Alternative to Singapore Strategy?

[Hood]

Singapore Strategy is regarded by many as a flawed concept. Heavy investment put into a base that could be cut off, exercises showing that carriers could sneak up and that invasion from the north was more likely, essentially Singapore could be surrounded and attacked by the Japanese, Malaya being lost before any chance of fighting back.
My question therefore is, what's a better alternative if trying to defend the British SEA possessions? Personally either have a base further east, perhaps a joint base with the dutch to shut the door on any japanese invasion fleet, or pull back across the straits if SEA is considered a write off in immediate defence. Air bases to ensure air superiority over the gulf and forces to knock out thailand if necessary.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Sea mines, MTB's, Submarines and Aircraft. Have the main RN base in either Ceylon or Western Australia.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Fight one war at a time. Brit Asian/Pacific strategy was based on no other wars. In that context Singapore as a major naval base makes sense. When the nazis bankrupted that strategy the Brits, had difficulty adjusting.

 

[SealTheRealDeal]

Option 1) Improved Singapore Strategy:
Be prepared to fight in Malaysia. Better yet, be prepared to seize the initiative and duke it out in other parts of SEA and the South China Sea.
+maintains control over the critical Straits
+relieving/retaking Hong Kong is less of a pipe dream
-only viable if Britain isn't distracted elsewhere
-requires much more investment into Britain's, still rather exposed and isolated, Malayan possessions

Option 2) Wide Perimeter Defence:
Write Singapore and Hong Kong off as indefensible and instead invest in Trincomalee and [somewhere in Oz].
+they may as well be on the moon
-they may as well be on the moon
-God forbid this line of thought be applied to the Mediterranean

Option 3) Compromise:
Treat Singapore as a forward base to be contested or ceded as the situation permits, in either case the main naval base and logistical node will be Trincomalee.
+Does not necessarily write off the entire Malay Barrier
+does not over invest in vulnerable Singapore
-may not be as reassuring to Australia and New Zealand

Option 4) Galaxy Brain Mode ON:
Britain gets a US style fleet train. Where does the fleet go? Where it wants, and it will stay there as long as it feels like it. What about repair facilities? They're called floating dry docks for a reason, given a couple months' notice any friendly port can become our repair yard.
+full strategic freedom
+can be retreated unlike a port
-EXPENSIVE!!! (especially for something that can sink)

 

[Colonel Grubb]

Option 2) Wide Perimeter Defence:
Write Singapore and Hong Kong off as indefensible and instead invest in Trincomalee and [somewhere in Oz].
+they may as well be on the moon
-they may as well be on the moon
-God forbid this line of thought be applied to the Mediterranean

This is what happens when 'fleet base Darwin' (or Sydney/Freemantle/Rabaul/Trincomalee) is raised. It potentially protects fleet assets but means the effectiveness to respond is dramatically reduced. Who in 1921 or even 1931 would have reasonably seen the Japanese launching their attacks from French Indochina?

 

[Hood]

This is what happens when 'fleet base Darwin' (or Sydney/Freemantle/Rabaul/Trincomalee) is raised. It potentially protects fleet assets but means the effectiveness to respond is dramatically reduced. Who in 1921 or even 1931 would have reasonably seen the Japanese launching their attacks from French Indochina?

perhaps combined with a fleet train idea? Allows for a lot of flexibility and leaves bases at Ceylon and, idk, preferably Sydney, Melbourne, even Adelaide. not a fan of Darwin because of how isolated it is and how it can potentially be attacked compared to say Adelaide. I'm thinking something similar to the US pacific fleet, fleet train plus having pearl as a "forward" base, ala say singapore or maybe a dutch base, and then ships being repaired in the safety of the US pacific coast, ala south coast of Oz.
If going for fleet train, having a main base that's vulnerable is going to knock you right out of the theatre with nowhere to hide.
Very expensive though.

 

[Colonel Grubb]

perhaps combined with a fleet train idea? Allows for a lot of flexibility and leaves bases at Ceylon and, idk, preferably Sydney, Melbourne, even Adelaide. not a fan of Darwin because of how isolated it is and how it can potentially be attacked compared to say Adelaide. I'm thinking something similar to the US pacific fleet, fleet train plus having pearl as a "forward" base, ala say singapore or maybe a dutch base, and then ships being repaired in the safety of the US pacific coast, ala south coast of Oz.
If going for fleet train, having a main base that's vulnerable is going to knock you right out of the theatre with nowhere to hide.
Very expensive though.

You don’t need a fleet train in the American sense when you have secure bases/ports/anchorages all around the world to operate from...

If you base anything out of Adelaide you may as well just build the bloody ships on the Murrumbidgee to keep them safe...🤪

 

[Rickshaw]

Why not provide the means to effectively defend Singapore so that southern Thailand can be invaded and the beachs there removed as invasion points (which afterall the Japanese did use in OTL)? The problem was, the British were starved of troops and aircraft, not of strategy. They had a strategy to defend Singapore, problem was they lacked the means to carry it out. Of course, having a properly trained force helps as well, with wide awake officers who were willing to do what was needed to defence the base.

If the British Army had supplied the guns at Singapore with the means to fire landward and the means to destroy their target (such as HE rounds rather than just AP rounds), things wouldn't have gone as badly as they did. Singapore was defended against naval attack, not land attack.

 

[Riain]

In 1930, just two infantry battalions were stationed in Malaya, one British and one Indian. By 1937, this had increased to three British and one Indian battalions. Reinforcement of Malaya started in September 1939 with the arrival of the 12 Indian Infantry Brigade.

The next formations to arrive in Malaya were the 6 Indian Infantry Brigade and 8 Indian Infantry Brigade which landed in Malaya in October and November 1940. They came under command of the 11 Indian Infantry Division that formed in Malaya in October 1940. These two brigades both comprised three Regular Indian Army battalions, but were short of artillery support.

The 8 Australian Infantry Division was formed in Australia on 4 July 1940 as part of the 2 Australian Imperial Force. The 22 Brigade, which had been formed in New South Wales, was deployed to Malaya on 2 February 1941. This bought the total number of field Brigades to 4.

In March and April 1941, another division was sent from India to Malaya, this formation being the 9 Indian Infantry Division, comprising the 15 and 22 Indian Infantry Brigades. This formation also comprised units from the pre-war Regular Indian Army, but again was short of artillery. On arrival in Malaya, the brigades were redistributed between the two divisions. The 6 and 15 Brigades came under command of the 11 Division, with the 8 and 22 Brigades under command of the 9 Division. This was done to balance out the experience of the formations. Two British Army battalions (2 East Surrey's and 1 Leicestershires) joined the 11 Division, one being allocated to each brigade.

With two divisions now stationed in Malaya, a corps, headquarters was required, so the III Indian Corps was formed in May 1941.

27 Brigade, 8 Australian Infantry Division arrived in Malaya in August 1941.

The 28 Indian Infantry Brigade arrived in August 1941 to act as corps reserve.

This brings the total field brigades to 8.

Japan invaded the whole of SEA with 11 divisions, Britain had 3-4 in Malaya alone, fighting on the defensive in close country with lots of cover against fewer troops, they needed tanks and air superiority to make up for the lack of raw numbers. Yet these troops were defeated utterly, being totally ineffective which points to horrific leadership and field training rather than poor strategy.

 

[Antiochus V]

In 1930, just two infantry battalions were stationed in Malaya, one British and one Indian. By 1937, this had increased to three British and one Indian battalions. Reinforcement of Malaya started in September 1939 with the arrival of the 12 Indian Infantry Brigade.

The next formations to arrive in Malaya were the 6 Indian Infantry Brigade and 8 Indian Infantry Brigade which landed in Malaya in October and November 1940. They came under command of the 11 Indian Infantry Division that formed in Malaya in October 1940. These two brigades both comprised three Regular Indian Army battalions, but were short of artillery support.

The 8 Australian Infantry Division was formed in Australia on 4 July 1940 as part of the 2 Australian Imperial Force. The 22 Brigade, which had been formed in New South Wales, was deployed to Malaya on 2 February 1941. This bought the total number of field Brigades to 4.

In March and April 1941, another division was sent from India to Malaya, this formation being the 9 Indian Infantry Division, comprising the 15 and 22 Indian Infantry Brigades. This formation also comprised units from the pre-war Regular Indian Army, but again was short of artillery. On arrival in Malaya, the brigades were redistributed between the two divisions. The 6 and 15 Brigades came under command of the 11 Division, with the 8 and 22 Brigades under command of the 9 Division. This was done to balance out the experience of the formations. Two British Army battalions (2 East Surrey's and 1 Leicestershires) joined the 11 Division, one being allocated to each brigade.

With two divisions now stationed in Malaya, a corps, headquarters was required, so the III Indian Corps was formed in May 1941.

27 Brigade, 8 Australian Infantry Division arrived in Malaya in August 1941.

The 28 Indian Infantry Brigade arrived in August 1941 to act as corps reserve.

This brings the total field brigades to 8.

Japan invaded the whole of SEA with 11 divisions, Britain had 3-4 in Malaya alone, fighting on the defensive in close country with lots of cover against fewer troops, they needed tanks and air superiority to make up for the lack of raw numbers. Yet these troops were defeated utterly, being totally ineffective which points to horrific leadership and field training rather than poor strategy.

I spent a fair bit of time looking into this topic - on a numbers basis the UK should have performed better, and I think it a more open terrain it would have despite the leadership issues.

However the terrain in Malaysia can be really thick jungle, which makes holding a continous front line very hard for any period of time. The later successul defensive actions in Burma relied upon substantial airsupply, artillery and tank formations and experienced and well equipped soldiers. Green formations which had had the lower grade officers (the better ones having been poached for use in North Africa) were hugely vulnerable to enciclement and infiltration in this terrain, and ill suited to carrying out offensive operations which could have kept the Japanese off balance. I think Percival correctly understood that defensive operations alone would fail, and drew upon his recent experience of the failings of the french army to support this. But in rejecting a defensive posture he also seems not have appreciated that his less experienced force would benefit from the ability to slow the enemy and pull back to more secure locations to give themselves time to regroup and then counter attack with the support of artillery in known locations.

Percival didn't do a particularly good job in either ensuring defensive positions were available were appropriate pre-war, or getting the troops up to a suitable standard for sustained operations. I don't think he started with a viable strategy in mind which made his efforts ineffective. That is before one notes that he seems to have been out of his depth at that level of command, and didn't have the ability or charisma to impose his will on his subordinates.

The lack of naval support should also not be undersestimated, Phillips arguablely doomed Malaya when he charged off with the big ships.

My thinking is that the Burma would have been a better place to try to hold because the Japanese overland supply lines would have deeply problematic from day one. The 18th division (along with the 17th) there might have achieved rather more, especially if had a couple of tank battalions supporting it.

 

[ArtosStark]

If the British Army had supplied the guns at Singapore with the means to fire landward and the means to destroy their target (such as HE rounds rather than just AP rounds)

AIUI there were guns that could fire landward. Including at least 2 of the 15” IIRC. Though the problem with no (or at least little) HE was a problem. I believe the area directly facing Jahore was a bit of a dead spot as well. The defences of Singapore could, and should, definitely have been better, but by the time the enemy is close enough for you to use them you have probably lost the campaign anyway. I am not sure Singapore could be held as a Fortress City on its own.

 

[yulzari]

I spent a fair bit of time looking into this topic - on a numbers basis the UK should have performed better, and I think it a more open terrain it would have despite the leadership issues.

However the terrain in Malaysia can be really thick jungle, which makes holding a continous front line very hard for any period of time. The later successul defensive actions in Burma relied upon substantial airsupply, artillery and tank formations and experienced and well equipped soldiers. Green formations which had had the lower grade officers (the better ones having been poached for use in North Africa) were hugely vulnerable to enciclement and infiltration in this terrain, and ill suited to carrying out offensive operations which could have kept the Japanese off balance. I think Percival correctly understood that defensive operations alone would fail, and drew upon his recent experience of the failings of the french army to support this. But in rejecting a defensive posture he also seems not have appreciated that his less experienced force would benefit from the ability to slow the enemy and pull back to more secure locations to give themselves time to regroup and then counter attack with the support of artillery in known locations.

Percival didn't do a particularly good job in either ensuring defensive positions were available were appropriate pre-war, or getting the troops up to a suitable standard for sustained operations. I don't think he started with a viable strategy in mind which made his efforts ineffective. That is before one notes that he seems to have been out of hid depth at that level of command, and didn't have the ability or charisma to impose his will on his subordinates.

The lack of naval support should also not be undersestimated, Phillips arguablely doomed Malaya when he charged off with the big ships.

My thinking is that the Burma would have been a better place to try to hold because the Japanese overland supply lines would have deeply problematic from day one. The 18th division (along with the 17th) there might have achieved rather more, especially if had a couple of tank battalions supporting it.

I agree that Burma is a better place to hold and reduce the Japanese army by attrition. It might have been better to put the theatre under Indian government control and establish the means to hold and supply Burma rather than look to Singapore which is isolated from land support and relies upon the Dutch East Indies to hold the south and west. Burma needs land routes to China and India plus an air defence that can allow the navy to keep sea routes open. Strategically Singapore is a self financing POW camp. With logistics an order of magnitude better than OTL the Indians and Chinese should be able to contain the Japanese even with it being the largest land campaign outside China against the Japanese. It would need a POD way back to structure the Indian army to suit, building upon the WW1 experience at peer level warfare. It would then make sense to build up an Indian defence industry and field level officer corps. The British and African forces would be acting in support of the Indian army.

 

[HJ Tulp]

The big problem with the Singapore Strategy is that it was essentially a offensive strategy while the actual war required a defensive strategy.

Building up Singapore as the main base of operations with all the facilities and defensive fortifications that entails was logical in the Interbellum, when the scenario was a one-on-one fight against the IJN. The war could then be fought near Formosa or even beyond, while the position of the base on the other side of the South China Sea meant that it was reasonably safe. Safe enough to hold out until the inevitable fleet of reinforcements would arrive from Europe that is.

This all changed in the late '30's and radically so in 1940. Fighting a war on two fronts (Home Waters and the Med) meant that there would be no fleet of reinforcements. When the Japanese began to make a move for the FIC the British didn't lift a finger to prevent that - quite the opposit in fact - there was a Japanese base right at the doorstep of the 'Gibraltar of the East'. By then it should have been clear to anyone that Singapore should not be the lynchpin of the Allied/British defense of the SEA. Even IF 'all' the reinforcements would have managed to keep the base (hell, even if they would have held Malaya) the Japanese would have been able to launch a clockwise offensive and take Sumatra. Without Sumatra, Singapore is surrounded and subsequently lost. The British knew that but still chose to reinforce Malaya instead of Sumatra. Tens of thousands of Allied soldiers were lost when Singapore fell, some without firing a single shot.

What I am trying to say here is that the Singapore Strategy as such wasn't bad or wrong. Clinging to it to the bitter, inglorious and frankly useless end, was.

 

[Peg Leg Pom]

Britain had a 2 1/2 ocean navy but in December 1941 found itself fighting a 3 1/2 ocean war. No one ever thought the French would be knocked out or that the RN would have to fight convoys through to Murmansk, let alone both. That stretched thing wire tight but could be coped with, then Japan attacked Malaya and Tarantoed the US Pacific Fleet.

 

[mial42]

Back France against Germany in the 1930s and avoid a general European war.

 

[sdgottsch]

Why did the Japanese believe they needed Singapore? If they don't attack the UK holdings then there is no reason for the UK to attack the Japanese. Since the UK had a defensive strategy at Singapore the Japanese don't need to attack.

 

[Gokbay]

Why did the Japanese believe they needed Singapore? If they don't attack the UK holdings then there is no reason for the UK to attack the Japanese. Since the UK had a defensive strategy at Singapore the Japanese don't need to attack.

Japan needed resources. Invading just the Philippines and Dutch East Indies would not be secure (also Britain was already allied with the Netherlands in the war against Germany so couldn't respond to the Japanese invasion of Dutch territory with "none of our business mate")

 

[HJ Tulp]

Why did the Japanese believe they needed Singapore? If they don't attack the UK holdings then there is no reason for the UK to attack the Japanese. Since the UK had a defensive strategy at Singapore the Japanese don't need to attack.

For Churchill and the UK getting the US into the war against Germany was their no.1 top priority. That means joining the war against Japan. No way the UK is sitting this out.

Britain was already allied with the Netherlands in the war against Germany so couldn't respond to the Japanese invasion of Dutch territory with "none of our business mate"

Actually Britain and the Netherlands were very much only allied against Germany and the DEI was doing it's upmost best to stay neutral - while the UK categorically refused to guarentee the territorial integrity of the DEI. So if Japan goes to war against only the DEI in early 1941, they will only have the KNIL and RNLN to contend with.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Assuming that the decision is to made after the Mid 1940 Japanese invasion of French Indo China - because before then its unlikely that Japan can sustain an invasion of Malaya.

Singapore has to be defended at the Kra Isthmus and with far more aircraft and more/better troops and better equipment than were provided OTL

The first is a political decision and the 2nd requires troops and equipment to be pulled pretty much from active warzones to somewhere where there is not an active war zone

I can see the potential for aircraft and divisions released from the UK garrison (more on that in a sec)

This is easy for me to say from my comfortable seat in 2021 as the UK represented the then armoury of the Allies (it would take another year or so for the USA to catch up and then race past the UK) and so defending the UK from any potential invasion was still a consideration then.

But I could see perhaps a braver decision being made to release several divisions from the 27 odd in the UK at the time (and Possibly a Canadian one?) for service in North Africa releasing the Australian Divisions and corps troops as well as 1 or 2 Indian Army Divisions for service in the Far East

Send a few hundred tanks hell even Covenanters for the Aussies to learn tank warfare - yes its a bad tank but its much better than no tank and I think it would show up the IJA tanks in combat (if proof was ever needed that a bad tank is better than no tank see the Battle of Slim river)

Release 2 or 3 wings of Spitfires Vs (with suitable reserves) for service in North Africa/Malta in Mid 1941 and send all P40s to the Far East (along with all RAAF units) - this will give the DAF parity with the Luftwaffe's JG27 fighter wing and its 109s that were enjoying a superiority over the P40s and Hurricanes in theatre

Have the several hundred P40s delivered to date replace the 169 odd 'porcine' F2's in Malaya - that should provide 5 or 6 Squadrons - about 200 operational P40 fighters and allow those replaced F2 aircraft to reinforce the Dutch and Chinese

Have Stuffy sent out to build an air defence network C3 system worthy of the name and improve the existing bases i.e. revetments, shelters, satellite airfields and dummy airfields etc and to train the fuck out of the local air forces

Send out Gen. Ironsides to bully the locals

Put Blamey in overall charge as the extra Aussies arrive placing the 2nd AIC as the core formation (with 3 Divisions and a tank Brigade)

Reduce the Hong Garrison to a tripwire force, accept its loss and use those units along with C force (if still sent) to garrison the Barrier island locations (Ambon, Timor, Rabaul) allowing for Brigade sized formations in each - send the 2nd Torpedo Boat Squadron to Kota Bahru and the 2 insects for use as riverine patrol craft on the West coast of Malaya / Thailand. If anymore MTBs can be sent from the UK Coastal Forces then great! The 3 Destroyers in HK are to be reassigned to Malaya and used as fast Minelayers on the East Coast and also used as part of Matador to help mine and capture the Thai Ports.

Place the Operation Matador into the hands of the newly arrived 2nd Australian Imperial Corps

Principle mission is to occupy the narrowest point of the Kra Isthmus and deny the East Coast ports of Southern Thailand to the Japanese if and when they try to invade.

This places 5 Divisions (14 Brigades) of Infantry in Malaya in 2 Corps plus 3 Brigade sized formations in Ambon, Timor and Rabaul

It will oblige the Japanese to significantly reinforce the Malaya attack and conduct it from Thailand and North of the Kra Isthmus and these forces would have to come from the Philippine Operation making that battle harder and forces allocated to follow on ops would have to be used earlier.

Assuming that the IJA can force the Commonwealth positions on the Kra Isthmus then I would expect that this fighting even in defeat would impose such attrition and delay on the IJA that would probably result in Malaya and therefore Singapore still holding past April when the rains come and therefore into 1942 by which time I would expect the USN and Far East RN units to have moped the floor with the Japanese Navy and come late 42 / 1943 the weight of British Empire and USA reinforcements would more than tip the balance.

If the reduced forces in the Philippines allow them to also hold then this would also prevent any follow up operations in for example Dutch East Indies

Unless more fleet assets can be sent Force Z is to be kept as a 'fleet in being' and not to be risked as per OTL - make the orders very clear - they are to wait until they can collaborate and concentrate with the UK reinforcements and USN Battlefleet SAGS and Carrier Groups when they arrive following any declaration of war from the safe anchorage of Pearl Harbour*.

Even if this mean tucking their tail between their legs and making themselves scarce.

Have far greater planning with the local allies - Dutch and US as to how they intended to fight and defend Malaya - and incorporate the Dutch boats and Harts subs into fighting in the South China seas - OTL this was a bit ropy to put it nicely.

I appreciate that the above is...too perfect. But the OP asked!

*What? Didn't be ridiculous. The IJN is incapable of such an attack. The USN Battlefleet is perfectly safe!

 

[Deleted member 94680]

Sea mines, MTB's, Submarines and Aircraft. Have the main RN base in either Ceylon or Western Australia.

Anything that means more MTBs gets my vote.

Why not provide the means to effectively defend Singapore so that southern Thailand can be invaded and the beachs there removed as invasion points (which afterall the Japanese did use in OTL)? The problem was, the British were starved of troops and aircraft, not of strategy.

In 1930, just two infantry battalions were stationed in Malaya, one British and one Indian. By 1937, this had increased to three British and one Indian battalions. Reinforcement of Malaya started in September 1939
...

Yet these troops were defeated utterly, being totally ineffective which points to horrific leadership and field training rather than poor strategy.

I think Percival correctly understood that defensive operations alone would fail, and drew upon his recent experience of the failings of the french army to support this.

Percival didn't do a particularly good job in either ensuring defensive positions were available were appropriate pre-war, or getting the troops up to a suitable standard for sustained operations.

Who would be a better choice? Did the British (or the Empire) have any “jungle experts” pre-WWII? Or just a defensive minded character who could see the need for a wider scheme to defend Singapore once the strategic picture changed?