Dividends of the North Sea
The massive ramp-up of North Sea drilling platforms during the 1970s, in part a response to European fears about the accessibility of affordable (and maybe more than affordable, reliable) oil supplies in the long, uncertain shadow of the 1973 Arab oil embargo, was anticipated not just as a geopolitical security feature but also a future economic boon. In the 1980s, for instance, Norway would transform from the poor, redheaded stepchild of Scandinavia to far and away the wealthiest Nordic state, financing its ambitious welfare state goals with the petroleum boon and leaving Sweden and Denmark ruing that they had not agreed to enter into co-development deals with Statoil when they'd had a chance. The gas fields at Groningen in the Netherlands had already proven for nearly twenty years the benefits that flowed to countries in Europe with easily exploitable natural resources in terms of social improvements, and Norway went above and beyond that.
In the UK, the exploitation of North Sea oilfields had thus been eyed as a surefire economic winner for whoever won the last election before the major cash and oil flows began in 1980, which partially explained the acrimony around the 1978 contest Callaghan had called at the most advantageous moment and Tory anger at Thatcher "blowing" it - it was broadly presumed that whoever in Westminster won the 1978 election was well-set to win in 1982 or 1983, when the Dividend, as it came to be called in official government white papers penned by the Exchequer, began really paying. Despite the general admiration the British people had for him and his talent in PMQs, one thing that always bedeviled Willie Whitelaw's leadership in opposition was that the Conservatives had broad internal disagreements on what exactly to spend the Dividend on if they were in power. Labour did not have that issue in government, even if the appearances of Labour unity were just that - appearances.
Many UK political observers had tensed ahead of the spring of 1981 when Peter Shore was due to unveil his first budget. Shore had briefly contested the previous year's leadership contest and been included by Healey as a major and substantive olive branch to the soft-left and even the Bennites, who badly mistrusted him as an austerian thanks to his infamous 1976 budget revisions and agreement to place Britain under IMF stewardship. Shore was a curious character even by the standards of the British left, who had been denied the Exchequer by both Wilson and Callaghan previously due to his unorthodox left-wing views on autarky, limiting the ability of the party to use his brilliant rhetorical skills and sharp wit on the frontbenches. Indeed, Shore had perhaps better been suited for the Foreign Office - Healey's preferred landing spot for him - after his renunciation of his previous support for the Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament, but his professed belief in withdrawing en toto from the European Economic Union sans referendum mere years after Labour had stuck its neck out on holding a referendum on staying in made that a difficult, and Owen had demanded a return to the Foreign Office as his price for dropping out and clearing Healey's path to Number 10 the spring before.
Shore formed part of what became known in Cabinet as "the Troika" - he, Home Secretary Michael Foot, and Education Secretary Neil Kinnock, the three soft-left champions Healey had appointed to key positions to keep the Tribune Group happy after Benn's ignonimous defeat and their champion's retreat to the backbenches with the likes of Eric Heffer and Dennis Skinner. Thus, he had two very influential friends in important ministries to help him drive what came to be known as the Shore Programme, based off of ideas charted out in his informal budget speech of the previous spring and then unveiled on Budget Day in 1981. Fundamentally, what Shore proposed from the Exchequer fell short of his previous support of autarky, nationalization and protectionism, but nonetheless had a firmly left-wing tint to it. The Dividend was to go into the National Public Wealth Fund, a new sovereign wealth entity, that would lend at fixed bargain-basement rates in three areas - one, inner cities that needed revitalization; two, the "roads, rails and bridges" that needed repair; and third, schools, with Kinnock championing the Bullock Report's suggestions for improving British education. The hope was that targeting unemployment both through jobs programs, expanded welfare programs, and spending on education and infrastructure would "end the loop of misery and despair" and "invest the dividends of our natural resources where they belong, in our human resources."
The debate over the Shore Programme saw a major loss to Labour when Roy Jenkins, a former rising star within the party, very publicly defected to the Liberals shortly after and declared in a tense speech, "A party which took lump after lump to get Britain's fiscal house in order in the Wilson and Callaghan years now abandons its rigor for starry-eyed utopianism!" Shore shot back that nothing in the budget was unpaid for, and mused that Jenkins was simply "bitter that having been rejected for his beliefs by this party, he now needs to find one as irrelevant to modern Britain as himself." The truth was, though, that many in Labour were quietly skeptical of Shore's spending plans, which while not out of the mainstream did have a sense of profligacy to them after the "tough medicine" that had begun in 1967 with the currency devaluation. That there were reports that both Healey and Owen were personally opposed to the budgets did not help, as rumor-mongering spread throughout Westminster.
The televised worldwide spectacle Royal Wedding of the Prince and Princess of Wales, and the visit of President Hugh Carey - a man temperamentally similar to Healey - did help distract from the infighting in part by instilling a broad sense of national spirit and pride, and the budget was quietly passed shortly thereafter. By late in 1981, unemployment had begun to indeed tick down significantly and inflation looked moderately under control, though Labour's lag in the polls behind Whitelaw's Tories still remained stubbornly in the high-single, low-double digits after recovering from apocalyptic numbers the year before. Healey was well-liked but his party was not; Shore was hugely popular with the left, but gave the public pause. Labour had begun to claw its way back from the difficult Winter of Discontent and horrific economy of 1979, but the road to the elections due by September 1983 was long and arduous...