Alternative History Armoured Fighting Vehicles Part 3

[Not James Stockdale]

I had forgotten about the Type 61 and I'm pretty sure @Claymore & I looked at it for the Rhino. The platform is great since it is designed for the smaller chap and there are similar terrain requirements (lighter bridges, crossing rice paddies etc).

The problem we ran into was working out how to circumvent their weapon export restrictions. My idea was an 'unofficial' copy is built domestically and there might be a shell company or two to launder the unofficial license payments back to the Japanese manufacturer.

I looked back at Claymore's model thread and found the Type 68 (Leo 1 turret on Type 74 hull) and an SPG based on the Type 61 hull. As for the Medium 40-ton family, that is entering service in 1943 and will take part in the invasion of northern Germany. I have not determined whether there is going to be a war between the Allies and the Soviets in Poland in Q3 or Q4 1944, but Manticoran and Free Polish mechanized forces can match the Soviets in terms of mechanized divisions.

Water Buffalo

From an idea by La Rouge Beret...

Xiangkhouan Province, Laos 1968

Second Lieutenant Truong To of the 1st Battalion, Vietnamese Army looked to his front at the remnants of his platoon. They were pinned down by two Chinese Army pillboxes and were being bracketed by their mortars. Although his platoon was in dead ground, if they moved out of cover his men would suffer grievous casualties.

He asked his radio operator if there had been any update on his request for fire support and was told that it was at least five minutes away… Five minutes, he thought, was an eternity in combat. If the support did not arrive soon he was going to withdraw his men to the start position.

He heard a dull thump and saw both Chinese positions explode in front of his eyes. Well, well, he thought as a smile cracked across his face, the Water Buffalo has broken down another door.

The Water Buffalo was borne from the second Laotian Crisis in 1964 and particularly the Pyrrhic victory at Muong Phine. Where the Chinese defensive bunkers had decimated the assault launched by the Vietnamese Parachute Regiment. After the battle the Vietnamese General Staff recognised the need for an assault gun to provide direct heavy artillery in support of attacking infantry.
Several vehicles were considered such as the M41 Bulldog MBT, but it was Colonel Duong Minh (later General), who suggested the Type 62, the Vietnamese version of the Japanese Type 61 MBT, be modified as an assault gun due to its availability following its replacement by the Type 68 in the MBT role. After liaising with the American military assistance team the M126 howitzer was fitted to the Type 62 hull and metamorphosed into the Type 62 (A).

Although, its official designation was Type 62 (A), it became universally known as the Water Buffalo due to its size, strength and symbiotic relationship with the infantry; similar to the relationship between the farmer and his buffalo. The Type 62 (A) saw service during the Vietnamese involvement in Laos, their invasion of Democratic Kampuchea and in repelling the Chinese invasion of northern Vietnam. Several vehicles were transferred to the Khmer National Army, and were again referred to as the Kouprey or Water Buffalo in Khmer. The Khmer attachment to the Type 62 A was so strong it became the moniker of the national Rugby team and in 2006 the last vehicles retired.

This vehicle is painted as the 1st vehicle ‘Hue’, 3rd Battery, 1 Bn of 11th Artillery Brigade, which participated in the battle of Xianghouan and which resulted in the destruction of the 3rd Volunteer Regiment of the People’s Liberation Army.

The model is made from components of a Tamiya Type 61 tank, a Tamiya M113, an Italeri M109, some bits and pieces from the spares box, plastic (styrene) card and a big blob of millliput modelling putty.

View attachment 403661

View attachment 403662

View attachment 403664

 

[cortz#9]

The recent talk about the Type-61 & 74 and Cambodian tanks inspired me to make this doodle.

M41 hull with Type-61 turret but armed with the Type-74's 105 cannon.
Not sure if all these mods would fit together but they appear to fit and I like the way it looks.

I can't imagine any scenario where this tank would come into being so no backstory, sorry.

 

[Rickshaw]

I am unsure why people are so convinced as to need to use armoured vehicles as recce vehicles. To me, it appears unneccessarily complicated and large. The role of reconnaissance is to see the enemy before he sees you. Back in the late 1970s when I served in the Australian Army we used to use the ultimate recce vehicle - small enough not to be noticed, large enough to carry up to four men and light enough for three men to lift out of puddles and bogs. I give you the ultimate recce machine which would do most militaries - the Mini-moke:

 

[Not James Stockdale]

I am unsure why people are so convinced as to need to use armoured vehicles as recce vehicles. To me, it appears unneccessarily complicated and large. The role of reconnaissance is to see the enemy before he sees you. Back in the late 1970s when I served in the Australian Army we used to use the ultimate recce vehicle - small enough not to be noticed, large enough to carry up to four men and light enough for three men to lift out of puddles and bogs. I give you the ultimate recce machine which would do most militaries - the Mini-moke:

The idea that scouts shouldn't have to fight has been comprehensively disproven in battles over the past millennia. What are you supposed to do with your 4x4s once you run into the enemy's 4x4s? Infiltration is a job for special forces. The problem with conceptualizing your screen as recce or scouts rather than cavalry is that you will never see anything more than what the enemy allows you to see. A few guys with scopes and a 4x4 can be a useful tool, but they are the seaplane reconnaissance to the Grand Fleet that is behind them, and certainly not the destroyers, cruisers, or battlecruisers. What do you think those were for? Ultimately, the job of any military units whose task is commonly characterized as "cavalry", "recce", or "scouting" is screening, and that has always required the ability to fight against the enemy screen.

On the modern battlefield, that little 4x4 is going to be spotted by ground surveillance radar or thermal imagers and get popped by an autocannon or missile from 3,000 meters away, so they are going to die before they see anything more substantial than a tracer. Even small armored vehicles like the CVR(T) don't offer any advantage anymore in terms of small target size or high speed because modern fire control systems are so good that any target that is seen will be hit.

The ultimate recce vehicle has good enough speed, excellent off-road mobility, overwhelming firepower, the best optical suites available, and enough protection to keep the crew relatively confident in their continued safety. The only problem with a main battle tank is that it doesn't float.

 

[ThirdyLovesAH]

The recent talk about the Type-61 & 74 and Cambodian tanks inspired me to make this doodle.
View attachment 693226
M41 hull with Type-61 turret but armed with the Type-74's 105 cannon.
Not sure if all these mods would fit together but they appear to fit and I like the way it looks.

I can't imagine any scenario where this tank would come into being so no backstory, sorry.

I was thinking of this design as the 1st gen tank of the JLDF from the Type 80 MBT that I requested earlier.

 

[Rickshaw]

The idea that scouts shouldn't have to fight has been comprehensively disproven in battles over the past millennia. What are you supposed to do with your 4x4s once you run into the enemy's 4x4s? Infiltration is a job for special forces. The problem with conceptualizing your screen as recce or scouts rather than cavalry is that you will never see anything more than what the enemy allows you to see. A few guys with scopes and a 4x4 can be a useful tool, but they are the seaplane reconnaissance to the Grand Fleet that is behind them, and certainly not the destroyers, cruisers, or battlecruisers. What do you think those were for? Ultimately, the job of any military units whose task is commonly characterized as "cavalry", "recce", or "scouting" is screening, and that has always required the ability to fight against the enemy screen.

On the modern battlefield, that little 4x4 is going to be spotted by ground surveillance radar or thermal imagers and get popped by an autocannon or missile from 3,000 meters away, so they are going to die before they see anything more substantial than a tracer. Even small armored vehicles like the CVR(T) don't offer any advantage anymore in terms of small target size or high speed because modern fire control systems are so good that any target that is seen will be hit.

The ultimate recce vehicle has good enough speed, excellent off-road mobility, overwhelming firepower, the best optical suites available, and enough protection to keep the crew relatively confident in their continued safety. The only problem with a main battle tank is that it doesn't float.

*SIGH* You are thinking of the north European plain or the wide open desert, not of Cambodia with it's dense patches of tropical rainforest. The Mini-moke is the ideal vehicle - small, light and easily maneuvered in an around the trees. An MBT is too big, too noisy, to undertake recce work. It would need to smash through the forests. Mini-moke would be in and out before the MBT could even reach the battlefield. It would be limited by the lack of bridges able to handle it's weight. Tanks are useful for fighting battles, not for finding out where the enemy is.

 

[cortz#9]

I was thinking of this design as the 1st gen tank of the JLDF from the Type 80 MBT that I requested earlier.

You didn't go into enough details then.

 

[ThirdyLovesAH]

You didn't go into enough details then.

That's my mistake But I will make it detailed for the next time

 

[Not James Stockdale]

*SIGH* You are thinking of the north European plain or the wide open desert, not of Cambodia with it's dense patches of tropical rainforest. The Mini-moke is the ideal vehicle - small, light and easily maneuvered in an around the trees. An MBT is too big, too noisy, to undertake recce work. It would need to smash through the forests. Mini-moke would be in and out before the MBT could even reach the battlefield. It would be limited by the lack of bridges able to handle it's weight. Tanks are useful for fighting battles, not for finding out where the enemy is.

First of all, you were responding to my own response to an assessment the comparative performance of cavalry vehicles in Cold War-era NATO armies. If you have to retroactively finetune your argument for it to be worth anything, that is your own failure. Second, you are still ignoring the problems of screening and economy of force missions. A small 4x4 may be a good choice for forward reconnaissance, but that's a job for a dozen men in a thousand. The only choice a four-man scout team would have if they encounter any patrol or outpost of any reasonable size would be to phone it in and run away. Your understanding of the battlefield would be entirely two-dimensional (distance to nearest enemy forces in a given direction). Identifying the forward line of troops will not help you identify the main axis of an enemy attack or look for exploitable weak areas in the enemy's defense in any reasonable timeframe. The best way to reconnoiter in the enemy's depth and gain an understanding of their responses and patterns is to attack, and the best tool for the attack is the main battle tank.

 

[cortz#9]

That's my mistake But I will make it detailed for the next time

If you want to use the pic for a TL or a different thread that's cool with me as long as you credit me for the drawing.

 

[Not James Stockdale]

Revisiting this earlier thought....

In a France-Fights-On scenario, can you get to a first and second generation of production P201/AM40's during the fighting? What form might those fielded machines take?

Photo from Char-francais.net

The archetypal FFO scenario involves the French government evacuating to Algiers to continue to war despite the occupation of the Metropole. If that is the case, the French aren't going to have any major factories and are going to be reliant on foreign aid for big-ticket items like armored vehicles.

As far as the AM-40 goes, the crew of two is too small and you would optimally have a gunner/observer and a radio operator as in the EBR. Obviously this is a design choice that the French tended to make because it reduced the size and weight of their vehicles, but it also hurt their combat capability. The EBR is about 1.5x bigger than the AM-40.

 

[Rickshaw]

First of all, you were responding to my own response to an assessment the comparative performance of cavalry vehicles in Cold War-era NATO armies. If you have to retroactively finetune your argument for it to be worth anything, that is your own failure. Second, you are still ignoring the problems of screening and economy of force missions. A small 4x4 may be a good choice for forward reconnaissance, but that's a job for a dozen men in a thousand. The only choice a four-man scout team would have if they encounter any patrol or outpost of any reasonable size would be to phone it in and run away. Your understanding of the battlefield would be entirely two-dimensional (distance to nearest enemy forces in a given direction). Identifying the forward line of troops will not help you identify the main axis of an enemy attack or look for exploitable weak areas in the enemy's defense in any reasonable timeframe. The best way to reconnoiter in the enemy's depth and gain an understanding of their responses and patterns is to attack, and the best tool for the attack is the main battle tank.

You are over-emphasising your own importance and the importance of your argument in IMO. I would suggest you reconsider that I was directly replying to your argument and whether or not I was ignoring your points. As the main thrust as the type and role of a recce vehicle my point remains. American views of what recce units do are uniquely American I would suggest and reflective that they want to, "grab and take what ever they can." Other armies have different views on how to conduct reconnaissance roles. Under the British Commonwealth tradition the best recce vehicle is equipped with a pair of binoculars to see the enemy first. Their role is to look for the enemy with what ever means at their disposal not to fight for information. MBTs are simply too big and heavy and expensive to squander to recce tasks.

 

[wietze]

*SIGH* You are thinking of the north European plain or the wide open desert, not of Cambodia with it's dense patches of tropical rainforest. The Mini-moke is the ideal vehicle - small, light and easily maneuvered in an around the trees. An MBT is too big, too noisy, to undertake recce work. It would need to smash through the forests. Mini-moke would be in and out before the MBT could even reach the battlefield. It would be limited by the lack of bridges able to handle it's weight. Tanks are useful for fighting battles, not for finding out where the enemy is.

and the competitor of the mini-moke

Citroën Méhari - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

even available (per 1979) as a 4x4

 

[Not James Stockdale]

Under the British Commonwealth tradition the best recce vehicle is equipped with a pair of binoculars to see the enemy first. Their role is to look for the enemy with what ever means at their disposal not to fight for information.

Now I know you are pretending to ignore me because I specifically addressed this point. You may think this is still true, although FRES, Tracer, and Land 400 Phase 2 would seem to disagree, but this was definitely the case with US mechanized cavalry (as opposed to horse cavalry) doctrine in WWII. The reason they were so lightly equipped (M8 armored cars, M3 scout cars, and Jeeps) was because their weapons and armor were only intended for self-defense. The consensus of cavalry officers was that this doctrine was fundamentally unsound and that fighting for information absolutely required.

Normal practice during the war was to reinforce cavalry units with self-propelled howitzers, light tanks, and tank destroyers, and the post-war report also urged an increase in dismounted strength because of issues cavalry units had in forests and urban areas in the Rhineland. This kind of doctrinal question applies regardless of time period or terrain

 

[Sooty]

 

[Rickshaw]

Now I know you are pretending to ignore me because I specifically addressed this point. You may think this is still true, although FRES, Tracer, and Land 400 Phase 2 would seem to disagree, but this was definitely the case with US mechanized cavalry (as opposed to horse cavalry) doctrine in WWII. The reason they were so lightly equipped (M8 armored cars, M3 scout cars, and Jeeps) was because their weapons and armor were only intended for self-defense. The consensus of cavalry officers was that this doctrine was fundamentally unsound and that fighting for information absolutely required.

Normal practice during the war was to reinforce cavalry units with self-propelled howitzers, light tanks, and tank destroyers, and the post-war report also urged an increase in dismounted strength because of issues cavalry units had in forests and urban areas in the Rhineland. This kind of doctrinal question applies regardless of time period or terrain

You are not being ignored. You are the one who is ignoring the context of this scenario. The Cambodians are not facing a top tier Soviet threat, they are facing a Vietnamese threat (indeed the argument could be made they are facing a top tier non-Soviet threat)one based around primarily infantry rather than armour. They are not fighting on the north European plain nor in a desert environment. They are fighting in Cambodia a country puctuated by dense tropical rain forest and rice paddies. Terrain not suited to the rapid movement of 50 tonne MBTs. What they need is something smaller, lighter and more manoeuvrable. Something not bound by bridges which prevent their movement. The US army tried to use vehicles and tactics more suited to the north European plain when it fought in Vietnam. How did that go? Not terribly well from my reading. You need to look at the world outside of the US armies' experience.

 

[Not James Stockdale]

You are not being ignored. You are the one who is ignoring the context of this scenario. The Cambodians are not facing a top tier Soviet threat, they are facing a Vietnamese threat (indeed the argument could be made they are facing a top tier non-Soviet threat)one based around primarily infantry rather than armour. They are not fighting on the north European plain nor in a desert environment. They are fighting in Cambodia a country puctuated by dense tropical rain forest and rice paddies. Terrain not suited to the rapid movement of 50 tonne MBTs. What they need is something smaller, lighter and more manoeuvrable. Something not bound by bridges which prevent their movement. The US army tried to use vehicles and tactics more suited to the north European plain when it fought in Vietnam. How did that go? Not terribly well from my reading. You need to look at the world outside of the US armies' experience.

You specifically mentioned British doctrine, so I responded to that. Trying to drag this back to Cambodia is just more of your weasel words. As I said before, the requirement for cavalry to be able to fight for information is insensitive to time or place. The fact that terrain in Cambodia or Vietnam or Afghanistan or Baghdad will create difficulties does not change that fact. The answer to difficult terrain has always been to increase dismounted strength, but vehicles are still needed to provide the cavalry with enough mobility to be faster than the opposition's main force.

Your mini-moke may be relatively speedy on the road, but no wheeled vehicle, especially with wheels that small, is going to match the off-road maneuverability of a tracked vehicle, and it certainly isn't going to float like an M113 or M114. Remember that the smaller the bridge, the easier it is to destroy. The obvious answer to difficult terrain is helicopters, which have been used extensively in these kinds of situations with very successful tactical results, but that isn't an option for the Cambodians. M113s are going to be plentiful and cheap, and BMPs are an option that would add a lot of firepower. When the US armored cavalry in Vietnam fought with the equipment they wanted, the choice was usually platoons organized with 3 tanks (M48A3s with 90 mm guns), 5 ACAVs (M113s with extra machine guns), 1 M113 with a rifle squad, and an M125 81 mm mortar carrier. The Sheridans replaced Pattons in divisional cavalry squadrons but not in the 11th ACR and the Army tank battalions, and the general consensus was that the Patton was the better option for the situation.

You have accused me of focusing too heavily on US experience several times, but the reality is that, among countries capable of procuring equipment to match a tactical and operational doctrine and not having to match their fighting style to the equipment they could get, only the British and Commonwealth countries decided to maintain cavalry forces designed purely for scouting and equipped only with light vehicles. In NORTHAG and CENTAG, the Dutch, Belgians, Germans, and Americans all had divisional and corps cavalry units equipped with main battle tanks. Only the British were left out. The French assigned a company of light 4x4s (11 vehicles total, including ATGM carriers) for each of their brigades but expected rapid and aggressive use of tanks and mechanized infantry to surround and contain Soviet spearheads, unlike the tactical doctrine preferred by the British. On the other side, the Soviets planned to use tanks as far forward as possible (immediately behind the light scout vehicles), had amphibious vehicles that could cross rivers without waiting for bridging support, and also expected their tank units to be able to conduct submerged river crossings on the march. Soviet tactical doctrine focused on massing combat power as quickly as possible, and there is no form of combat power more mobile than a tank.

 

[Claymore]

@Not James Stockdale , @Rickshaw … Alright enough gents, take a deep breath and relax.

I‘m not sure I care for the use or implications of the term ‘weasel words’ on my thread - a thread that is intended for the open-minded and mature discussion of all things AH AFV without prejudice, or recourse to name calling. I don’t expect everyone to agree with everything that is posted here but I do expect everyone to remain calm and civil in their interactions with each other.

I grow weary of the matter so please refrain from continuing your current conversation here; use the PM facility if you must.

 

[cortz#9]

@Not James Stockdale , @Rickshaw … Alright enough gents, take a deep breath and relax.

I‘m not sure I care for the use or implications of the term ‘weasel words’ on my thread - a thread that is intended for the open-minded and mature discussion of all things AH AFV without prejudice, or recourse to name calling. I don’t expect everyone to agree with everything that is posted here but I do expect everyone to remain calm and civil in their interactions with each other.

I grow weary of the matter so please refrain from continuing your current conversation here; use the PM facility if you must.

Hear hear.

 

[Peebothuhlu]

At work.

Hi @Claymor.

A question and , please humor me if you will.

Ignoring little things like "The suspension is too old" etc.

Which of the three turrets for your M24-JX-V2, V3, V4 might fit on the Puma variant hull you've illustrated?

Am basically looking for a 'Mobile support gun' type vehicle to follow along with the 8×8 transports you've created.

Basically I'm thinking of a 'Reinforcing vehicle' that can be added to a 'Lance' of my cavalry troops to kind of help 'Stiffen' their capabilities when comming up against possible 'Tougher' NPC (Non Player Character, or Game Assest) in the pending adventures.

Much cheers and again much thanks.