Basileus Theos

Interesting TL. I would like to see something more on the emerging syncretistic culture of the empire, though. In OTL the Hellenic element remained rather aloof of the natives, reinforced by migration from Greece, and what "Orientals" there were among the ruling classes had become (at least outwardly) hellenized. Also, how is Zoroastrianism doing?

I have however one rather major nitpick, namely the traditional cliche "Roman legion always beats Macedonian phalanx". The Romans, including during the Punic Wars, used volunteer citizen troops, who were then disbanded after each campaign. This means that, unlike the permanent professional Hellenistic armies, they had a problem of fielding seasoned, well-disciplined and well-trained men and units, or providing them with experienced leadership. It was only the extraordinary duration of the Punic wars that made several tens of thousands of Roman soldiers into hardened veterans and their generals adept in handling them. These were then the troops that defeated the Hellenistic armies in Greece and Anatolia, although even then in many cases it was a pretty close thing. If the Roman system had greater inherent flexibility, it was also limited to infantry. In cavalry, the Romans were hopeless, let alone when facing heavy cataphract cavalry, and as for "modern siege engineering", it was the Hellenistic states that led the way, not the Romans. A good read on the subject, if you're interested, is Goldsworthy's "The Fall of Carthage".
 
Interesting TL. I would like to see something more on the emerging syncretistic culture of the empire, though. In OTL the Hellenic element remained rather aloof of the natives, reinforced by migration from Greece, and what "Orientals" there were among the ruling classes had become (at least outwardly) hellenized. Also, how is Zoroastrianism doing?

I have however one rather major nitpick, namely the traditional cliche "Roman legion always beats Macedonian phalanx". The Romans, including during the Punic Wars, used volunteer citizen troops, who were then disbanded after each campaign. This means that, unlike the permanent professional Hellenistic armies, they had a problem of fielding seasoned, well-disciplined and well-trained men and units, or providing them with experienced leadership. It was only the extraordinary duration of the Punic wars that made several tens of thousands of Roman soldiers into hardened veterans and their generals adept in handling them. These were then the troops that defeated the Hellenistic armies in Greece and Anatolia, although even then in many cases it was a pretty close thing. If the Roman system had greater inherent flexibility, it was also limited to infantry. In cavalry, the Romans were hopeless, let alone when facing heavy cataphract cavalry, and as for "modern siege engineering", it was the Hellenistic states that led the way, not the Romans. A good read on the subject, if you're interested, is Goldsworthy's "The Fall of Carthage".

Interesting. I've actually just edited my section on military reforms, to lean more in the direction of a focus on heavy cavalry, as in the OTL Parthian and Sassanid empires. I suppose all this time I've just sort of taken the "legion vs. phalanx" argument for granted. I'll definitely check it out.

And yes, I expect to go into more detail about the emerging syncretic culture soon. I know that in OTL the Macedonians acted more like conquerors and isolated themselves with Hellenistic culture. However, the reason I've chosen to go more in a direction of Orientalism in TTL is that it seemed to be the direction that Alexander the Great was taking--after all, he himself adopted a great deal of the cultural trappings of the Persians, and insisted on intermarriage between the two groups' nobilities, along with a policy of cultural syncretism that was later abandoned after his death by his generals.

In TTL, don't forget that Alexander not only survives much longer, allowing his policies to be taken further, but that several entire generations of mixed and interrelated Macedonian-Persian nobility have now grown up with this cultural fusion. It is only natural that they will continue in that direction. With the loss of Greece and Macedon, there is very little left for the ruling elite to identify with Hellenic culture, as they have all grown up in the east, surrounded by Oriental customs, with both Macedonian and Persian heritage. They may speak Greek, be educated along the lines of Classical thought (though admittedly, Indian philosophy is now entering the mainstream), perhaps even worship Greek deities, but they have little else to link them to Achaea. They wear Persian clothes, eat Persian food, and have long been exposed to the Persian customs which are being increasingly adopted by the nobility. Many of them probably have even adopted specifically Persian religious practices, although naturally I expect with Hellenic influences in the cultural exchange (i.e. eastern burial rites, the use of sacred fires for the royal family, the worship of the king, both Greek and Oriental gods, and Hellenic style religious artwork and representations).

Remember, one of the major complaints of the Macedonians and the Greeks during the reign of Alexander, after his conquest of Persia, was that they were increasingly feeling alienated by his adoption of eastern culture.
 
220 B.C. – 194 B.C.
The decline and fall of Carthage
While the last decade of the third century B.C. has been one of relative peace and prosperity for the Argead Empire, the western Mediterranean Sea has seen only mounting tensions and continued conflict between Rome and Carthage.

The death of King Lysimakhos II Eupatōr in 211 B.C. brings his grandson, the ten year old King Lysimakhos III Philomētōr to the throne, under the regency of his uncle Prince Hērakleidēs. By this time the Kingdom of Carthage has found itself in a state of decline. The harsh indemnities imposed upon the near-bankrupt Carthaginians by the Treaty of Syracuse in 220 B.C. (3,000 talents, to be paid in ten annual installments) has left the kingdom in heavy debt to the Roman Republic, with King Lysimakhos II having already fallen behind on his payments to the Roman Senate by 216 B.C. The lack of sufficient funds has forced prince Hērakleidēs to disband much of the standing army of mercenaries, leaving the kingdom far more vulnerable then before. In addition, his heavy taxation of the native Carthaginians has led to an increase in hostilities towards the Greek ruling elite, who, unlike their cousins in the east, have refrained from assimilating, intermarrying, or even adopting much of the native culture of Carthage. Instead, the House of Lysimakhos has attempted to impose Hellenic culture upon the Phoenicians of North Africa—and, though the old Carthaginian nobility has thus far tolerated their new Greek kings, the recent disasters of the war with Rome, coupled with the heavy taxes now imposed, has made the Lysimacheads very unpopular and increased unrest in the provinces. With the Carthaginian navy greatly diminished from both the disasters of the Punic war and the financial neglect from the bankrupt treasury, Hērakleidēs has found it increasingly difficult to govern the kingdom’s possessions in Iberia. This is only worsened by the recent policies of the Roman Senate to expand the Republic’s influence on the peninsula’s western coast, in order to consolidate Roman dominance in the Mediterranean Sea.

Realizing that he has little other choice, Hērakleidēs allies himself with the Romans in 208 B.C., ceding them Carthage’s possessions on the western Iberian coast, in exchange for the forgiveness of the remainder of his debts to the Senate. This newest shift of Carthaginian foreign policy, effectively allying the Lysimacheads with their hated enemy, only serves to alienate Hērakleidēs his only remaining base of supporters: the Macedonian nobility. In the end, the unpopular regent is murdered by his own bodyguards at Tunis in the summer of 207 B.C., and the fourteen year old King Lysimakhos III is declared of age to rule by the royal council and nobility.

However, King Lysimakhos III soon proves to be far more inept than his uncle. Weak willed and easily dominated, the young king falls prey to the various factions of the royal court. Realizing the king’s weakness for beautiful women and the ease with which his lovers can manipulate him, many of his most powerful and enterprising courtiers soon begin plotting against one another to install their own candidates in the royal bedchamber. Between the years 206 B.C. and 201 B.C., King Lysimakhos III takes no less than eleven new concubines in quick succession, all of whom become pawns for their families and the factions that placed them in power. As is to be expected in such an unstable situation, none of the women in question manage to escape violent deaths at the hands of their rivals.

By the winter of 200 B.C. even the king’s own subjects in Carthage have had enough of the government’s incompetence. On February 15, a mob of over 11,000 Carthaginians storms the royal palace, murdering many of the king’s hated favorites and courtiers, and driving King Lysimakhos and his family from the city. The angry mob calls for the restoration of the old Phoenician oligarchy and the permanent expulsion of all Greeks and foreigners from the city. The result is that the Council of Elders, an elected assembly consisting of members of the old Phoenician aristocracy, is restored to power after over a century of interregnum. The council then proceeds to elect two magistrates known as suffetes, to rule for life, according to the old constitution of the city.

Meanwhile, the colony of Gadir seizes the opportunity to gain autonomy due to the severe unrest now present in Africa and revolts in the spring of 200 B.C. The city’s Greek population overthrows its governing satrap and instead proclaims and independent oligarchy. However, the Greek elite soon proves itself equally unpopular and enjoys only a brief rule, being itself overthrown and driven from the city by the fall of 198 B.C. That same year, the Phoenician aristocrat Adonibaal seizes power as king, taking advantage of the present power vacuum in southern Iberia to exert his dominance over much of the remaining Carthaginian possessions there by 196 B.C. That same year, the Roman Senate, now realizing the value of a Phoenician client state in Iberia as a buffer against any future Carthaginian expansion there, extends its support to the King Adonibaal, recognizing the new Kingdom of Gadir offering the support of Rome in exchange for a payment of annual tribute as an allied client of the republic. King Adonibaal readily agrees, and the next twenty years see a renaissance in Phoenician culture in southern Iberia, under the hegemony of Gadir, which flourishes under Roman protection.

The resurrected Republic of Carthage, however, is not so fortunate, and proves to be short lived. Fleeing to nearby Tunis in the winter of 200 B.C., King Lysimakhos is soon after besieged by his rebel Carthaginian subjects in April, 200 B.C. Outnumbered and with very little remaining support, the king forced to flee Tunis with his family and retainers on the night of July 3. Realizing that his only hope for regaining his throne now lies with his former enemies in Rome, the Carthaginian king takes ship for Italy from Utica several weeks later, disguised as a Greek tradesman, arriving in Rome in September, 200 B.C. While the king is granted asylum by the Republic, the Senate at first ignores the king, only agreeing to listen to Lysimakhos’ appeal in February, 199 B.C. This is mainly due to the election of Q. Fulvius Flaccus to the consulship that same month. Flaccus, a member of the anti-Carthage party in the Roman Senate, greatly desires to subdue the Carthaginians and destroy what remains of their maritime empire by curtailing their independence and installing the a Roman puppet in Africa. The consul and his political allies hope to see the realization of a Roman client kingdom, granting the Republic control of not only the valuable trade routes of the western Mediterranean once and for all, but also giving Rome access to the fertile, grain rich lands of the North African breadbasket.

In March, 199 B.C., preparations begin for the restoration of King Lysimakhos to his throne. Determined to exert his control over the easily cowed king, Flaccus forces King Lysimakhos to sign a humiliating treaty with the Senate, in exchange for the Republic agreeing to return his lost throne to him. By the terms of the agreement signed at Ostia on April 4, 199 B.C., King Lysimakhos agrees to pay the Roman Republic 10,000 talents in return for restoring him to power, to be paid in twenty annual installments. Further, the king promises his eternal friendship to the Romans as an ally in both defense and trade, and agrees to allowing the Senate to maintain a garrison of 2,000 legionaries in Africa on loan for the next two decades, in order to ensure both that the terms of the treaty are carried out, and also that all future unrest is sufficiently dealt with (the king no longer having the funds to maintain the mercenary corps of his predecessors). Flaccus invades Africa in the early summer, landing at Ruspina on June 12, 199 B.C. with three legions at his command.

The new Carthaginian Republic, however, is still too weak to adequately respond to the Roman invasion, lacking both the funds and the organization to take the defensive. The Phoenician aristocrats of the Council of Elders, having inherited the empty treasury of the Lysimacheads, are now forced to donate a great deal of their own personal wealth to finance the war; further, the republic is also compelled to heavy tax its citizens, which soon turns much of the people against the new government. This also results in growing unrest in the city itself, especially by the ‘urban mob’, which has swelled greatly in recent years, due mostly to the depopulation of the war torn African countryside.

With limited finances at its disposal, the Council of Elders is only able to levy a force of 11,000, mostly mercenaries hired from the tribesmen of nearby Libya, Mauritania, and Numidia, which is placed under the joint command of the suffetes Hasdrubal and Bomilcar. The suffetes and their army meet Flaccus and his advancing legions near Tunis on August 8, 199 B.C. While both Hasdrubal and Bomilcar fight bravely they are far too outnumbered by the Romans. Further, the Carthaginian generals are forced to contend with the low morale present amongst their soldiers, most of whom have been inadequately paid and supplied. Within hours of engaging the enemy, the Carthaginian forces are quickly overcome by Flaccus and his legions; those that are not cut down soon break ranks and retreat, abandoning the republic. By the day’s end, the corpses of both Hasdrubal and Bomilcar can be found amongst the 5,000 Carthaginian dead who litter the battlefield. The Carthaginian army now routed, the way is clear for Flaccus and his men to march upon Carthage itself. With the death of both the republic’s ruling magistrates, however, the Council of Elders is left unprepared to adequately defend itself. After only several weeks of siege, the Phoenician aristocracy surrenders on September 13 and opens the city to the invading Romans.

Flaccus, a known sympathizer with the Anti-Carthaginian party in Rome, proves to be just as ruthless in victory as he is in battle. The consul gives his soldiers leave to pillage and loot the city, despite the pleas for mercy from its citizens. Over the course of the next three days, the legionaries slaughter and rape a great deal of the Carthaginian citizenry, aristocratic and urban poor alike, burning down the famed palace of Lysimakhos and the great temple of Baal Hammon, and carrying off with them over 4,000 talents worth of gold and slaves. As promised, King Lysimakhos is then restored to his throne by Flaccus and his legionaries, though the ruin and destruction wreaked upon Carthage by the Romans necessitates that he is forced to temporarily move his capital north to Utica, until the damage can be repaired. While Flaccus sails for Italy the following spring, in 198 B.C., he leaves his garrison of 2,000 legionaries as promised, under the command of the military tribune Ti. Claudius Nero. For his successes at Tunis, the former consul is granted an ovation on the Alban mount by the Roman Senate.

King Lysimakhos, however, finds himself in an even more desperate situation than before. As the looting of the Romans (and the desperate defensive measures of the defeated Carthaginian republic that preceded this) have incurred further financial troubles, Lysimakhos finds Carthage to be once again a bankrupt state. Though he attempts to remedy the problem by putting much of the surviving Phoenician aristocracy to death and confiscating their wealth and estates, the king is soon disappointed to find the amount levied inadequate. Forced to heavily tax his subjects in order to pay his debts to Rome, the king, who enjoyed some popularity upon his return with the urban poor, now finds himself even more unpopular than before—though the continued presence of Nero and his garrison ensure that all unrest is harshly crushed. With Roman recognition of the new Kingdom of Gadir in 196 B.C., he is further forced to openly recognize the rebel King Adonibaal and abandon all claim to Carthage’s remaining possessions in Gades. This humiliation causes the restored remains of the Macedonian aristocracy, his only power base outside Nero’s legions, to also withdraw much of their support.

Under attack from all sides, Lysimakhos is thus forced to confiscate a great deal of the grain produced in the fertile regions of Africa, dispatching regular shipments to Rome in order to pay off the massive debts he has incurred. While his tactic provides a convenient way of buying off the Romans with the only remaining source of income he has left, it only serves to increase unrest in the provinces, causing more and more peasants to abandon their farms and the great urban mobs of Carthage and Utica to swell. With little work available and declining economy due to the loss of Carthage’s control over trade in the Mediterranean, most of the urban subjects of the kingdom are thus reduced to poverty and starvation, while the ample grain reserves of Africa are plundered and sold to Rome to pay off the unpopular king’s mounting debts.

It thus comes as no surprise to the Roman Senate that the king’s second reign is far shorter than his first. In November, 194 B.C., an angry mob in Utica soon rises up and murders King Lysimakhos III. As the king is seen as expendable, the Romans, under the command of Claudius Nero, do not act to protect him. Instead, they wait for the mob’s two day rampage through the city to end, and then quietly proclaim Lysimakhos’ three year old bastard son as King Lysimakhos IV, with the Roman Senate acting as executor of the murdered king’s realm and estate.
 
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