AHQ: U-boat sinking rate to achieve victory?

I checked my sources BD. ENDIT.
But why did your sources state there were 2 attacks on U-480 when there was clearly only 1?
And your ambush minefield claim is also incorrect.
How did the RN know that U-480 was headed towards that exact spot?
Because if they knew U-480's position then they would hunt it with ASW ships and planes, not plant a minefield.
U-480 simply blundered into a random minefield while looking for targets of Portsmouth.
There was no ambush involved and the RN did not know where U-480 was homeported, otherwise it would have destroyed U-480 as it left the harbor in Norway.

And thus, this is proof that the Alberich system was a success, as long the the glue kept the tiles on the sub.
 
I checked my sources BD. Ambush minefield is still an ambush minefield. And here is why it was laid.






NOW WHY DO YOU SUPPOSE THE BRITISH PUT THE AMBUSH MINEFIELD THERE? (2nd attack) Look at the maps.


From the very wiki article I cited.

As for the anechoic tile?



ENDIT.
An ambush means that you have to know the enemy is headed to your ambush spot.
How do we know that the minefield was specifically laid for U-480?
There were other U-boats in the Channel at the time.

The RN just got luck when U-480 was sunk.
It was it's 3rd patrol.
Why didn't the "ambush minefield" work on it's second patrol then?
Because the RN didn't know anything about U-480, only that U-boats were active in the Channel and they were sinking ships.

And you literally just contradicted yourself when you said U-480 was attacked twice.
The source you cited about U-480 is the same one as mine, which clearly stated it was only attacked once.
 
We are steering off topic... Although the rubber coating may be nice to have, it will not solve the main problem the Germans faced in the early years of the Battle of the Atlantic.
The Germans simply lacked numbers at the beginning of the war to put adequate pressure on Great Britain. They also lacked efficient recon planes and they lost sizable amounts of subs to aircraft action. Rubber coating may be good at later stages of the war to fend off hordes of Allied destroyers / corvettes when operating underwater.
In 1940-1941 (and these are the two years the Germans have a chance to win the war of the Atlantic!), U-boats mainly operated in the surface, went underwater only partly, mostly to evade attacks by planes and ships or remain undetected. The killing was mostly done by semi-submerged boats operating at night (the Allies did not have good radar on their ships yet!). Rubber coating in 1940 will certainly not win the war for them.
 
An ambush means that you have to know the enemy is headed to your ambush spot.
Noticed where that idiot, Hans-Joachim Förster, kept going? Hunter ambush trick is to watch your prey, notice his repetitive behavior and then trap him. It is how the U-boat war was fought. I'll have something to say about this in a bit.
How do we know that the minefield was specifically laid for U-480?
It was laid to kill idiots like Hans-Joachim Förster.
There were other U-boats in the Channel at the time.
They didn't blunder into that minefield.
The RN just got luck when U-480 was sunk.
Predictive behavior is not luck.
It was it's 3rd patrol.
It was Hans-Joachim Förster's third visit to the same area and indicated he had fixated on it. The British played the %s as you do in U-boat warfare and they won.

Why didn't the "ambush minefield" work on it's second patrol then?
%s. it takes time to establish a pattern. Three patrols and the RN HAD the pattern.

Because the RN didn't know anything about U-480, only that U-boats were active in the Channel and they were sinking ships.
Nope. They knew they had a specific U-boat that liked to hunt near that patch of ocean.
And you literally just contradicted yourself when you said U-480 was attacked twice.
The source you cited about U-480 is the same one as mine, which clearly stated it was only attacked once.
An ambush minefield is "an attack".

Your case has just been demolished. ENDIT, and this time it sticks. No further communication from me on this subject.
 
We are steering off topic... Although the rubber coating may be nice to have, it will not solve the main problem the Germans faced in the early years of the Battle of the Atlantic.
The Germans simply lacked numbers at the beginning of the war to put adequate pressure on Great Britain. They also lacked efficient recon planes and they lost sizable amounts of subs to aircraft action. Rubber coating may be good at later stages of the war to fend off hordes of Allied destroyers / corvettes when operating underwater.
In 1940-1941 (and these are the two years the Germans have a chance to win the war of the Atlantic!), U-boats mainly operated in the surface, went underwater only partly, mostly to evade attacks by planes and ships or remain undetected. The killing was mostly done by semi-submerged boats operating at night (the Allies did not have good radar on their ships yet!). Rubber coating in 1940 will certainly not win the war for them.
The coating could have been placed on a percentage of submarines that were used to attack convoys while the rest (the none coated ones) attacked lone unescorted merchants in more remote areas. The coating would improve a U-boat's ability to remain hidden and escape the escorts after an attack.
Or maybe target the escorts themselves.
I think having some U-flaks at the start of the war would give the Allies a nasty surprise too, though it would only be for a short amount of time.
 
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Noticed where that idiot, Hans-Joachim Förster, kept going? Hunter ambush trick is to watch your prey, notice his repetitive behavior and then trap him. It is how the U-boat war was fought. I'll have something to say about this in a bit.


It was laid to kill idiots like Hans-Joachim Förster.

They didn't blunder into that minefield.

Predictive behavior is not luck.

It was Hans-Joachim Förster's third visit to the same area and indicated he had fixated on it. The British played the %s as you do in U-boat warfare and they won.


%s. it takes time to establish a pattern. Three patrols and the RN HAD the pattern.


Nope. They knew they had a specific U-boat that liked to hunt near that patch of ocean.

An ambush minefield is "an attack".

Your case has just been demolished. ENDIT, and this time it sticks. No further communication from me on this subject.
That's just your interpretation of the subject.
But whatever, to each their own.
I agree that this discussion is at an end.
 
The coating could have been placed on a percentage of submarines that were used to attack convoys while the rest (the none coated ones) attacked lone unescorted merchants in more remote areas. The coating would improve a U-boat's ability to remain hidden and escape the escorts after an attack.
Or maybe target the escorts themselves.
I think having some U-flaks at the start of the war would give the Allies a nasty surprise too, though it would only be for a short amount of time.
In theory, yes. In practice, no.
The BdU sent out subs as soon as they were ready to predefined patrol areas. Once a convoy was spotted, all available boats within range were steered in. The BdU did not send out UXXX to go and attack convoy HX-XX, that information was not available at the time the UXXX left its base.
 
In theory, yes. In practice, no.
The BdU sent out subs as soon as they were ready to predefined patrol areas. Once a convoy was spotted, all available boats within range were steered in. The BdU did not send out UXXX to go and attack convoy HX-XX, that information was not available at the time the UXXX left its base.
That's why the Kriegsmarine needed a dedicated marine patrol plane, probably powered by diesel engines and with drop tanks to extend range.
These naval AWACS planes can guide subs to convoys and lone merchants while staying at a safe altitude.
 
As Mulligan noted in his book on Henke, two thirds of U-boats failed to make a single successful attack. Already by late '42 there was a significant increase in the number of unproductive patrols, especially among VIIs.
I'd be interested in knowing why there were so many dry patrols, & if that rate increased as the war went on. (I'd bet it did.)
As soon as Germany makes a concentrated effort then oil tankers will be positioned at the centre of all convoys and it will essentially be impossible to get a hit on a tanker.
That does seem likely... I'd wonder if it was possible doing that would have a detrimental effect on Britain's war production, thanks to delivery delays.
their operations in the Caribbean were a missed opportunity
That was my thinking exactly.
highlights the fact they did not have auxiliary cruisers in numbers or coordinated with u-boat operations
Lack of co-ordination was a persistent bugaboo... :rolleyes:
 
A study done by a German Historian post WW2 identified how many convoys were detected and how many of those were attacked. The percentage detected was in the low double digits - if I remember correctly - and the percentage of those actually attacked even lower. Based on this the following comes to mind:
  1. Establish an operational research organisation including but not limited to civilian specialists as well as serving sub-mariners.
  2. Operational research - not only conduct it, use the results.
  3. Navy purchased and controlled search aircraft (I know - almost ASB).
  4. Naval officers involved in intelligence gathering at places like Algerciras - Spain. Photos of escort vessels taken from there had the background removed and in doing so removed evidence of High Frequency Direction Finding equipment.
And anything else that increases the number of convoys detected and attacked,
 
A study done by a German Historian post WW2 identified how many convoys were detected and how many of those were attacked. The percentage detected was in the low double digits - if I remember correctly - and the percentage of those actually attacked even lower. Based on this the following comes to mind:
  1. Establish an operational research organisation including but not limited to civilian specialists as well as serving sub-mariners.
  2. Operational research - not only conduct it, use the results.
  3. Navy purchased and controlled search aircraft (I know - almost ASB).
  4. Naval officers involved in intelligence gathering at places like Algerciras - Spain. Photos of escort vessels taken from there had the background removed and in doing so removed evidence of High Frequency Direction Finding equipment.
And anything else that increases the number of convoys detected and attacked
Those are good ideas, except for one thing: the presumption that attacks on convoys are the only option. Attacks on single ships are safer & (for the duration OTL) more commonplace. How can those be increased? (I do like the idea of reporting agents in foreign ports, but that increases Enigma traffic, which isn't good for Germany.)

Ops research is an angle I hadn't thought of; that could very well increase the number of contacts.

How "talkative" were solo-sailing merchantmen? Could they be detected & tracked by a U-boat-borne DF set? (Yes, I know, that presupposes BdU would even believe that could be done, which OTL didn't happen.:rolleyes: ) It would work against convoys...
 
One should also look at the whole picture, apart from what the Kriegsmarine and especially the BdU could do.
A concentrated effort by the Luftwaffe to attack and effectively burn down the docks at Liverpool would considerable hinder Great Britains ability to resupply.
Compared to the carpet bombing of London, this effort would aid the War of the Atlantic a lot more.
If you can't kill all the merchants destroy the infrastructure necessary to offload them.
 
I'd be interested in knowing why there were so many dry patrols, & if that rate increased as the war went on. (I'd bet it did.)
Yes, again, especially among VIIs. There were a number of factors such as the inexperience of many crews manning new boats. Bad weather hindered many operations such as those against SC 123 and HX 230. The most important factors, though, were improved allied defenses and intelligence. Many convoys evaded u-boat patrol lines and even some which didn't, like SC130, were so well protected they didn't lose a single ship.
 
One should also look at the whole picture, apart from what the Kriegsmarine and especially the BdU could do.
A concentrated effort by the Luftwaffe to attack and effectively burn down the docks at Liverpool would considerable hinder Great Britains ability to resupply.
Compared to the carpet bombing of London, this effort would aid the War of the Atlantic a lot more.
If you can't kill all the merchants destroy the infrastructure necessary to offload them.
The Luftwaffe was not strong enough to do this. Other west coast ports were available also.

And, as the RAF found out in the "battle of Berlin" , concentrating air raids on a single target makes it easier for the defence to blunt the offensive. Bear in mind the need to keep the Luftwaffe up to strength for Barbarossa.
 
I remain unconvinced about the wonders of rubber tiles on U-boats.
The RN, which was always very keen on quiet subs) didn't bother with them until a long time after the war (70's, iirc). If they'd been so useful, they'd have been used. Even now, look at a sub coming back off patrol - even with modern adhesives, a lot of the tiles are missing
 
I remain unconvinced about the wonders of rubber tiles on U-boats….Even now, look at a sub coming back off patrol - even with modern adhesives, a lot of the tiles are missing

Considering the terrible poundings (from storms and ordinance) U-boats endured in the North Atlantic, I wonder if any would've stayed put.
 
I'm also skeptical about the more and better aircraft for the Germans being anything more than a short term benefit. That will just prompt the Allies to hasten their efforts to get air cover over the convoys.
 
Considering the terrible poundings (from storms and ordinance) U-boats endured in the North Atlantic, I wonder if any would've stayed put.
Actually conditions are much BETTER for a modern boat. The nukes pretty much stay submerged, no nasty North Atlantic surface wave action to scrape tiles off
 
I remain unconvinced about the wonders of rubber tiles on U-boats.
The RN, which was always very keen on quiet subs) didn't bother with them until a long time after the war (70's, iirc). If they'd been so useful, they'd have been used. Even now, look at a sub coming back off patrol - even with modern adhesives, a lot of the tiles are missing
They were used, but by the time the Germans figured out how to make the tiles stick for long enough it was already 1944 and the noose was tightening on Germany's neck.
I think those tiles would be more useful on U-boats operating in the Med and South Atlantic, Med especially.
 
not to wade into middle of a duel but I've seen footnotes that the rubber matting was at least planned for Type XXIII boats, which actually seems a more appropriate sized project?
I remain unconvinced about the wonders of rubber tiles on U-boats.
The RN, which was always very keen on quiet subs) didn't bother with them until a long time after the war (70's, iirc). If they'd been so useful, they'd have been used. Even now, look at a sub coming back off patrol - even with modern adhesives, a lot of the tiles are missing
do you think it would be a more productive exercise to attempt on smaller boats? less area (of the vessel) to cover, less time on patrol before they could be examined.

of course even building "coastal" boats (maybe a bit of misnomer since Type II & Type XXIII had thousands of miles range) would be viewed as defeatist?
 
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