Sommerville might change his plans if a juicy target like a surface task force comes within range. Indeed he might go out of his way to get these cruisers.
As already mentioned, going deep into the Strait of Malacca would leave the British forces with little room to maneuver, easy prey for surface and submarine attack.
Not to mention that despite some recent setbacks, the Japanese still have a massive number of land based aircraft in the region. Army and Navy included, the Japanese probably have more fighters alone then Somerville has aircraft aboard his carriers. Sacrificing four aircraft carriers to take out a handful of cruisers is not a good thing for the British, and would completely undo everything they've accomplished ITTL, leaving the Japanese plans for later in June/July completely uncontested, and leaving the British with three or four fewer carriers for other operations down the road.
Also, from rereading the last few updates, it mentions that the cruisers are being ordered to Singapore, not all of them have actually arrived yet. Baring SIGINT, the British also at this time from my understanding also don't have the means to conduct air recon of Singapore anyway, so even any SIGINT would likely be dated to alter the end of May strikes at this date.
The Japanese may be somewhat weaker ITTL compared to OTL, and the British slightly, very slightly, stronger ITTL, but not by much, and baring a freak occurance or something, Somerville isn't stupid, retarded, or a risk taker if he doesn't have to be. Less then two months ago, ITTL, he was trying to keep his entire fleet from being slaughtered similar to the Americans at Pearl Harbor, or his Royal Navy comrades aboard HMS Prince of Wales and HMS Repulse. Running into the teeth of the enemy to maybe take out two or three cruisers, at the risk of gutting the British carrier fleet, is suicide, and if he where to actually order it his subordinates or another Vice Admiral(Somerville is currently only a Vice Admiral to my understanding) would likely countermand him and possibly relieve him of command.
That's not to say that by chance one or two cruisers or some of these other ships the Japanese are sending to the region or that are already present might not happen to make a port call in Sabang by coincidence(if the author so chooses), or that allied submarines might not get lucky and blow one or two ships out of the water.