I guess I just don't understand why you need to beach these vessels instead of just having them be very close? Why is a beached heavy cruiser with 8" guns better than one that's floating? Accuracy?
Amen
I used to be paid to plan amphibious landings, more specifically the fire support. From that perspective this looks like a complete waste of effort. There would be zero advantage in providing fire support to the first couple hours of the assault. None.
The destroyers that came in close after 08:30 still had problems identifying the enemy bunkers that were in defilaide & camoflaged. Even after two hours of rising tide they were still 1,200+ meters from the targets. A deep draft ship is going to beach 2,000+ meters off the beach at 06:30. At that range the residual rain haze & prelanding bombardment smoke/dust are going to make it next to impossible to spot exposed targets. Those in defilaide would have to spotted from far down the beach, so the range could easily be 3,000 meters.
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There's other ways to improve performance. Have a less complicated plan so that one or two landing craft off the mark doesn't throw the whole plan off and objectives based on targets of opportunity instead. Release the DD tanks closer so they don't get flooded. Don't tell the bombers to drop "a few seconds later" so the bombs actually hit the beach. Actually bombard with more than a handful of ships for hours and hours on end. ....
That last may have been the most sure. I've seen reasons for not starting the bombardment earlier. Leaving those aside:
1. Tactical suprise was lost when the airborne drop started at 01:30. If the German accounts are correct the alarm went out shortly after the paras started dropping. Around 02:00, depending on the HQ, orders for full alert & to man the battle positions went out. Most soldiers were rousted out of bed and at company muster by 02:30. The bulk of the solders were at the battle positions by 04:30 & the last stragglers around 05:00. That is over a hour before the first US soldiers set foot on UTAH Beach & over two hours before the Brits set foot on distant SWORD Beach. Some of the German soldiers describe being sent to breakfast shortly after 05:00.
2. The defenders did not live in the beach defenses. The were billeted at varying distances inland in French houses, hotels, tents, converted barns or commercial building. A few of the bunkers or gun positions had spartan living accomadations, but these were supposed to be temporary. & could not house even half the defenders numbers.
I've not yet found a description of exactly how the German defenses were manned when not alerted. Estimating from my own training I'd expect 1-3 men with each crew served weapons bunker; a similar number at each company & battalion CP and each artillery observation post. Also a platoon size guard detail for each kilometer of beach. Omaha Beach was approx 8000 meters long, with 12 cannon bunkers & twice that many MG bunkers. So, maybe 350 men actually in or very near the beach defense positions. that may be between 15 & 20 % of the total assigned to defend the 8 kilometer front of O Beach.
The remainder were sleeping, or whoring anywhere from 300 to 3000 meters inland, perhaps further for some. Its a short march by any armies standards, but it seems to have taken a minimum two hours to get the battle positions manned to 90%. That movement was made without interfereance other than a few stray paratroopers.
Lets supose the Allied planners had choosen to set a program of suppresive fires on the beach defenses, and interdiction fires inland on the approaches, from around 02:00. These would not be of the intensity to constitute destructive fires, or even nuetralizing fires. The object would be to pin as many of the defenders inland between their billets & the battle positions. This would not prevent all movement, but would slow it, disrupt it, and inflict 2-3% casualties in the first couple hours to 04:00. After full light the interdiction program could be reduced somewhat, with the fires concentrated on the beach defenses. That still interferes with defenders moving to their assigned bunkers.
Exactly how much this would reduce the numbers in the beach defenses, or inland artillery positions can only be guessed at. I'd estimate 25% overall at a minimum, but would not be suprised if it reached 50% or even 75% at a few locations. More important is the effect on morale and combat efficiency. A number of NCOs & officers would be missing, some of the CP would be non functional, some of the guns with too few crew, and counter attack groups missing or too demoralized. Overall the defenders would have been subject to four hours of heavy caliber fire vs the 45 minutes of the historical fire plan for O Beach. while the fire would have been less intense during the first three hours & many would have avoided it, the last hour plus of intenser fire on the beach defenses would have enhanced the necessary degradation of morale, or 'bombardment shock' as some might put it.
Between the missing interdicted men & final suppresion or shock the combat efficiency of the beach defenses & supporting artillery might be reduced by 25%, perhaps more in some locations.
