BURNISHED ROWS OF STEEL: A History of the Great War (Foreward)

[TFSmith121]

More like the British don't like it...

be honest, you just don't like "Portlandia" ... I am looking forward to the British move up the Columbia. That will be exciting

More like the British don't like it...

Portland, Maine was, in fact, to be the target of one of the two offensives the British planned to open the war with if it broke out in 1861-62... at least according to Kenneth J. Bourne, and presumably he's the one to know.

Portland, Oregon, is a fairly obvious target in the North Pacific theater in a BROS-type of conflict; the Columbia (and the Willamette) are the most effective "highways" into the interior, although the Lower/Middle/Upper divide on the Columbia segments the river pretty cleanly.

Seymour and Knox' expedition up the river is probably as exciting simply from trying to ascend the Columbia in 1863 absent bar pilots, river pilots, and lights and bouys as it would be from anything Schenk, Beale, Alvord, Carleton et al could try, but one expects they would try ... the Civil War generation of US officers were fairly inventive and certainly tended not to shrink from the fight.

One of the things that jumps out from reading Cullum is that in terms of professionally educated officers, the US really was fighting with one hand behind its back in 1862; it took the mobilization of the '62 volunteers and the USCTs in '63 to really get to the point where conscription was necessary (even as a prod for enlistment) and there were a lot of men with solid experience who spent much of 1861-65 in various sideshows and backwaters, for perfectly understandable strategic reasons.

One thing with an Anglo-American conflict is that those men would have seen their fair share of elephants.

As always, thanks for the read and the post; appreciate it.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

As sketched in Part 1 of Chapter 15:

I forgot, Did the Americans already capture Trois Reveres and are currently seiging Quebec City, or are they still stuck in Lac st. Pierre?

As sketched in Part 1 of Chapter 15 (March, 1863):

... the Army of Canada (was) facing roughly three times its numbers, and spread from Three Rivers north and east to Quebec. Russell’s force at Three Rivers was in danger of being cut off by an American move from across the frozen river, while the remainder of Lord William Paulet’s forces were split by the need to garrison the city itself as well as the position at Levis, south of the river. Williams’ headquarters, sitting in the Citadel, was as equally isolated from the rest of British North America as the general had been from the Allied forces when he was surrounded at Kars in 1855.

At the same time, Lord Frederick Paulet’s Army of New Brunswick remained bogged down in the trenches outside of Portland; only a newly-created fourth division, under Major General H.K. Bloomfield, remained in reserve in New Brunswick. The British strategy to wage a two front war in North America had left them with two armies, neither strong enough for their tasks, and with their headquarters some 550 miles apart.

Grant has four corps (12 divisions) facing four British in Lower Canada; Heintzelman has two (six divisions) facing roughly the same in Maine.

Best,

 

[MorningDew]

As sketched in Part 1 of Chapter 15 (March, 1863):

... the Army of Canada (was) facing roughly three times its numbers, and spread from Three Rivers north and east to Quebec. Russell’s force at Three Rivers was in danger of being cut off by an American move from across the frozen river, while the remainder of Lord William Paulet’s forces were split by the need to garrison the city itself as well as the position at Levis, south of the river. Williams’ headquarters, sitting in the Citadel, was as equally isolated from the rest of British North America as the general had been from the Allied forces when he was surrounded at Kars in 1855.

At the same time, Lord Frederick Paulet’s Army of New Brunswick remained bogged down in the trenches outside of Portland; only a newly-created fourth division, under Major General H.K. Bloomfield, remained in reserve in New Brunswick. The British strategy to wage a two front war in North America had left them with two armies, neither strong enough for their tasks, and with their headquarters some 550 miles apart.

Grant has four corps (12 divisions) facing four British in Lower Canada; Heintzelman has two (six divisions) facing roughly the same in Maine.

Best,

So they're going for both at once? Damn that's impressive, risking so many lives!

Actually, that wasn't all that clear to me, so if i'm wrong could you explain it in a bit more understandable way?

 

[TFSmith121]

Gracias ...

Glad to see that this is back ... I thought I was the only impatient, I see it was not so ... !!

The initial extract attributed to Sherman reminded me of the 'spirit' of something that could have told a Roman general in similar circumstances ... Speaking of which, may Quebec or another Canadian city to suffer a similar fate suffered by Atlanta in OTL.
Maybe the first step for introduce the British to the type of war waged by the Union and the secessionist Southerners or at least that, starting perhaps to understand what kind of war in which they are struggling.

British Army logistical difficulties and to deploy troops to meet the need arising in their interests around the world and the growing need to prioritize from their political and military leaders, given its finite material and human resources.

Something that is obvious, besides the increasing and obvious disproportion in population between the two sides, is also almost uniform existence among American Officers with experience in combat... regular or irregular.

It's nice to see mentioned in the context of this TL, that Battle key in southwest theater of the American civil war ...

*The first of many appearances in defense of their new nation of the Hispanic New Mexicans.

This is quite relevant given the relative oblivion ,politically motivated perhaps, and given current US political climate.


** Of course, they were neither the only nor the first Hispanic to do of the Unionist side, as well as there were Hispanics whose regional loyalties and geopolitical circumstances led them to organize regiments and fight for the South.

With regard to my earlier statement about the Battle and '' historical forgetfulness '' I apologize to divert the discussion
but just in case be useful, leave this link: http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2015/mar/30/hispanic-activists-pushing-for-glorieta-pass-recog/

The Sherman quote is basically an edited version of how he responded to the mayor and city council of Atlanta in 1864; seems appropriate.

And yes, Sherman does have something of a "Roman" attitude toward war; he and Grant, for example, were not romantics, unlike Lee and some of his subordinates. They were supreme realists. Interesting observation...

The foundation of what I've tried to do with BROS is get the actual, historical orders of battle correct, and then go month-by-month, with attention to season and geography, to see how it all might play out. One of the conclusions that rapidly comes into view is that the British were not in a position to wage a major, continental-scale conflict with a Western power, as should be clear from their record in 1854-56 and, for that matter, 1899-1902.

And, for that matter - and as you point out, given the scale of the empire - 1914-18 and 1939-45.

The orders of battle and assignments are as historically accurate as I can make them, and the individual histories of those named in BROS are all "real" - none of the named characters in BROS are fictitious, and their military records, or lack thereof, are historically accurate.

Could the typical American volunteer officer, not a graduate of West Point or Norwich, compare in terms of professional experience with a typical British regular? No, but at the same time, they were not novices; the United States had fought a two-year-long conventional conflict with a peer competitor in 1846-48, and tens of thousands of men who had seen active service in the field in Mexico were available and healthy enough to offer their services in 1861-65; even more would have come forward in the event of a "foreign" war, as sketched in BROS.

Glorieta Pass, for the size of the forces employed, was one of the more decisive actions in the conflict; afterwards, the rebels never threatened any loyal territory west of Missouri.

The circumstances of an Anglo-American conflict are such that the US was (and in BROS, has) mobilized a far wider spectrum of the population, and earlier, than historically; that, and the likely shared interests of the US and Mexico in a world where both were engaged in active hostilities with a European power, are such that relationships between the US and its neighbors, and within the American population, are likely to be very different in the second half of the Nineteenth Century than they were historically.

Thanks for the link; interesting.

Always appreciate your comments.

Best,

 

[La Rouge Beret]

Interesting comment WRT longer term diplomatic relationship between Mexico and the United States. I wonder if ITTL the friendly rivalry between the USA and Canada will be between the USA and Mexico... the mind boggles.

Happy for further information here, but is it fair to identify Mexico as being a peer competitor with the USA in the time frame 1846 - 1848? As even at that stage I would say that the USA has several clear advantages, but then again a very small Regular Army - so perhaps that balances out.

 

[TFSmith121]

The orders of battle for the US, rebel, and British empire

So they're going for both at once? Damn that's impressive, risking so many lives! Actually, that wasn't all that clear to me, so if i'm wrong could you explain it in a bit more understandable way?

British strategy in the event of war with the US in 1861-62 was to mount invasions of upstate New York from Lower Canada and Maine from New Brunswick; source is British Preparations for War with the North, 1861-1862 by Kenneth Bourne.


The orders of battle for the US, rebel, and British empire forces in BROS are as historically accurate as I can make them, based on sources from the day (British and US); the only real "adjustment" I have made is to give all sides (essentially) the same divisional organizations (headquarters, three brigades of 3-4 regiments/battalions each) so as to compare like with like. This would work out to be, at full strength, a division of roughly 10,000 men each; obviously, casualties and the needs of a formation on campaign would reduce that ... based on the Army Lists for 1861-62, totalling up every regular British battalion historically in British North America, the Caribbean, Britain, Ireland, and the Channel Islands, plus six more from the Med, plus the existing volunteer units from BNA, gets the equivalent of eight divisions. By the same measure, and in my best estimate, the US could have gotten about 18 similar divisions together for service in the Canadas and Maine; another 30 or so would be left for service against the rebels in the southern/border states, not including militia.

Best,

 

[La Rouge Beret]

Wonderful update and enjoying the level of detail that you go into with this TL.

BZ.

 

[TFSmith121]

Quite possibly...

Interesting comment WRT longer term diplomatic relationship between Mexico and the United States. I wonder if ITTL the friendly rivalry between the USA and Canada will be between the USA and Mexico... the mind boggles.

Happy for further information here, but is it fair to identify Mexico as being a peer competitor with the USA in the time frame 1846 - 1848? As even at that stage I would say that the USA has several clear advantages, but then again a very small Regular Army - so perhaps that balances out.

Quite possibly...

As in Chapter 13:

... The meeting at the Palacio Nacional has assumed an almost mythic stature in the histories of both Mexico and the United States; the first true expression of La Alianza, the century-long partnership between the two great republics, each battered and besieged by European powers.

During the 1846048 war, the US and Mexico were peer competitors in the broad sense of both being Western powers with broadly comparable standards for their militaries, in terms of tactics and equipment - more so then, say, the US and the native tribal societies.

And Mexico certainly had the advantage in terms of being on the defensive...

Thanks for reading and the post; any thoughts on the section, either generally or the Battle of the Chehalis?

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Thanks very much!

Wonderful update and enjoying the level of detail that you go into with this TL.

BZ.

Thanks very much!

The detail is half the fun; certainly brings out the realities of who could do what to whom when you look at it down to the battalion level.

Best,

 

[La Rouge Beret]

Thanks very much!

The detail is half the fun; certainly brings out the realities of who could do what to whom when you look at it down to the battalion level.

Best,

I couldn't agree more, a casual look at planned vs actual TO&E for most units can clearly demonstrate what is achievable and what was not.

La Alianza certainly has a better sound to it than the Entente Cordiale. As always looking forward to more, work permitting of course.

Also what chance is there for Mexico to act as another industrial base for the Union ITTL? As a southern supply base or chain could really assist the Western Theatre.

 

[TFSmith121]

Sure ... they have to get rid of the French, first, though

I couldn't agree more, a casual look at planned vs actual TO&E for most units can clearly demonstrate what is achievable and what was not.

La Alianza certainly has a better sound to it than the Entente Cordiale. As always looking forward to more, work permitting of course.

Also what chance is there for Mexico to act as another industrial base for the Union ITTL? As a southern supply base or chain could really assist the Western Theatre.

Sure ... they have to get rid of the French, first, though!

Hope to have the last section of Chapter 15 up the coming weekend.

Best,

 

[Xenophonte]

Relations between the US and its neighbors

The evolution of relations between the United States of the TTL and its southern neighbors it's highly speculative but based on OTL, can be projected that regardless of the outcome of the war,'splendid isolation' of the United States with respect to involvement in European affairs would end, forever.

It is likely to influence the evolution of relations between the US and the rest of the world in general and Latin America in particular, the same or similar structural factors in OTL; but as they are expressed it will be determined by the divergent historical events or not, and the responses to them of its protagonists.

In short we may see something similar to the ominous (from the Latin American optician, of course), Roosevelt's policy toward the region decades before, but with different motivations ...

As for Mexico unless the sociopolitical instability that afflicted that nation and its people during this period are altered by the events in the north (not likely), ironically a "friendly" US government to Mexico but then the necessary reconstruction, which will be more interested, concerned and actively involved in the events of the world and the region ... would be very 'bad news' for at least Mexico.

In my opinion, we could see an American government and the American political class of the nineteenth century, in this context, to consider national security and foreign affairs, in its widest sense, as the highest priority ..

About apply Policies which would whether well adapted to the American reality, and that would be in its consequences, quite similar to the imperialist policies of their European counterparts.

A US national security policies that include as such, I suppose, the possibility of being 'forced' perhaps to get involved and take side in the internal affairs of its allies, either de jure or de facto. It since the US perspective should include Mexican socio-political stability, either made by themselves or imposed by the United States for proxies, intervene directly and perhaps not excluding its conversion into a part of a hypothetical network of vassal states in Central America or perhaps in the more dystopian scenario total incorporation or part of certain Mexican regions to the United States.

In this scenario we may be able to see that 'hunting season' opens with respect to the Caribbean possessions of Great Betraña at first ... but not limited to, British.

 

[sloreck]

Given how the USA is working with the French-Canadian population here, I don't see Sherman wrecking Quebec City except as a by-product of an assault and any damage in that case could be transferred to the British commander who made the French town a battlefield rather than sensibly surrendering. I can see Sherman, as he marches east from Quebec City (presumably to cut off the rear of the British forces in Maine) applying the hard hand of war to individuals and towns, most particularly anglophone ones, who do not comply promptly and completely with his demands. Unlike the march through Georgia, here the US armies in Canada are using their rearward supply lines, not cutting loose, so overmuch destruction ("making Canada howl") is counterproductive until they clear out Maine and restore the rail lines to Canada from Maine for supply. Once that happens, the Maritimes might see some "Georgia" treatment.

An important point here is that the Union is much more united than OTL because of the entry of the UK. This is very bad for the CSA because fighting as an ally of a foreign enemy (and a traditional one at that) it is very hard for anyone to espouse the idea to let the "wayward sisters" go free. I think I mentioned before that I expect an unintended consequence of the lifting of the blockade to be very much less in the way of emergency industrialization and concommittant centralization than OTL. While the relatively free flow of British supplies is good for the CSA now, if and when the UK ends its part in the war you can be sure that part of any armistice/treaty will be NO British supplying of the CSA (including building ships for the CSN as well as formal or blockade running supplies). When this happens the stores the CSA has will run down quickly and be difficult to replace, and they will be faced with a well equipped, hardened, large, and very pissed Union military.

 

[TFSmith121]

Very true; the difference in such a change in US policy

1) The evolution of relations between the United States of the TTL and its southern neighbors it's highly speculative but based on OTL, can be projected that regardless of the outcome of the war,'splendid isolation' of the United States with respect to involvement in European affairs would end, forever.

2) It is likely to influence the evolution of relations between the US and the rest of the world in general and Latin America in particular, the same or similar structural factors in OTL; but as they are expressed it will be determined by the divergent historical events or not, and the responses to them of its protagonists.

3) In short we may see something similar to the ominous (from the Latin American optician, of course), Roosevelt's policy toward the region decades before, but with different motivations ...

4) As for Mexico unless the sociopolitical instability that afflicted that nation and its people during this period are altered by the events in the north (not likely), ironically a "friendly" US government to Mexico but then the necessary reconstruction, which will be more interested, concerned and actively involved in the events of the world and the region ... would be very 'bad news' for at least Mexico.

5) In my opinion, we could see an American government and the American political class of the nineteenth century, in this context, to consider national security and foreign affairs, in its widest sense, as the highest priority ... About apply Policies which would whether well adapted to the American reality, and that would be in its consequences, quite similar to the imperialist policies of their European counterparts.

6) A US national security policies that include as such, I suppose, the possibility of being 'forced' perhaps to get involved and take side in the internal affairs of its allies, either de jure or de facto. It since the US perspective should include Mexican socio-political stability, either made by themselves or imposed by the United States for proxies, intervene directly and perhaps not excluding its conversion into a part of a hypothetical network of vassal states in Central America or perhaps in the more dystopian scenario total incorporation or part of certain Mexican regions to the United States.

7) In this scenario we may be able to see that 'hunting season' opens with respect to the Caribbean possessions of Great Betraña at first ... but not limited to, British.

1) Very true; the differences resulting in such a change in US policy occurring in the 1860s-70s, rather than the 1930s-40s, however, would be significant. The US and the various Latin American nations are much closer to each other in terms of internal politics, external diplomacy, economic strength, and demographics (population/size, that is) in the mid-Nineteenth Century than in the mid-Twentieth; the US is the dominant power in the hemisphere already (Brazil had about 8.4 million people in 1860, for example; the US already had 31.4 million), but the economic and military strength, for example, was not as marked.

2) True; my point is that given the "European threat" being aimed at both the US and the Latin American states, it is more likely to be something approximating an actual partnership, rather than the single dominant power model.

3) T. Roosevelt's Dollar Diplomacy and the Roosevelt Corollary, or FD Roosevelt's Good Neighbor Policy? I could see policy going either way in BROS-world, depending upon events.

4) True, but one can hope - if there were two men who potentially could have carried it off sucessfully, one would think they would be Juarez and Lincoln.

5) Certainly possible, but I'd put the odds at 50-50 for "partnership" and "alliance" rather than imperialism of whatever stripe. The US of the 1860s is not the US of the 1890s, and Lincoln was not McKinley. Again, one can hope...

6) Again, certainly possible, but Lincoln was on record as early as the 1840s as being against filibustering for national aggrandizement; in BROS, I have the Lincoln Administration willing to consider returning the Gadsden Purchase territory to Mexican sovereignty as an element of a wartime "short of war" alliance due to the Anglo-American conflict. That's back in Chapter 13...

7) Certainly possible, but the European powers with colonies in the Caribbean still (at least in the 1860s) can defend what they have, especially with the Americans embroiled in the Anglo-American conflict and/or the rebellion. Of course, if something like the Guerra Grande in Cubabreaks out in 1868, and especially if the Spanish are engaged elsewhere.

Thanks for the post; always interesting to talk some of this out with the readers.

Best,

 

[mudhead]

More like the British don't like it...

Portland, Maine was, in fact, to be the target of one of the two offensives the British planned to open the war with if it broke out in 1861-62... at least according to Kenneth J. Bourne, and presumably he's the one to know.
Best,

Alas, dead 22 years now. Lovely man. His book on Palmerston is excellent.

 

[TFSmith121]

True... and yep

1) Given how the USA is working with the French-Canadian population here, I don't see Sherman wrecking Quebec City except as a by-product of an assault and any damage in that case could be transferred to the British commander who made the French town a battlefield rather than sensibly surrendering. I can see Sherman, as he marches east from Quebec City (presumably to cut off the rear of the British forces in Maine) applying the hard hand of war to individuals and towns, most particularly anglophone ones, who do not comply promptly and completely with his demands. Unlike the march through Georgia, here the US armies in Canada are using their rearward supply lines, not cutting loose, so overmuch destruction ("making Canada howl") is counterproductive until they clear out Maine and restore the rail lines to Canada from Maine for supply. Once that happens, the Maritimes might see some "Georgia" treatment.

2) An important point here is that the Union is much more united than OTL because of the entry of the UK. This is very bad for the CSA because fighting as an ally of a foreign enemy (and a traditional one at that) it is very hard for anyone to espouse the idea to let the "wayward sisters" go free. I think I mentioned before that I expect an unintended consequence of the lifting of the blockade to be very much less in the way of emergency industrialization and concommittant centralization than OTL. While the relatively free flow of British supplies is good for the CSA now, if and when the UK ends its part in the war you can be sure that part of any armistice/treaty will be NO British supplying of the CSA (including building ships for the CSN as well as formal or blockade running supplies). When this happens the stores the CSA has will run down quickly and be difficult to replace, and they will be faced with a well equipped, hardened, large, and very pissed Union military.

1) True. The US would, I expect (and have written it as such in BROS) treat the Francophones with kid gloves, and (generally) only take a hard policy with the Anglophones if there are provocations, certainly based on the historical precedents in 1861-65.

2) Also true. The problem with L-L is that if the benefactor decides to turn off the tap, the recipient is SOL, and trying to create a munitions industry in mid-war is not simple. A European intervention is not an immediate war winner for the rebellion; in many ways, it would have been a two-edged sword.

Best,

 

[Xenophonte]

My reference was

My reference was to the Roosevelt closer in time, the policies of the second are too remote in time and place had its origins in an American society too dissimilar to the timeframe in which we are in the TL.

Perhaps the Lincoln Administration and its successors hypothetical look due to its very proximity and relative goodwill toward Mexico Latin America in general and in particular to take sides, to monitor closely it's political conflict and possibly involved willingly or not.

After all, I think the same of 'Kipling's' ideologies in general and of 'Manifest Destiny' in particular that at the turn of the century and beyond and had its specific weight in the formation and in the consciousness of Americans stakeholders and in its relations with the other peoples of the region and the world; acting would follow, which would clear the importance and extent of that influence is a matter of speculation in the situation of this TL.


Finally, regarding the possibility that similar military requirements on Canadian trigger something similar to Sherman's march to the sea, if not be in a position to avoid doing so by not affect the prospective Francophone regions in its path, in the case of their geographical distribution serious enough to be homogeneous as possible? Even if possible and do not want more that cause ill will of Quebecers by a march through blood and fire, it may be hampered by these reasons.


*For those who commented it is also nice to find authors encourage and participate in the AltHistorical speculation, since a firm foundation in OTL.

 

[TFSmith121]

Thanks for the recommendation...

Alas, dead 22 years now. Lovely man. His book on Palmerston is excellent.

Thanks for the recommendation... haven't really had Palmerston "show up" in BROS, other than second-hand; didn't think I could do him justice, but at the same time, if there's an Anglo-American conflict that begins in 1861-62, one expects Lincoln would handle it better than Pam.

Different age, and Lincoln understood people and mass mobilization in a democracy; he is very much a man of the Nineteenth Century, and even a precursor to the leaders who could handle the mass movements of the Twentieth.

Palmerston strikes me as the last Eighteenth Century statesman.

Best,

 

[TFSmith121]

Understood...

1) My reference was to the Roosevelt closer in time, the policies of the second are too remote in time and place had its origins in an American society too dissimilar to the timeframe in which we are in the TL.

2) Perhaps the Lincoln Administration and its successors hypothetical look due to its very proximity and relative goodwill toward Mexico Latin America in general and in particular to take sides, to monitor closely it's political conflict and possibly involved willingly or not.

3) After all, I think the same of 'Kipling's' ideologies in general and of 'Manifest Destiny' in particular that at the turn of the century and beyond and had its specific weight in the formation and in the consciousness of Americans stakeholders and in its relations with the other peoples of the region and the world; acting would follow, which would clear the importance and extent of that influence is a matter of speculation in the situation of this TL.

4) Finally, regarding the possibility that similar military requirements on Canadian trigger something similar to Sherman's march to the sea, if not be in a position to avoid doing so by not affect the prospective Francophone regions in its path, in the case of their geographical distribution serious enough to be homogeneous as possible? Even if possible and do not want more that cause ill will of Quebecers by a march through blood and fire, it may be hampered by these reasons.

5) *For those who commented it is also nice to find authors encourage and participate in the AltHistorical speculation, since a firm foundation in OTL.

1) Got it; Teddy Roosevelt. Certainly not shy about using force in support of US policy - but to be fair, he came of age, and into power, in a very different world than Lincoln.

2) Certainly to be expected; again, there seems to be a positive, albeit distant, aquaintanceship between Lincoln and Juarez - one can hope it would continue and improve.

3) Manifest Destiny was more of an antebellum concept, essentially part and parcel of the US strategy to dominate the continent; once that was achieved in 1848, and preserved in 1865, the US wasn't looking to gain political control (generally) of territory in Latin America - certainly not in the 1860s and 1870s, as witness the failure of the proposals to annex Santo Domingo.

4) Lower Canada was dominated by Francophones in the 1860s; New Brunswick by Anglophones. That being said, the US was fairly careful about threading the needle of political control without overt force in the liberated territory in 1861-65. Granted, Canada is different, but the Americans had made a point of trying to find local allies there in 1775-76 and 1812-14; presumably - as sketched out and discussed above - that would hold true in the event of an Anglo-American war breaking out in 1862... Lincoln and his administration were pretty adept politicians, after all.

5) Indeed; I appreciate the input.

Best,

 

[HistLover]

I hate to be a nag or ask for to much but theirs two things I would like to see before the new year.

First, an index of all of the actual story post since this thread has gotten so long.

Second, I'm the kinda of guy that likes some visuals along with word descriptions. So would it be two much to ask somebody to provide maps of the actual campaigns/battles in order for me and others to understand what's going on. Mostly I could do with a map of the front lines in North America at present time in story/every six months of the war?

I hope this isn't too much I just think it would enhance the reading experience and make it easier.