The Federalist weren't willing to make peace on any terms. Giving up on the West was nonnegotiable. The New England States didn't want to leave the Union, they just wanted to be listened to. If the British want to end all disunion in the U.S. keep making impossible demands. Don't be silly the U.S. was still paying contractors in 1815. They might have to pay higher interest rates on bonds, but they'd still have money. What do you think the merchant classes in England who wanted peace would be doing when the government was telling them the war will last forever?
British annex Louisiana during War of 1812
- Thread starter AlternateEagle
- Start date
unprincipled peter
Donor
The border is likely the Mississippi River. Taking the east bank is going to require a serious arse kicking. Should that happen, North America as we know it is entirely different. USA as we know it, including the east coast, is entirely different.
West of the river, the question becomes the north/south border. The most plausible is somewhere in Arkansas. As I mentioned in another post, it is possible Natchez region could be captured, then traded for the top half of LA territory. In this scenario, West Florida would have been captured, as well, and that is Spanish. Spain is a British ally, but Britain might allow USA to have it if it ends the war. It is doubtful Britain wants to hold any of LA Territory, but for some reason, they do here. That reason has to be really strong, and/or the victory to be big enough, for Britain to push for the north.
USA can still be a world power if the loss doesn't cause a downward spiral. Unlikely to be a major power, though.
I'm not so sure that the river would be the best place, too much of a chance of friction or worse. If needs be a 'buffer zone' of 20 miles of so?
unprincipled peter
Donor
and then you need a buffer for the buffer.
At the time, most of the east bank was native territory, the two exceptions being the tip of Illinois and Natchez and below. Taking Natchez is plausible. Taking Illinois requires major arse whooping. I suppose it is possible Britain keeps Natchez and West Florida (or returns both to Spain), and then mandates western Kentucky/Tennessee as a native reserve.
There's two ways to avoid friction: Take all of the old Northwest, including Ohio, which isn't likely, or guarantee freedom of navigation on the Mississippi. The latter is a given, no matter the outcome, as long as USA has settled lands anywhere in the Ohio River Valley. To deny it guarantees another war.
Sometimes, rivers make convenient, but impractical boundaries. The Mississippi is not one of those. At the time, the Chickasaw claimed some territory on the west bank, but that wasn't much consideration for the whites. Otherwise, the Europeans have been separated by the river from the beginning. The French claimed both banks prior to the 7YW, but had minimal presence on either. Since then, the river made a practical border, until the Purchase a decade prior to POD. Much more practical than some imaginary line on soil, which is your proposition.
That could well mean an arms race and a cold war. Forts and batteries up and down both banks and that costs money. The way the US was run, and still is today in some ways, that would fall on the states and not the federal gov. It didn't get sorted until 1886 and the Endicott reforms, and that didn't work very well. An easy win for Britain if it come down to money
unprincipled peter
Donor
so your buffer strip on the east bank doesn't need defending?
Rivers make for good barriers. Crossing a river as wide as the Mississippi isn't going to be easy. Marching across the imaginary line you've drawn across western Kentucky/Tennessee/Alabama/Mississippi is going to be much easier.
I don't think I'll ever stop being amazed at your ability to say with an atmosphere of utter confidence things that are not only completely wrong, but that you could have disproved with a simple Google search. Quick quote that settles the matter: "In 1814, after the British burned the nation's capital, many banks outside of New England stopped redeeming their notes in gold or silver. Soldiers, army contractors, and government securities holders went unpaid, and the Treasury temporarily went bankrupt." Longer quote, from the War Department at the time:
Of course, governments which are financially solvent are constantly dealing with correspondence about unpaid bills, from large:
- Apr 7, 1815: New Orleans, LA; 1 page; M221/63: 6662. Jackson writes Quartermaster General Knight, in view of the latter's lack of money, to draw on the War Department for $40,000, "which I hope may answer your purpose until further arrangements can be made."
- May 4, 1815: Nashville, TN; 1 page; M221/63: 6479. Jackson forwards to Secretary Dallas two letters from Joseph Lane, cashier of the Bank of New Orleans, which note that bills drawn on the War Department have been returned as protested. "It has given me the pain & mortification that it should have been found necessary to protest bills which I had been athorsed to draw & which were necessary to the welfare of the service in which I was engaged."
- Jun 10, 1815: Nashville, TN: 3 pages; M221/63: 6529-6530. Jackson again raises the issue of unpaid bills drawn on the War Department at the Bank of New Orleans, the authorities of which believed his authority to do so was sacrosanct. "I hope those bills will be taken up, not only my feelings but the credit of the U. States require it."
- Jun 13, 1815: Nashville, TN: 25 pages; M221/63: 6512-6528. Jackson forwards to Secretary Dallas a letter from Quatermaster General Simeon Knight, complaining about his lack of funds for discharging bills now due.
- Feb 5, 1815; Newport, RI; 2 pages; M221/60: 4163. Heileman advises Brigadier General Cushing that the garrison at Newport lacks wood for fuel and funds to obtain any. Moreover, "I am wearied of begging supplies from a people who would almost smile at our distresses and embarrassments."
- Oct 16, 1815; Newport, RI; 1 page; M221/62: 5850. Heileman writes Secretary Crawford on how to handle unsettled claims attributed to himself and acquired in consequence of obeying the commanding general. Accordingly, "I procured what was wanted on credit, and the bills remain in my hands unpaid - an abstract of them was furnished the War Department some time since - the amount is rising $3,000, if I mistake not."
- Nov 27, 1814; New York, NY; 2 pages; M222/14: 5841-5842. Swartwout reports to Secretary Monroe the status of his funds for quartermaster activities at Niagara, whereby he found his draft at Utica unpaid. Worse, in Albany, the promised $100,000 transfer had yet to materialise. "Thus situated I have not a dollar at my disposal as Quartermaster General, the subordinate officers upon the whole frontier are without funds, and many of them deeply indebted to individuals for temporary loans to enable them to discharge the ordinary demands upon the department." He again requests a $100,000 transfer to fund his activities through February.
- Nov 28, 1814; New York, NY; 1 page; M222/14: 5480. Swartwout acknowledges to Secretary Monroe that he is being forwarded $60,000 in Treasury notes as, "this is the only arrangement that under the existing state of things can at present be made." He fears the amount may not satisfy the needs of local banks.
- Apr 15, 1815; New York, NY; 3 pages; M222/18: 7766-7767. Swartwout contacts Secretary Dallas as to the sorry state of his financial affairs. "By an inspection of my accounts it will therefore appear that I have not a dollar of public funds at my disposal & consequently, that it is not in my power to enable Col. Jenkins to take up his draft." He also feels that the sale of public property might raise money for the government.
- Jul 31, 1815; New York, NY; 1 page; M221/66: 9542. Swartwout acknowledges War Department orders and will sell off all the public provisions in his jurisdiction. He notes, "We are still without funds for the current expenses of the Department. Ought those which will be produced from these sales to be thus applied."
What was it you said a few posts ago?
Further proof that the United States lost the War of 1812.
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I always find it amusing that you find these facts and extrapolate that they mean the army & navy were about to disband, or at the very least shutdown operations. The U.S. had been operating in a state of financial mess for the whole war, and it was much worse in the ARW. Find me an example of a field army that disbanded. Huge ships were being built on Lake Ontario; work didn't stop for lack of credit. If the British were demanding terms that were completely unacceptable to even the Federalists, the war would go on.
Interesting in you chronical of financial woes even after the war was over the U.S. immediately embarked on the Second Barbary Coast War, a major naval build up, and Jackson continued operations against Florida when he still didn't have money. From the Economic History of the United States.
Across the two and half years of the war, 1812–1815, the federal government took in more money than it spent. Cash out was $119.5 million, cash in was $154.0 million.[130] Two-thirds of the income was borrowed and had to be paid back in later years; the national debt went from $56.0 million in 1812 to $127.3 million in 1815. Out of the GDP (gross domestic product) of about $925 million (in 1815), this was not a large burden for a national population of 8 million people; it was paid off in 1835.[131] A new Second Bank of the United States was set up in 1816, and after that the financial system performed very well despite the fact that there was still a shortage of gold and silver.[132]
U.S. per capita GDP 1810–1815 in constant 2009 dollars[133]
The economy grew every year from 1812 to 1815 despite a large loss of business by East Coast shipping interests. Wartime inflation averaged 4.8% a year.[134] The national economy grew 1812–1815 at the rate of 3.7% a year, after accounting for inflation. Per capita GDP grew at 2.2% a year, after accounting for inflation.[135] Money that would have been spent on imports—mostly cloth—was diverted to opening new factories, which were profitable since British cloth was not available.[136] This gave a major boost to the industrial revolution, as typified by the Boston Associates. The Boston Manufacturing Company built the first integrated spinning and weaving factory in the world at Waltham, Massachusetts, in 1813.[137]
The U.S. Economy wasn't collapsing, the shipping industry was. The Debt in 1815 was 7.26% of GDP & $15.91 cents per capita. In the UK's national debt in 1814 was 679 million pounds, more than double the GDP, and it took 100 years to pay it off. So where do you get the idea that the UK could easily fight an indefinite war with the U.S. for a grand strategic plan of taking the center of North American away from the U.S.? Both sides had very sound reasons to end the war on the basis of a draw.
Nobody has extrapolated this from those specific facts but you. @The Gunslinger absolutely correctly questioned whether the US could pay for these new steamships, and you told him categorically that the United States in the War of 1812 was entirely capable of paying its contractors. I then illustrated, from about five minutes on Google, that they weren't - whereupon you hastily move the goalposts to try and bring the conversation onto something other than your own unfamiliarity with the topic at hand.
As I said, I don't think I'll ever stop being amazed at your ability to say with an atmosphere of utter confidence things that are not only completely wrong, but that you could have disproved with a simple Google search.
"the naval contractors A. and N. Brown, employing "one thousand Carpenters" building warships on Lake Ontario, protested that "it will ruin us if money is not Sent from the Navy Department that will pass in this State." "[O]ne hundred thousand Dollars was Due on 22nd December 1814, and the Like Sum on the first of febuary [sic] 1815... if we are to be paid in money Seven Per Cent under par we never will be able to fulfil our contract.'
Having already been caught out on the question of whether the United States was paying its contractors, you doubled down and picked an even more specific reference without even bothering to check whether the shipbuilders on Lake Ontario were on the verge of a stoppage. It's just incredible: surprises me every time you do it. But needless to say, those steamship builders are going to see how the US government is treating contractors on Lake Ontario and jump right into bed with them.
I like how you stick a ridiculously high bar on the demand - a whole field army disbanding - when what the lack of pay actually means is that men desert. "desertion affected the [US] army to the same extent as sickness, 12.7 per cent... being recorded as deserters"; comparable average for the British army (1812-15) was 3.4%. Or they go home when their time expires, or they don't bother joining up in the first place. Bring on the quotes:
- 'On November 9 [1812], Smyth informed General Dearborn that two militia regiments, one at Utica and another at Manlius (near Syracuse), as well as a volunteer company at Buffalo, had mutinied because they had received no pay. Also, another volunteer militia company threatened not to cross into Canada unless it received pay and a clothing allowance.'
- 'Brig. Gen. George McClure was left with only about 100 troops to defend Fort George on the Niagara peninsula in December 1813 when his militiamen departed as soon as their terms expired, despite his pleas to stay longer. McClure noted that "having to live in tents at this inclement season, added to that [circumstance] of the pay-master coming on only prepared to furnish them with one out of three month's pay has had all the bad effects that can be imagined." He noted that his militiamen, "finding that their wages were not ready for them, became with some meritorious exceptions, a disaffected and ungovernable multitude."'
- 'With only limited means, the national government understandably tried to curtail excessive state use of militiamen by refusing to pay for them unless they were called for by the federal government and inspected by a regular army officer. In fact, numerous claims for payment for militia drafts were denied when established rules were not followed. There were occasions, however, where states had to respond promptly to invasion by the enemy before the federal government authorized them. Governor James Barbour of Virginia expressed his anger and amazement when Secretary of War John Armstrong refused to pay for militiamen summoned by the governor to protect Norfolk early in 1813. Instead of "generous and unsuspecting confidence" in furthering the wishes of the government, Barbour declared, states would adopt "the close suspicion of the miser, who before he acts demands solid and unquestionable pledges." To appease Virginia, the administration paid that state's militia expenses. This step, however, angered Maryland, which had also been refused compensation for unauthorized militia drafts. A committee report of the Executive Council of Maryland accused the Madison administration of partiality in assuming Virginia's militia expenses while denying Maryland's. The Council adopted a resolution denouncing the administration's action as "partial, unjust, and contrary to the spirit of our constitution."'
- 'Even when the states conformed to all of the federal requirements, such as getting the militia mustered and inspected by a regular officer, the national government was unable, or unwilling, to pay the militia because of a lack of funds. The shortage of money was due to the difficulty that Secretary of the Treasury Albert Gallatin had in borrowing capital from the financial markets, particularly in New England. Consequently, Secretary Armstrong opted to divert most War Department funds to the northern front. As a result, money to pay militia, build fortifications, and reimburse states was simply not available. The bureaucracy was also overwhelmed by bills forwarded for payment, often accompanied by improper or inadequate paperwork, and it refused to pay without adequate documentation.'
- 'The fact remains that the states were not promptly remunerated for expenses, and by late 1814 the government had no money for reimbursement. This situation did not reduce the number of complaints. Governor William Miller of North Carolina, for example, informed his legislature in December 1814 that none of the troops or individuals who had furnished them supplies in 1813 had received payment. He asserted bluntly that "patriotism alone cannot be relied upon as a sufficient incentive to endure the hardships and privations of war. Men must be paid or they cannot be expected to fight."... Similarly, Governor Isaac Shelby of Kentucky admonished Armstrong in August 1814 for the government's failure to pay the state's militia for past service. Shelby complained particularly about the treatment of the men who had marched with him into Canada in 1813. Because the government was withholding their pay, it had become his duty "to be more cautious in future, in complying with demands on this State for troops; and to come to an explicit understanding with the War Department on this subject."'
- 'After his campaign against the Creek Indians in the fall of 1813, General Claiborne wrote Armstrong on January 24, 1814, explaining why his militiamen refused to enlist in the regular army. His Mississippi Volunteers were returning to their homes "with eight months pay due to them and almost literally naked. They have served for two or three months of an inclement winter, without shoes or blankets and almost without shirts." He added that they were "still attached to their country, and properly impressed with the justice and necessity of the war," but "as they believe that some of these sufferings and privations were not unavoidable, they have for some months past almost uniformly declined prolonging their terms of service by enlisting in the regular army."'
- 'Perhaps the most damning indictment of the militia system, and an indication of its failure during the war, was the establishment of state armies. Had the war continued another year, it seems certain that a significant majority of the states would have forsaken reliance upon the militia and established permanent (standing) state armies. By 1815, at least ten of the eighteen states had adopted, or were in the process of adopting, laws establishing state armies. In three other states their governors recommended consideration of such a force... It is quite possible that the states would have adopted the idea broached in the Hartford Convention and suggested as well by Ohio and Virginia near the end of the war, namely, withholding direct taxes owed by the state to the federal government to cover the state's costs in paying their militias and providing for their defense. The case of Massachusetts and Connecticut is easily understood because of their long-standing differences with the administration. Connecticut governor John Cotton Smith affirmed his support for the recommendation of the Hartford Convention that states assuming the burden of defense should retain a portion of the taxes collected within the state to meet state defense needs.
- On one occasion the ship's company of an American privateer, which had been destroyed after a desperate and celebrated resistance to attack by British armed boats, arrived at St. Mary's. Of one hundred and nineteen American seamen, only four could be prevailed upon to enter the district naval force. This was partly due to the embarrassment of the national finances. "The want of funds to pay off discharged men," wrote the naval captain at Charleston, "has given such a character to the navy as to stop recruiting." "Men could be had," reported his colleague at St. Mary's, now transferred to Savannah, "were it not for the Treasury notes, which cannot be passed at less than five per cent discount. Men will not ship without cash. There are upwards of a hundred seamen in port, but they refuse to enter, even though we offer to ship for a month only."
The Second Barbary War (17–19 June 1815; 3 frigates, 3 brigs, 2 schooners, 2 sloops) is a major naval build-up? Perhaps, for the United States. In 1816 the British take five ships of the line, four frigates, five brig-sloops, four bombs, and 55 smaller vessels to Algiers, and they don't even call it a war.
It's a good job the United States doesn't need ships to move goods from one bit of the country to another, isn't it?
Whatever more or less of success or injury attended the coastwise trade in the several localities, the point to be observed is that the enemy's operations effectually separated the different sections of the country from one another, so far as this means of intercourse was concerned; thereby striking a deadly blow at the mutual support which might be given by communities differing so markedly in resources, aptitudes, and industries... To get by sea from one end of the country to the other it was necessary to break the blockade in starting, to take a wide sweep out to sea, and again to break it at the desired point of entrance. This, however, is not coasting.
The effect which this coast pressure produced upon the welfare of the several sections is indicated here and there by official utterances. The war party naturally inclined to minimize unfavorable results, and their opponents in some measure to exaggerate them; but of the general tendency there can be no serious doubt. Mr. Pearson, an opposition member of the House from North Carolina, speaking February 16, 1814, when the record of 1813 was made up, and the short-lived embargo of December was yet in force, said: "Blocked up as we are by the enemy's squadron upon our coast, corked up by our still more unmerciful embargo and non-importation laws, calculated as it were to fill up the little chasm in the ills which the enemy alone could not inflict; the entire coasting trade destroyed, and even the little pittance of intercourse from one port to the other in the same state destroyed [by the embargo], the planters of the Southern and Middle states, finding no market at home for their products, are driven to the alternative of wagoning them hundreds of miles, in search of a precarious market in the Northern and Eastern states, or permitting them to rot on their hands."
Please don't tell me that when you see a reference to the blockade destroying "commerce", you assume it only means the international trade of the United States and not inter-state commerce.
I get the idea that the British can do it more easily than the United States, because structural weaknesses (e.g. not having a national bank) meant that a debt of only 7.26% of GDP hit the creditworthiness of the United States federal government so hard that individual officers were having to sign IOUs to feed their troops. If both sides spend another $100m on continuing the war, with a third coming out of taxation and two-thirds out of borrowing, then the US national debt goes from $127m to $193m (52% increase) and the British national debt goes from £679m to £692m (1.9% increase). As ancien regime France proves, it's not the size of the debt but its size relative to people's confidence in your ability to pay it back that matters:
France's budgetary difficulties stood in sharp contrast to Britain, where authority over taxation, borrowing, and expenditure was held solely by Parliament. Although Britain financed its wars primarily by borrowing, Parliament could and did alter taxation unlike the French government. These differences enabled Britain to assume higher ratios of taxes and debt to GNP than France while debt service absorbed proportionally less revenue... For 1788, Weir finds government debt to be 56 percent of GNP for France and 182 percent for Britain, taxes to be 7 percent of GNP for France and 12 percent for Britain, with the ratio of debt service to tax revenue 62 and 56 percent respectively. The relative cost of funding, measured by debt service to debt was 7.5 percent for France and 3.8 percent for Britain.
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I haven't shifted any goal posts. What is being argued is first the U.S. Economy was on the verge of collapse at the end of 1814, it wasn't. The other argument being made is the U.S. has to make peace on any British terms because they could no longer sustain their forces in the field, also not true. Yes, I've said U.S. finances in the War of 1812 were a mess. In your example of the contractor being in desperate need of payment for building ships of the line on Lake Ontario your research didn't find if the minimum payment was made. I can only assume it was because construction on the USS New Orleans & Chippewa continued till the end of the war.
During the war the U.S. completed the ships of the line Independence, Washington, and Franklin. Columbus had been burned along with the frigate Columbia in the Washington Navy Yard, but Congress authorized her restarted construction, and a navy strength of 9 ships of the line, and 12 heavy frigates. Yes, I do consider that a major naval build up.
The point I was trying to make and was lost on you wasn't that the U.S. was managing its debt as well as the UK. It was that the British Government wanted to end the war because it was costing a lot of money for no good purpose. In this and every other Anglo/American 19th Century war thread we get into this insane Britain has decided to humble the U.S. no matter what the cost, or how long it takes. It takes on the aspects of a life-or-death struggle like the World Wars of the 20 Century. None of these scenarios pose any kind of existential threat to the UK. They all involve things like national pride, about the wilderness north of the Columbia River, or over a pig. The most substantial is over the Maine Boundry, and that could be settled by talking about it.
Trying to take the Louisiana Purchase from the Americans puts them under an existential threat. By pushing them into a corner even the Federalists of New England would have to join the war because they were committed to the Westward Expansion. They are not going to leave the Union. You are not dividing the Americans you are uniting them. Finally, as I've said many times if the war is still going on in March 1815 the British will pull the plug when Napolean returns from Elba.
If not the Congress of Vienna might well breakup into a new war, with the UK fighting Russia & Prussia. Europe was more important to the UK than North American ambitions. Advancing in India is next in importance and promoting British commerce which fighting the Americans only harms. They had money to be made by trading with them, and none to made by fighting them.
I mean, US propaganda aside, that's never really been in doubt. Winning a battle after the peace treaty is signed does not a victory make.
The country that fails in its stated aim to annex their enemies territory (Canada), and has its capital city burnt down, all by a country very much viewing the American theatre as a side show to the much more important job of finishing off Napoleon, is assuredly not the victor.
The fact that it was already fighting an effectively indefinate war?
The evidence for that is right in front of you. At the time of the War of 1812, the UK was a living breathing example of a country whose economic set up and infrastructure was able to sustain a multi decade war-it had been fighting Revolutionary then Napoleonic France for almost 2 decades at that point.
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Are you serious? You really think the War of 1812 was fought because the Americans wanted to annex Canada? The Americans didn't think they'd won because of the Battle of New Orleans, though that was icing on the cake. Most of America's war objectives were achieved. Tecumseh's British backed tribal Confederacy was defeated ending the threat to the settlements in the Old Northwest. The Tribes in the Lower Mississippi region were also defeated, the Spanish threat was ended, and West Florida was captured. Britain agreed not to support any of the tribes against the U.S. again.
With the end of the Napoleonic Wars Impressment, and attacks on American shipping was ended. During the war the Americans had established control of Lake Erie, and the rest of the Great Lakes to the West. That gave the Americans control of most of the Canadian lands north of Lake Erie. The Government buildings in Washington were burned, but the attacks on Baltimore & Plattsburg were defeated. The Americans had stood up to British aggression against it, and neither side ever wanted to go to war again, so they made their point.
It's interesting that you say the Battle of New Orleans didn't matter since the whole point of this thread is that if the British had won, they would've broken the peace treaty and tried to keep New Orleans, and the whole Louisiana Purchase. In that case it did matter the Americans won a big victory. In the OTL the British failures at New Orleans, Plattsburg, and Baltimore showed them that invading the U.S. wasn't an easy task.
unprincipled peter
Donor
The only one arguing about the OTL Battle of New Orleans is you. The thread is about doing better in the War, specifically Louisiana, to the point that Louisiana Territory is turned over to the British. That says nothing about the OTL BoNO. Several, including myself, have pointed out that 'doing better' has to happen at an earlier point in the war.
I know its July 4th tomorrow but you know you don't have to take nationalistic umbrage to every contrary opinion in this thread, yes?
? Please explain how what I said was nationalistic umbrage. The United States didn't declare war on Great Britain to annex Canada. Does anyone on the board seriously think American aggression was the cause of the war? Most American war aims were achieved during the course of the war. Concluding the Americans lost the war because they failed to capture the Canadian heartland, and suffered the humiliation of having its capital burned doesn't change the long-term strategic gains they made. I've always said the war was fought to a draw. To those who say the British flat out won the war I ask what strategic goals did the UK attain? Or is this a, "We won the war on the battlefield, but the politicians gave it all away at the peace talks." kind of stabbed in the back theory?
Well, they quite clearly defended Canada and prevented its annexation / capture by the United States, all while fighting an existential threat.
Many prominent historians blame American aggression for the war, even many Federalists and a few Republicans questioned American motives of starting the war. And the fact that it so closely coincided with Napoleon's invasion of Russia was deeply suspicious.
Britain ended the Orders in Council before was even declared and was never arming the Indians to the rhetoric the western legislators claimed (British gifts to Indians in 1812 were half of what they the previous year to assuage American fears) and Britain was simply never going to budge on impressment regardless of how well the war went for America. With that in mind, it's very hard to view Britain as the instigator. One of America's chief concerns was already solved (Orders in Council), another wasn't ever really happening except in the minds of its proponents (arming the Indians), a third would never be settled by arms (impressment). It's very hard not to view America as the aggressor in that light.
Except the paramount goal of the war was the address the impressment of sailors. Which they unequivocally did not get in Ghent. The simple coincidence that the Napoleon wars ended and so impressment was supposedly a non-issue is silly. America declared the war to address many issues, and by 1815 they got nothing. They lost.
It's one thing to speculate on the British {somehow} annexing Louisiana, either the state or the whole territory even, but to claim that the USA lost the war of 1812, when the British were trying to say the Louisiana Purchase was null and void, so that they could attempt to conspire to contain US westward expansion at the Mississippi, well, we all know how that worked out, don't we. The fact that the battle of New Orleans was a British defeat, and the western border of the USA is the Pacific coast tells a different tale.
The USA didn't gain Canada, but we did gain (or retain, depending on your point of view) our westward expansion, all the way to the Pacific.
Happy 4th of July weekend everyone!!!