Another option would be for Japan to push south into the Dutch Indies, Malaya, and Indian Ocean while bypassing the Phillipines and any other US posessions...in essence daring an isolationist US to intervene in a war between Japan and Britain and the NEI.
Obviously they run the risk that the US will see this as a clear strategic threat to the US or a situation of "crossing the line", and here's a possible interesting outcomes to this:
1. To "send a message" the US very publically orders the bulk of the Pacific fleet to the Phillipines. I think that is pretty much a given regardless of whether or not the US declares war. Two interesing options then occur:
2. The US does not declare war and its fleet is not opposed by the Japanese. It becomes stationed in the Phillipines and other US bases are beefed up. The US has no causus belli against Japan that the Congress would consider sufficient justification for a DoW. Japan's actions are interpreted by isolationist Americans as part of an expanded "European War" and are intended to deny Britain access to resources from Australasia and perhaps India. In essence, rather than risking all on war with the US, they risk it all on the hope that such a war can be avoided...at least for the time being.
3. If the US declares war and moves fleet westward, the Japanse implement their planned attritional strategy. As the US fleet (8old dreadought battleships with limited AA capibility, 3 carriers with, and support vessels) steam across the Pacific, Japan's fast carrier force escorted by the fast Kongo battleships and destroyers (essentially the Pearl Harbor task force) strikes in mid pacific as part of the "attrition strategy" inherent in Japanese planning for the "decisive battle". The US fleet, with pre-war standard AA and generally inferior and outnumbered naval aviation, is mauled by the Japanese carrier strikes, losing 3-4 battleships and maybe 2 carriers which sink in the deep Pacific. Couple this with land based G3M and G4M air raids on the Phillipines to diminish the repair and resupply capability of US naval bases there, even if the Japanse lose a carrier or two they are in a better position than OTL to negotiate an end to the war. Or, if the US hasn't yet declared war but this seems only to be a matter of time, maybe do this as a "surprise attack" on the fleet while it is underway and perhaps even less prepared to mount a sucessful defense or counterstrike.
Another thing to consider. Even if Japan loses these early naval battles decisively things might turn out far better for them than in OTL. They would have lost the "decisive battle" early and militarist dogma would have been disproven. Liberal groups in Japan (there still were some in high places) might achieve a change in government allowing Japan to negotiate an end to the war without the mass bombings, allied occupation, and other elements of an unconditional surrender (an Allied doctrine that hadn't yet solidified in 1941-42). They'd be forced to give up all 1941-42 conquests, pay reparations, perhaps accept some treaty limitations on the size of Japan's military, and maybe even abandon the China war as well, but Japan might escape the loss of Korea, South Sakhalin, Formosa, and other earlier conquests, but it sure beats the alternative.