Assertion- Alfred Thayer Mahan lost WWI for Germany

chronos said:
It is difficult to see what germany could have gone other than go all out building a HSF which was one and battlecruisers.

The fugures show germany was spending LESS than the other powers on defence.

I don't understand what the first sentence means.

As for the second, that is not true. Here is increases in defense spending between 1890 and 1913:

Britain 117
France 92
Russia 19
Germany 158
Austria Hungary 160

So the CP were increasing spending far more than the Entente. If you have actual defense spending figures I'd be interested to see them.
 

chronos

Banned
I'm soorry but your figures areinaccurate. The A-H spending was very low compared to the other Powers. germany spent significantly less than the Three Entrent Powers. From 1910 F & R's shot up hugely.

See Furguson's The Pity of War for an instant source.

The only solution for germany was to build a strong oil-fired battle cruiser force and match the British build in battleships after 1910 as the liberal government was simply not amenable to a deal.

This would mean Britain was more likely to control its allies.

G and A-H were spending less than the Entente.
 
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
I honestly have no idea what you're referring to here. In both wars, it was fairly slow (13-knotish) merchant cruisers that were by far the most effective raiders. The only warship to achieve any degree of success in this role was Emden in the Indian Ocean, a small, not terribly fast, unimpressively armed (4.1" guns) cruiser.
Ask a naval warfare enthusiast to explain it to you. Basically the convoy system reduces losses to submarines or small converted merchant ship raiders because it reduces opportunities to sink ships. The ships are in bunches, so if your convoy has ten ships, the submarine or small, converted merchant ship raider can sink only one before the others escape, thus reducing the subs ability to sink ships. This works, but reduces carrying capacity because the ships arrive at the harbor in bunches (the convoys) and take time to be unloaded. Not only does the convoy sail at the speed of the slowest ship, but in unloads, reloads, and bunkers at the speed of the slowest ship. I think (IIRC) that convoys reduced British imports by one third, instantly.
What fast, heavily armed cruisers did was eliminate small convoys that were effective against submarines or small, converted merchant ship raiders because the fast, heavily armed, cruiser raider could sink all the ships in a convoy before they could escape. They could sink a merchant ship rapidly, and then chase after the convoy.
You couldn't even escort the convoy with any less heavily armed ship or it would sail alongside out of range of your escort and sink it. If the escort charged the cruiser, the cruiser would sail away slightly faster and sink it before it closed range.
Only battleships could protect convoys when a real cruiser raider was loose. Such as when the Australian expeditionary force couldn't get to the Middle East until the raider was sunk or a battleship was available for escort in OTL.
This is something that the Germans didn't do. Why is the point of this thread.
 
DOn't just tell me my numbers are wrong. I at least had the decency to post some. If you have conflicting figures, then let's see them. You only argument so far is that the peace-loving Germans were victimized by the war-mongering British. Since your assertion flies in the face of truly overwhelming evidence, it's really up to you to present a degree of evidence. Ferguson is a revisionist out for headlines, and by the way, his figures agree with mine.

chronos said:
I'm soorry but your figures areinaccurate. The A-H spending was very low compared to the other Powers. germany spent significantly less than the Three Entrent Powers. From 1910 F & R's shot up hugely.

See Furguson's The Pity of War for an instant source.

The only solution for germany was to build a strong oil-fired battle cruiser force and match the British build in battleships after 1910 as the liberal government was simply not amenable to a deal.

This would mean Britain was more likely to control its allies.

G and A-H were spending less than the Entente.
 
Please don't be condescending, I am a naval enthusiast and have been for decades. I know what a convoy is, and they were adopted for a variety of reasons, and in WWI were not adopted by the British until large raiders had ceased to be an issue.

You will note that the success of large expensive raiders was nil. The expense of building and maintaining a raider force is self defeating. If a large cruiser were on the loose, convoys would just be escorted by obsolete battleships which were useless in the battleline but perfectly effective against a cruiser.

wkwillis said:
Ask a naval warfare enthusiast to explain it to you. Basically the convoy system reduces losses to submarines or small converted merchant ship raiders because it reduces opportunities to sink ships. The ships are in bunches, so if your convoy has ten ships, the submarine or small, converted merchant ship raider can sink only one before the others escape, thus reducing the subs ability to sink ships. This works, but reduces carrying capacity because the ships arrive at the harbor in bunches (the convoys) and take time to be unloaded. Not only does the convoy sail at the speed of the slowest ship, but in unloads, reloads, and bunkers at the speed of the slowest ship. I think (IIRC) that convoys reduced British imports by one third, instantly.
What fast, heavily armed cruisers did was eliminate small convoys that were effective against submarines or small, converted merchant ship raiders because the fast, heavily armed, cruiser raider could sink all the ships in a convoy before they could escape. They could sink a merchant ship rapidly, and then chase after the convoy.
You couldn't even escort the convoy with any less heavily armed ship or it would sail alongside out of range of your escort and sink it. If the escort charged the cruiser, the cruiser would sail away slightly faster and sink it before it closed range.
Only battleships could protect convoys when a real cruiser raider was loose. Such as when the Australian expeditionary force couldn't get to the Middle East until the raider was sunk or a battleship was available for escort in OTL.
This is something that the Germans didn't do. Why is the point of this thread.
 
I've always blamed the immediate outbreak of the war on France, and some Russian generals. The long term causes I tend to find favor Germany's in fault, with Austria-Hungary coming in Second.

The reason I stipulate France is because, according to Keegan, IIRC, the Wilhelm and Nicholas had come to an agreement that Russia would not mobilize its Army in response to A-H's mobilization against Serbia. Neither really wanted war, and the Kaiser explained to Czar that Russian mobilization meant German mobilization, and German mobilization meant war. IIRC, Nicholas agreed that war was not what they wanted.

It was at this time that I believe Nicholas' generals told Nicholas that cancelling the mobilization orders wouldn't be smart and that it would hurt Russia's ability to mobilize again in the immediate future should the crisis continue.

This was coupled by a call from France saying that if Russia mobilized, France was prepared to mobilize it's forces in support of Russia's move. This led Nicholas to rescind the demobilization orders.........

If I could find Keegan's book, I could find out whether or not I'm talking out of my ass.......
 
The blame goes to Austria, who had delivered a ten-point ultimatum to Serbia - the Serbs accepted 9 out of 10 (one, allowing an Austrian role in Serbian judicial proceedings, violated the Serbian constitution), but the Hapsburgs were set on war. Russia couldn't allow Serbia to be crushed or it would end her influence in a critical region and cripple her pan-Slav credibility.

Why does everyone blame France for everything? :rolleyes:

Bulgaroktonos said:
I've always blamed the immediate outbreak of the war on France, and some Russian generals. The long term causes I tend to find favor Germany's in fault, with Austria-Hungary coming in Second.

The reason I stipulate France is because, according to Keegan, IIRC, the Wilhelm and Nicholas had come to an agreement that Russia would not mobilize its Army in response to A-H's mobilization against Serbia. Neither really wanted war, and the Kaiser explained to Czar that Russian mobilization meant German mobilization, and German mobilization meant war. IIRC, Nicholas agreed that war was not what they wanted.

It was at this time that I believe Nicholas' generals told Nicholas that cancelling the mobilization orders wouldn't be smart and that it would hurt Russia's ability to mobilize again in the immediate future should the crisis continue.

This was coupled by a call from France saying that if Russia mobilized, France was prepared to mobilize it's forces in support of Russia's move. This led Nicholas to rescind the demobilization orders.........

If I could find Keegan's book, I could find out whether or not I'm talking out of my ass.......
 
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
The blame goes to Austria, who had delivered a ten-point ultimatum to Serbia - the Serbs accepted 9 out of 10 (one, allowing an Austrian role in Serbian judicial proceedings, violated the Serbian constitution), but the Hapsburgs were set on war. Russia couldn't allow Serbia to be crushed or it would end her influence in a critical region and cripple her pan-Slav credibility.

Why does everyone blame France for everything? :rolleyes:

I think its fair to place the greater share of the blame on both France and Russia. And thats not excluding from spreading the rest among the equally guilty players.

The Habsburgs really had to put the Serbs in their place. The Serbian Government had virtually sponsored the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand. The Russians were acting as protector of the slavs and pretty much gave the Serbs, knowingly or unknowingly, a 'blank cheque' that they would come to their aid. I think both the French and the Russians, at least a certain French ambassador in St. Petersburg, figured out that this was the time to redress the balance of European power in the favour of the Triple Entente - London reluctantly signing on.

Regarding the discussion of commerce cruisers I think its likely that one could eventually end up with the battlecruiser, tho sporting 9.2in or 10in guns as originally considered by Fisher. The Cavendish/Frobisher class at 9750 tons and its 7x7.5in guns is a semi-throwback to the armoured cruisers of earlier 1900s when designed in 1915, but it might fit the bill.
 
David S Poepoe said:
The Habsburgs really had to put the Serbs in their place. The Serbian Government had virtually sponsored the assassination of Franz-Ferdinand. The Russians were acting as protector of the slavs and pretty much gave the Serbs, knowingly or unknowingly, a 'blank cheque' that they would come to their aid. I think both the French and the Russians, at least a certain French ambassador in St. Petersburg, figured out that this was the time to redress the balance of European power in the favour of the Triple Entente - London reluctantly signing on.

Except that that's absurd - the Serbs' responsse to the Austrian ultimatum represented a real humiliation for them - and went about as far as chastisemane could without becoming an assault on the independent existence of the Serb state, which certanily had no command role in the assassination. Russia's negotiating posture with A-H clearly indicated a willingness to tolerate anything short of annexations at Serbia's expense, which influential sections of the Dual monarchy's leadership opposed anyway.

Moreover, all the French did in 1914 was have war declared on them by Germany without anything like a legitimate cassus beli - they played no active role in the crisis whatsoever.
 
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
Please don't be condescending, I am a naval enthusiast and have been for decades. I know what a convoy is, and they were adopted for a variety of reasons, and in WWI were not adopted by the British until large raiders had ceased to be an issue.

You will note that the success of large expensive raiders was nil. The expense of building and maintaining a raider force is self defeating. If a large cruiser were on the loose, convoys would just be escorted by obsolete battleships which were useless in the battleline but perfectly effective against a cruiser.
I'm surprised that you don't understand that what doesn't happen is just as important and frequently more important than what does happen in naval matters. I would have expected you to know that.
Did you understand my point about how convoys reduce merchant shipping? Did you understand my point about ships stuck in harbor for fear of raiders reduces your ability to move troops around?
Did you understand that I was saying that Germany didn't build a raider navy and should have? I wasn't saying that Germany waged an effective raider war, I was saying that Germany didn't wage an effective raider war, and could have if she had built fast, heavily armed, unarmored cruisers with the money she instead spent on a battleship fleet second only to Britain.
 
wkwillis said:
Fast, heavily armed, unarmored cruisers were the premier screw up the enemy's commerce warships. The sneak around cruisers were better at catching the enemy because there were so few of them and they did so little damage that the British put up with them as a minor annoyance. It was the fast, heavily armed, unarmored cruisers that kept the British ships in the harbor instead of moving troops and other material.

Wkwillis, there appears to be some misunderstanding between you and Abdul Hadi Pasha. Actually, I have quoted your post because it is written in a manner as if you spoke of facts ("cruisers WERE", "it WAS the fast..."). Maybe you are not a native English speaker.

Anyway, the comments are correct from a naval strategy perspective.
 

Grey Wolf

Donor
wkwillis said:
I'm surprised that you don't understand that what doesn't happen is just as important and frequently more important than what does happen in naval matters. I would have expected you to know that.
Did you understand my point about how convoys reduce merchant shipping? Did you understand my point about ships stuck in harbor for fear of raiders reduces your ability to move troops around?
Did you understand that I was saying that Germany didn't build a raider navy and should have? I wasn't saying that Germany waged an effective raider war, I was saying that Germany didn't wage an effective raider war, and could have if she had built fast, heavily armed, unarmored cruisers with the money she instead spent on a battleship fleet second only to Britain.

Whilst true that whilst the WW1 raiders such as Karlsruhe, Konigsberg, Emden etc were on the loose it DID tie up loads of shipping in ports, require escorted convoys across the Indian Ocean for example, this was not a long-term viable option. These raiders WOULD be caught. They had only a limited initial access to logistical supplies, and had to make do with what they could catch/capture - which of course became less if convoys were dominant. They were a short-lived resource.

Now, obviously onbe could emulate the KM of WW2 and send warships out later on (eg the cruise of the Scheer in the Indian Ocean) but how effective a tactic is this ? Actually, that's a question. How effective was it, and how effective would it have been in WW1 ?

Grey Wolf
 
Grey Wolf said:
Now, obviously onbe could emulate the KM of WW2 and send warships out later on (eg the cruise of the Scheer in the Indian Ocean) but how effective a tactic is this ? Actually, that's a question. How effective was it, and how effective would it have been in WW1 ?

Grey Wolf

In WW1, the raiders will have two advantages compared to WW2. First of all, airpower and radar are unimportant or non-existant, so that it is far easier for the raiders to strike and hide again. The Admiral Scheer in WW2 had its success in the early years of the war...in 1943, she would not have survived long. The second point is that many merchants in WW1 will not even have a wireless set, or only a weak one, further decreasing the risk for the raider.

However, it will be a problem to resupply the raiders. Most ships of the OTL German navy did not have sufficient range, and it will be risky to rely on coal taken from captured merchants. After all, IIRC, one of the reasons Spee was caught at the Falklands was that he was delayed by one or two days due to coaling from a captured ship. BTW, speaking of Spee, many naval historians state that he would have had more effect, had he detached all his cruisers similar to the Emden.
 
wkwillis said:
Alternate Germany Navies as a thread? I have some strategic ideas, but there are real experts on this board.

2. 4000 ton cruiser submarines, designed to make the French unhappy around the Mediterranean and anywhere else.

4,000 ton submarines are pretty large. The German Type VII of WW2 (atlantic boat) had only some 1,200 tons. Anyone have the K class displacement figures at hand? They might come close, as they had more than 100 meters of length, but they were also not really successful designs :)
 
Wow, you really are being a condescending prat over this topic; I don't really think there's any call for it - people can disagree without being rude. I read all your points, I just don't accept them. And I responded to your points, while you just ignore mine and restate yours.

Anyway, to answer you again, convoying was necessary and practiced, raiders or no. Convoying was NOT practiced when Germany had raiders available, and it WAS adopted to face the submarine menace. Regardless of whether or not a merchant convoy could scatter if it encountered a sub, it was not possible to assign an escort to each individual ship, and even if convoying did reduce the effectiveness of the merchant marine, it did so much less than being sunk would. Large expensive surface raiders would have been hunted down and destroyed in short order, as they always are. WWII provided some excellent examples of how effective surface warships were as raiders - an extremely uneconomical option. Germany's strategic position made surface raiders an impossible option, as Britain's location made it easy to blockade her - note that blockade duty was handled by AMCs - and thus leaving raiders no route of return. Since Germany lacked a network of bases and had no potential to hold what they had, there was no means of supplying, repairing, maintaining, or even replacing crew. Thus any raider sortie was one-way and of limited duration.

Submarines were much, much more effective and economical.

What Germany SHOULD have done is build a fleet large enough to match Russia in the Baltic and concentrate on not alienating Britain for no apparent reason.

Now FRANCE could have had some success with a raider strategy, as she had extensive coastlines that would have been harder to watch plus lots of overseas bases, and forces to protect them. But even then, this could only work in a war of short duration.

wkwillis said:
I'm surprised that you don't understand that what doesn't happen is just as important and frequently more important than what does happen in naval matters. I would have expected you to know that.
Did you understand my point about how convoys reduce merchant shipping? Did you understand my point about ships stuck in harbor for fear of raiders reduces your ability to move troops around?
Did you understand that I was saying that Germany didn't build a raider navy and should have? I wasn't saying that Germany waged an effective raider war, I was saying that Germany didn't wage an effective raider war, and could have if she had built fast, heavily armed, unarmored cruisers with the money she instead spent on a battleship fleet second only to Britain.
 
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sikitu said:
In WW1, the raiders will have two advantages compared to WW2. First of all, airpower and radar are unimportant or non-existant, so that it is far easier for the raiders to strike and hide again. The Admiral Scheer in WW2 had its success in the early years of the war...in 1943, she would not have survived long. The second point is that many merchants in WW1 will not even have a wireless set, or only a weak one, further decreasing the risk for the raider.

However, it will be a problem to resupply the raiders. Most ships of the OTL German navy did not have sufficient range, and it will be risky to rely on coal taken from captured merchants. After all, IIRC, one of the reasons Spee was caught at the Falklands was that he was delayed by one or two days due to coaling from a captured ship. BTW, speaking of Spee, many naval historians state that he would have had more effect, had he detached all his cruisers similar to the Emden.

While many naval historians feel that Spee would have been more effective if he had scattered and 'Emdened', this is not to say that raiding would have been an effective overall strategy for Germany, it was making better use of doomed assets before they were hunted down and destroyed. I tend to think he should have either tried to get home or gone to East Africa where is men and artillery would have been of real use.

The German WWII surface raiders had virtually no success at all, certainly nothing to justify their expense. Again, the only effective raiders were slow, reliable, inexpensive armed merchants.
 
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
While many naval historians feel that Spee would have been more effective if he had scattered and 'Emdened', this is not to say that raiding would have been an effective overall strategy for Germany, it was making better use of doomed assets before they were hunted down and destroyed. I tend to think he should have either tried to get home or gone to East Africa where is men and artillery would have been of real use.

The German WWII surface raiders had virtually no success at all, certainly nothing to justify their expense. Again, the only effective raiders were slow, reliable, inexpensive armed merchants.

I agree with your judgment concerning WW1. East Africa might have been an interesting option for Spee, but the question is if he had a realistic chance of getting there. WW1 also showed that German strategy had not allowed to set up a sufficient base network for effective naval warfare, and the entry of Japan meant that even the best base, Tsingtao, was useless. In my opinion, German naval strategy was based on various critical misjudgments, one of them being that it had never expected to go to war not only against the RN, but also France, Russia, Italy and Japan at the same time.

Concerning WW2, I disagree, however. The strategic effect of surface raiders in the first years of the war was not bad, however, Germany never had enough of them (or submarines), but this is not surprising considering that the navy was not prepared for war. To use a famous quote, the navy was only able to show that it could die nobly. And indeed they made better use of their assets than Imperial Germany in WW1 IMHO.
 
sikitu said:
I agree with your judgment concerning WW1. East Africa might have been an interesting option for Spee, but the question is if he had a realistic chance of getting there. WW1 also showed that German strategy had not allowed to set up a sufficient base network for effective naval warfare, and the entry of Japan meant that even the best base, Tsingtao, was useless. In my opinion, German naval strategy was based on various critical misjudgments, one of them being that it had never expected to go to war not only against the RN, but also France, Russia, Italy and Japan at the same time.

Concerning WW2, I disagree, however. The strategic effect of surface raiders in the first years of the war was not bad, however, Germany never had enough of them (or submarines), but this is not surprising considering that the navy was not prepared for war. To use a famous quote, the navy was only able to show that it could die nobly. And indeed they made better use of their assets than Imperial Germany in WW1 IMHO.

I don't think it was even possible for Germany to set up a sufficient support network for raiders since her colonial empire was so small and vulnerable.

Why do you disagree about WWII raiders? What did they accomplish? Zilch. Not one managed to do a single thing before being sunk. If you can think of any successes, please let me know.

The only surface ships that achieved anything were merchant raiders, not sophisticated and expensive warships.
 
Perhaps the more interesting point is that some kind of psychosis had gripped the German leadership on warships. Even when it became clear that it was impossible to catch up with the British, and the effort was consuming needed resources and arousing London's anger, it proved impossible to stop.

Abdul, when was the famous event where the British had to decide between four new dreadnaughts to keep the lead and six new ones to pull ahead, and finally compromised on eight?

Meanwhile, since Germany had no choice but to maintain a large standing army in peacetime, a problem London was spared, Berlin could never commit the same level of resources. Meanwhile England started to build a highly professional army of its own.

As an example, as late as 1911-1912 Germany assumed the maximum British involvment on the continent on a short notice to be six divisions, yet by 1914 London could send 12 and keep another 2 in reserve.

At 25,000 men per division, that means Germany managed to add 200K to the armies of France and Belgium while gaining no benefit of their own.

On the matter of Serbia, the key question is whether or not the Serbian government was linked to the assassination.

If it was, then A-H's behavior was reasonable, even moderate, and the question is about the hypocrisy of Russia or England, whose response to a small and violent nation murdering the Prince of Wales or the Tsarevitch can be confidently predicted.

I also recall that Winston Churchill predicted exactly when the war would begin to a period of @16 months, several years earlier. He stated it WOULD begin after the Kiel Canal was completed and before Russia's first stage in upgrading the railroad system was complete in spring of 1915.
 

chronos

Banned
Unhappily the line to the Serbian government is there since Col."Apis" the head of the "Black Hand" was also head ofSerbian military intelligence.
 
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