Basileus Theos

[Deleted member 5909]

250 B.C. – 247 B.C.​

An uneasy peace.​

The events surrounding the mysterious death of King Philippos III Euergetēs at Nineveh, and the rise of Queen Berenikē Philomētōr that follows occur in quick succession. Queen Berenikē’s only son, the seven year old Prince Alexandros, is immediately proclaimed King Alexandros V Tryphōn that same day, the first royal successor to a Great King to not have already at least nominally shared the throne with his father. Two weeks later, at the summer capital of Ecbatana in Medea, Queen Berenikē is named as royal regent and co-ruler with her son by the Synedrion.

Despite her probable involvement in her husband’s untimely death, the Queen Mother immediately arranges a spectacular funeral for her uncle, ensuring one of the most magnificent spectacles of memorial games ever held at Babylon, since the reign of King Alexandros III Megas himself. She even piously observes a prolonged six months of royal mourning in his honor. In January, 249 B.C., the twenty-two year old queen goes so far as to have herself crowned jointly with her son at Gordium. Later, as if this already was not bold enough for an Argead queen, she begins minting coins with both the faces of she and her young son, in an attempt to publicly assert right to rule—the first queen in the history of the empire to do so.

Already anticipating harm from the newly risen queen, King Philippos’ other widow, Queen Apama, is informed by a loyal court eunuch in the late winter of 249 B.C. of a plot against her life by Berenikē and her supporters. Acting fast, the queen dowager flees from Babylon the following night, with her three young children, accompanied by a small group of servants and supporters. Though the group is pursued by the forces of the Queen Regent, who instructs her soldiers to capture the family at all costs, Apama and her children manage to safely reach Phoenicia, disguised as a troop of Phrygian actors, where they are able to take ship from Sidon for the safety of Italy.

Meanwhile, King Philippos Nikatōr, the famed King of Carthage, dies at Tunis in the fall of 249 B.C., aged sixty-two. He is succeeded by his son, King Lysimakhos II Eupatōr (b. 276 B.C.), who has served as his co-ruler for the last three years. Over the last decade, the rising power of Rome has brought the republic into an increasing rivalry and conflict with Carthage over dominance of the western Mediterranean. This is worsened both by Rome’s recent conquest of southern Italy, which has given them possession of the entire peninsula, to the Po valley, and also by the fact that Argead control of the eastern sea limits any expansion in that direction by either of the powers and confines them to the west. Further, the aggressive policies of expansion and conquest pursued by Carthage and Rome in Iberia and Italy respectively over the last thirty years, have set the two states on a path to unavoidable war for dominance in the west.

The policies of inherited by the Queen Mother from her late husband King Philippos III Euergetēs have been rather pacifist and benign. The Argeads have been allies of both the Romans and Carthaginians, and profited greatly from it. Further, by maintaining a western foothold in Sicily, they have ensured not only a balance of power by their presence in the west, but also a share in the profits of the lucrative trade there. With little interest in pursuing any further western expansion, King Philippos III saw little harm in allowing Roman conquest of southern Italy and conflict with the Gallic tribes of the Po river valley.

By the same logic, the Iberian wars (lasting from 275 B.C – 251 B.C.) were also largely seen indifferently by the Great King. It was through these conflicts that King Philippos Nikatōr was able to reconquer the old Carthaginian colonies of southern Iberia, which essentially operated autonomously after the conquest of Africa by King Alexandros III until that time, due to lack of royal initiative to subjugate them. The King of Carthage also was able to defeat the dominant Celtic and Iberian tribes of the peninsula’s western coastline, either annexing their territories or reducing their chieftains to client kings. The new King Lysimakhos II has thus grown up in this atmosphere of expansionism and Carthaginian-Roman rivalry. Eager to live up to his expectations as the heir of the famed “King Philippos the Victor”, and to gain a reputation for himself as a military commander, the king begins preparations for war with Rome.

In Rome, the senate also sees a future war as both inevitable and greatly within the interests of the Roman state and people. The experienced general Lucius Caecilius Metellus (consul in 253 B.C. with Gnaeus Cornelius Scipio as his colleague), now just returned from his service in Etruria as proconsul, now finds himself elected to the consulship in 247 B.C. for a (technically illegal) second term. When the Carthaginians invade the lands of the Lacetani tribe in Iberia that same year, their king, already aware that the Romans are amassing their forces in Italy, appeals to the Senate for assistance, both fearing a second Iberian war between the Carthaginians and the northwestern tribes of the peninsula, and also desperate to maintain his kingdom’s unsteady position as an independent and neutral state. The republic now sees its chance, and immediately declares war on Carthage in the spring of 247 B.C.

 

[minifidel]

Just want to point out that the grain thing only became a significant issue about a century hence, after the Roman agricultural economy collapsed and the urban proletariat swelled. Prior to that most Romans grew their own food.

It should be noted though that this collapse was a result of the constant war, since it meant that the yeomen farmers who made up the backbone of the Roman military machine were away from their farms too long, or simply died in numbers that couldn't be replaced easily. There is I suppose a possibility that this decline might be slowed down ITTL, but if Rome is as belligerent as OTL, this collapse will happen eventually.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

Argead Empire, 250 B.C.

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[Deleted member 5909]

247 B.C. – 241 B.C.​

The first Punic war.​

With the outbreak of war between Rome and Carthage, both of whom are technical allies of the Argeads, the empire is now faced with two choices: declare for either side and have the possibility of tremendous gain in the west, or remain neutral, playing the two powers off until they exhaust themselves. While the Synedrion prudently advises Queen Berenikē in the direction of the latter course as the wisest, her mind is already made up. The queen refuses to forsake her beloved brother in Carthage, and immediately promises him her support. The queen has also always been decidedly anti-Roman due to her upbringing in the Carthaginian court, and she thus sees opposition to the republic’s expansion as her filial duty. Further, the decision of the Senate to grant asylum to Queen Apama and her children in Italy in 249 B.C. has only solidified her anti-Roman sentiments. In August, 247 B.C., she declares war on the Roman senate and people.

The queen begins preparations for war immediately, gathering an army at Sardis and orders her fleet in Syracuse to deploy, lending the services of her 300 warships there to her brother, King Lysimakhos II. This ensures a great allied naval victory against the inexperienced Roman fleet at Lipara in October, 247 B.C. The news of which quickly reaches Babylon and is taken as an omen of divine favor by the queen, who publicly offers sacrifices of thanksgiving to both Poseidon and Ishtar.

In Rome, the senate sees the actions of the Argead queen as a great betrayal of their long held partnership in the west, and a sacrilege upon the sacred oaths sworn to cement their various treaties and pacts during the reign of King Philippos III Euergetēs. They order Queen Apama and her children to be installed in a grand residence on the Aventine hill (due to the prohibition on foreign monarchs crossing the city’s sacred boundary, the pomerium), and treated with the full honors of royalty. Already, there are whispered plans to somehow engineer a palace coup and their installation in Babylon by any means possible, though with no foreseeable means, they are quickly abandoned by the middle of 246 B.C. Crossing the Adriatic sea with five legions in February, 246 B.C., Metellus invades the Argead allied kingdom of Epirus in retribution for Queen Berenikē’s betrayal, buying time for the badly damaged Roman fleet to be restored at Ostia.

The Romans easily overwhelm the unprepared armies of King Alexandros II of Epirus. Metellus manages to score two crushing victories against the king. The first of these is at Dodona in May, 246 B.C., where the Romans are able to smash through the lines of the famed Illyrian mercenary spearmen, and force the king to retreat south. The second occurs at Ambracia on November 21, 246 B.C., where Metellus and his legions almost completely destroy the Epirote army of 20,000, cutting off King Alexandros’ retreat across the sea, and into Argead held Greece. In a feat of almost legendary proportions which will be forever remembered by future Roman generations, Metellus becomes the third Roman citizen in the history of the republic to defeat and slay an enemy leader in single, hand to hand combat, earning him the sacred honor of spolia opima—Metellus will later be granted a triumph the following year upon his return to Rome. King Alexandros’ widow and half-sister, Queen Olympias, manages to flee east into Macedon along with her two sons. The Romans then install a client king of their own, a cousin of Alexandros II, as King Alketas II of Molossia, setting him up with a Roman garrison in Passaron, while occupying the north directly.

News of the fall of Epirus to the Romans reaches Babylon in December. By this time, Queen Berenikē has managed to levy an army of 20,000 cavalry and nearly 55,000 infantry at Sardis. She appoints the strategos Artabazos, of the House of Pharnabazos (one of the most ancient and noble families in Persia), a veteran commander of her husband’s Sicilian war, to act as commander of the western theatre. Artabazos and his troops cross the Hellespont into Thrace that spring, after wintering in Anatolia.

Meanwhile, realizing that at this point a naval defeat of the Carthaginians will not be possible, especially in alliance with the Argeads, the Romans prepare for a land campaign in Iberia. The former consul Publius Claudius Pulcher is given command of the army, with special proconsular imperium granted to him by the senate; the entire force, with reinforcements arriving from Metellus’ campaign in Epirus, consists of eight legions. He departs Italy in April, crossing the Po and memorably marching his men across the Alps, a feat of no small skill. Pulcher and his legions arrive in Lacetani territory by December, 245 B.C., wintering at Barcino.

By September, 245 B.C., Artabazos has managed to reach Epirus, where he attacks the vastly outnumbered puppet king Alketas II and the Roman legion left to garrison the kingdom at Pambotis. While the Romans fight well, they are vastly outnumbered by Artabazos’ massive force of 70,000, and are soon forced to fall back into retreat to the capital at Passaron. There, Artabazos besieges them through the fall and winter months, hoping to inflict a quick defeat and secure Argead occupation of Epirus for the duration of the war, in order to launch an invasion of Italy the following spring. His plans fail, however, in February, 244 B.C., when four legions, under the command of the praetor Marcus Aemilius Lepidus arrive to lift the siege. What follows is one of the greatest military defeats in Argead history; 48,000 Romans manage to defeat over 70,000 Greco-Persians, using elite Roman tactics to smash through the Macedonian phalanx, destroying the myth of Argead supremacy once and for all. In all, 22,000 bodies will litter the fields outside the city gates of Passaron, 15,000 of which are of those of Artabazos’ own men. The humiliated general is forced to immediately retreat into Macedon and prepare for war on the home front.

In Iberia, Pulcher and his army advance south, joining with a force of Lacetani auxiliaries, before encountering the forces of King Lysimakhos II at Tarraco in the spring of 244 B.C. The young king, inexperienced and far too desirous of personal glory to heed the warnings of his more experienced commanders, personally leads the cavalry charge against the advancing legionaries, barely escaping with his own life. Pulcher easily gains the upper hand, due to his opponents near constant underestimation of him, inflicting a strategic defeat upon the Carthaginians and forcing them to retreat south to Edeta. The Romans pursue them, engaging in a series of light skirmishes Tertosa and Seguntum, before finally directly meeting their rivals on the battlefield near Edeta itself in August. This time, King Lysimakhos II at least shows better sense, and, once again on the verge of a heavy defeat by the Romans, agrees to a tactical retreat further south, to Carthago Nova, where he hopes to muster more troops and buy time against the advancing forces of Pulcher.

However, despite the republic’s stunning success thus far, Rome is still stretched too thin conducting the war on two fronts. Lepidus hopes to at least cripple the Argeads, and having discovered the great advantage his own forces have over the outdated Macedonian phalanx, believes he can knock them out of the war very soon. In late May, he launches an invasion of Macedon proper, besieging Artabazos at Aigae. It is here, however, that the Persian general is finally able to prove himself a competent commander, and he manages to withstand the Roman assault, holding out in the ancient stronghold of the Macedonian kings. Using the rocky terrain to his advantage, the general holds the high ground and blocks all further Roman advances, finally forcing Lepidus and his legions to turn back in temporary defeat in November. Though western Macedon is occupied by the Romans, their further advance is now halted for the moment. A desperate Artabazos now plots his next move.

In April, 243 B.C., Pulcher finds himself far more lucky, when Carthago Nova falls to his legions, and the defeated King Lysimakhos II is forced to pull back even farther, to the western citadel at Basti. Determined to secure the whole of Iberia, the proconsul seeks to win a decisive victory over the king of Carthage, and force him back across the Pillars of Hēraklēs. To achieve this, however, he needs far more troops, and thus Pulcher is forced to request reinforcements in the summer of 243 B.C. By this time, the senate is frustrated by Lepidus’ inability to break through Argead defenses in Macedon, and orders him to abandon the Balkan theatre as a dead end, and instead send 20,000 men to Pulcher in Iberia, and then cross the Adriatic a second time to bring the war south to Argead held Sicily. Upon his departure in October, the propraetor leaves only two legions at the disposal of King Alketas in Epirus. While Artabazos wishes to pursue Lepidus into Italy, he is forced to instead regroup at Pella for a coming campaign in Molossia, and then send word to his allies in Sicily of a coming Roman attack.

In the late summer of 242 B.C., four legions arrive in Iberia, and join with Pulcher and his forces. Using the full might of the Roman military machine, the ambitious proconsul then directly attacks King Lysimakhos near Baria in September. There, he finally manages to cut off the Carthaginian retreat and score the decisive victory he has been hoping for, greatly diminishing the forces of King Lysimakhos, forcing him to finally abandon eastern Iberia for his possessions in the southwest.

This news is only further accentuated by word of a second Roman victory, this time at Inessa, where the Argead garrison in Sicily is routed in July, and forced to retreat to the safety of the walls of Syracuse, preparing to sail with a great majority of the Argead fleet which is anchored there. This allows Lepidus to buy enough time to take both Thermae and Panormus, effectively securing Roman occupation in the face of the coming Argead retreat, though how long they will be able to hold the island, with its large population of hostile Greeks, is uncertain. However, on February 2, 241 B.C., tragedy strikes, when the entire embarking Argead fleet (numbering almost 290 warships), now sailing for the safety of Corinth, is caught up in a massive storm soon after leaving Syracuse, and almost completely destroyed. The result is a disaster of awesome proportions, effectively destroying all Argead naval dominance in the western Mediterranean sea.

Meanwhile, with their heavy losses in Iberia, and King Lysimakhos’ seeming inability to effectively either score a reasonable victory over Pulcher, or block his advance on the peninsula, the Carthaginians now realize they are fighting a losing battle. Worse yet, the brutal effects of the war have torn apart the urban coastline of western Iberia, and caused a great disruption in trade in the western sea, a vital source of Carthage’s wealth. King Lysimakhos’ ineptitude as a commander has also cost his kingdom a great deal, and after six years of near constant warfare fought on distant fronts by an army composed mostly of mercenaries (along with the aforementioned current trading crisis), the state treasury is now greatly depleted.

Artabazos sues for peace at Pella, in May, 241 B.C. Already unable to defeat the superior skill of the Roman legionaries with his outdated phalanx tactics, the Roman occupation of Sicily and the destruction of his fleet at Syracuse previously that year have finally forced his hand. The empire has lost its advantage even at sea, and the declining state of Carthage has ensured that there will be no allied reinforcements or auxiliaries arriving in the near future. Further, the war has essentially been one disaster after another for the Argead empire, with heavy losses in men and ships, and now Roman occupation of Epirus and Sicily—not sense the succession crises of the reign of King Alexandros IV Sōtēr has the empire been in such a vulnerable position.

Abandoned by their allies, the Carthaginians follow that summer, surrendering in Iberia and calling for peace with the Romans, their massive fleet at Tunis and their still extant, if tenuous, dominance of the western sea now their only remaining trump cards in the coming peace agreements.

By the terms of the treaty of Brundisium, the defeated King Lysimakhos is forced to cede the islands of Corsica and Sardinia. Further, in lieu of a heavy indemnity, the bankrupt king is instead forced to cede much of its possessions on the western coast of Iberia to Rome. Queen Berenikē is also humiliated by the treaty’s terms, as she is compelled to cede Sicily and the islands of Malta to Rome. Further, the queen mother is to agree to abandon all claims to Epirus and recognize the Roman client kingdom of Molossia instead, and in return, Rome will withdraw all her legions currently occupying the satrapy of Macedon. The terms are finally ratified in late 241 B.C.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

241 B.C. – 239 B.C.​

The downfall of Queen Berenikē Philomētōr​

The brutal defeat and surrender of Artabazos, the humiliating peace of Brundisium, and the loss of Epirus and Sicily, and with it, any Argead foothold in the western Mediterranean, combined with the destruction of the flotilla of Syracuse (taken by many as an ill omen of divine wrath), all result in a general decline the popularity of Queen Berenikē and her rule. The disastrous results of the Punic war, and the ill considered decision to ignore the advice of the Synedrion and betray the Romans, have caused a great deal of opposition to the queen mother and made her hold on power all the more tenuous.

Despite the fact that her son, King Alexandros V Tryphōn, is now nearing sixteen and fully capable of ruling directly, Queen Berenikē still remains his co-ruler, easily dominating and controlling her young son. It is his mother’s lover, Perseus, of the House of Antigonos, now recently appointed chiliarch, who is the real power behind the throne, however. Having already become the queen’s current sexual partner by 246 B.C., the young aristocrat has managed to completely gain her confidence by the end of the Punic war, and now rules as uncrowned king.

The incompetence of Queen Berenikē and the rising power of her lover, are enough to turn much of the royal court against her. By the spring of 240 B.C., a majority of the Synedrion is now actively plotting against the queen. The conspirators, led by the noble Mithridatēs of the House of Spitamenēs, a sōmatophylax (royal bodyguard) of the king, plan to use their influence with the powerful Immortals (the royal infantry guard) to incite them to rise up and murder Perseus, who has recently been named their honorary commander—a position technically only available to the sons of Persian noble houses.

In June, at the royal palace in Ecbatana, the secret cabal acts. Deciding against using the Immortals, for fear of inciting a temporary mob rule by the royal guard, they instead, as armed courtiers, set upon Perseus in one of the inner courtyards of the palace, brutally stabbing and bludgeoning him to death. Much to the surprise of the conspirators, the seventeen year old King Alexandros V, who has been watching from one of the upper balconies of the palace, does not flee in terror, but instead bravely strides forth and bestows his blessing upon them—though later sources will be unclear if this was originally out of fear for his own life, or hatred of the cruel Perseus, who has essentially kept him as a hostage for the last five years of his life. Indeed, the Great King does not even plead for the life of his mother, instead ordering her strangled in her bath immediately to ensure that his power is now absolute.

King Alexandros V Tryphōn is now absolute lord and master of the Argead empire. He orders the mangled body of the hated Perseus thrown to a local mob of angry subjects in Ecbatana, who tear him limb from limb, and cast the body into a nearby cesspit. Nevertheless, despite his mother’s great unpopularity, she was still a Great Queen of Asia, and thus worthy of respect. Though he is advised against it by his council, the Great King orders the proper funeral honors observed, though he denies her deification or any funeral games, instead having her corpse quietly cremated and laid to rest in the royal mausoleum at Susa.

Disliking the prospects of his own brother being used against him, and wishing to promote peace in the House of Alexandros, at least for the moment, he invites Queen Apama and his half-siblings to return to Babylon. Desiring a bride of proper rank, he weds his half-sister, Apama’s daughter, the twenty year old princess Laodikē in 239 B.C. Her sister, Barsinē, is wed to King Alexandros’ client and vassal, King Ariobarzanēs II of Pontus.

Seeing his half-brother, Antiokhos (b. 261 B.C.), as being of little threat (due to the fact that only King Alexandros himself can claim to be born of two royal parents), he dispatches the prince to Cyprus. There he arranges for the prince to wed the young Cypriot queen Eirēnē, whose recent accession has caused some problems in the eastern Mediterranean. The vulnerable position of Cyprus, and the inability of the recovering Argead empire to protect the valuable island, has led King Alexandros V to fear that it may succumb to Roman influence, or else be lost to some other power. Further, by giving his brother a throne, he believes he can at least neutralize any potential trouble, as well as secure Argead control of Cyprus in the process.

The year 239 B.C. is brought to a close by one further development: in the fall, more Greek refugees arrive from Sicily in Babylon. One of these is the astronomer and mathematician Arkhimēdēs of Syracuse, a man whose fame as a philosopher is just beginning to become known. He soon arrives at the royal court, and, having impressed King Alexandros V Tryphōn with many of his discoveries, he soon receives royal patronage.

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Meanwhile, realizing that at this point a naval defeat of the Carthaginians will not be possible, especially in alliance with the Argeads, the Romans prepare for a land campaign in Iberia. The former consul Publius Claudius Pulcher is given command of the army, with special proconsular imperium granted to him by the senate; the entire force, with reinforcements arriving from Metellus’ campaign in Epirus, consists of eight legions. He departs Italy in April, crossing the Po and memorably marching his men across the Alps, a feat of no small skill. Pulcher and his legions arrive in Lacetani territory by December, 245 B.C., wintering at Barcino.

...
In Iberia, Pulcher and his army advance south, joining with a force of Lacetani auxiliaries, before encountering the forces of King Lysimakhos II at Tarraco in the spring of 244 B.C. The young king, inexperienced and far too desirous of personal glory to heed the warnings of his more experienced commanders, personally leads the cavalry charge against the advancing legionaries, barely escaping with his own life. Pulcher easily gains the upper hand, due to his opponents near constant underestimation of him, inflicting a strategic defeat upon the Carthaginians and forcing them to retreat south to Edeta. The Romans pursue them, engaging in a series of light skirmishes Tertosa and Seguntum, before finally directly meeting their rivals on the battlefield near Edeta itself in August. This time, King Lysimakhos II at least shows better sense, and, once again on the verge of a heavy defeat by the Romans, agrees to a tactical retreat further south, to Carthago Nova, where he hopes to muster more troops and buy time against the advancing forces of Pulcher.
...

This news is only further accentuated by word of a second Roman victory, this time at Inessa, where the Argead garrison in Sicily is routed in July, and forced to retreat to the safety of the walls of Syracuse, preparing to sail with a great majority of the Argead fleet which is anchored there. This allows Lepidus to buy enough time to take both Thermae and Panormus, effectively securing Roman occupation in the face of the coming Argead retreat, though how long they will be able to hold the island, with its large population of hostile Greeks, is uncertain. However, on February 2, 241 B.C., tragedy strikes, when the entire embarking Argead fleet (numbering almost 290 warships), now sailing for the safety of Corinth, is caught up in a massive storm soon after leaving Syracuse, and almost completely destroyed. The result is a disaster of awesome proportions, effectively destroying all Argead naval dominance in the western Mediterranean sea.

The Romans beating the Macedonian phalanx, and conquering Epirus and part of Macedonia, I can believe. (My knowledge of the era's a bit weak, but I assume that the classic legionary formation has been developed?)

But... Moving entire armies into Iberia when the Carthage/Argead alliance has total naval superiority, and no supplies can therefore be shipped by sea? You have 'Rome stretched too thin', but suddenly she comes up with an additional 4 Legions and somehow gets them to Iberia?

Then, despite being already stretched too thin and having come up with legions out of thin air(??), they come up with even more, and apparently walk across the ocean bottom to get to Sicily (since they can't get there by sea.)

Then, AFTER all this, the entire Argead fleet just happens to be caught in a storm and destroyed!?!?



I was really liking this TL, but this post suddenly goes way beyond plausible, IMO.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

The Romans beating the Macedonian phalanx, and conquering Epirus and part of Macedonia, I can believe. (My knowledge of the era's a bit weak, but I assume that the classic legionary formation has been developed?)

But... Moving entire armies into Iberia when the Carthage/Argead alliance has total naval superiority, and no supplies can therefore be shipped by sea? You have 'Rome stretched too thin', but suddenly she comes up with an additional 4 Legions and somehow gets them to Iberia?

Then, despite being already stretched too thin and having come up with legions out of thin air(??), they come up with even more, and apparently walk across the ocean bottom to get to Sicily (since they can't get there by sea.)

Then, AFTER all this, the entire Argead fleet just happens to be caught in a storm and destroyed!?!?



I was really liking this TL, but this post suddenly goes way beyond plausible, IMO.

You're right, actually. I was unhappy with my section on the Punic wars, both writing it and how it turned out. On closer inspection, I realize that it is riddled with errors--I wanted to tie it up far too fast, and I believe it unraveled in the process.

Before any further updates, this will need to be remedied, and I plan on rewriting most of it. Indeed, I'm almost rather ashamed at how ASB it's gotten.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

250 B.C. – 247 B.C.​

[FONT=&quot]An uneasy peace.[/FONT]​

The events surrounding the mysterious death of King Philippos III Euergetēs at Nineveh, and the rise of Queen Berenikē Philomētōr that follows occur in quick succession. Queen Berenikē’s only son, the five year old prince Alexandros, is immediately proclaimed King Alexandros V Tryphōn that same day, the first royal successor to a Great King to not have already at least nominally shared the throne with his father. Two weeks later, at the summer capital of Ecbatana in Medea, Queen Berenikē is named as royal regent and co-ruler with her son by the Synedrion.

Despite her probable involvement in her husband’s untimely death, the Queen Mother immediately arranges a spectacular funeral for her uncle, ensuring one of the most magnificent spectacles of memorial games ever held at Babylon, since the reign of King Alexandros III Megas himself. She even piously observes a prolonged six months of royal mourning in his honor. In January, 249 B.C., the twenty-two year old queen goes so far as to have herself crowned jointly with her son at Gordium. Later, as if this already was not bold enough for an Argead queen, she begins minting coins with both the faces of she and her young son, in an attempt to publicly assert right to rule—the first queen in the history of the empire to do so.

Already anticipating harm from the newly risen queen, King Philippos’ other widow, Queen Apama, is informed by a loyal court eunuch in the late winter of 249 B.C. of a plot against her life by Berenikē and her supporters. Acting fast, the queen dowager flees from Babylon the following night, with her three young children, accompanied by a small group of servants and supporters. Though the group is pursued by the forces of the Queen Regent, who instructs her soldiers to capture the family at all costs, Apama and her children manage to safely reach Phoenicia, disguised as a troop of Phrygian actors, where they are able to take ship from Sidon for the safety of Italy.

Queen Berenikē, young and naïve, soon falls under the influence of one of her own courtiers, the strategos Artabazos. A son of the Persian noble house of Pharnabazos, one of the most ancient in the empire, the general is middle aged, handsome, and particularly charismatic. By the spring of 249 B.C., the queen has openly taken Artabazos as her acknowledged lover, much to the scandal and horror of the royal court and council. That August she appoints him to the vacant office of chiliarch, making him the most powerful man in the realm.

Meanwhile, King Philippos Nikatōr, the famed King of Carthage, dies at Tunis in the fall of 249 B.C., aged sixty-two. He is succeeded by his son, King Lysimakhos II Eupatōr (b. 276 B.C.), who has served as his co-ruler for the last three years. Over the last decade, the rising power of Rome has brought the republic into an increasing rivalry and conflict with Carthage over dominance of the western Mediterranean. This is worsened both by Rome’s recent conquest of southern Italy, which has given them possession of the entire peninsula, stretching from the lands of the Calabrians in the south, north to the upper reaches of the Po river valley, and also by the fact that Argead control of the eastern sea limits any expansion in that direction by either of the powers and confines them to the west. Further, the aggressive policies of expansion and conquest pursued by Carthage and Rome in Iberia and Italy respectively over the last thirty years, have set the two states on a path to unavoidable war for dominance in the west.

The policies of inherited by the Queen Mother from her late husband King Philippos III Euergetēs have been rather pacifist and benign. The Argeads have been allies of both the Romans and Carthaginians, and profited greatly from it. Further, by maintaining a western foothold in Sicily, they have ensured not only a balance of power by their presence in the west, but also a share in the profits of the lucrative trade there. With little interest in pursuing any further western expansion, King Philippos III saw little harm in allowing Roman conquest of southern Italy and conflict with the Gallic tribes of the Po river valley.

By the same logic, the Iberian wars (lasting from 275 B.C – 251 B.C.) were also largely seen indifferently by the Great King. It was through these conflicts that King Philippos Nikatōr was able to reconquer the old Carthaginian colonies of southern Iberia, which essentially operated autonomously after the conquest of Africa by King Alexandros III until that time, due to lack of royal initiative to subjugate them. The King of Carthage also was able to defeat the dominant tribes of the peninsula’s southern reaches, namely the Bastetani and Turdetani, reducing their chieftains to client kings. The new King Lysimakhos II has thus grown up in this atmosphere of expansionism and Carthaginian-Roman rivalry. Eager to live up to his expectations as the heir of the famed “King Philippos the Victor”, and to gain a reputation for himself as a military commander, the king begins preparations for war with Rome in the future, increasing the ranks of his Iberian, Mauritanian, and Numidian mercenaries—the core of his army.

In Rome, the senate also sees a future war as both inevitable and greatly within the interests of the Roman state and people. With the conquest of Italy, the senate is now turning its eyes westward, and is now eager to gain a foothold on the Iberian peninsula, to both halt any further Carthaginian expansion there, and also to expand their influence in the Mediterranean. The republic soon establishes relations with the Lacetani people, seeing the tribe as a valuable buffer against Carthage and its allies. The king of the Lacetani himself is also wary of a potential second Iberian war, and the resulting subjugation to Carthage it will bring, and allies with Rome in 249 B.C.

As tensions mount between the two powers and their growing ambitions, the Romans finally see their chance to declare war in 247 B.C. That year, the Ilecarvones attack their rivals the Lacetani; while the former are not a proper ally of King Lysimakhos II, the king has, nevertheless, covertly supplied troops to them, seeking to simultaneously undermine the Romans and exert their influence in the northwest. When reports reach Rome, the senate immediately declares war.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

247 B.C. – 245 B.C.​

The Punic war​

Part the first, the Mediterranean theatre.​

With the outbreak of war between Rome and Carthage, both of whom are technical allies of the Argeads, the empire is now faced with two choices: declare for either side and have the possibility of tremendous gain in the west, or remain neutral, playing the two powers off until they exhaust themselves. While the Synedrion prudently advises Queen Berenikē in the direction of the latter course as the wisest, her mind is already made up. The queen refuses to forsake her beloved brother in Carthage, and immediately promises him her support. The queen is decidedly anti-Roman due to her upbringing in the Carthaginian court, and she thus sees opposition to the republic’s expansion as her filial duty. Further, the decision of the senate to grant asylum to Queen Apama and her children in Italy in 249 B.C. has only solidified her anti-Roman sentiments. In August, 247 B.C., she declares war on the Roman senate and people.

The queen begins preparations for war immediately, gathering an army at Sardis, hoping to cross the Adriatic and invade Italy directly. She also sends word to Amyntas, satrap of Sicily, to prepare his forces for war—as the satrap is also the admiral (navarkhos) of the empire’s western fleet, at this time mostly anchored at Syracuse and numbering over 280 warships.

In Rome, the senate sees the actions of the Argead queen as a great betrayal of their long held partnership in the west, and a sacrilege upon the sacred oaths sworn to cement their various treaties and pacts during the reign of King Philippos III Euergetēs. They order Queen Apama and her children to be installed in a grand residence on the Aventine hill (due to the prohibition on foreign monarchs crossing the city’s sacred boundary, the pomerium), and treated with the full honors of royalty. Already, there are whispered plans to somehow engineer a palace coup and their installation in Babylon by any means possible, though with no foreseeable means, they are quickly abandoned by the middle of 246 B.C.

In early May, 246 B.C., news reaches the court at Susa that the Carthaginian fleet, under the command of the Greek admiral Isidōros, has defeated the more inexperienced Roman navy off the coast of Olbia, halting a potential Latin invasion of Sardinia. The news is immediately taken as an omen of divine favor from Poseidōn, and Queen Berenikē publically offers sacrifices to both the sea god and the Mesopotamian war goddess Ishtar with her son at Babylon the following month.

The Carthaginian navy once again proves its superiority and dominance of the waves off the coast of Emporion, near Iberia, when Isidōros is able to route the republic’s fleet a second time in October, 246 B.C., cutting off any further Roman aid to the Lacetani and ensuring that any Roman invasion of the Iberian peninsula in the near future will have to be conducted over land—forcing the senate to abandon any plans for a war in the Iberian theatre, as such a march would both be perilous for a large force over the alps, and, without any secured sea passage available, would likely result in the disrupted arrival of reinforcements and supplies to a Roman force there.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

245 B.C. – 241 B.C.​

The Punic war,​

Part the second, the Balkan theatre.​

In February, 245 B.C., the chiliarch Artabazos arrives in Sardis, having been dispatched by Queen Berenikē earlier that year to take command of her forces there, now fully prepared for battle. The force numbers some 55,000 infantry and 20,000 cavalry, and includes the famed Persian heavy infantry, the so-called Immortals, along with the Hyaspists, the Macedonian hoplite guard. He immediately marches west, crossing the Hellespont and arriving in Pella by mid April of that same year. The commander immediately begins preparations with his ally King Alexandros II of Epirus, an Argead client king, for a collaborative invasion of Italy. However, disagreements between the two commanders effectively stalls the invasion. King Alexandros II already resents Artabazos for his haughty demeanor and refusal to listen to the advice of the more experienced Epirote king. Further, the chiliarch’s Persian birth does not help matters, as Alexandros II, along with a majority of his commanders, see the general as a barbaric oriental conqueror, the local sentiments of the Greeks and Macedonians having changed little since the brutal Hellenic wars of the early third century B.C.

The delay works to the advantage of the Romans, who are now preparing to take the offensive and initiate an invasion of Epirus. Appointing the Roman consul M. Aemilius Lepidus to command the invading army in January, the senate supplies him with six legions and several cohorts of Gallic auxiliaries, bringing the consul’s total strength to 49,000. The following month, on February 26, the Romans arrive in Brundisium, prepared to make the perilous crossing across the Adriatic, into Epirus. The senate has by now taken all precautions possible to secure a Roman victory if forced to engage in naval combat, outfitting the Roman fleet to include some 200 warships. Lepidus sets off on the ides of January, determined to reach Epirus and prevent any potential Italian invasion.

With his negotiations with King Alexandros still bogged down, Artabazos takes harsher measures to secure the success of his commission. Having heard of a Roman force preparing to cross the Adriatic, he sends to Amyntas in Syracuse, commanding the navarkhos to deploy his fleet and attack Lepidus; hoping to catch the consul in the midst of his crossing, Artabazos sees the attack as an easy victory, with superior numbers and experience on the side of the Argeads. However, just after departing from Syracuse, disaster strikes when Amyntas and his fleet are blown off course by a massive storm on February 19, 245 B.C. Over ninety Argead ships are wrecked off the coast of Naxos, and the causalities include Amyntas himself, whose drowned body washes up on the shores of Sicily. Despite the setback, the Argead flotilla still numbers 190 ships, and the fleet’s temporary command still sees victory as possible, due to the Roman fleet’s past performances. Nevertheless, they do not catch up with Lepidus until he is just over two days away from land. Kleitos, the fleet’s presiding navarkhos, underestimates the new Roman fleet, engaging them off the coast of Kerkyra on March 18. Despite being almost evenly matched, the ineptitude of Kleitos, combined with the battle hardened attitude of most of the Roman sailors, manage to win the day for Lepidus, who not only inflicts a decisive victory over the Argead navy, but also destroys over 42 of their ships, forcing a humiliated Kleitos to retreat to Syracuse and regroup. Rome is now master of the Adriatic sea.

Several days later Lepidus lands at Acheron. When news of this reaches Artabazos, the general finally seizes command by force, threatening to retreat into Macedonia and abandon the undersupplied and outnumbered Alexandros II of Epirus to the advancing Romans. The king is forced to capitulate to the Persian chiliarch’s demands, grudgingly accepting his superior rank, at least for the time being, and placing his 20,000 troops, mostly consisting of allied Illyrian mercenaries, under the general’s command. He then marches west from Pella, hoping to cut off any further Roman advance using his superior numbers. Lepidus however, instead of meeting the Argeads directly, instead decides to consolidate his occupation of Epirus, defeating much of the kingdom’s garrison in a series of light skirmishes, and then besieging the capital at Passaron. He takes the city by early May (using the advanced siege technology of Rome to his advantage) just in time to hear news that the Greco-Bactrian forces have crossed the mountains into Molossia.

Near Pambotis, Lepidus engages Artabazos on June 13, 245 B.C. While the Greco-Persians have the clear advantage in terms of numbers, they are still by no means assured a clear victory. Due to the longstanding Argead policy of levying armies from the different corners of the empire and only sending soldiers of non-native extraction to garrison a territory, aside from their Illyrian allies, most of the Argead forces present are Persians, Medes, and Syrians, unfamiliar with the terrain, and in this respect they are at least equally matched by the Romans. Further, Artabazos’ refusal to listen to the advice of his Epirote allies, ensures any potential upper hand is lost. Using his tested skills as a sound tactician, along with the superior discipline and formation of the Roman legion, Lepidus manages to decisively defeat the outdated Macedonian style phalanx of Artabazos, smashing through his lines and inflicting heavy casualties on the general’s men. Suffering heavy losses and outmaneuvered, Artabazos orders his army to retreat east into Macedon, abandoning Epirus at least temporarily.

Rather than pursue Artabazos east, Lepidus decides to continue his policy of securing his hold over Epirus, opting to winter there with his troops, so that he can both have time to regroup and also be close enough to Italy to receive any needed supplies or reinforcements, the Adriatic still held by the Romans in the face of the recent Argead defeat there. Further, he sees being close to Rome as necessary, as news of an extension of his proconsular powers in the Balkans for the following year is anticipated in the late fall. Weighing the unstable situation in Epirus as one that can be used to Rome’s advantage, Lepidus plays on the strong anti-Persian feelings of the Epirote people, who are already resentful of Argeads and their subjugation, the terms of which ensure a large annual tribute in coin and men. In response, Lepidus gains popularity by presenting himself as a liberator, going so far as to install a pro-Roman king at Ambracia under the name King Pyrros III in August, himself a distant cousin of the exiled King Alexandros II.

In the spring of 244 B.C., Lepidus marches east, his proconsular powers extended for two more years, his armies resupplied from Italy, and his strength reinforced by a levy of fresh Epirote auxiliaries from King Pyrros III. Artabazos, however, finds himself in an even weaker position then he previously faced. His defeat at Pambotis has humiliated him, and by this point, he knows that it is Queen Berenikē’s confidence alone which allows him to remain in command of the Balkan theatre. His underestimation of the Romans has also been fatal, resulting in heavy casualties that number almost 11,000. Further, the loss of Epirus has only served to lower the morale of the allied forces of King Alexandros II; by the late winter of 244 B.C., King Alexandros and his Epirote soldiers are close to mutiny, while the Illyrian mercenaries are threatening to disband, the loss of the royal treasury at Passaron having delayed their payment, with the funds sent from Babylon being considered inadequate. Only the armies of Artabazos, brought from Sardis, remain unquestionably loyal to their commander, despite the fact that much of the losses sustained at Pambotis were from their own ranks.

Determined to regain at least something of his former glory, Artabazos marches south to defeat Lepidus, who has now received two further legions from Italy, bring his forces to almost 62,000, including auxiliaries. The two armies meet near Orestis on July 12, 244 B.C. By this time, Artabazos has realized the tactics of the legionaries are superior to those of the Hellenistic phalanx, however, the chiliarch still sees success against the Romans as possible, if superior numbers can be effectively used to his advantage. Willing to sacrifice a great deal of his men on the altar of victory, the proud general recklessly attempts to smash through his opponents advancing formation, sustaining massive casualties in the process. Once again, Lepidus proves the supremacy of the Roman legion, outflanking the Argeads as they attempt to drive a wedge between the Roman advance.

News of the Roman victory soon reaches the cities of Greece to the south. Despite the brutal Argead reprisals of the Hellenic wars less than fifty years before and the loss of a great deal of their local autonomy and democracy, the Greeks of the Aetolia, Attica, the Peloponnese, and Phocis are still far from a subjugated people. A succession of unpopular provincial satraps and city tyrants has done nothing to boost Argead popularity in Achaea. Further, the increasing syncretism and adoption of Persian cultural trappings by the Great Kings in Babylon have only served to increase the alienation felt by the Greeks, who consider themselves to be under foreign rule by barbarians, with Argeads little better than successors to the Achaemenid dynasty. The shift of Argead focus to the western Mediterranean, however, has ensured that the Greeks have been greatly neglected as well, over the last few decades. This has allowed a hotbed of unrest to form in cities such as Argos, Delphi, Elis, and Troezen, whose citizens are now on the verge of revolt, with the local tyrants installed from Babylon swiftly losing a great deal of their hold there.

With Artabazos occupied in the north and severely weakened, many of the leading citizens of Greece see the time as one that is ripe for revolt. The deployment of much of the local garrison to reinforce the general in Macedon, by royal orders sent from Babylon only serve to seal the fate of Argead authority in Achaea. In Argos and Delphi, the cities’ citizens assemblies, now greatly stripped of their former authority, rise up and seize power from the Argead tyrants there in the winter of 243 B.C. Before he can react, the satrap Euaristos himself is assassinated in Argos by a local mob, attempting to quell the revolting populace with his limited troops. By mid April, most of the remaining major cities of Greece are in open revolt, and have restored their own local constitutions, with those Argead soldiers remaining in Achaea having either thrown in their lot with the rebels or disbanded.

Meeting at Argos in June, they send to Lepidus at Larissa, the Romans now occupying much of Thessaly. In exchange for Roman protection and support, they promise to send Lepidus auxiliary hoplite troops and supplies. Seeing the great opportunity that now lies before him, Aemilius Lepidus meets with the Greek delegation at Delphi, and, after receiving a favorable message when he consults with the oracle there, immediately sacrifices to Fortuna on his return to Larissa, giving thanks for the new promise of victory. Allying himself with the newly formed League of Argos, Lepidus marches north in February, 242 B.C., besieging Artabazos at the ancient Macedonian capital and citadel situated on the rocky acropolis of Aegae.

Within the city’s ancient walls, never before penetrated by an invading army, Artabazos and his forces hope to buy time until reinforcements can arrive from the east. Already, Queen Berenikē has heard of the loss of Greece, and though the general still retains his lover’s favor, he knows that his position at the royal court, never strong to begin with, is eroding. Though she has sent for 10,000 Median troops to join him in Macedon, and has also ordered fresh supplies, shipments are not expected to reach him until the summer. Meanwhile, after the costly defeat at Orestis endured by the Argeads has cost them the loyalty of their Epirote allies. While Artabazos originally planned to attempt to second strike at the Romans before they could secure their occupation of Thessaly and march north, he has been forced to hold off and instead attempt to hold Macedon in a defensive position. This is due mainly to the series of mutinies that occurred amongst the Epirote component of his army intermittently throughout 243 B.C. The heavy handed approach of the general in dealing with the uprisings have only worsened the situation. It is his murder of the troublesome King Alexandros II in the summer of 243 B.C., however, that finally destroys any remaining loyalty amongst the Epirote auxiliaries. By January, 242 B.C., his Illyrian mercenary corps have totally disbanded and the remains of his Epirote forces have abandoned him to throw in their lot with Lepidus. Artabazos is now alone with a force of only 43,000 to defend his position in Macedon, and thus, he sees the security of Aegae as his only option.

Artabazos and his defenders bravely hold out for over six months, however, a lack of adequate food and resources, and the threat of a renewed mutiny, this time from his own Persian troops, forces chiliarch to abandon the city in early September to Lepidus. With little remaining options open, the general order his armies to retreat into Thrace. Though he attempts to present his actions as only a temporary retreat for tactical purposes, neither his army nor his superiors in Babylon are fooled. By November, his long awaited reinforcements arrive in Amphipolis, along with dreaded news from Babylon—Artabazos must return to Susa in the spring to answer for his ineptitude, even the Queen Mother’s own love for the general not being enough to shelter him from the fury of the Synedrion and the royal court, both of whom are calling for his blood to such a degree since the devastating loss of Macedon, that even Queen Berenikē dares not oppose their demands.

However, before his replacement can arrive, Lepidus attacks in late April, 241 B.C. Desperate to prevent a Roman invasion of Thrace, Artabazos switches his tactics, and instead holds his position on the hills outside the town of Philippi, taking the defensive; the battle lasts nearly two days. On the first day, though he sustains heavy casualties in the lines of his infantry, Artabazos is able to prevent Lepidus and his legions from gaining the high ground, keeping the Argead position, blocking the Roman advance and wearing down their attacking infantry. However, it is on the second day that Artabazos finally gains redemption in the eyes of his enemies in Babylon. Relying mostly on his heavy cavalry, he unleashes his Phrygian horsemen against the tightly assembled lines of the Roman infantry, breaking their formation and causing mass confusion and driving the legionaries back. It is a costly victory for the Argeads, but one that at least ensures their hold on Thrace, blocking and future Roman advance east. In the end, over 42,000 bodies litter the fields of Philippi. Among them is that of Artabazos himself, who dies personally leading his cavalry’s charge. Lepidus and his forces then retreat west to Pella.

 

[DrakeRlugia]

I'm keeping an eye on this.

Unfortunately I don't have much knowledge of the era so I can't offer any useful comments, but it's definately interesting. It's nice to see a TL where Alexander lives but the empire he leaves behind doesn't collapse totally, but rather begins to stagnate slowly.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

244 B.C – 238 B.C.​

The Punic war​

Part the third, the Italian theatre​

Meanwhile, the war in the western theatre has reached an essential stalemate. The weakened Argead navy has been attempting to regroup at Syracuse under the command of its new satrap and navarkhos, Mithridatēs, a noblemen of both Persian and Greek blood. Between the years 244 B.C. and 242 B.C. Mithridatēs has spent most of his time rebuilding the fleet in Sicily, aided mostly by Carthaginian ships sent on loan from King Lysimakhos II, his own position in on the western seas temporarily secure since the Roman defeat at Emporion in 246 B.C. The loss of Greece to revolt, however, has greatly crippled the navarkhos’ efforts, forcing him to rely all the more on both supplies and sailors sent from Phoenicia.

The losses sustained at Kerkyra have further necessitated a temporary shift of Argead focus to the Tyrrhenian and Ionian seas in order to prevent any Roman invasion of Sicily. This has only contributed greatly to Lepidus’ successes in the Balkans, as it has meant abandoning their ambitions in the Adriatic sea. However, Mithridatēs own foresight has been instrumental in the preservation of Argead control of Sicily. After only receiving meager reinforcements in 243 B.C., due to Queen Berenikē’s preoccupation with the Balkan war, the satrap has instead managed to ally himself closer with the Carthaginians, securing over 25,000 troops from King Lysimakhos, mostly consisting of Iberian and Numidian mercenaries, all sent on loan to protect the king’s own personal interests there. The defeat of the Roman fleet off the coast of Locri in late September, 243 B.C. manages to recapture much of the Argead navy’s former glory and prevent any future attempts at a Roman invasion of Sicily for the time being. Mithridatēs has proven himself a competent admiral and a force to be reckoned with.

In January, 242 B.C., the King of Carthage himself arrives in Sicily with a force of some 60,000, including over sixty war elephants. Mithridatēs and King Lysimakhos then begin preparing for the long awaited Italian campaign. In April, 242 B.C., the allied forces, now amounting to over 80,000 soldiers, cross the straight of Calabria, landing at Rhegium.

The invasion of the Carthaginians and their Argead allies from Sicily sends waves of panic throughout Italy. All at once, the constant stream of good news being sent from the warfront in Macedon becomes of little consequence. The senate, however, has been worrying about the possibility of such an invasion for some time now, having perceived the growing threat of Sicily to Roman security in Italy. Now faced with a crisis, the senate confirms the former consul L. Valerius Flaccus as dictator, placing him in command of nine legions and over 20,000 auxiliaries, mostly sent by those Gallic, Pannonian, and Veneti tribes allied with the Republic, along with Rome’s new Greek allies.

Flaccus confronts the invading Carthaginians near Thurii in July. Despite King Lysimakhos’ own youth and inexperience as a military commander, Mithridatēs manages to take charge and prove himself an able general on the battlefield, emerging as the de facto commander of the Argead-Carthaginian army. Using the king’s war elephants to a devastating effect against the unprepared Roman infantry, scattering their advance and throwing the Romans into disarray. Flaccus is forced to retreat north or risk heavy losses, allowing Mithridatēs to occupy the whole of Magna Graecia, where he and King Lysimakhos opt to winter.

In Rome, the defeat has been received with great unease by both the senate and people. Upon the expiration of his term as dictator in October, Flaccus is not nominated by the consuls for a second term. Meanwhile, the superstitious senate orders the Sibylline books to be consulted, hoping to appease the gods of Rome. The college of priests who oversee the interpretation and the preservation of the sacred books announce that great sacrifice must take place. Thus, in November, in the middle of the Forum Romanus, four men are buried alive in offering—two Gauls and two Greeks. It is in the aftermath of this grim spectacle of hope that the people elect as consuls P. Cornelius Scipio and C. Caecilius Metellus, both of whom are given joint command of the legions formerly assigned to Flaccus. In the spring, the consuls march south, hoping to block the enemy advance in the Oscan country of the south.

Engaging the enemy at Luceria in August, 241 B.C. Scipio at first begins to gain the upper hand, even when faced with the advancing African elephants of King Lysimakhos. However while the consul desires to hold his ground with his adequate force of legionaries, his less capable partner, Metellus, insists on breaking the Carthaginian lines with his cavalry when it appears that the enemy has begun to fall back, ordering a series of direct attacks. Mithridatēs, however, has no intention of retreating, and has instead managed to lure the Romans into attacking, in order to more effectively wear down their infantry, mimicking the tactics of the late Artabazos in Thrace to startling success. In the end, Metellus’ mistake costs him not only his own life, but those of 22,000 of his men in one of the worst defeats in Roman history.

Instead of retreating west to Rome, however, Scipio instead moves north, into the eastern reaches of Sabinium, hoping to lure Mithridatēs away from Rome and keeping his position east of the Apennines for the winter. His ploy manages to work, and, engaging in series of light skirmishes with the Carthaginian-Argead army, he is able to win a series of quick, indecisive victories in the fall of 241 B.C., using the element of surprise and his familiarity with the Italian terrain against his foes. The success which Scipio enjoys using his guerilla tactics, though minor, is nevertheless seen as the first real victory in the Italian theatre since the war’s commencement. Indeed, it is enough to ensure Scipio’s appointment after the expiration of his consular term in January, 240 B.C.

Meanwhile, King Lysimakhos is determined to pursue Scipio and defeat him upon the battlefield, his recent antagonism and its success having greatly infuriated the king. King Lysimakhos himself, young and restless, desires glory on the battlefield, and sees final defeat of Scipio as a way to achieve this. For the first time in the entire campaign, the king ignores the advice of Mithridatēs, opting to winter at Hadria in pursuit of Scipio, instead of crossing the Apennines, taking Capua and invading Latium in the spring, now left mostly undefended.

Scipio’s position, now anchored in Umbria for the winter, is further strengthened in April, 240 B.C., when four legions sent by Lepidus arrive from Thessaly via Ancona. In May, he is informed by his scouts that King Lysimakhos and Mithridatēs are marching northeast. Knowing that King Lysimakhos is making to cross the Apennines—a perilous decision considering the fact that he is risking many of his war elephants by doing so—Scipio moves north, ready to block their crossing and head them off before they can even enter the western reaches of the peninsula.

At the Futa pass, near Arretium, on May 30, 240 B.C. Scipio and his forces meet the Carthaginian and Argead forces, taking the defensive and blocking their crossing. Using the narrow pass to his advantage, Scipio forces Mithridatēs to attempt to smash through the tight defensive lines of the Roman infantry, an almost impossible task. Further, location of the battle ensure that the Carthaginian’s war elephants cannot be used. Having managed to destroy a great deal of Mithridatēs’ cavalry and heavy infantry, Scipio then advances, cutting down the Carthaginians where they stand and smashing through their narrow lines. His own advance blocked, Mithridatēs advises King Lysimakhos to retreat east, or face annihilation. The king promptly agrees, attempting to flee the battle with most of his remaining forces intact.

Scipio and his men, however, do not intend to allow a clean retreat. Instead, they continue their assault as King Lysimakhos and his soldiers attempt to lead a retreat, causing mass chaos. The result is a disaster for the Carthaginians and a clear Roman victory. In all, nearly 48,000 Carthaginians die in both the battle and orchestrated retreat over the Apennines, many falling to their deaths in an attempt to evade being killed by Scipio’s men. The defeat is one of the most devastating in Carthaginian history.

Their retreat south cut off by Scipio in the summer, King Lysimakhos and Mithridatēs are forced to winter with their forces at Ariminium. With only a little over 33,000 remaining soldiers and twenty war elephants, the prospects open to the two men and their armies are slim. The only remaining options open to them are a retreat south to Sicily or taking the long road north over the Alps, to the city-state of Massalia, a Carthaginian ally since the Iberian wars in 258 B.C. While both are equally dangerous, the trek south is seen as one of certain death, and thus, with little other options available, the remains of the Carthaginian-Argead allied force are thus compelled to march north, into the wilds of Cisalpine Gaul.

Thus, while Scipio, hailed as imperator by his troops after the battle of Futa Pass, is granted a triumph upon his return to Rome, the battle weary Carthaginians make the dangerous march across the Alps in the spring of 239 B.C., having wintered at Cremona. The venture is difficult, and by the time they reach the Greek city of Massalia in November, they have lost over 7,000 men and nearly all their remaining war elephants. In the spring of 238 B.C., Mithridatēs returns to Sicily with what remains of his forces, while King Lysimakhos sails for Africa, hoping to muster further mercenaries and regroup.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

237 B.C. – 232 B.C.​

The Punic war,​

Part the fourth, the Sicilian theatre​

With their recent success against the Carthaginians in Italy, the Roman senate now desires to strike while the Argeads are weak and invade Sicily. However, despite their heavy losses on land, the Argeads still control the waves in the Tyrrhenian and Ionian seas, and this is undisputed. The senate now realizes that any future success will have to be achieved first at sea, in order to break the Carthaginian-Argead naval supremacy and secure victory.

Rome’s recent alliance with the Greek League of Argos improves matters in this arena. The expert Greek shipbuilders supply the Roman fleet with both well built triremes and seasoned navigators and sailors. Further, the Romans draw upon their land supremacy, taking it to sea by outfitting their vessels with grappling irons and battering rams, allowing them to effectively board the ships of their enemies and engage in hand to hand combat, giving them an advantage.

On July 7, 237 B.C. at Lipara, the new Roman naval machine is tested for the first time, under the command of the propraetor M. Livius Drusus. Faced with an allied Argead and Carthaginian force under the command of Mithridatēs, and numbering nearly 400 ships, Drusus, with a fleet of only 310, directly attacks his enemies. Unprepared for the close combat initiated by the Romans and the brutal damage of the superior Latin battering rams, Mithridatēs and his fleet are no match for Drusus, who not only manages to inflict a devastating strategic defeat upon his enemies, he also becomes the first Roman commander in the history of the republic to earn the honor of a naval crown.

In November, 237 B.C., Scipio is called out of political retirement in Rome and elected for a (technically) illegal second term as consul, in order to lead Rome’s legions south against his old enemy Mithridatēs. After taking office in January, 236 B.C., he marches south that spring, accompanied by eight legions. However, the Roman advance is blocked in Calabria in June by Mithridatēs, who, wishing to buy time for the arrival of reinforcements from Syria, musters his fleet at Messana, threatening to attack any advancing Roman ships. It is only in the late fall of 236 B.C., that a second naval defeat at the hands of Drusus, just off the coast of Naxos, clears the way for a Roman invasion.

Luckily, just as Scipio, his powers now extended as proconsul, crosses the straight of Calabria and lands near Messana in spring, 235 B.C., Mithridatēs, now at Thermae, is informed that reinforcements from both Carthage and Syria have arrived, bringing his forces in Sicily to 60,000 men. Taking Tyndaris in July after a siege of several months, Scipio marches west to defeat Mithridatēs and secure the island’s northern terrain. Rising to the occasion, the satrap manages to regain much of his former prestige as a military commander when he defeats the advancing Scipio and his legions at Calacte in September, outflanking the Roman infantry and forcing Scipio to retreat back to Tyndaris for the time being, where he and his forces winter. However, though Scipio has been prevented from advancing west for the time being, Mithridatēs has only been able to secure his victory at a heavy cost, having lost over 17,000 men on the battlefield. While the satrap knows that Scipio is a superior tactician, he also has the advantage of numbers, and, despite the heavy cost, Mithridatēs believes he can use them to his advantage and wear down the Romans. Once again, the Argeads are gambling with their near limitless human resources, sacrificing tactics and skill in the process.

Knowing that Scipio will most likely attempt to take Syracuse next, his western advance halted, Mithridatēs prepares his men and marches south in February, 234 B.C., hoping to cut the proconsul off. At Leontini, on May 19, 234 B.C., Mithridatēs and his forces attack Scipio and his legions. The battle lasts through most of the day, and is one of great ferocity and brutality. Both generals refuse to concede defeat, and Mithridatēs in particular suffers heavily for his pride. Leontini is one of the worst Argead defeats in the entire war, killing over 40,000 Greco-Persian soldiers, as opposed to the 18,000 lost by Scipio. In the end, Mithridatēs is forced to retreat south, taking his remaining 22,000 soldiers with him.

By now, Sicily is all but lost. However, Mithridatēs, despite the obvious desperation of his position, still refuses to abandon the island, informing Queen Berenikē in a dispatch, “I am prepared to sacrifice myself and all my men, if it means securing your hold over this wretched rock.” While the queen organizes reinforcements to be sent, Mithridatēs gears up for guerilla warfare. Using his familiarity with the islands land, and his army’s small size, which allows him to quickly attack and retreat, the satrap continues to refuse to face Scipio outright, instead using his enemy’s own tactics against him by attacking his forces by surprise, inflicting as many casualties as possible, and then quickly retreating. Mithridatēs now intends to wear the Roman legionaries down as much as is feasible, while at the same time, diverting the general’s attentions form vulnerable Syracuse, as he is now faced with no other option but to attempt to defeat Mithridatēs, or suffer continued losses.

However, before reinforcements can arrive in time, Mithridatēs is finally forced to openly engage Scipio on the battlefield, when the proconsul cuts off his army at Phintias in March, 233 B.C. Hopelessly outnumbered, the Argead forces fight bravely, but are no match for Scipio and his legions. Though he survives the carnage and manages to flee into the mountains, Mithridatēs knows he is finally defeated. Rather than fall into the hands of the Romans, he falls upon his sword soon after, in the manner of Ajax, taking his own life.

The death of Mithridatēs leaves Syracuse open for the taking. Besieging the city in August, Syracuse manages to hold out against Scipio throughout the winter, only surrendering to escape starvation in February, 232 B.C. Respectfully, Scipio does not sack the city, though he does give his men permission to loot and pillage both Eryx and Panormus when they are taken later that year.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

232 B.C. – 220 B.C.​

The Punic war​

Part the fifth, the separate peaces of Brundisium and Syracuse​

With the fall of Sicily and defeat in the western Mediterranean, not to mention the loss of nearly all Argead possessions in the Balkans, the last fourteen years have essentially been a disaster for the Argead empire, the likes of which has never been seen before. With little other option, King Alexandros V Tryphōn is forced to sue for peace with the Romans in May, 232 B.C. (his unpopular mother having already been assassinated in 236 B.C.), effectively abandoning their Carthaginian allies and saving themselves from further misfortune and defeat at the hands of the Roman Republic.

The agreement made between the two powers, while humiliating for the Argeads, could nevertheless be far worse. The Roman senate, while it possess the better bargaining point due the republic’s success, is still wary of demanding too much from the Argead empire, as they realize the potential for future retaliation. Instead, they seek to neutralize their power in the western Mediterranean, keeping the empire at a safe distance. According to the terms of the treaty of Brundisium, King Alexandros V Tryphōn is forced to cede both Sicily and Malta to the Romans. Further, he must recognize the independence of the League of Argos, though he will be allowed to keep possession of Crete and the Cyclades. Rome is allowed to directly annex Epirus, while King Pyrros III is given the throne of Thessaly as a client and ally of Rome. Finally, King Alexandros V must abandon his claims to Macedon—the ancestral homeland of the Argeads—which he must recognize as an independent kingdom, and a client of the Roman republic. On the kingdom’s throne, they place the Great King’s half-brother, Queen Apama’s son, Antiokhos (b. 261 B.C.), who now is installed as King Antiokhos I of Macedonia.

Meanwhile, while peace is at least reached in the east, King Lysimakhos II of Carthage refuses to surrender. While he manages to defeat the Romans at the naval battle of Nora, off the coast of Sardinia in the summer of 231 B.C., the Romans retaliate by inflicting two decisive victories of their own at sea at Cossyra (May, 228 B.C.) and Cercina (March, 227 B.C.) respectively, effectively destroying Carthaginian naval dominance in the western Mediterranean. Indeed, the victory at Cercina is particularly harsh, with the Romans managing to wreck over forty of Carthage’s vessels. Defeated at sea, and without any suitable allies to turn to for naval assistance, the King Lysimakhos is forced to carry the battle over to land.

In April, 225 B.C., the Roman consul M. Claudius Marcellus lands at Thacape with twelve legions. He manages to successfully take both Acholla and Ruspina by the fall of 223 B.C. Indeed, he enjoys a great deal of success in Africa, defeating King Lysimakhos II at Leptis in June, 222 B.C. Though the king of Carthage finally manages to defeat the Roman proconsul near Neapolis in March, 221 B.C. scoring a devastating victory and forcing Marcellus to retreat, the achievement is bittersweet. The Roman retreat of the spring and summer of 221 B.C. is a harsh one, and results in Marcellus affecting a scorched earth policy that leaves much of Africa in ruins. By the time Marcellus and his armies sail for Sicily in September, 221 B.C., King Lysimakhos II is forced to surrender.

In the peace of Syracuse, concluded in the late spring of 220 B.C. the Roman Republic is merciless. While King Lysimakhos is allowed to retain his Iberian territory and what remains of his fleet, he receives very little other concessions. Carthage is forced to cede Corsica, Sardinia, and the Balearic islands to Rome, agree to halt any further expansion into Iberia, and pay a heavy indemnity of 3,000 talents, in ten annual installments. Even worse, the war has left Carthage essentially bankrupt. This is due to several reasons: the state treasury has greatly suffered due to the disruption in trade caused by the war’s length; the destruction of much of the kingdom’s fleet has resulted in a loss of supremacy at sea, and thus control of much of the trade in the western Mediterranean; as the kingdom’s armies are primarily composed of mercenaries from Iberia, Mauritania, and Numidia, their heavy cost, again due to the length of the conflict, has also been difficult to shoulder for the state; finally, the ruin and devastation of the rich lands of the North African coast by the African campaign of Marcellus have destroyed much of the local economy.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

230 B.C.​

Murder in Susa
​

The war has left the Argead empire weakened, though far from defeated as a major power in the Mediterranean. The last decade of the war has been especially difficult for the empire, due to the invasion of the Scythian barbarian tribes in the kingdom of Bosporus, a client and ally of the Argeads, in 240 B.C. Stretched thin and forced to fight on two fronts against separate enemies, much of the war effort in the west suffered. Nevertheless, the empire is at least able to achieve victory in the north in 234 B.C., when the forces of King Eumēlos III and his Argead allies defeated the Scythians at Olbia.

King Asokah’s pacifist policies towards his neighbors have at least secured peace on the eastern borders of the empire throughout the Punic war. Even after his death in 232 B.C., Argead relations with India have continued to be peaceful, his successor, King Dasaratha Maurya continuing his grandfather’s foreign policy. This period of peace and security has allowed for the eastern frontiers to prosper and generate a great deal of wealth in trade with the east. Further, the benign relations between the Argeads the Nubian kings, the relative peace existing in the eastern Mediterranean sea, and the continued tribute from the Sabaeans, have ensured stability and prosperity, and, despite the disruption of trade in the western Mediterranean due to war, the Argead empire has remained economically strong, continuing to profit from its position at the center of a majority of existing trade routes. Thus, the empire remains rich and powerful in the east, despite its humiliating losses in the Punic war. With far more riches and subjects then even Carthage and Rome combined, the empire is at least in a good position to recover from the disasters of the mid third century B.C.

The humiliating loss of the province of Macedonia, the ancient homeland of a great many of the noble families of the royal court, not to mention of the House of Argaïos itself, and the ineptitude of Artabazos has done nothing for the popularity of Queen Berenikē Philomētōr. By 240 B.C., much of the royal court has turned against her, blaming the Queen Mother for involving the empire in the disastrous war with Rome, destroying the profitable alliance with the republic and needlessly involving the Argeads in the affairs of Carthage—until very recently, a rogue kingdom formed by a rebel satrap (the events of the reign of King Alexandros IV Sōtēr still fresh in the minds of many older courtiers). The queen’s incompetence as a monarch, and general ignorance of the affairs of state has also managed to destroy any basis for support on the Synedrion council. The death of Artabazos only has worsened this, as the queen’s new lover, the Macedonian noble Alēktō, has proved even more irresponsible than Artabazos. Though she wisely does not give him command of an army, she nevertheless names him chiliarch in 239 B.C., and allows him to effectively rule the empire as the true power behind the throne—a task he has occupied by ensuring his supporters grossly profit at the expense of much of the royal court, making him enemies everywhere in the process. Fearing the potential power of the sixteen year old Great King, Alexandros V, he has kept him as a virtual hostage, only fueling the young king’s resentment.

In the end, it is King Alexandros V Tryphōn himself who turns against his unpopular mother and her hated lover. The nineteen year old king, already tired of being shut out of his birthright by his mother and the domineering Alēktō, allies himself with a group of dissatisfied nobles in the winter of 236 B.C. That spring, while at Susa, the conspirators act, seizing power in a palace coup, that already has the support of a great majority of the royal court and nearly the entire force corps of the royal bodyguard—which include the 10,000 Immortals, the Hyaspists, and the royal cavalry guard. Seizing control of the royal palace at Susa with his armed guards on April 26, 236 B.C., King Alexandros V immediately has his mother strangled in her bath. Instead of directly dealing with Alēktō, he has the chiliarch throne to a city mob, who tear the hated man apart with their bare hands. His body is later dumped in a ditch, after King Alexandros V forbids any honorable burial. Queen Berenikē is cremated instead of being embalmed in the traditional manner, though her ashes are laid to rest in a quiet ceremony in the royal necropolis at Susa, mostly out of the Great King’s desire to fulfill his filial duties. She is nevertheless refused the right to funerary games, due to her by custom as a reigning queen, and no royal fires are extinguished to mark her death. The queen is also explicitly denied the honors of deification and her own personal cult. All references to her are destroyed, including statues, coins, and inscriptions.

Thus, it is King Alexandros V who secures peace with the Romans in 231 B.C., determined to salvage the empire’s position and end the disastrous war of his mother.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

The blue represents the Argead Empire, the light blue its client kingdoms and allies.
The red represents the Roman Republic, and the light red its client kingdoms and allies.
The yellow represents the Kingdom of Carthage.
​

 

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

OK, MUCH better. THanks.

Mind you, posting that huge amount of text all at once takes a lot of digesting on the part of your readers.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

OK, MUCH better. THanks.

Mind you, posting that huge amount of text all at once takes a lot of digesting on the part of your readers.

I know, I should really slow down sometimes; but excitement and impatience always get the better of me.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

I rewrote "Murder in Susa". I wasn't really happy with it, and I feel this more accurately portrays the state of Argead affairs during the war...

245 B.C. – 230 B.C.​

The Punic war​

Part the sixth, the internal affairs of the Argead empire during the conflict​

As the war unfolds and Artabazos’ ineptitude as a commander is revealed in the constant stream of dispatches reaching the Synedrion, Queen Berenikē finds herself under increasing pressure from royal council to recall the general from the Balkans. Queen Berenikē, however, refuses to listen to the advice of her own more experienced councilors, and instead proudly continuing to invest her trust in her beloved general. While much of the court nobility had hoped that the strong influence of Artabazos over the queen mother would diminish after he was sent to the front, the opposite now appears to be true, with the chiliarch’s power stronger than ever by proxy.

Nevertheless, not even the power of the queen can disguise the failing situation in the west, when the occupation of Thessaly by Roman legions under the command of Lepidus in 244 B.C. destroys much of the court’s faith in Artabazos. However, it is his inability to respond to the Greek revolt the following year, and the loss of the empire’s Hellenic possessions, the long held jewel in the Argead crown, which finally erodes what remaining support the chiliarch enjoyed at home. Despite even this, Queen Berenikē remains faithful to her lover, believing all setbacks to be only temporary and refusing to consider otherwise.

It is the loss of Macedon and the mutiny of the Illyrians in 242 B.C., however, which finally turns the queen mother against Artabazos. The province of Macedonia is not only the land of origin of the Argead dynasty itself, but also the ancestral homeland of many of the families of the court nobility. And, with a high degree of intermarriage and syncretism having taken place over the course of the last century between the invading Hellenic nobility and the ancient Persian aristocracy, even a majority of those of the nobility that do not belong to a Macedonian noble house still have some degree of Macedonian ancestry, and thus are personally effected by the loss of the province. Indeed, Artabazos’ actions not only result in his own dishonor in the eyes of the ruling elite, but also the humiliation and disgrace of the empire itself, with the loss of the core of its ancestral homelands.

Even Artabazos’ own death defending Argead control of Thrace (the dynasty’s only remaining foothold in the Balkans), which he manages to do successfully at the bloody battle of Philippi in 241 B.C., while at least rehabilitating the general’s own personal honor to some degree, does very little to redeem Queen Berenikē in the eyes of her court and council. On the contrary, without the opportunity to publically separate herself from her former lover by having him recalled and punished, the queen remains forever associated with his failures.

The Scythian invasion of the Kingdom of Bosporus the following spring, an Argead client and protectorate, only further increases the queen’s troubles. King Eumēlos III of Bosporus, who has been dealing with minor raids and attacks by the Scythian barbarians since his accession in 253 B.C., is now faced with a full scale invasion of the rich lands of the Hypanis river valley. Unable to defend against the barbarian tribesmen on his own, he appeals to Babylon for aide. As the Scythian invasion threatens to disrupt Argead dominance of the lucrative Black Sea trade, a major source of wealth for the empire, Queen Berenikē is forced to act to protect her interests, even though the empire is already at war in the west.

Sending the strategos Ptolemaios (the queen’s satrap of Pontus) with a force of 25,000 men north, into Bosporus, she is forced to delay needed reinforcements in Sicily to the general Mithridatēs. Though Ptolemaios and King Eumēlos are successful in overcoming the barbarian forces (the Scythians being at this time greatly disorganized and prone to internal conflicts), inflicting a crushing defeat on the Scythians at the battle of Olbia in May, 238 B.C. and driving out of Bosporus, his success goes largely unnoticed in the face of news of Mithridatēs humiliating return to Sicily from the disastrous Italian campaign. Indeed, the victory does nothing for Queen Berenikē’s sinking popularity.

In the east, incursions by the Parni, an eastern Iranian people from the eastern shores of the Caspian sea, soon begins to increase in the province of Parthia from the summer of 239 B.C. onwards. The Parni and their allies, however, are prevented from invading Parthia by the strong fortifications along the northeastern border. Nevertheless, they continue to plague those living on the northern frontier by raiding farms and villages in the summer, despite their inability to present a real threat. While Orōdēs, the satrap of Parthia, is a competent military commander, the lack of the queen’s ability to send him adequate troops, caused mainly by the current war with Rome, prevents the satrap from mounting any northern campaign to deal with the Parni directly, and thus, he is forced to content himself with strengthening his defenses and preventing the raids from spreading south from the frontier.

It is only King Asokah Maurya’s policy of pacifism and non-aggression due to his staunch Buddhist beliefs that protects the Indian frontier and the borders of the far east. Indeed, despite the complete failure of nearly all foreign policy during the reign of Queen Berenikē, relations with the Mauryan empire remain as good as ever. The two powers even continue to exchange foreign embassies over the course of the reigns of King Asokah and his successor, King Dasaratha Maurya. This proves greatly beneficial to the far eastern trade routes, which remain secure and prosperous, contributing to the relatively stable economy of the period.

By the spring of 239 B.C., Queen Berenikē has taken a new lover, the Ionian nobleman Alēktō, only recently appointed to the rank of honored companion of the Synedrion (and thus only a minor councilor). Alēktō, himself several years the queen’s junior, soon manages to gain her complete confidence, easily dominating the mind of the weak willed Berenikē. While the Queen Mother shoes the good sense to not give him command of her armies in the west, she nevertheless hastily appoints him to the vacant post of chiliarch in September, 238 B.C. From this point onwards, Alēktō effectively rules the empire as the power behind the throne, keeping the seventeen year old King Alexandros V Tryphōn as his virtual hostage at Susa, a move he will later come to regret. As de facto ruler of the empire, Alēktō largely neglects the administration and only pays minimal attention to the failing war effort in the west. Instead, the power hungry chiliarch uses his position to secure patronage and favors for his family and supporters, while at the same time increasing his own personal wealth with state funds. It is soon whispered by many that the ambitious Alēktō even plans to wed the queen mother and usurp the throne. The new royal favorite soon makes himself the most hated man in the empire. His incompetence and irresponsibility as a ruler already painfully obvious, Alēktō’s promotion his own favorites and family, and his habit of shutting both the old Persian and Macedonian ruling elite out of power in favor of his own personal circle of supporters does nothing to improve his position.

Meanwhile, by the winter of 236 B.C., the court has lost all confidence in the ability of Queen Berenikē to rule effectively. Neither the army, whom she has continued to neglect and place under the command of disastrous leadership, nor the ruling elite, whom she has ignored, will continue to tolerate her rule for much longer. Already, she is seen as the cause of all the empire’s misfortunes by both noble and peasant alike. It is Queen Berenikē who is blamed for the empire’s involvement in the disastrous war with Rome, the ruinous alliance with Carthage, the loss of nearly all the Balkan possessions of the Argeads, and the essential rule of the empire by the queen’s favorites. That winter, a court conspiracy soon forms at Ecbatana to overthrow the queen mother. The courtiers soon manage to win over the support of all three divisions of the royal guard (the famed heavy infantry Immortals, the spearmen of the Hyaspists, and the noble Hetairoi Cavalry), who are equally eager to see the queen removed from power.

In June, 236 B.C., the nineteen year old King Alexandros V Tryphōn turns against his mother. Fearing that his life is in danger and that Alēktō means to kill him soon, the Great King soon throws in his lot with the conspirators. Further, King Alexandros is by this point tired of being denied power by his mother and her lovers, having long ago reached his majority. Even he has turned against his mother, and is more than willing to betray her and gain absolute power.

At Ecbatana, on August 2, 236 B.C., the conspirators act. That afternoon, the young king seizes power and orders that Alēktō be put to death immediately. When the chiliarch’s supporters refuse to obey the commands of the king, he then sets upon them with a force of 2,000 men of the royal guard, who have been awaiting the king’s orders all along. The guards then storm through the palace at the king’s instruction, brutally murdering most of Alēktō’s family and supporters. Not even Queen Berenikē is spared their wrath, and it is King Alexandros himself who gives the order for his mother to be strangled in her bath.

While the hated chiliarch manages to escape from the carnage, he is met by an angry mob outside the palace, many of whom have already heard the news of murder in the palace, and have come calling for the hated Alēktō’s blood, fearing that he has seized power. The mob attacks the chiliarch, bludgeoning, beating, and literally tearing him limb from limb with their bare hands. The violence is only quelled when King Alexandros V himself appears upon the steps of the palace before his people and surrounded by his loyal guards. The message is clear: justice has been done and the rightful Great King of Asia has been restored to power.

Alēktō’s body is denied the right to a proper burial by royal command, and instead, the mangled pieces of his body are thrown from the city’s walls into a ditch below to rot, but not before his head is paraded around the Ecbatana on a pike. King Alexandros is more merciful towards his mother, though probably only out of filial piety. Queen Berenikē’s body is whisked out of the city that night, and, denied the right to be embalmed in honey like the rest of her ancestors, is instead hastily cremated, her ashes quietly laid to rest in the royal necropolis at Susa. Nevertheless, King Alexandros orders her name removed from the list of kings and denies her a public funeral, or the regal privilege of funerary games. Further, the temple fires are not extinguished to mark her passing, and she is denied the honors of her own royal cult. King Alexandros even refuses to instigate any period of mourning in her honor. Indeed, soon after, in November, 236 B.C., King Alexandros V even changes his regnal name (the royal name by which all Argead monarchs officially reign under) from ‘Tryphōn’ (“magnificent”) to ‘Eupatōr’ (“of a good father”), as if to further disassociate himself with the past and mark the beginning of a new era.

Despite his best efforts, however, the new King Alexandros V Eupatōr is unable to regain the upper hand in the longstanding war with Rome. His mother’s disastrous conflict will be her lasting legacy to the empire, as it forces the Great King of Asia to sue for peace with the Romans after the loss of Sicily in 231 B.C., abandoning their ill fated alliance with Carthage and saving them from further humiliation and loss. The decision will prove very politically and economically sound in the long term, as it will restore relations with Rome and ensure stability in the Mediterranean (the loss of Sicily to Rome now threatening conflict in the eastern reaches of the sea).

In October, 230 B.C., the empire annexes the client state of Cyprus with the death of its king, who, dying without heirs leaves the island realm to the Argeads by the terms of his will. This has the effect of solidifying King Alexandros’ hold over the eastern Mediterranean, even despite the loss of Greece, as it secures everything beyond the shores of Euboea as in the possession of the Argeads.

As the year 230 B.C. comes to a close, King Alexandros’ fortunes seem to be on the rise, as his popularity has managed to remain firm with all of his subjects be they noble, soldier, or peasant, even with the humiliating losses of the war confirmed in the treaty of Brundisium—although to be fair, the enduring hatred of his mother by the people allows him to easily shift much of the blame away.

 

[Deleted member 5909]

230 B.C. – 198 B.C.​

The reign of Alexandros Eupatōr​

In order to secure peace on the western frontier, King Alexandros V Eupatōr weds his half-sister, Laodikē (the daughter of Queen Apama and widow of King Pyrros of Thessaly) in 229 B.C., according to the ancient Achaemenid practice. The marriage, however, will produce only two surviving children, both daughters. Like his predecessors, however, the Great King of Asia does not limit himself to monogamy, but instead takes several wives in the oriental custom, mostly to seal alliances with neighboring kings (though admittedly, he will have more consorts than any Argead king before him): in 227 B.C. he weds Tishyaraksha, daughter of King Dasaratha Maurya to secure peace on the eastern frontier; the following year, he marries the princess Eirēnē, daughter of King Eumēlos of Bosporus. However it is the lady Drypetis, daughter of the Persian noblemen and sōmatophylax (personal gentleman) Artabanos of the noble clan of Artavazdēs, who becomes King Alexandros’ final and favorite wife in 223 B.C.

While there has already been a great deal of syncretism between east and west during the reigns of King Alexandros III Megas and his successors, it is the reign of King Alexandros V Eupatōr that witnesses a the start of a distinct period of increasing cultural assimilation into the oriental fold. With the loss of Macedonia, the final link to the Argead empire’s Greek cultural roots is essentially lost, and this has the effect of creating a gradual shift, with the king and the ruling elite adopting more and more aspects of oriental culture, particularly the customs of Anatolia, Persia, and Syria. This results in a budding Persian revival (especially in such areas as art, architecture, poetry, and recreation), and the increasing identification of the Achaemenid dynasty with the Argeads, who view themselves as their legitimate successors by conquest. Nevertheless, at the same time, many aspects of Hellenistic culture still remain very strong—such as Greek being the official language of the empire and its ruling elite, and Greek literature, sciences, and philosophy retaining their dominant place in society (though the introduction of Indian philosophy from the far east has also gained a foothold by this time).

[FONT=&quot]Realizing that the empire’s army is outdated in its structure and tactics (specifically the Hellenic style phalanx), King Alexandros V begins reforming his armies in 228 B.C. This is mostly in response to the great humiliation suffered during the Punic war, and a reaction to the loss of the Balkan possessions. The Great King’s reorganization of the army is greatly influenced by the Roman legion, as well as the old structure of Achaemenid forces. The new Argead army is to be far more disciplined and organized, with a great deal of modern siege engineering adopted from the Romans, and a focus on systemized attacks and tactics. As these reforms are both extensive and far reaching, they are not fully realized until 223 B.C. Having realized the effectiveness of mounted troops against heavy infantry during the Punic wars, the backbone of the army is now to consist of the heavy cavalry unit, known as the hippeus, and armed with a lance, sword, and bow. Light horsemen are not commonly to be used, in contrast, with most being drawn from the ranks of auxiliaries. For the most part, foot soldiers are to mainly consist of light infantry, known individually as an hoplitēs in the old Greek fashion, and will play a secondary and supportive role to the cavalry, being mostly levied from the peasantry. All armies are now to be levied by conscription, directly by each satrap, with previous policy being retained of ensuring that soldiers almost never serve in their own province. While the conscription of additional forces mostly occurs only in times of war, the empire nevertheless is now to retain a standing army, consisting of the royal guard, and garrisons in frontier provinces under the command of the local satrap, which can number anywhere from one to three myrioi in number(see below). The principle organizational unit of the army becomes the myrias, or a force of 10,000 men, under the command of a hēgemōn. The myrias is divided into ten units each known as a khiliostys, which number 1,000 men each, and are commanded by a lokhagos. Each khiliostys is further subdivided into ten units each of 100, known as an hekatontarkhia, under the command of an officer known as an hekatontarkhēs. Finally, all hekatontarkhia are further subdivided into the smallest unit, the a so-called “tent group” of ten soldiers, or the dekania, overseen by a dekarkhos. In addition, an army, or stratia, can be formed by two or more myrioi being combined under the command of a stratēgos (general). Myrioi also contain elite units of war elephants organized into a group of twenty, and known as a thērarkhia. A majority of myrioi have at least one attached thērarkhia unit, due to the use of war elephants in battle. Further, auxiliary units, mainly levied from client kingdoms and allies also exist, all of which are grouped into khiliostys units, and mainly consist of light infantry and cavalry. The royal guard is also reformed, with a majority of the other individual guards being subsumed into the Immortals (athanatoi), who retain their name, though not their previous organization. Instead, the Immortals are now to consist of ten khiliostys numbering 10,000 in total, all under the command of a stratēgos, and consisting solely of heavy cavalry.

[/FONT]This new military machine is first put to the test in 219 B.C. with devastating efficiency, when King Alexandros V personally leads a campaign against the marauding Parni tribes, in retribution for their raids and attacks on the Parthian frontier. The campaign proves a success, and after defeating the Parni in a series of small scale battles, he finally manages to crush them near Alexandria Margos, on the Bactrian frontier, driving the Parni further north and forcing their king to pay annual tribute to the Argead empire from 217 B.C. onwards.

The Parni threat finally vanquished, King Alexandros V turns his eyes southward, towards the rebellious Sabaeans. By this time, the Kingdom of Saba in Arabia, though technically an Argead ally and client since the reign of King Alexandros IV Sōtēr, has long stopped paying tribute to the empire. While the kingdom’s payments were already irregular during the reign of King Philippos III Euergetēs, the accession of Queen Berenikē and her preoccupation with the Punic war has allowed the Sabaeans to declare their full autonomy, with King Samah Ali Yanuf cutting off all ties with the Argeads after 239 B.C. King Alexandros V has long desired to subdue the kingdom and regain control of the wealthy incense trading routes to the south, though he has thus far been unable, due mostly to the focus he has been keeping on reforming the empire after the disasters of the Punic war. His victory over the Parni, however, finally motivates him to act against the Sabaeans, and gain the military glory so often achieved by his ancestors.

The Great King thus invades Saba in the spring of 215 B.C. Utilizing his control of the Persian Gulf, King Alexandros V prepares a fleet at Nicaea in Oman, where he launches his invasion, sailing around the southern coast of the Arabian peninsula with an army of 65,000 and landing near Qana in May. From there, he marches north, encountering King Samah Ali Yanuf near Shabwa, with a force of 40,000 in July, 212 B.C. While the armies of Saba, mostly composed of mercenaries from the surrounding desert tribes, are able to hold their ground against the advancing Argead forces, they are no match for their superior organization and discipline. King Samah and his forces are defeated and forced to retreat west.

Sacking the Sabaean capital of Marib after a four month long siege in November, King Alexandros V winters there, securing his dominance of the kingdom’s central and eastern regions. It is only the following summer, however, near the southwestern coastal city of Aden, that the Great King manages to finally defeat the Sabaeans, capturing King Samah, and having strangled before the assembled men of his royal guard. While the Great King declares victory in the fall, he soon realizes that his successes have been premature. The Sabaeans and their allies in the lands of Himyar and Qataban are not so quick to surrender, despite their defeat at Aden. Instead, under the leadership of several powerful local clans, they mount a guerilla war against the invading Argeads, beginning in October, 214 B.C. Thus, the Great King finds his conquest of Saba now greatly undermined by near constant attacks by rebellious clans.

As King Alexandros V has little desire to annex the kingdom, he instead installs an Argead puppet at Timna, King Karab II Zarih, a younger nephew of the late King Samah. Leaving him with a force of 14,000 to garrison the rebellious client state, King Alexandros V then abruptly withdraws with most of his army, sailing for the Gulf of Aquaba in April, 213 B.C. Despite the mixed results seen in Saba, and the heavy unrest in that land, the Great King nevertheless sees his campaign as having been a success, as he has now managed to install his own client king to rule over Yemen, and has at least, recovered Argead dominance of the lucrative incense trade.

The last years of the Great King’s long reign are spent in securing the succession. With the death of his two eldest sons, Philippos (in 209 B.C.) and Amyntas (in 207 B.C.), both of whom by his Mauryan wife, Queen Tishyaraksha, he decides to make his younger son, Tiridatēs (b. 220 B.C.), eldest child of his favorite wife, Queen Drypetis, his heir. While it is probable that the deaths of both Queen Tishyaraksha’s sons was due to poisoning by the ambitious Prince Tiridatēs (or else by some other rival half-brother, perhaps Queen Eirēnē’s sons, Asandros or Lysimakhos), the aging Great King does not seem to notice the rivalry within his harem, as it has become fairly routine over the last generation, and indeed, was also known to be fairly common during the Achaemenid dynasty.

On December 11, 205 B.C. at Babylon, the fifteen year old Tiridatēs is officially proclaimed his father’s co-ruler in the traditional manner, under the name King Tiridatēs Epiphanēs (“the illustrious”). In the ancient custom, the new king is then wed to his half-sister, Queen Laodikē’s eldest daughter, Barsinē (b. 225 B.C.). The young king is then soon after dispatched to the province of Bactria to act as satrap there in 204 B.C., in supervision of the eastern frontier, though his father’s failing health necessitates that he be recalled in the fall of 200 B.C.

King Alexandros V Tryphōn Eupatōr dies of natural causes at Susa on March 24, 198 B.C., aged fifty-six, leaving for his heirs a stable and reformed empire. Greatly mourned by the royal court, he is immediately deified, with the royal cult of Theos Eupatōr being instituted soon after his death on the orders of his son, the new King Tiridatēs, who orders an extended period of mourning for three months. Indeed, the new king’s devotion to his father is obvious, as his own coronation does not take place at Gordion until August, 198 B.C., at which time the royal fires are finally relit.