Alternatives to Scapa Flow as a base for the Grand Fleet during World War 1

[I want to learn]

Shortly prior to the outbreak of World War 1, Scapa Flow was chosen to be the base of the Royal Navy during wartime. Scapa Flow is a huge anchorage, but had a lot of predictable disadvantages. Infrastructure to support capital ships was essentially non-existent: ships undergoing maintenance or repair mostly had to go elsewhere, and coal had to be shipped in from elsewhere and kept onboard colliers until needed. There were no pre-war harbor defenses. Finally, Scapa Flow was intentionally remote, which was protective against attacks at anchor but meant the Grand Fleet was consistently unable to intervene against raids on the English coast. This last factor led to multiple large Royal Navy squadrons being stationed in other ports.

What if the entire Grand Fleet was based in Rosyth? I think some minimal effort had been made to prepare Rosyth to host a battlefleet pre-war and that it was the leading competitor to Scapa Flow. It is also the option with the most historic precedent, since the Battlecruiser Force consistently was based out of Rosyth, at times so were the 3rd Battle Squadron (the KE8 pre-dreadnoughts), and the Grand Fleet sometimes used Rosyth as an assembly point. I think the biggest point usually brought up against Rosyth is that it wasn't as good a training ground as Scapa Flow, but that debate is linked to the performance of Beatty's battlecruisers in combat so there's a lot of confounders when it comes to determining how truly significant this issue might be. Although probably the most plausible, I think a base at Rosyth is the least dynamic to consider from an alternate history perspective since it's not that different than OTL.

A clear departure from OTL instead would be basing the Grand Fleet at the Nore, which traditionally was a major command post and base to begin with. The logistical support immediately available would be excellent and the fleet would be much, much closer to raids by the German High Seas Fleet on the English Channel or the English coast, while still being reasonably (if not better?) positioned to cut the High Seas Fleet off from its home bases if it tries to sortie north to destroy ships conducting the distant blockade. I'm not sure if the training situation would be any better or worse than Rosyth or Scapa Flow. The main point against stationing the Grand Fleet at the Nore is that it is more exposed to attacks such as by torpedo boats at night. Personally I find this to be an insufficient deterrent because the 3rd Battle Squadron (including HMS Dreadnought herself!) was stationed there and if it was so easy to raid the Germans would eagerly have done so since destroying isolated squadrons of battleships was their only path towards conventional naval parity. I think this option is still basically plausible in an alternate history, but it significantly changes the naval dynamics from OTL. The "baby-killer" raids are presumably too dangerous to attempt, so the High Seas Fleet has to figure out something else to do (like send the battlecruisers on raids into the Atlantic?) or remain idle (and foment earlier revolution?).

Still vaguely plausible is basing significant elements of the Grand Fleet out of the Humber. HMS New Zealand and HMS Invincible were briefly stationed there in 1914, and HMS Marlborough returned there after the Battle of Jutland so I get the sense there was some ability to support capital ships, but I'm really not sure about the particulars. It's probably not substantially different than the Nore in terms of strategic implications.

Portsmouth might also be considered as an option. I think it was a major peacetime yard for the Royal Navy and it was the site of the Royal Fleet Review during the July crisis. It has the logistics to support the fleet and the fleet can defend incursions into the English Channel (but maybe not the raids on the East coast?) while being better protected than putting the fleet in the Thames. This might be where a Grand Fleet hides if it suffers major losses or if leadership is extremely cautious.

Getting into exotic allohistoric alternatives, the Grand Fleet might be based out of Norway. There are plenty of deep fjords to host the fleet and places for fleet exercises. Logistics and lack of existing defenses is an issue, but hey they made it work in the Orkneys, why not Norway? Never mind neutrality.

Finally, the Grand Fleet could take station at the Skaw. The German High Seas Fleet would sometimes assemble there in peacetime so it must have had some virtues as an anchorage. However, a base at Skagen would have been highly exposed and logistically challenging. It would have resulted in the summary occupation of Jutland (eventually including Skagen itself presumably) by the German army, but in the meantime would have been a highly provocative stimuli to the High Seas Fleet to come out and fight immediately. Highly implausible for World War 1 as we know it.

 

[Not James Stockdale]

Cromarty Firth had a history as a popular fleet anchorage. It would be relatively isolated without being as detached from the British rail network as Scapa Flow. The downside is that you sortie into Moray Firth and have to sail more than a hundred miles to gain any sea room. I have heard variously that Rosyth was too small for the whole Grand Fleet, that the Admiralty was worried about saboteurs bringing down the Forth Bridge to trap the BCF, and that the outlet route over 40 miles to the sea was too narrow. If the latter is true, Cromarty Firth wouldn't be much better.

Considering the need to protect the Norway convoys with capital ships against German battlecruiser raids, the limited sea room (also infested with mines) south of the Norfolk coast, and the lack of anchorages along the English east coast (basically only the Humber), the Grand Fleet practically has to be based in Scotland.

 

[general]

I think Portsmouth is out as a wartime base for the Grand Fleet simply because the harbour entrance is so narrow. When I visited in 2015, I could'nt believe just how narrow it was.
It would take quite a while for the Grand Fleet to exit in an emergency.

 

[Monk78]

Any chance of a U47 style uboat attack inside scapa flow in ww1 ?

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

Any chance of a U47 style uboat attack inside scapa flow in ww1 ?

There was one attack that I know of IOTL, but it wasn't until 26th October 1918 and the submarine was sunk by the controlled minefield. And as the article on the Scapa Flow Historic Website says the anchorage hadn't been used for 6 months and the Grand Fleet was at Rosyth at the time of the attack.

UB116 : Scapa Flow Wrecks

www.scapaflowwrecks.com

 

[NOMISYRRUC]

I have heard variously that Rosyth was too small for the whole Grand Fleet, that the Admiralty was worried about saboteurs bringing down the Forth Bridge to trap the BCF...

I have a very vague memory of listening to a Radio Four Saturday Night Play in the 1980s which was about that very subject. Except that as far as I can remember it was set in the Edwardian Era and the Germans were planning to trap the Russian Baltic Fleet (which was making a goodwill visit) in Rosyth as well as the would be Grand Fleet. It might have been adapted from a novel.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

I think Plymouth was the peacetime base but it was considered too close to Germany allowing for a surprise torpedo boat attack and minefields in the Dover straights hence the Scapa flow base was the war time base due to its remoteness and ability to allow the fleet to pretty much go where it liked (from memory Churchill watching them all leave before Britain declared war was where he coined the phrase "Castles of Steel").

A good idea might be to work out where the Home fleet deployed in WW2.

When U47 sank Royal Oak Scapa Flow had already been abandoned as a 'main base' but I cannot recall where the fleet was based.

 

[sparky42]

Any chance of a U47 style uboat attack inside scapa flow in ww1 ?

There were concerns about such an attack, from memory the Grand Fleet was dispersed in the early period of the war in order to improve the defences with some ships ending up all the way over in the Irish Ports. Also there was an early attempt in 1914

Scapa Flow - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

 

[Cryhavoc101]

There was one attack that I know of IOTL, but it wasn't until 26th October 1918 and the submarine was sunk by the controlled minefield. And as the article on the Scapa Flow Historic Website says the anchorage hadn't been used for 6 months and the Grand Fleet was at Rosyth at the time of the attack.

UB116 : Scapa Flow Wrecks

www.scapaflowwrecks.com

U18 in Nov 1914 also managed to penetrate via Hoxa Sound only to find the anchorage empty - she was detected and rammed by an armed Trawler Dorothy Gray which destroyed her periscope and the sub had a number of system failures and was then then rammed by the destroyer HMS Garry which forced her captain to surface and scuttle the sub with the loss of a single crewman.

 

[Admiral Jellicoe]

The need for a remote base outside of TBD range was in part a reaction to the opening attack on Port Arthur by the Japanese at the onset of the Russo-Japanese war. This coupled with a general obsession of a 'bolt from the blue' attack pushed the fleet away from the Nore. That plus the adoption of the distant blockade over the close blockade (also influenced by the prevalence of TBDs and submarines) necessitated the move of the fleet. Scapa was the logical answer albeit arrived at very late. Ironically the dispersal of the fleet to Irish ports in 14 due to the submarine risk led to the loss of Audacious in loch ewe by mine.

Given the strategic choice of distant blockade and the need to remove a 'bolt from the blue' TBD attack I think only Rosyth provides a viable alternative. Cromarty never held more than a Battle squadron and cruisers and has all the remoteness of Scapa but without the space and exit choices. Roysth has the base support in spades but is crowded and more easily watched by submarines. The currents around Scapa, the multiple entrances, the space and depth of anchorage, its distance from the enemy and sitting right on the strategic windpipe i.e the entrance into the North Sea makes it much better for the RN and harder for the Germans

 

[ArtosStark]

The shift from France to Germany as the most likely threat meant that the traditional bases of the RN along the south coast of Britain were no longer feasible. They form an obvious block on any French attempt to operate in the Channel or enter the North Sea, and can easily allow sorties into the Celtic Sea, Bay of Biscay and North Atlantic. But the channel forms a bottleneck to them being useful for a fight in the North Sea.

When this was considered by the Admiralty the best choice was considered to be the Humber. It had ample room for both docking and gunnery practice, strong rail connection to the rest of the country and optimal positioning to counter German movements in the North Sea. Its critical failing was that it was considered to be vulnerable to torpedo attack. German torpedo boats could reach it and return to their bases all under cover of darkness. Thus a port strike on the fleet was considered to be a real danger. This lead to the selection of Rosyth. Rosyth was never really big enough to support the entire grand fleet. IIRC it was rated for 15-17 dreadnoughts. It is also connected to the rest of the country through a single railway bridge that was vulnerable to sabotage or a very well placed artillery strike. Between that, and the decision to shift to distant blockade, Scapa makes a lot of sense.

If you consider the TB threat to be real than the Bases used IOTL are definitely the best options. If you consider them to be overblown, which I do, then IMO the Humber is the best option. Scapa and/or Cromarty would still be a useful as a base for older PD's and earlier Dreadnought to support the blockade but the main strength of the GF would be available where they can best counter German movements. Plus the BCF could be kept close to the commander GF, giving Beatty less room to order changes to RN doctrine on ammunition handling and gunnery practice.

 

[I want to learn]

Considering the need to protect the Norway convoys with capital ships against German battlecruiser raids, the limited sea room (also infested with mines) south of the Norfolk coast, and the lack of anchorages along the English east coast (basically only the Humber), the Grand Fleet practically has to be based in Scotland.

I think Cromarty was basically a satellite base to Scapa Flow IOTL.

I don’t want to overly dissect a single line of your post but I don’t think conveys to Norway were organized until early 1917, by which point the Grand Fleet had been based at Scapa Flow for years. Up until then, I don’t think the Royal Navy had major interest in protecting trade to or from Norway, I don’t think Britain depended on any particular resources exclusively from Norway. The circumstances the eventually led to Norwegian convoys was that Norway essentially joined the British blockade and cut off trade to Germany to guarantee coal imports from Britain to Norway. The other price of this was Britain had to organize protection. Prior to being strong-armed into becoming a de facto client of the Entente Norway was a route for American goods into Germany. Even if defending Norwegian trade from German battlecruisers was a long-standing concern, it seems to be worth pointing out that the Royal Navy task force (the battlecruisers) regularly allocated to counter the 1st Scouting Group wasn’t even usually based at Scapa Flow.

How did lack of sea room and anchorages impact the deployment of the 3rd battle squadron to Sheerness?

 

[I want to learn]

When this was considered by the Admiralty the best choice was considered to be the Humber. It had ample room for both docking and gunnery practice, strong rail connection to the rest of the country and optimal positioning to counter German movements in the North Sea. Its critical failing was that it was considered to be vulnerable to torpedo attack. German torpedo boats could reach it and return to their bases all under cover of darkness. Thus a port strike on the fleet was considered to be a real danger

Why was the Humber considered more vulnerable to torpedo attack than bases in the Thames estuary? Or was the Nore not considered for other reasons?

 

[I want to learn]

A good idea might be to work out where the Home fleet deployed in WW2.

I think the Home Fleet spent a good amount of time at Scapa Flow during WW2 too, but by then its remoteness had gained attraction due to the threat of bomber raids.

 

[ArtosStark]

Why was the Humber considered more vulnerable to torpedo attack than bases in the Thames estuary? Or was the Nore not considered for other reasons?

As I understand it the Thames bases were considered equally vulnerable. It is not much further from the Humber to the Nore from the Ems. And I don't think they were ever considered for a main east coast base, as I don't think they could support a force the size of the GF for any length of time. I am not positive on that part however.

The 1907 war plans envisioned that:

The British battle fleet (51 battleships and 13 armoured cruisers) would be concentrated in the Humber to support either cordon and counter High Seas Fleet movements. The blockade and central position of the British fleet would force the Germans out to defend their trade where they would be engaged after their Baltic line of retreat had been cut off.60

In 1908:

Concern over East Coast coaling and torpedo bases also indicated that aspects of the Ballard Committee plans were deemed legitimate by the Admiralty. Frequent North Sea cruises gave the C-in-C Channel ample exposure to existing facilities at the principal East Coast ports and their suitability for wartime operations. In early August. Beresford outlined the benefits and shortcomings of eastern ports and made several recommendations. Based on the distance to the Ems (Borkum Light) and the main German exit north of the Elbe, he identified three suitable anchorages for North Sea operations: the Humber, the Forth (Rosyth), and Cromarty. Out of these, the Humber was the best positioned "strategically", but was geographically indefensible against enemy torpedo craft and thus useless as a fleet base. As Cromarty was too far north, Beresford suggested Rosyth as the main fleet coaling base. He recommended that the Board consider: improving the Forth's defences, Cromarty as an alternate, Grimsby's development, and the Humber's employment as a flotilla base. The DNI and Admiralty concurred with Beresford's analysis and recommendations, adding Scapa Flow as another potential main base in the North Sea. 104

https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/2926803/408275.pdf

 

[I want to learn]

As I understand it the Thames bases were considered equally vulnerable. It is not much further from the Humber to the Nore from the Ems. And I don't think they were ever considered for a main east coast base, as I don't think they could support a force the size of the GF for any length of time. I am not positive on that part however.

I wonder if splitting the Grand Fleet between the Nore and the Humber was viable and if it would have dispersed the logistical challenges. The battlecruisers and a battle squadron or two at the Humber and the rest of the battleline at the Nore, for example. They'd be closer together than the BCF in Rosyth was to Scapa Flow.