Aus and Dutch foil Op Trikora

Riain

Banned
It's hard to find info on this event, the 1961 Indonesian takeover of West Papua, but the correlation of forces could be interesting. The Dutch with their carrier and it's Sea Hawks and a sqn of Hunters had little option but to buckle before Indonesia's Mig 21/19/17/15s, Tu16 and Il28s.

But WI Australia was willing to back up it's pre-event support of the Dutch with a show/threat of military force. Perhaps a joint Aus-Dutch exercise could be organised near Darwin? Australia could deploy the Melbourne with Sea Venoms, a couple of Avon Sabre sqns and a couple of Canberra sqns.

Leaving aside the geo-political aspects how would such a conflict pan out? How would avon Sabres and Hawker Hunters fare against the Indo bombers. How would the Tu16/As1s fare against a pair of light carriers with Sea Hawks and Sea Venoms? How about the Canberras against the Migs?
 
I don't know how populair it would be in Australia given the fact that when the Hr.Ms. Karel Doorman visited Fremantle the Unions striked and the KR had to use the propellor thrust of it's Air Wing to nudge the carrier in dock without the aid of tugs.
 

Riain

Banned
I know a bloke who served on the Melbourne, and he told me that regular practice had shown the props of Trackers were the best for moving the carrier when the wharfies on strike. Apparently they have more bite in the air than an A4 jet.
 
Riain said:
It's hard to find info on this event, the 1961 Indonesian takeover of West Papua, but the correlation of forces could be interesting. The Dutch with their carrier and it's Sea Hawks and a sqn of Hunters had little option but to buckle before Indonesia's Mig 21/19/17/15s, Tu16 and Il28s.

But WI Australia was willing to back up it's pre-event support of the Dutch with a show/threat of military force. Perhaps a joint Aus-Dutch exercise could be organised near Darwin? Australia could deploy the Melbourne with Sea Venoms, a couple of Avon Sabre sqns and a couple of Canberra sqns.

Leaving aside the geo-political aspects how would such a conflict pan out? How would avon Sabres and Hawker Hunters fare against the Indo bombers. How would the Tu16/As1s fare against a pair of light carriers with Sea Hawks and Sea Venoms? How about the Canberras against the Migs?

As far as I know about the events of that era, America strongly approved of the Indonesian takeover and their sabotage of the UN process for a referenda of the West Papuans to choose independence (maybe this was inevitable after US intelligence got burnt during the attempted Sumatran secession of a couple of years before--certainly Washington ended up with a very friendly regime in Jakarta after '65).

Anyway, in 1961 we were signatories of ANZUS and SEATO, not NATO. I don't see Ming siding with the Netherlands over this, not without major geopolitical changes over the previous decade having occurred.

I don't know how populair it would be in Australia given the fact that when the Hr.Ms. Karel Doorman visited Fremantle the Unions striked and the KR had to use the propellor thrust of it's Air Wing to nudge the carrier in dock without the aid of tugs.

I should know this, but don't. Was the wharfie strike actually connected to the issue of the Dutch/Indonesian confrontation, or just the standard mid-century industrial strike?

That union being pro-Indonesian in 1961 would be ironic, as their nominal allied political wing leader Arthur Calwell would use vicious anti-Indonesian rhetoric at the '63 federal election, criticising the Coalition government for not speeding up the purchase of F111s with which to threaten our Northern neighbours.
 
Riain,

Let's say the Dutch and Australian show of force stops Indonesia from grabbing West Papua in 1961. What happens in 1962? Or 1963? Or 1971?

How long would Holland and Australia be willing to shield West Papua? Would the people of either nation be willing to undertake a long term defensive occupation of the region with enough forces in place to deter an Indonesian landgrab?

Prevent the seizure of West Papua in '61 and you just make it more likely that the Indonesians will grab it at a later date and the more likely the Indonesians will hold all that they grab, like say East Timor, for longer.


Bill
 

Riain

Banned
The Indos struck while the situation was in a state of flux, as they did during the Konfrontasi and East Timor. If they back down and try again later the status quo of an independent West Papua would be established and Indonesia would be invading a sovereign state, which is a different kettle of fish altogether.
 
If they back down and try again later the status quo of an independent West Papua would be established and Indonesia would be invading a sovereign state, which is a different kettle of fish altogether.


Riain,

And just who is going to put boots ashore to drive the Indos out of West Papua when they do invade later?

We can talk about violations of sovereignty and other ideals all we want, but the truth is that all nations are not created equal in the court of world opinion. Who in the early 1960s will fight and die for West Papua?

I'm not trying to be a contrarian here, I'm truly interested in who might think West Papua was worth the effort and whether that effort wouldn't be seen by many in the developing world as just a reflexive kick from a dying colonial system.


Bill
 
If Australia does get involved, how would this affect our Mandate in PNG? Would there be pressure to unite the territories?
 

Riain

Banned
Bill, your question is valid in reverse as well. How badly does Indo want West Papua, enough to force a landing in the face of the RAAF and RAN? It's one things to bluff and bluster against the Dutch while things are unsettled, its another entirely to lose brand new combat aircraft and warships in combat to overturn the established status quo. The stand-off only has to last for 18 months before the Konfrontasi starts and West Paupua's security will be side benefit of the Confrontation.

XT, I don't know if a unification movement would occur because OTL the two independence events were 14 years apart and one was snuffed out at birth.

Magniac, JFK was lobbied over West Papua but how would this lobbying go if Australia was flexing its muscle over the issue?
 
Riain,

And just who is going to put boots ashore to drive the Indos out of West Papua when they do invade later?

We can talk about violations of sovereignty and other ideals all we want, but the truth is that all nations are not created equal in the court of world opinion. Who in the early 1960s will fight and die for West Papua?

I'm not trying to be a contrarian here, I'm truly interested in who might think West Papua was worth the effort and whether that effort wouldn't be seen by many in the developing world as just a reflexive kick from a dying colonial system.


Bill

Bill, your question is valid in reverse as well. How badly does Indo want West Papua, enough to force a landing in the face of the RAAF and RAN? It's one things to bluff and bluster against the Dutch while things are unsettled, its another entirely to lose brand new combat aircraft and warships in combat to overturn the established status quo. The stand-off only has to last for 18 months before the Konfrontasi starts and West Paupua's security will be side benefit of the Confrontation.

XT, I don't know if a unification movement would occur because OTL the two independence events were 14 years apart and one was snuffed out at birth.

Magniac, JFK was lobbied over West Papua but how would this lobbying go if Australia was flexing its muscle over the issue?


Good points, Riain, Bill Cameron.

It seems that pretty much everybody in Indonesia back then did want to gain West Papua "back". It wasn't all just about irredentism and not so sensical paranoia towards a possibility of a Dutch reconquista, but it also was a vital political commodity to be exploited by the rivalring political factions of the time. As about if Indonesia was really that commited to gain West Papua, it was indeed the case. You can even argue that all the those aircrafts and warships Indonesia had gained was also mostly in preparation to invade West Papua, in case diplomatic struglles wouldn't work. I don't if Australia was that commited though, but if Indonesia did execute her plan to actually commence a full scale invasion it's hard to see that Australia would just let it be.
 
I should know this, but don't. Was the wharfie strike actually connected to the issue of the Dutch/Indonesian confrontation, or just the standard mid-century industrial strike?

.


The voyage of the sole Dutch Carrier Strike Force was quite the disappointment to put it mildly. The idea was that the world would see that the Netherlands was prepared to defend the Papouas. The Americans saw it as sabre rattling ( but not in the positive way) the Japanese didn't want the KR to dock in Japan and the Australian Unions striked when it arrived at Frematle. As far as I know it was specificly against the Dutch.

On the other hand the Brazilian-Dutch relations were greatly improved when it docked there :D
 
I believe that the key for a Dutch (or independent) New Guinea is the USA. If the USA decide to support their Nato ally the Netherlands in this conflict, I realy doubt the Indonesians would do anything. But the Americans decided that having a friend in Indonesia was more important than their Dutch ally (who would support them anyway, whatever the Americans did; certainly considering there wasn't that much support for any new war in the east) or the Papua's (who were basicly irrelevant). If the Americans would have supported the Dutch, i think New Guinea would have remained Dutch until independence (assuming they still wanted indepence, many former colonies found out that money from the home countries is preferable to independence). If Dutch New Guinea becomes independent a union with eastern New Guinea is possible.
 
Riain said:
Magniac, JFK was lobbied over West Papua but how would this lobbying go if Australia was flexing its muscle over the issue?

When I studied modern Asian history at uni West Papua/Irian Jaya took a back seat to East Timor because of INTERFET etc, but now I've remembered what the pivotal 'sellout' was, the New York Agreement*.

Both Indonesia and the Netherlands were supposed to allow for a UN administration of West Papua--the latter abided by this agreement, the former didn't.

Australia allowed it to happen because it wasn't part of the former British Empire, and we were only prepared to commit to supporting Malaysian control of Sarawak and Sabah. So Australia sent forces to repel (that is, contain) the Konfrontasi, but you already know that.

The problem with Australia flexing its muscles over West Papua is Indonesia wasn't communist, and therefore it wasn't suitable as a serious enemy for the Menzies government.

And I think Sukarno-era Indonesia going communist is impossible.


*There is some serious Pilgerism going on in the preface to this document at wikisource, even more so on the discussion page.
 
I believe that the key for a Dutch (or independent) New Guinea is the USA. If the USA decide to support their Nato ally the Netherlands in this conflict, I realy doubt the Indonesians would do anything. But the Americans decided that having a friend in Indonesia was more important than their Dutch ally (who would support them anyway, whatever the Americans did; certainly considering there wasn't that much support for any new war in the east) or the Papua's (who were basicly irrelevant). If the Americans would have supported the Dutch, i think New Guinea would have remained Dutch until independence (assuming they still wanted indepence, many former colonies found out that money from the home countries is preferable to independence). If Dutch New Guinea becomes independent a union with eastern New Guinea is possible.


What if the Netherlands anounces that it will not be able to send forces to Northern Germany incase of a Soviet attack because it has to protect West Papua? The reason that JFK told the Dutch to f*** off was because hey, we were already their allies!
 
Bill, your question is valid in reverse as well. How badly does Indo want West Papua, enough to force a landing in the face of the RAAF and RAN?


Riain,

That's a very good point, which is why I brought up 1962, 1963, and so on. How long would Holland and Australia be willing to patrol West Papua to prevent an Indo landgrab? Because, as soon as those Western forces depart, the Indos are showing up in force and my original question becomes the operative one again: Who in the West is willing to die for West Papua?

The posts by Ridwan Asher, HJ Tulp, Magniac, and Pompejus all point out the most important aspect of this question; the Indonesian seizure of West Papua doesn't occur in a vacuum. There are other, interlocking geopolitical concerns ranging as far afield as NATO's border with the Warsaw Pact. In the OTL West Papua, like current day Darfur sadly, was simply not important enough to do anything but bloviate about.

So the question now becomes how do we make West Papua important enough to fight over?


Bill
 
Riain,

That's a very good point, which is why I brought up 1962, 1963, and so on. How long would Holland and Australia be willing to patrol West Papua to prevent an Indo landgrab? Because, as soon as those Western forces depart, the Indos are showing up in force and my original question becomes the operative one again: Who in the West is willing to die for West Papua?

The posts by Ridwan Asher, HJ Tulp, Magniac, and Pompejus all point out the most important aspect of this question; the Indonesian seizure of West Papua doesn't occur in a vacuum. There are other, interlocking geopolitical concerns ranging as far afield as NATO's border with the Warsaw Pact. In the OTL West Papua, like current day Darfur sadly, was simply not important enough to do anything but bloviate about.

So the question now becomes how do we make West Papua important enough to fight over?


Bill

I think the key is not to make West Papua important enough to fight over but for the US to be willing to jump in to help the Dutch.

The thing is that the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns was a staunch Atlanticist. He would become Secretary General of NATO after all. He was 100% sure that the USA would come to the aid of the Netherlands because they were suppossed to be committed to freedom and the likes but far more because of the Netherlands. Luns was convinced that JFK would say: Luns, buddy, it might be a pain for us long-term but we'll never let a friend down. Ofcourse Luns should have realised that nations don't have friends, only interests.

As from the POV of the JFK administration the end-result was a win/don't-lose situation: The got the Indonesians in the bag and the Dutch weren't going anywhere. Then there is the conspiracy talk about Freeport: the Dutch didn't need US to exploit West Papuas natural resources, the Indonesians did. Anyway, alot of that is, as said, conspiracy talk.

What happens though if Luns is so naive? What if he goes to Washington not to ask for Americas help but to announce that the Kingdom of the Netherlands will be forced to suspend it's obligations to NATO. RNN ships of war will not be able to do their tours with NATO squadrons as they have defend West Papua and unfortunantly the Northern German Plain will have to do with one Army Corps less as it will have to be withdrawn.
 

Riain

Banned
The political POD is the hard one. In my mind a good one is that Menzies isn't such an arselicker and wants countries to our north that we can control rather than being part of Indonesia, which we can't even disagree with let alone influence. That way the US, with their own strange sense of self interest, can be avoided as the lynchpin of the crisis. The US' interest in this crisis would be tiny compared to what else was happening in 1961 and if two of it's small allies decided to combine and make a stand over West Papua I doubt the US would intervene on behalf of Indonesia.
 
I believe that the key for a Dutch (or independent) New Guinea is the USA. If the USA decide to support their Nato ally the Netherlands in this conflict, I realy doubt the Indonesians would do anything. But the Americans decided that having a friend in Indonesia was more important than their Dutch ally (who would support them anyway, whatever the Americans did; certainly considering there wasn't that much support for any new war in the east) or the Papua's (who were basicly irrelevant). If the Americans would have supported the Dutch, i think New Guinea would have remained Dutch until independence (assuming they still wanted indepence, many former colonies found out that money from the home countries is preferable to independence). If Dutch New Guinea becomes independent a union with eastern New Guinea is possible.

Since Indonesian successes in quashing the Madiun Soviet rebellion in 1948 and PRRI/Permesta/DI-TII rebellion in 1957-58, US decided that Indonesia isn't anything weak nor leftist enough for its interests to be neglected. It was mainly the fear that Indonesia would further shifting to the Communist bloc had her interests not been accomodated, that became the main base in US policies making towards Indonesia post-58.

If though US would still going to oppose Indonesian claim on West Papua, Indonesia I think would still go for it anyway. Doubtful that Indonesia would be successful this way, and as the result Indonesia will make itself in firm allegiance with the Communist bloc similar with Nasserian Egypt. That was "the" worst case scenario most people in US wanted to prevent from happening.

When I studied modern Asian history at uni West Papua/Irian Jaya took a back seat to East Timor because of INTERFET etc, but now I've remembered what the pivotal 'sellout' was, the New York Agreement*.

Both Indonesia and the Netherlands were supposed to allow for a UN administration of West Papua--the latter abided by this agreement, the former didn't.

Australia allowed it to happen because it wasn't part of the former British Empire, and we were only prepared to commit to supporting Malaysian control of Sarawak and Sabah. So Australia sent forces to repel (that is, contain) the Konfrontasi, but you already know that.

The problem with Australia flexing its muscles over West Papua is Indonesia wasn't communist, and therefore it wasn't suitable as a serious enemy for the Menzies government.

And I think Sukarno-era Indonesia going communist is impossible.


*There is some serious Pilgerism going on in the preface to this document at wikisource, even more so on the discussion page.

In my perspective, from just seeing article VII and IX, it's apparent already that all those UNTEA thing was just a tool to transfer West Papua to Indonesia.

Sukarno Indonesia going communist is implausible at best, but him taking Nasserite stance would be more than just a head-ache for US.

And btw, what's with that thing about UN was short of money at that time, and all those Japanese conspiracy in the discussion page ?!! o_O
 
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What if the Netherlands anounces that it will not be able to send forces to Northern Germany incase of a Soviet attack because it has to protect West Papua? The reason that JFK told the Dutch to f*** off was because hey, we were already their allies!

I think the key is not to make West Papua important enough to fight over but for the US to be willing to jump in to help the Dutch.

The thing is that the Dutch Minister of Foreign Affairs Luns was a staunch Atlanticist. He would become Secretary General of NATO after all. He was 100% sure that the USA would come to the aid of the Netherlands because they were suppossed to be committed to freedom and the likes but far more because of the Netherlands. Luns was convinced that JFK would say: Luns, buddy, it might be a pain for us long-term but we'll never let a friend down. Ofcourse Luns should have realised that nations don't have friends, only interests.

As from the POV of the JFK administration the end-result was a win/don't-lose situation: The got the Indonesians in the bag and the Dutch weren't going anywhere. Then there is the conspiracy talk about Freeport: the Dutch didn't need US to exploit West Papuas natural resources, the Indonesians did. Anyway, alot of that is, as said, conspiracy talk.

What happens though if Luns is so naive? What if he goes to Washington not to ask for Americas help but to announce that the Kingdom of the Netherlands will be forced to suspend it's obligations to NATO. RNN ships of war will not be able to do their tours with NATO squadrons as they have defend West Papua and unfortunantly the Northern German Plain will have to do with one Army Corps less as it will have to be withdrawn.

Kinda ASB-ish there. Netherlands wasn't free from all those fear against Soviet conquest of Europe, nor it was really committed to keep West Papua to the point that it would actually let itself under Soviet influence for that....
 
The political POD is the hard one. In my mind a good one is that Menzies isn't such an arselicker and wants countries to our north that we can control rather than being part of Indonesia, which we can't even disagree with let alone influence. That way the US, with their own strange sense of self interest, can be avoided as the lynchpin of the crisis. The US' interest in this crisis would be tiny compared to what else was happening in 1961 and if two of it's small allies decided to combine and make a stand over West Papua I doubt the US would intervene on behalf of Indonesia.

The PoD though, should be before PRRI/Permesta rebellion. Once Indonesia has managed to demonstrate itself in front of US as better candidate for future partner in maintaining order in the SE Asia susceptible to US influence, it won't be implausible to have Australia making its own move. I think that, if Indonesia would be the first to set up the fire, Australia would be having the justification interfere. Well whoever sets up the fire first, Indoensian failure in gaining West Papua will only result in its further shifting to the Communist bloc. It's fair to say that you must first prevent US from taking the stance it professed post-58 OTL, if you want US to let Australia take its own initiaitve.
 
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