreline. When you went downstream, the effect was remarkable in that apparent speed to shoreline picked up markedly. That's the experience that connected me to this portion of your tale.)

Glad to hear it resonated; sounds like an interesting job.

Thanks for the compliment, and appreciate the detailed response. I have tried to think about the geography, and the available technology, throughout BROS. Perhaps overly so, but as I have said, I am trying to be realistic in this, and avoid any of the more common memes than seem to crop up in this sort of writing.

And as anyone who has spent any amount of time on foot - or on the water - knows, it's all uphill.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Humm...I'd think that would be pushing the boundaries a little, don't you?

Now I'm hoping they can find a way to do that to Sutlej



Well they might work with him, but I can certainly see them doing their best to get rid of him. As I've said before, Papineau wasn't exactly beloved by the remaining radicals upon his return, for obvious reasons.



Well that's my quibble, nobody is going to sack the town. Sure they'll torch it and call it battle, but like the sack of York? Unlikely.

Humm...I'd think that - burning Sutlej - would be pushing the boundaries a little, don't you? Trying to avoid overly grandiose suspensions of disbelief.

Understood that Paipineau had a mixed reputation; he was, however, someone I would expect could rally the Canadiens, which is sort of the need...and after that, there's a question of hang together or hang separately.

Consider "sack" to be hyperbole from the day that was picked up by a pair of academic authors at a university whose future is, I hope, fairly obscure in the world of BROS...

Best,