Allied invasion of NW Europe in 1943

Redbeard

Banned
Gremlin said:
With all this talk of logistics - when did the ideas and application of the (Mulberrys?) artifical harbour and the undersea oil line come about?

As I see it without these 2 inventions the Allies would have to chance at seizing a port and as dieppe showed, this wasn't easy.

Neither the Mulberry, nor the pipeline or the specialist engineer vehicles would have been ready for a 1943 invasion, and much less landing capacity would be available.

All in all, even if a significant force was landed and survive on the beach (the Atlantic wall isn't as far) the Germans still can deploy and supply more forces by rail across Europe than the allies can land and supply across the channel. This points to a scenario much worse than just having the initial waves repulsed from the beaches.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
Redbeard said:
Neither the Mulberry, nor the pipeline or the specialist engineer vehicles would have been ready for a 1943 invasion, and much less landing capacity would be available.

All in all, even if a significant force was landed and survive on the beach (the Atlantic wall isn't as far) the Germans still can deploy and supply more forces by rail across Europe than the allies can land and supply across the channel. This points to a scenario much worse than just having the initial waves repulsed from the beaches.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

The book that made me make this post did have answers to this.

The need for an artificial port etc was realised in 1942 (apparently Churchill had suggested something along the lines of it for an attack in WW1) so if construction had started then its possible it would have been ready for 43 (actual Mulberry construction started in 43 for 44).

Same goes for the specialist engineer vehicle - Hobart was first of all sent to the ME as he suggested armoured policies that were against the SOP's for the day then pensioned off in 1940 (he joined the Home Guard) before being brought back into active service in 1942/43.

IIRC, the first flail tank was used at Alemain in 42 in a prototype form so specialist engineer vehicles could have been developed earlier - IF there was a commitment - the key line.

When it was decided to postpone a landing in 43 and make it 44 instead, the priority LC had dropped like a stone, with a commitment, it would have stayed there.

In 43, the German front lines are further east and south so it will take them longer to get then to the beaches.

I'll edit this later on with specific dates from the book and other sources when I get home.

The key line is 'If there had been a commitment to invade in 1943 then all priorities change', its impossible unless there is a commitment to invade in 43 but with one then things will change.
 

Redbeard

Banned
PMN1 said:
The book that made me make this post did have answers to this.

The need for an artificial port etc was realised in 1942 (apparently Churchill had suggested something along the lines of it for an attack in WW1) so if construction had started then its possible it would have been ready for 43 (actual Mulberry construction started in 43 for 44).

Same goes for the specialist engineer vehicle - Hobart was first of all sent to the ME as he suggested armoured policies that were against the SOP's for the day then pensioned off in 1940 (he joined the Home Guard) before being brought back into active service in 1942/43.

IIRC, the first flail tank was used at Alemain in 42 in a prototype form so specialist engineer vehicles could have been developed earlier - IF there was a commitment - the key line.

When it was decided to postpone a landing in 43 and make it 44 instead, the priority LC had dropped like a stone, with a commitment, it would have stayed there.

In 43, the German front lines are further east and south so it will take them longer to get then to the beaches.

I'll edit this later on with specific dates from the book and other sources when I get home.

The key line is 'If there had been a commitment to invade in 1943 then all priorities change', its impossible unless there is a commitment to invade in 43 but with one then things will change.

A Tiger Tank could have been built by 1940 if someone had realised in time that it was necessary and a carrier with 100 torpedo carrying strike aircraft would have been well within technical possibilities by 1918.

In short I'm not impressed by the argument. The invasion wasn't launched by 42 or 43 because the alllies in time (not at least due to Alanbrooke) realised that they were far from ready - and couldn't be before 1944.

And even if Mulberries, pipelines and "Hobarts" had been available the German potential for deploying a counterattack force was much bigger in 1943 than in 1944. Even in 1944 it perhaps was mainly fue to Hitler sleeping that the bridgehead wasn't wiped out by the operational counterattack. In 1944 the best argument for believeing that the bridgehead would hold out is the tremendous airsupremacy of the allies. That wasn't present by 1943 and especially not regarding tactical airsupport. By 1943 tha Germans actually had fuel!

A major invasion scheduled for 1943 can hardly be completely concealed - if that means Citadelle (Kursk) being cancelled - or hold back back until the invasion is a reality, any allied 1943 attempt is doomed - no matter of mulberries etc. It must not be overlooked, that even by late 1944 the German railways were capable of shifting 25 Divisions from the east to the west in a few weeks - unseen by the allies.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard
 
Redbeard said:
A Tiger Tank could have been built by 1940 if someone had realised in time that it was necessary and a carrier with 100 torpedo carrying strike aircraft would have been well within technical possibilities by 1918.

In short I'm not impressed by the argument. The invasion wasn't launched by 42 or 43 because the alllies in time (not at least due to Alanbrooke) realised that they were far from ready - and couldn't be before 1944.

And even if Mulberries, pipelines and "Hobarts" had been available the German potential for deploying a counterattack force was much bigger in 1943 than in 1944. Even in 1944 it perhaps was mainly fue to Hitler sleeping that the bridgehead wasn't wiped out by the operational counterattack. In 1944 the best argument for believeing that the bridgehead would hold out is the tremendous airsupremacy of the allies. That wasn't present by 1943 and especially not regarding tactical airsupport. By 1943 tha Germans actually had fuel!

A major invasion scheduled for 1943 can hardly be completely concealed - if that means Citadelle (Kursk) being cancelled - or hold back back until the invasion is a reality, any allied 1943 attempt is doomed - no matter of mulberries etc. It must not be overlooked, that even by late 1944 the German railways were capable of shifting 25 Divisions from the east to the west in a few weeks - unseen by the allies.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

The book does highlight that it would take a change in priorities on the Allied side - forgetting about bouncing the rubble and concentrating on oil and transportation and we know what that did when it was carried out, an earlier appreciation that daylight unescorted bombing was suicide and of what the Merlin/Mustang could do etc

Also points out that the German units would have had much further to travel east west in 1943 and there would have been less talk of Germany being defeated than there was in late 44.
 
Quick comment before I get back to work...USA strategic warfare required 64 million pounds of supply delievered during 1944 to sustain the aircampaign that dismembered the German economy and prepare the ground for DDay and then march accross Europe.

To do that they had to build atleast 10,000 liberty type ships in 1943 [more than double the historic level when the who Liberty design/building program itself was a hugh mircale ] and have complete domination of the sealanes...to say nothing of having defeated the Luftwaffe. Defeat of the UBoat fleet before 1943 requires earlier Enigma cracking.

Not saying it can't be done , but this is a tall order to expect of an armed forces that a mere 14-16 months before had be jolted out of peace into War by Pearl Harbour. It takes most war economys 1-2 years to get up to speed.
 
Got back home....

Artificial harbours first came to Eisenhowers attention spring 1942 at a Combined Operations - according the Eisenhower, the proposal by Mountbatten was greeted with hoots an laughter (I'm fairly sure i've seen this said in Carlo D'Este's Eisenhower but I dont have the book on hand at the moment). Churchill is supposed to have had the idea of a floating harbour as part of a plan to occupy the Fresien Island in 1917 but I haven't found any other referenece to back that up.

Hobart was sent to North Africa in 1938 but retired in 1940, then recalled back to active servcie the next year but is wasn't until early 43 that he took charge of the division to produce the experimental vehicles needed. Matildas had been modified into Scorpian flail tanks in time for use at Alemain.
 
That line is from a recent BBC documentary 'The Warlords', a 3 part series talking about Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin, I haven't heard it mentioned elsewhere but from waht i've read i get the impression Roosevelt was quite prepared to give Stalin what he wanted.

From ‘Warlords, the heart of conflict 1939 – 1945’ by Simon Berthon and Joanna Potts.

Page 131

But as the war ground on, Churchill began to see a new threat to Europe – the man who had become the third ally in the fight against Hitler, Joseph Stalin. In late 1942 he told Anthony Eden: ‘It would be a measureless disaster if Russian barbarianism overlaid the ancient state of Europe.’

Roosevelt thought otherwise. As far as he was concerned, the cause of war in the first place was the in fighting between Europe’s ancient, imperialist nations and he began to see in Stalin someone who would help him in his great cause of freeing the world of that Imperialism. Also in 1942, in a conversation with the Roman Catholic Archbishop of New York, he remarked: ‘The European people will simply have to endure Russian domination in the hope that – in ten or 20 years – the European influence will bring the Russians to become less barbarous.’


This is taken from ‘The Roosevelt Letters: Being the Personnel Correspondence of Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Vol.3: 1928 – 1945.
 
Guys

I think Calbear mentioned the key problem, i.e. logistics. [As have a few others]. Even if you presume that several key decisions are made differently and various, powerful, vested interests are overcome it is going to be a hell of a gamble trying a French invasion in 43. The US will not have anything like the number of trained troops and without the fighting in Italy a lot less experience. More to the point how will they ship them to Britain and the supplies to support them. Someone made a comment about the US shipping a lot of non-munitions to Britain. That is quite accurate. However what was shipped was the food to feed the population and raw materials for Britain's industries - which by this time meant war production. If you think that Britain can be the base for an invasion of France while the population is dying or starvation or war production has been crippled by shortages of raw materials then there's something way wrong with your understanding of the war.

This factor has been discussed in a lot of detail on a naval site I'm a member of. Apart from a couple of people who think otherwise the general view is it simply wouldn't work. Arguably a fair amount could have been freed up if the US had been willing to listen to advice on organising shipping more efficiently. Even so the most learned people there, who know a lot, lot more than me think it wouldn't be possible to organise and support the invasion with any hope of success.

This ignores as mentioned that the U boats were only really defeated in the spring of 43. They could have been defeated earlier but that would have needed changes in decisions some time before mid-42. Difficult anyway to advance it much during the winter months when the weather helped the U boats.

The Germans were in a much better military state in 43 and possibly even more importantly their transport system was a lot better. If you think how many tons of bombs were dropped on northern and eastern France in 44 and most of that wouldn't have been possible a year earlier as less planes and less equipment would have been available. Not to mention the skills and experience to use the techniques being developed. This was also the problem with the panacea target approach. Given the right decisions and a lot of luck a lot more damage might have been done to the German economy and war machine. However we lacked a lot of the tools, such as the long ranged fighters, earlier along with much bitter debate over the target. I don't think even under the best of assumptions we could have pounded the French transport system and damaged their oil supply say. Without both then the N European railway system can ship reinforcements to the front a lot quicker than the allies can land them, even in 44. And in 43 the Germans have a lot more troops available for the mission. Don't forget that in OTL it was only a highly efficient espionage operation persuading Hitler that the Normandy landings were a feint that stopped a lot more German troops arriving while the allies were tied up in the bridgeheads.

Furthermore, without the intensive bombing of the German cities, supported by long ranged fighters that would not have been available earlier in suitable numbers, the Luftwaffe would have been much stronger. As Calbear said there was no way any invasion would have been risked without overwhelming control of the air.

I also think the idea of so much less in the Med is very risky. You may not get an Italian surrender, which would not only mean Italian troops holding ground in the Balkans, but free up sizeable forces from the historical Italian front. True the Germans would have to cover against some landings but its difficult to see them being as much as were tied up historically, with garrisons over much of the area and a major campaign in Italy. Given that the terrain and rail networks make it more difficult to switch forces between the south than either east or west it was very useful having the Germans tied down in those areas.

Also the basic assumption that a successful 43 invasion of France would leave the western powers in control of virtually all of Germany is way off. As someone said early on the Nazis are not going to bitterly defending the Carpathians from the Red Army while western troops are fighting their way through Berlin. A successful 43 landing, highly unlikely as it is, will see an higher priority given to the west by the Germans. The border might be moved a little east but not by very much even without politics intervening. With Britain physically and morally exhausted and Roosevelt uninterested Poland will be under Soviet control as will Bohemia. There is a chance you might save a bit more of the Balkans but highly unlikely with more Soviet forces available and the western allies not even making any gestures towards the region. Furthermore the markedly higher butcher's bill the western allies will pay, even if we don't get drawn into a battle for Berlin, will leave the west weaker, both materially and psychologically.

Steve
 
The invasion of Europe could not even be considered until Allied Air superiority (if not supremacy) was in hand. By 6/44 the Allies had established complete control of the airspace over the Channel and most of France. An invasion before the Allies had this advantage was unthinkable.
That's a really important point, but I think it raises a couple of others, including the most important, & often overlooked, one. First, if air supremacy is a must, a/c production might need to change. That, in turn, demands changes to Bomber Command policy (unlikely, given Harris, but not impossible in the overriding Allied interest). And that, in turn, offers an opportunity to Coastal Command to get more aircraft. (Diversions don't need to be nearly so big as wkwillis presumes: just 3-4 lousy squadrons of VLR Liberators in NF in '42!) Which brings me to the #1 issue: troop strengths. By May '43, the mooted time, did the Allies have enough manpower in Europe to successfully achieve Neptune? If not, it might be necessary to get more Coastal Command aircraft much sooner, to enable the troop buildup to succeed. This is balanced by the reduced demand for shipping to supply the troops (& civilians!) after an Italian invasion...
More to the point how will they ship them to Britain and the supplies to support them. Someone made a comment about the US shipping a lot of non-munitions to Britain. That is quite accurate. However what was shipped was the food to feed the population and raw materials for Britain's industries - which by this time meant war production. If you think that Britain can be the base for an invasion of France while the population is dying or starvation or war production has been crippled by shortages of raw materials then there's something way wrong with your understanding of the war.
True, except for one thing: AUS was getting about double the weight of supply/man as B.A., & about half of that was simply being thrown away or not used....
This ignores as mentioned that the U boats were only really defeated in the spring of 43. They could have been defeated earlier but that would have needed changes in decisions some time before mid-42. Difficult anyway to advance it much during the winter months when the weather helped the U boats.
Presuming the decision to go is made in time, the change with the biggest impact, as noted, is dead easy. (Fire Harris?:p)
If you think how many tons of bombs were dropped on northern and eastern France in 44 and most of that wouldn't have been possible a year earlier as less planes and less equipment would have been available.
I have to disagree. A lot could've been diverted (as OTL) from fruitless bombing of German cities.
This was also the problem with the panacea target approach.
Some of Harris' resistance was due to being denied the Ultra showing how bad the fuel situation was for Germany.
Given the right decisions and a lot of luck a lot more damage might have been done to the German economy and war machine. However we lacked a lot of the tools, such as the long ranged fighters
I agree on the first. More use of air-laid mines bombing of canals could've had serious impacts on German transportation of parts &, more important, coal to powerstations. I disagree on fighters: it was possible to execute minelaying missions with nearly zero losses; the missions were so low hazard, they were used for crew training...
Don't forget that in OTL it was only a highly efficient espionage operation persuading Hitler that the Normandy landings were a feint that stopped a lot more German troops arriving while the allies were tied up in the bridgeheads.
The XX Committee was up & running early in the war; if the decision was taken to go 5/43, the turned German agents would've put out disinformation just as they did.
Furthermore, without the intensive bombing of the German cities, supported by long ranged fighters that would not have been available earlier in suitable numbers, the Luftwaffe would have been much stronger. As Calbear said there was no way any invasion would have been risked without overwhelming control of the air.
I don't see the connection. Local air superiority was possible without bombing or LR fighters.
I also think the idea of so much less in the Med is very risky. You may not get an Italian surrender, which would not only mean Italian troops holding ground in the Balkans, but free up sizeable forces from the historical Italian front.
Fall of Sicily gets Italian surrender, just as OTL, & no mainland invasion frees more Allied troops than German, plus shipping (as noted).
True the Germans would have to cover against some landings but its difficult to see them being as much as were tied up historically, with garrisons over much of the area and a major campaign in Italy.
Hitler was convinced, with some help from the Brits (Operation Mincemeat), of an intended invasion in the Balkans.

Furthermore, I doubt the Germans could move forces out of Italy, given a hostile population... And, do the Allies give Italian POWs the option to join them invading Normandy? Also, as Grigg points out, what was the sense of crushing the Tunis pocket, rather than just choking it off? How long did that waste? 2mo?
As for the Pacific war, the earlier commitment to NW Europe means less commitment to the Pacific, however, I think it really only means means less LC's so does that mean MacArthur's drive is restricted while the USN drive through the central Pacific carries on, the Essex's etc construction programme is not going to be afftected that much if at all as the material is already going to be allocated.
I have to disagree there'd be no changes; LCs were lowered in priority when it looked like the invasion would be later, & IIRC, the Essexes (or CVEs) bumped up (leading to a ridiculous #CVs in PTO, IMO). If it's looking like mid-'43, LCs keep higher priority. Also, with no Italian invasion after Sicily, there are more anyhow, so it's likely IMO Dragoon & Neptune go off similitaneously, as planned.

I agree MacArthur's going to get less, but that means FDR has to decide on a 1-road strategy; assuming he goes for CPac, & tells Dougie, "Sorry, you'll have to bypass P.I.", the U.S. gets to Okinawa/Iwo at least 5mo sooner (no P.I. delay), plus they're easier to take (not reinforced by troops who were destined for P.I. but didn't arrive due to Sub Force interdiction:cool:), so take, what a month or 2 off? Bypass Peleiliu [sp?], maybe another month. B-29s begin burning Japan a couple months sooner, probably. And Japan starts looking for a surrender 5-8mo sooner, while FDR's still alive, not while HST's just taking over...

One other ish might get addressed that wasn't OTL: the wastage of shipping in PTO due to slow unloading. Hulls swung at anchor for extended periods (days; IIRC, even weeks), so the total amount of shipping used was way above what should've been needed...
Tanks & trucks don't run very well without fuel, this delayed the allies during a critical period that MIGHT have made the "Dash to Berlin" possible.
IMO, that was a product of "target fixation" on Berlin (& implicit in it, ending the war), & the squabbling between Monty & Patton, which IMO had Ike too distracted playing referee. Monty, the supposed genius, couldn't see the obvious: to use Antwerp, the Scheldt had to be cleared, which could've been done with a couple of battalions in early September OTL. Also, in '44 OTL, IMO, there's some sense of B.A. exhaustion, from being at war so long; in '43, less so, so maybe there'd be a bit more boldness tactically, & a bit clearer vision. Maybe the breakout from Gold/Juno/Sword into Caen happens a tick sooner, maybe Monty realizes clearing the Channel ports is a futile exercise (it's not like the Germans aren't going to blow them up), so maybe he has the wit to send Andy McNaughton fulllbore into Antwerp/Scheldt (maybe Simonds can get him to persuade Monty?) in June/July '43 (assuming May '43 Neptune) & the dash to Germany doesn't stall for lack of fuel... (Of course, it didn't help the Red/White Ball drivers didn't have 10 tonners, 'cause planners didn't expect to need them...:confused:)
what does having Cherbourg open for business sooner do for the supply situation?
I doubt you get Cherbourg open soon enough to change much. IMO, Antwerp was the biggie, if the Allies could get there, & clear the estuary, soon enough...
I'd have to say that the prognosis that the Russians would just move west faster in this timeline seems more accurate.
It is, but for an overlooked reason: Germany used France as a training area. Take it away, reinforcements to EFront are lessened, & Red Army moves faster. Into Germany? Maybe not: May '43, Red Army was still well behind its prewar borders...
The Germans will never come close to being cauldroned as at Falaise in OTL. They will withdraw to the Scheldt and the Westwall in good order, demolishing the bridges of France along the way and doing whatever else occurs to them in the way of reducing the Allied capability to move troops and equipment around.
Why? Hitler's less of a nitwit TTL? He ordered von Kluge to attack, & von Kluge dutifully went into the trap, sprung 'cause the Allies (thanks to BP) knew he was coming... And if the Allies are doing so well early, why doesn't their success continue as OTL? In fact, why don't they do better TTL?
Defeat of the UBoat fleet before 1943 requires earlier Enigma cracking.
Actually not. As noted, a handful of VFR squadrons in NF & Iceland'd do it. You don't need to read the contents, just DF a message near a convoy, presume it's a U-boat & figure it's liable to mean lots more where that came from pretty soon. The importance of breaking KM Enigma is overstated.
 
I to have read the Griggs' book - which at the very least is thought-provoking.

But when we think of a '43 D-Day - it surely doesn't have to be in the spring e.g. May or June, although such a timing may add complications with weather and sea state - early September can't be ignored.

Problems in OTL were an other confidence on the part of the US - Marshal etc, with an initial wish for an invasion in '42. Events in Kasserine Pass showed British caution, wasn't misplaced.
Trouble was - from then on, it was suspicion on the part of the US on British motives for the 'delay' and for more action in the Med.
This 'trouble' meant that the decision to invade Sicily wasn't made until after the North-African campaign was over. The decision to invade the mainland of Italy wasn't made until the Battle of Sicily was over! All these decision delays cost time - and lives.
Whether the W. Allies could've invaded Sicilly before Tunis was captured, is debatable. But the planning for it, could have been done earlier.
Moreover, the gap between Sicily & Italy invasions need only be weeks! When Germans have been sucked into the Island invade the Mainand and cut them off.
Time thus saved in the Med, may just may allow options for Northern-France.
 

burmafrd

Banned
My question is why do you have to invade NORTHERN France? Instead invade SOUTHERN France.After you take Sicily you invade there instead of Italy. Weather is MUCH better. German forces are very weak in Southern France.
 

Markus

Banned
In his book '1943, the victory that never was', John Grigg suggests that with changes in policy and comitments (plus the moving of some commanders to other posts), the Allied invasion of North West Europe could have been launched successfully in 1943.



Sounds most dubious for you need:

-air superiority
-secure SLOCs
-sufficient ground troops


Air superiority and SLOCS are not the biggest problems. But numerically it´s mostly a zero sum game. If the Allies don´t invade NA and Italy and send the troops to the UK the Germans will not send theirs to NA and Italy either, but into France. And in NA and Italy the Germans had actually good troops, a lot better than the 2nd and 3rd rate units that were stationed in Normandy, Italy will still be in the war and their troops need (edit)not to be replaced, while the US ground troops still had some leanring to do in 43.

By the way, without mulberries, LSTs and so on available in sufficient numbers in 1943 the invasion is in deep trouble. The Germans could do logistics too. Any invasion force that does not take a port ASAP would not be able to be reinforced faster than the defenders and thus be defeated. So by 1942 fortifying the ports had already begun(see Dieppe raid).
 
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Sounds most dubious for you need:

-air superiority
-secure SLOCs
-sufficient ground troops


Air superiority and SLOCS are not the biggest problems. But numerically it´s mostly a zero sum game. If the Allies don´t invade NA and Italy and send the troops to the UK the Germans will not send theirs to NA and Italy either, but into France. And in NA and Italy the Germans had actually good troops, a lot better than the 2nd and 3rd rate units that were stationed in Normandy, Italy will still be in the war and their troops need to be replaced, while the US ground troops still had some leanring to do in 43.

By the way, without mulberries, LSTs and so on available in sufficient numbers in 1943 the invasion is in deep trouble. The Germans could do logistics too. Any invasion force that does not take a port ASAP would not be able to be reinforced faster than the defenders and thus be defeated. So by 1942 fortifying the ports had already begun(see Dieppe raid).

Well, with Mulberries, Churchill had proposed an artificial harbour in July 1917 as part of a plan to occupy the Frisian Islands -he proposed concrete caissons towed across and sunk to form an artificial atoll to produce a weather and torpedo proof harbour. He also saw the caissons as being tie-up points for destroyers and platforms for aircraft to land and take off on.

With shipping there were at least the same number of divisions afloat at the start for Husky as for Overlord.

All the components do appear to have been there, but it would take an earlier commitment to 'go' for 1943 to get them in place in time - this is something Grieg emphasizes time and time again. This would require the sacking of some individuals - Harris and the other Bomber Barons for a start.
 
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Markus

Banned
Well, with Mulberries, Churchill had proposed an artificial harbour in July 1917 as part of a plan to occupy the Frisian Islands.

Unless one was ready in mid-43 its a moot point. Off course one side can make everything right all the time and ASAP, but that would be utterly unrealistic. Aynway its a moot point. see below


All the components do appear to have been there,...
Like i said, in 43 the Germans can counter any move you make, in mid-44 the combined effect of the eastern, african, and italian and balkan fronts meant they could not.

Not invading NA and Italy would immensly benefit the Germans as they can concentrate a bigger number of troops of a higher quality on a much smaller area. Invading France in 43 would make it even worse.
Time works for the Allies. They can raise many more new divisions, force the enemy to disperse its troops along an ever wider front until his lines are overstretched and can be broken easily.

In case the intention is to prevent the USSR from "liberating" too much of Europe, what about not dallying and bungling after the invasion? Avoiding the collosal fuck-ups at Falaise and the Bulge would be 100 times simpler and safer than a 43 invasion and they could shorten the war by half a year or more.
 
There several time mentioned, that the Germans were stronger in 1943. I don´t think so. As far as I know, the Wehrmacht had in summer 1943 less then 5000 tanks. In the West some units were still equipped with Panzer II. In summer 1944 they had 8000 tanks, all modern models. 1943 Speers "Rüstungswunder" was still in the beginning and the gros of the new material went to "Operation Zitadelle". So we have no Atlantikwall and units with Panzer II in the West. Won´t stop the Allies from formimg a Bridgehead. And if they can send reserves from the Eastern front (if they can) its to late. Even in Italy, against a much more weaker landingsforce, the ´Wehrmacht couldn´t throw the Allies back in the sea. Wouldn´t work in France either.
 
My question is why do you have to invade NORTHERN France? Instead invade SOUTHERN France.After you take Sicily you invade there instead of Italy. Weather is MUCH better. German forces are very weak in Southern France.

Not likely, the Allies as the Germans guessed landed next on the bay of Naples - Salerno. There was an idea to drop the 82nd Airborne on Rome, but that didn't happen - thank goodness! Why - simple - air power.

I think Mountbatten wanted Sardinia rather than Sicilly, but then how many airfields on Sardinia in comparison to Sicilly!?

IMO an alternative - would've been to go up the east coast of Italy - Taranto/Brindisi - with a limited objective of the Foggia airfields, and isolating off communications from cut off Germans in the South-west. While, conducting an island hopping campaign - Sicilly, Sardinia, Corsica. This leaves the Germans in a total state of confusion - where will the Allies strike next - Northern Italy, Southern France or Jugoslavia?
 
Germans will not send theirs to NA and Italy either, but into France.
At a time when manpower was desperately short in Russia?:confused: Why do you think France was garrisoned by the old, ill, & (ex?)-POWs? 'cause the good troops were in Russia, busy getting killed...
 
Unless one was ready in mid-43 its a moot point. Off course one side can make everything right all the time and ASAP, but that would be utterly unrealistic. Aynway its a moot point. see below

How about Op Torch + Roundup? One point everyone has passed by is that Op Overlord was not succesful by chance, it was succesful by completely outclassing the opponent. Op Overlord -scale invasion is not necessary for a complete success, it could have been done with much less resources.

Not invading NA and Italy would immensly benefit the Germans as they can concentrate a bigger number of troops of a higher quality on a much smaller area. Invading France in 43 would make it even worse. Time works for the Allies. They can raise many more new divisions, force the enemy to disperse its troops along an ever wider front until his lines are overstretched and can be broken easily.

Not so clearly. Normandy area could be made airtight even by 1943 correlation of air forces and the interdiction against German troop movements would be about as bad. As for the weapon wankery, one has also to consider that in 1943 the German quality in many areas of tactical weapons wasn't as good as in 1944. For example, Panzerfaust was just being introduced, no Panzerschreck yet, much less 75-88mm AT capability, Panthers waiting to fall apart etc...

One has to consider one thing: interior line advantage was not so clearly with Germany yet. In summer of 1943 the distance via (2008) road network from Ruhr to Cherbourg was 650km's. From Ruhr to Napoli some 1250km's, from Ruhr to Kursk about 2000km's. In summer of 1944, for some odd reasons, the distances and thus lengths of strategic redeployments were smaller.

Finally there's the supposed ability of Germans to throw back the Allied invasion to the sea. Already by 1943 Allied air and naval support would be tremendous so I really doubt it. The 1942 Dieppe isn't a good example, as one must remember that the operation was botched and much was learned from it. It must be remembered that in Salerno landings of September 1943 Germans were unable to do it despite much better force ratio (Six panzer/PG divisions, one parachute divisions) available virtually at the outset of the battle against the 8 divisions of 5th Army.

In case of 1943 Normandy landings there would most likely be strategic surprise as was the case in even in 1944 after it was certain that the Allies would land, which would mean that any German reinforcements would take days before they could reach the landing area. In the best case of maskirovka the mobile units would be in Italy and Kursk with the only mobile units in the West being the units in forming phase as in OTL.
 

Markus

Banned
At a time when manpower was desperately short in Russia?:confused: Why do you think France was garrisoned by the old, ill, & (ex?)-POWs? 'cause the good troops were in Russia, busy getting killed...

If there is a massive troop buildup in the UK, there will be a troop buildup in France. And hey, the 352nd was a second rate division and they did quite ok against the Americans.
 
Finally there's the supposed ability of Germans to throw back the Allied invasion to the sea. Already by 1943 Allied air and naval support would be tremendous so I really doubt it. The 1942 Dieppe isn't a good example, as one must remember that the operation was botched and much was learned from it. It must be remembered that in Salerno landings of September 1943 Germans were unable to do it despite much better force ratio (Six panzer/PG divisions, one parachute divisions) available virtually at the outset of the battle against the 8 divisions of 5th Army.
Don't forget Anzio, where even 5" DD guns were crucial in the early survival of the beachhead, blowing the crap out of panzers. If 5" could do it, surely 12", 14", & 16" could at Normandy...
 
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