April 1942 Alternate Indian Ocean

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It was a different, more innocent time. Although when you realise that someone in the RN arranged to replace ships with names like Gay Charger and Gay Bruiser with boats in the succeeding class called things like Dark Adventurer and Dark Invader you have to wonder if they were having a laugh.

The Dark Biter had a valiant ten years, skulking about Britain's coastal waters, presumably out of view of teacher's watchful eye
 
We do have a very active 4 year old grandson. Son has firearms securely locked in a safe.
I sincerely hope that the family is disciplined enough never to leave the safe unlocked. Or that it's where the child can never ever access to without a very unlikely combination of mishaps.

I'm sure your son is very careful. But he only has to slip once...
 
I sincerely hope that the family is disciplined enough never to leave the safe unlocked. Or that it's where the child can never ever access to without a very unlikely combination of mishaps.

I'm sure your son is very careful. But he only has to slip once...

You just need to lock the ammunition away. And, of course, teach the kids about weapon safety. Alternatively, don't have ammunition in the house and only buy some when you go shooting.
 
1030 Hours, 22 November 1942, Port Blair, Andaman Islands – While the garrison with the “help” of the local population worked to cleanup from the attack, staff officers at the seaplane base worked to make sense of the sighting reports. There was no need to decode them, both messages were transmitted in the clear, one by an untrained fighter pilot and the other by a crew that probably knew they were about to meet their demise given that the message cut out midway through its third repeat. For once the Japanese did complement the Thai aircrew to the other Thai officers in the meeting. The Thais were clearly reluctant allies and the Japanese questioned both the quality of their training and their courage but in this case the Jake’s crew had shown sufficient quantities of both.

What was clear was that the Eastern Fleet’s carriers were just over 200 miles away from Port Blair and appeared to retreating although it was possible their course was due to the requirements of flight operations and they planned to double back for a late afternoon or even night attack against the still undamaged freighters sitting in port. Port Blair did not command any offensive assets although word was flashed to the bases at Mergui in Burma and Sabang on Sumatra, both of which commanded long range Betty and Nell torpedo bombers. The problems were persistent tracking of the enemy task force and the distances involved. The carriers were already several hundred miles away from both bases and if they maintained course, the gap would continue to grow meaning any attack against the task force would be unescorted. However, those decisions were for the commanders at Mergui and Sabang, the job of the units at Port Blair was to pass on their sighting reports. In an attempt to get additional intelligence another Jake was launched to the expected location of the Eastern Fleet’s task force if it continued on its present course and two shorter ranged Daves were sent out to cover the approaches to Port Blair in the event the carriers were returning for a second attack.

Looking at the map, Mergui is at least a couple hundred miles further east of Port Blair, unless they could land at Port Blair later on, they wouldn't be able to find the British carriers.

From my understanding and looking up via wikipedia, the Andaman and Nicobar islands where not heavily garrisoned by the Japanese. The where also not surrendered until after the end of the war in 1945. With the various changes that have occured, what are the odds that the British could assemble an offensive task force sometime late in 1943 or more likely in 1944 to evict the Japanese. By that point, they should have three or four carriers available, and by that point it might be possible to free up an infantry division and support.
 
1100 Hours, 22 November, Port C, Indian Ocean – The arrival of two convoys, one from Colombo and one from Fremantle made Port C a very busy place. Fortunately, recent dredging efforts had permitted a significant increase in the number of ships that could safely berth in the lagoon. Six freighters along with the RFAs Athelstane and Appleleaf were staying at Port C to unload cargo and fuel while another eight freighters and the RFA British Sergeant were continuing on to Fremantle with 12 freighters loaded mostly with foodstuffs and medical supplies from Fremantle were sailing to Trincomalee before continuing to ports in Bengal.

Per standard procedure, escort assignments were changing hands as well. The heavy cruiser HMS Devonshire, the minelayers HMS Manxman and HNLMS Willen van der Zaan, the Free French aviso Savorgnan de Brazza, and the old Greek destroyers Spetsai, and Kountouriotis were returning to Ceylon with the ships coming up from Fremantle and they were joined by the now empty RFA Pearleaf. The corvettes HMAS Cairns, HMAS Mildura, HMCS Vancouver, and HMCS Dawson and the gunboat USS Tulsa were remaining at Port C to assume local escort and patrol duties. Meanwhile, the workhorses of Port C’s escort flotilla, the corvette HMS Hollyhock, the patrol yacht USS Isabel, and the US Coast Guard cutter Haida were escorting the freighters bound for Fremantle and then all three ships would receive much needed repairs while their crews got well-earned shore leave on something larger than a coral atoll. Handover operations and replenishment for some of the smaller ships took the rest of the day and most of the night and both convoys were underway to their destinations by 0700 on 23 November.
 
1100 Hours, 22 November, Akyab, Burma – The ports at Calcutta, Chittagong, and Akyab were also jammed with ships unloading crucial supplies for famine and disaster relief as well as military cargo for the ongoing buildup in Bengal and the Arakan. In addition to the freighters, the RFAs Brown Ranger and Eaglesdale were offloading fuel at Akyab and Chittagong. Overhead RAF Hurricanes and Mohawks maintained vigil for Japanese reconnaissance aircraft or worse, bombers while the escorting warships either replenished in port or patrolled offshore.
 
1230 Hours, 22 November 1942, 280 Miles Southwest of Port Blair, Indian Ocean – The Thai E13A Jake out of Port Blair was past the point where its crew should have spotted the enemy carrier task force. After flying for ten more minutes the pilot had to make a decision regarding his continued search. He considered flying north but a weather system in that direction led him to decide the best course of action was to head south for 100 miles before turning back for Port Blair. While a prudent decision by the pilot, he could not know that at 1100 hours, Rear Admiral Boyd had ordered the task force to turn to the northwest. First because flight operations demanded the change in course but also because the deteriorating weather 60 miles to the north would shield his ships from the prying eyes of enemy reconnaissance planes and permit the task force to slow down to a more efficient speed.
 
1300 Hours, 22 November 1942, Sabang, Sumatra – At the air bases at Sabang, Sumatra and Mergui, Burma ground crews busily prepared Betty and Nell torpedo bombers for missions against the Eastern Fleet’s carrier task force known to be operating in the Bay of Bengal. The problem was that did not have up to date position reports on the enemy ships and with only five hours of daylight remaining, the odds of getting an attack in before nightfall were rapidly diminishing. Still, they had to be ready and if nothing else, their planes and crews would be ready to go at dawn in the event the Eastern Fleet was still in the area.
 
1500 Hours, 22 November 1942, Force A Eastern Fleet, 230 Miles West of Port Blair, Indian Ocean – Force A of the Eastern Fleet had entered the weather system and was now protected by low lying clouds and rain squalls. The task force had slowed to 15 knots allowing the destroyers to conserve fuel and was headed due west. Rear Admiral Boyd’s plan was for the task force to continue due west for another 100 miles before turning southwest for a meeting with the support group on 23 November.
 
1800 Hours, 22 November 1942, Christmas Island, Indian Ocean – The destroyer transports USS McKean and USS Talbot and the merchant cruiser HMS Alaunia arrived at Christmas Island as night was falling and fortunately the weather was fairly calm. HMS Alaunia tied up at the pier at Flying Fish Cover to unload her cargo while the destroyers took turns at the pier alongside the larger ship. The ships’ crews and the garrison worked double time to get the ships unloaded so they could be on their way as soon as possible and by 0700 the next morning with four RAAF P-40s orbiting overhead, all three ships were underway for Port C at 15 knots.
 
Going forward now, are there any plans for any additional interludes around the Guadalcanal region? I'm still curious as to what impact or butterflies might come about with Norman Scott still around and in overall command instead of having to play 2nd fiddle to other officers like Callaghan ITTL.

You've mentioned this timeline will probably close out at the end of 1942, whenever you get to that point. Assuming you do anything else going forward, have you ever considered the idea of a sequel in a new thread? Personally, even though it's still a ways off yet, I'm actually rather curious to see how the upcoming offensive in Burma will go what with the various changes that have happened so far.
 

Driftless

Donor
It just sort of happened that way, I didn't intend it.

Maybe not, but I'd bet there were similar days historically. Now, for the Japanese naval planners keeping score at home, a burst of activity like this probably would make them nervous.... "What's up with that?" An unintended bonus for the allies? A shift of Japanese attention for a short while?
 
Going forward now, are there any plans for any additional interludes around the Guadalcanal region? I'm still curious as to what impact or butterflies might come about with Norman Scott still around and in overall command instead of having to play 2nd fiddle to other officers like Callaghan ITTL.

You've mentioned this timeline will probably close out at the end of 1942, whenever you get to that point. Assuming you do anything else going forward, have you ever considered the idea of a sequel in a new thread? Personally, even though it's still a ways off yet, I'm actually rather curious to see how the upcoming offensive in Burma will go what with the various changes that have happened so far.

Working some Guadalcanal updates right now. There will not be a sequel to this TL but there will be epilogue chapters.
 
0500 Hours, 23 November 1942, Dili, Timor – Loaded with the troops and supplies of the 3rd Yokosuka SNLF, the light cruiser Kinu and the destroyers Harukaze, Matsukaze, Hatsushimo, Akatsuki, Sazanami and Inazuma cleared Dili’s harbor and headed north into the Java Sea at 20 knots. They were making a high-speed run to Port Blair to avoid lurking Allied submarines. They planned to stop in Singapore to refuel and take on additional supplies and replacement personnel for the elite unit of Imperial Marines. The recent strike against Port Blair by the Eastern Fleet had increased the anxiety of Japanese commanders that an invasion of Port Blair was not only possible but likely and getting reinforcements to the outpost was high priority. It was hoped a fast convoy of warships would stymie Allied interdiction efforts, much in the same way Rear Admiral Tanaka’s Tokyo Express was causing so many headaches to Allied forces in the Solomon Islands.
 
0500 Hours, 23 November 1942, Rangoon, Burma – Clearing weather in Burma meant increased flight operations for both sides and the Japanese were getting ready to hunt big game. IJN H6Ks out of Penang had tracked the movement of Allied convoys in the Bay of Bengal and Japanese listening posts had picked up the arrival of the convoys. Unfortunately, for the Allies it was simply impossible to manage the berthing and unloading assignments of so many freighters without a significant amount of radio traffic.

However, the Japanese needed eyes on the targets in order to plan their attacks so once again the call went to the hard-working reconnaissance units of the JAAF and the IJN. Launching out of Rangoon were two Ki-46 Dinahs of the 81st Sentai while four H6Ks took off from the seaplane base at Penang and the Kanoya NAG at Mergui added two of its Betties for good measure. The primary targets were ports along the coasts of Bengal and the Arakan. Looking for the elusive Eastern Fleet carrier task force were two H6Ks out of Penang, two Thai Air Force Jakes from Port Blair, and three Nells from Sabang. At air bases in Burma and Thailand, JAAF and IJN bomber crews at breakfast and rested. Their planes had been prepared during the night and now all they could do was wait for the results of the reconnaissance missions.
 
0600 Hours, 23 November 1942, Norfolk, Virginia – The aircraft carrier USS Ranger, the battleship USS Alabama, the heavy cruiser USS Augusta, the light cruisers USS Brooklyn and USS Cleveland, and 10 destroyers were assembled at the Norfolk Naval Base and preparing depart on a special mission. Only the ships’ captains and executive officers knew their destination and only the senior most officers in the task force knew the nature of their mission. Ranger’s air group was getting reconfigured from the fighter heavy complement she embarked for OPERATIONS PEDESTAL and TORCH with the swapping out some fighters for additional dive bombers.

All ships were making necessary repairs from recent operations and their departure was set for 27 November. Ranger’s CAG and her squadron commanders had boarded a Pan Am Clipper bound for Great Britain at 0500 that morning, while several Fleet Air Arm pilots from the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet had boarded Ranger the day before after making the westbound flight across the Atlantic on the Clipper. This only fueled speculation among the ships’ crews and while everyone come to the conclusion that they were most likely headed for Scapa Flow for duty with the Home Fleet, but nobody had any ideas beyond that other than they were getting ready for something big. The day before a steward from the flag mess on Ranger had reported to his bunk mates that the tension among the senior officers was so thick you could feel it in the air. Word had also spread around the carrier that the dive bomber squadrons had been augmented with experienced combat veterans from the fighting in the Pacific who had been temporarily pulled out of instructor billets at Jacksonville and Pensacola.
 
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