I'll go with a POD in November of 1942 when the Russians surround the Germans at Stalingrad. If the Allies are on the ball they will figure out that Russia isn't dead yet and might grab Eastern Europe.
The Allies divert half the aircraft, escort carriers, destroyers, landing craft, shipping, troops, fuel, etc, going to the Pacific and send it to the Atlantic. The Atlantic theatre gets seventy percent instead of forty percent of the Allied munitions production. The Allied force in the Pacific is left with the ability to launch half as many invasions as it had in OTL. The submarine war runs along at full speed, but the island hopping war is considerably slowed down, which means the bombing campaign is also slowed down because we don't have range to Tokyo.
The implications of this is that in June of 1943 the Allies can launch two invasions of Europe. One with the armed forces in North Africa as soon as the Tunis pocket surrenders, and the other with the buildup in Britain. This was the case in OTLin 1944. The Allied landings in Normandy were the hammer for the Allied landings in the south of France as the anvil. Once both landings were in place the Germans faced a pincer move and had to move fast to escape in OTL.
Since the Allies are not pinned down to the Italian front in 1943 like in OTL, the Germans are going to be forced to defend the entire line of the Mediterranean and all the islands at the same time as they are forced to defend the entire coastline of France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. They will be stretched even thinner than in OTL. The Germans were especially worried about attacks on Norway and Greece in OTL because of the importance of the iron ore of Sweden and the oil of Rumania. Assume that the distribution of troops is as wide in this ATL as in OTL. The Germans have to guard against landings everywhere.
Another implication is that the German airforce is going to be in sad shape by the summer of 1943. If you have almost twice as much fighters in a dogfight as the opposition, you shoot down almost four times as many enemy fighters. You shoot them down fast enough and they are going to be fielding less competent fighters who get shot down even faster and the new pilots get even less training before going into combat, and it just gets worse and worse. That's what the Allied concentration on the Pacific did to Japan. Now it's going to happen to Germany instead.
The loss of synfuel plants and aircraft factories and ammunition plants and antiaircraftgun factories will also slow the German response to the air war. You wind up in a sort of death spiral.
German intelligence in Britain was pretty much controlled by the British. But German "white" intelligence was not. The Germans would know that they were in for some serious pain in 1943 and that will lead them to cancel Kursk. They will withdraw first to the Dneiper, and then to the Carpathians. Both lines will be hard for the Russians to take and will bleed them severely. The German generals pleaded not to do Kursk, and they will get their way in this ATL.
In this ATL the Italian government will not be able to demonstrate it's complete incompetence to the extent it did in OTL. The Italian people were irritated by it's inability to fight a war, but infuriated by it's inability to arrange a surrender. Two years of the Allies fighting their way up the Italian peninsula and bombing the northern areas cemented this.
The Italian government will survive the war the way Spain's government did, because it avoided the consequences of supporting the Germans. Not Mussolini and Badoglio as party leaders, of course, but other fascisti in their place as a legitimate party leadership after the war.
When the Allies come ashore at Normandy they will face fewer troops and much less fortifications. I assume that they will be through the bocage on the first day as planned, and in tank country on the other side before the Germans can stop them. The Germans will be switching armor and infantry units to the west by the spring, but not enough to defeat them before they are established in tank country where the Allied logistical and munitions superiority will be dominant. The secondary invasion in the south of France that was so critical in OTL will not be important in this ATL.
The Germans will never come close to being cauldroned as at Falaise in OTL. They will withdraw to the Scheldt and the Westwall in good order, demolishing the bridges of France along the way and doing whatever else occurs to them in the way of reducing the Allied capability to move troops and equipment around. The Allies should not assume that they will have any French railroad equipment available after the Liberation of France, or a working bridge or ferry or overpass or tunnel.
The bad news for the Germans is that the destruction of Hamburg will happen with the Allied air forces in close range of the German cities. The Allies never managed to match the Hamburg firestorm till the closing months of the war at Dresden. In this OTL they will have more aircraft and closer bases while the Germans are still ramping up their nightfighter capability and after they have lost half their radar capability with the loss of France and Belgium. Not to mention the increased capability of the Allies to move fuel and bombs to Europe, and the lower rate of losses with all those French air fields for the Allied aircraft to land on when returning from a raid. Hamburg probably won't happen till September of 1943 just because the planes used in OTL will have other priorities before the invasion and therefor the first Hamburg raid will probably hit a lot harder and do a lot more damage than in OTL.
With the Allies bombing Germany from across the Rhineland and the Russians still outside the Carpathians, there will be considerable pressure for the German leadership to negotiate a surrender to the Allies. Further, the Allies will be aware that Russia is still a formidable power. If Roosevelt dies in 1945 as in OTL then he will be able to dictate peace terms. If he dies in 1944 then Wallace will be president. Neither one will allow the Nazis to escape justice the way that Truman did and the consequence is that the war will continue till January of 1945, except that the airwar will be considerably more difficult for Germany.
Germany will suffer far more civilian casualties in this OTL. Not just the cities, but also the towns will be leveled. Any town or city or factory complex or village railroad junction will be destroyed. Germany will collapse to loss of the railroad net in this OTL purely as a side effect of the total destruction of the urban and suburban and rural concentrations by Allied air power in 1944.
The European Jews had been essentially all murdered by the summer of 1943 in OTL, except for the Hungarian Jews. In this OTL, the Hungarians will still be behind the German lines. As to whether the Hungarians will allow their Jews to be murdered in this ATL, I do not know. In OTL Horthy's son was captured by the Germans and Horthy surrendered the Hungarian forces in return for his release, and the Jews were promptly rounded up and killed. If Horthy's son is not captured in this ATL the Hungarian Jews may survive.
Rumania will have ethnically Rumanian areas between the Dniester and the Carpathians. This may make them more or less likely to negotiate a separate peace. It will not make the Germans less likely to hold their lines because the Germans will have more troops without the losses at Kursk, the armored losses at Kursk, and the troops of the Courland pocket. Those Courland pocket troops will be pulled out because with France and Belgium in Allied hands the airbases to bomb Berlin, etc, will be closer to the south and west than to the north and east. Holding Courland will not offer the Germans any advantages and they will withdraw and redeploy those troops.
