Wotcher,
Having searched the archives we've speculated on Beria attaining hegemony of the Soviet Union post 1953 twice before in 2017, both threads focusing on the tools necessary for Beria to achieve prominence, with significant contributions by David T. Instead, I want to focus on changes to the Soviet bloc under a Beria hegemony equivalent to Khrushchev's hegemony: 1953-1964.
For speculations sake: Beria restrains his reformist impulses around nationalities and the integration of the Soviet Union into international capitalism; he plays "the game" much better, bringing Mikoyan onside and working Khrushchev and their mutual reform agendas much better at a human level. This leaves Beria equipped with a sufficient negotiating position to survive to 1964, when he will be sent off to a pickling factory as a result of failures in his reform programmes and his management of the party dynamic.
This post is largely inspired by the portrayal of Beria in the recent film Death of Stalin, and in particular the attention given to Beria as the only serious character in a delightful farce.
With a softer movement towards sanity in the Soviet Union than historically, Beria is probably caught up in the "socialist-humanist" vibe of relaxed cultural, police and national behaviour, tied to the fundamental renegotiation of the economic position of peasants and rural workers in relation to small family production; and, to the renegotiation with the industrial workers around factory control.
The chief issue I see here is whether the "anti-party bloc" issue comes to primacy before or after a critical moment in Poland and/or Hungary. Consider, for example, if the Beria bloc is capable of forcing the "Hungarian New Course" experiment in both Hungary and Poland such a critical moment may not emerge if reform is controlled by the party in both instances. Should a crisis rear its head it may be played more intelligently (Poland, historically) or less intelligently (Hungary, historically). Either case gives the opportunity for a purge of the anti-party bloc and the cementing of a larger position for negotiation with the Soviet working class than historically.
Finally, of course, this results in a greater number of dead and raped soviet citizens between 1953 and the late 1960s.
yours,
Sam R.
Having searched the archives we've speculated on Beria attaining hegemony of the Soviet Union post 1953 twice before in 2017, both threads focusing on the tools necessary for Beria to achieve prominence, with significant contributions by David T. Instead, I want to focus on changes to the Soviet bloc under a Beria hegemony equivalent to Khrushchev's hegemony: 1953-1964.
For speculations sake: Beria restrains his reformist impulses around nationalities and the integration of the Soviet Union into international capitalism; he plays "the game" much better, bringing Mikoyan onside and working Khrushchev and their mutual reform agendas much better at a human level. This leaves Beria equipped with a sufficient negotiating position to survive to 1964, when he will be sent off to a pickling factory as a result of failures in his reform programmes and his management of the party dynamic.
This post is largely inspired by the portrayal of Beria in the recent film Death of Stalin, and in particular the attention given to Beria as the only serious character in a delightful farce.
With a softer movement towards sanity in the Soviet Union than historically, Beria is probably caught up in the "socialist-humanist" vibe of relaxed cultural, police and national behaviour, tied to the fundamental renegotiation of the economic position of peasants and rural workers in relation to small family production; and, to the renegotiation with the industrial workers around factory control.
The chief issue I see here is whether the "anti-party bloc" issue comes to primacy before or after a critical moment in Poland and/or Hungary. Consider, for example, if the Beria bloc is capable of forcing the "Hungarian New Course" experiment in both Hungary and Poland such a critical moment may not emerge if reform is controlled by the party in both instances. Should a crisis rear its head it may be played more intelligently (Poland, historically) or less intelligently (Hungary, historically). Either case gives the opportunity for a purge of the anti-party bloc and the cementing of a larger position for negotiation with the Soviet working class than historically.
Finally, of course, this results in a greater number of dead and raped soviet citizens between 1953 and the late 1960s.
yours,
Sam R.