AHQ: U-boat sinking rate to achieve victory?

[BlackDragon98]

For the Liberty/Victory ships, that proved possible. For U-boats, I'm not sure it could be, ever. Even allowing stockpiles of engines, torpedo tubes, & such, they have to be installed on slip, & that can only be done so fast. (How the U.S. built so many fleet boats so fast, IDK...but it looks like U.S. yards were comparatively slow.)

Type XXI submarine - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

"Between 1943 and 1945, 118 boats were assembled by Blohm & Voss of Hamburg, AG Weser of Bremen and Schichau-Werke of Danzig. Each hull was constructed from nine prefabricated sections with final assembly at the shipyards. This new method allowed for a hypothetical construction time of less than six months per vessel, but in practice all the assembled U-boats were plagued with severe quality problems that required extensive post-production work and time to rectify.[19] One of the reasons for these shortcomings was that sections were made by companies having little experience with shipbuilding, after a decision by Albert Speer. As a result, of 118 Type XXIs constructed, only four were fit for combat before the Second World War ended in Europe. Of these, only two conducted combat patrols and neither sank any Allied ships.[20] Post-war assessments by the US Navy and British Royal Navy also found that the completed submarines had poor structural integrity due to the manufacturing problems. This rendered the submarines highly vulnerable to depth charges, and gave them a lower maximum diving depth than earlier U-boat designs."

OTL the only problems were quality related and that was because Speer gave them to the wrong companies and those companies were most likely using slave labor.
ITTL the contracts are given to the professionals and only German labor is used (more German women hired?) making construction time 5-6 months per sub.
With 10 construction slips, you could pour out 20 U-boats a year. With 50 slips that number becomes 100 a year. And these subs are to be assembled in camouflaged slips which would be patrolled by Luftwaffe operational training squadrons.
1935-1939 is 4 years.
4x100=400
Now Donitz has his 400 U-boats.
Add anechoic tiles for operations near the UK coast, steal snorkel designs from the Dutch in 1938, reliable contact detonators on their electric torps, more training, and goodbye UK.

 

[McPherson]

"Between 1943 and 1945, 118 boats were assembled by Blohm & Voss of Hamburg, AG Weser of Bremen and Schichau-Werke of Danzig. Each hull was constructed from nine prefabricated sections with final assembly at the shipyards. This new method allowed for a hypothetical construction time of less than six months per vessel, but in practice all the assembled U-boats were plagued with severe quality problems that required extensive post-production work and time to rectify.[19] One of the reasons for these shortcomings was that sections were made by companies having little experience with shipbuilding, after a decision by Albert Speer. As a result, of 118 Type XXIs constructed, only four were fit for combat before the Second World War ended in Europe. Of these, only two conducted combat patrols and neither sank any Allied ships.[20] Post-war assessments by the US Navy and British Royal Navy also found that the completed submarines had poor structural integrity due to the manufacturing problems. This rendered the submarines highly vulnerable to depth charges, and gave them a lower maximum diving depth than earlier U-boat designs."

Point of interest. Liberty ships broke apart because of spotty welding on their first or second runs across the Atlantic. Reason... Henry Kaiser had never run a ship-building company. Solution? Hire trained welders to teach the women how to weld better and run classes 3 shifts, 7 days a week and pass-fail the students before sending them back to the pre-fab and final assembly yards. OUR PEOPLE were better than their people.

It was not that Speer hired the wrong companies. It was that NAZIS were stupid.

 

[BlackDragon98]

Point of interest. Liberty ships broke apart because of spotty welding on their first or second runs across the Atlantic. Reason... Henry Kaiser had never run a ship-building company. Solution? Hire trained welders to teach the women how to weld better and run classes 3 shifts, 7 days a week and pass-fail the students before sending them back to the pre-fab and final assembly yards. OUR PEOPLE were better than their people.

It was not that Speer hired the wrong companies. It was that NAZIS were stupid.

No, the main problem was that they were using slave labor to build those U-boats, just like they used slave labor to build Bf 109s, V2 missiles, and other weapons.
Quality suffered accordingly, either due to sabotage or the workers simply being unsuited for the job.
Quality control also went to shit in Nazi German after 1943, because more weapons were needed and there simply wasn't time for all the necessary quality checks.

American workers were women who's husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons depended on the quality of their work.
Germans used slaves who were mistreated and malnourished, wanting nothing more than to see the Reich fall.
See the difference here?

 

[McPherson]

No, the main problem was that they were using slave labor to build those U-boats, just like they used slave labor to build Bf 109s, V2 missiles, and other weapons.
Quality suffered accordingly, either due to sabotage or the workers simply being unsuited for the job.
Quality control also went to shit in Nazi German after 1943, because more weapons were needed and there simply wasn't time for all the necessary quality checks.

American workers were women who's husbands, brothers, fathers, and sons depended on the quality of their work.
Germans used slaves who were mistreated and malnourished, wanting nothing more than to see the Reich fall.
See the difference here?

What was missed with

OUR PEOPLE were better than their people, ,,, and ... NAZIS were stupid?

 

[Cockroach]

ITTL the contracts are given to the professionals and only German labor is used (more German women hired?) making construction time 5-6 months per sub.
With 10 construction slips, you could pour out 20 U-boats a year. With 50 slips that number becomes 100 a year. And these subs are to be assembled in camouflaged slips which would be patrolled by Luftwaffe operational training squadrons.
1935-1939 is 4 years.
4x100=400
Now Donitz has his 400 U-boats.
Add anechoic tiles for operations near the UK coast, steal snorkel designs from the Dutch in 1938, reliable contact detonators on their electric torps, more training, and goodbye UK.

Okay:
1. Where do you get the equipment to fit out those extra 100 slipways and associated dockyard infrastructure? (This is distinctly non-trivial... a slipway and dockyard are kinda large and obvious with a lot infrastructure such as cranes and machine shops, not just a strip of concrete and a pair of welders...).
2. How long does it take to build and assemble said slipways and dockyard infrastructure? Can you do it in a timely manner without the British and French noticing? (e.g. Bethlehem Fairfield Shipyard took 9 months from go on the Liberty Ship program to the first hull leaving the slipway... So, even in the best case of a rushed emergency program you'd loose most 1935 production)
3. Was there actually enough suitable industrial capacity available to do prefabrication of U-Boat hull components? And other more specialist components (electric motors, batteries etc.)? (Not all metal bashing industry translates into the skilled manpower and suitable infrastructure to build an effective pressure hull, and what good is a pressure hull if you don't have engines, motors and batteries?)
4. Even given the above can you really tool up to build 100 U-Boats in the first or second year of this plan? (TBH, even with a concerted effort I'd expect you'd end up with minimal production for the first year or even eighteen months while the whole prefabrication and assembly process is debugged.)
5. Can you really guarantee the British not noticing an extra 200-400 U-Boats? (I can actually buy the Germans getting away with an extra 20, 30 maybe even 50 U-Boats over OTL pre-war production without spooking the Poms, IOTL they were of the mind that they'd beaten the U-Boats before so it can't be too difficult to do so again... But 400? No fecking way!).
6. Where do you get the crews to man the extra U-Boats? And how do you train extra 400 crews without the British et al. knowing?
7. Throwing resources into setting up mass production you're likely confined to a U-Boat design substantially completed as of 1934-1936, and the investment in production jigs and similar makes it harder to switch to a new class. Is a swarm of Type IIs actually of use in interdicting British shipping in the Atlantic?
8. How do you explain why the above happens without resorting to blatant hindsight?
Is it physically possible for the Germans to produce enough U-Boats to strangle Britain? I'd say yes. Is it plausible for the Germans to actually do so pre-war/early-war with any realistic PoD? I'd have to say no.

 

[BlackDragon98]

Okay:
1. Where do you get the equipment to fit out those extra 100 slipways and associated dockyard infrastructure? (This is distinctly non-trivial... a slipway and dockyard are kinda large and obvious with a lot infrastructure such as cranes and machine shops, not just a strip of concrete and a pair of welders...).
2. How long does it take to build and assemble said slipways and dockyard infrastructure? Can you do it in a timely manner without the British and French noticing? (e.g. Bethlehem Fairfield Shipyard took 9 months from go on the Liberty Ship program to the first hull leaving the slipway... So, even in the best case of a rushed emergency program you'd loose most 1935 production)
3. Was there actually enough suitable industrial capacity available to do prefabrication of U-Boat hull components? And other more specialist components (electric motors, batteries etc.)? (Not all metal bashing industry translates into the skilled manpower and suitable infrastructure to build an effective pressure hull, and what good is a pressure hull if you don't have engines, motors and batteries?)
4. Even given the above can you really tool up to build 100 U-Boats in the first or second year of this plan? (TBH, even with a concerted effort I'd expect you'd end up with minimal production for the first year or even eighteen months while the whole prefabrication and assembly process is debugged.)
5. Can you really guarantee the British not noticing an extra 200-400 U-Boats? (I can actually buy the Germans getting away with an extra 20, 30 maybe even 50 U-Boats over OTL pre-war production without spooking the Poms, IOTL they were of the mind that they'd beaten the U-Boats before so it can't be too difficult to do so again... But 400? No fecking way!).
6. Where do you get the crews to man the extra U-Boats? And how do you train extra 400 crews without the British et al. knowing?
7. Throwing resources into setting up mass production you're likely confined to a U-Boat design substantially completed as of 1934-1936, and the investment in production jigs and similar makes it harder to switch to a new class. Is a swarm of Type IIs actually of use in interdicting British shipping in the Atlantic?
8. How do you explain why the above happens without resorting to blatant hindsight?
Is it physically possible for the Germans to produce enough U-Boats to strangle Britain? I'd say yes. Is it plausible for the Germans to actually do so pre-war/early-war with any realistic PoD? I'd have to say no.

The preparations for such a building program would have to have it's roots before the Nazis even took power. Wegener instead of Raeder as Reichmarine C in C, which means prepping for a guerre de course (raider war). Wegener knows the power of the U-boat from the last war and he asks Donitz to mass produce them. The planning for the production scheme starts in 1930, the organization of all the companies, factories, etc. For example, MAN had been developing marine diesels at the end of WW1 but were forced to scrap their designs as part of the Versailles treaty. A little bit of encouragement and a few time based contracts could get them and other companies rushing to work in 1929.

NV Ingenieurskantoor voor Scheepsbouw - Wikipedia

en.wikipedia.org

Shell companie in Holland that was a front for German sub research and development. It was a joint venture by 2 German shipbuilding companies. With the right incentive from Wegener and Donitz, the ITTL version of the Type IX can start production in 1934 if all goes right.
The Soviet S-class sub had finished blueprints in 1933 and overall it was remarkably similar to the Type IX in dimensions, weaponry and shape (both were designed by the same company), though the S-class was 1.2 knots faster. Thus, the S-class can be used as the basis of the ITTL Type IX design, which saves a shit load of design time. Just upsize the design and you can get the Type IX U-boat at the start of the war.

Once Hitler comes to power in 1933, Wegener and Donitz convince him follow their plan, called Plan X, which calls for a fleet of 400 U-boats, lots of merchant raiders, long range destroyers and escorts, as well as a small number of capital raiders (battlecruisers and cruisers). There will also be dedicated long range marine patrol aircraft with radar to spot enemy ships and merchants and guide U-boats in. As well, Luftwaffe operational training squadrons are to provide protect for U-boat and naval facilities as part of their training. Wegener uses his influence with Hitler to arrange Gestapo security for the U-boat construction facilities which are disguised as regular slips for merchants and regular factories.

ITTL the German rail and canal systems are improved instead of the Autobahn. Kaiser-Wilhelm canal is enlarge to allow the new Kriegsmarine battlecruisers to pass through. Propaganda efforts are focused on extolling the virtues of German's new capital ships and any mention of U-boats is avoid at all costs.
If the Brits get suspicious then say that these new subs (the ones past the limits) are not ocean going subs but rather coastal subs to counter the Soviet Baltic Fleet, which was pretty powerful ITTL especially with the huge battleships they were building.

 

[BlackDragon98]

What was missed with

No one was better than anyone else.
USA is a manufacturing giant compared to Germany and it never had to suffer the shit that German went through after WW1 and the 1920s-1930s.

 

[McPherson]

No one was better than anyone else.
USA is a manufacturing giant compared to Germany and it never had to suffer the shit that German went through after WW1 and the 1920s-1930s.

Who won? And why?

 

[Zheng He]

I have problems with the idea of accelerating the U-boat build to do more damage early in the battle.
Ignoring for the moment that the RN were keeping a close eye on U-boat production, and would have screamed loudly if they saw that ramping up, where do the resources come from? Read Tooze. A U-boat consumes resources that are in desperately short supply (not so much the steel, things like rubber, copper, etc). Germany cant aquire more. So, what doesn't get built? Allocate too much away from the Army and you might get bogged down in France. The German low priority for U-boats until France falls was the correct one imo.

In OTL, the program accelerated fast late 1940, but these boats wouldn't arrive for a year (longer allowing for crew training). By which time the British are churning out escorts at a rate of knots, and have centimetric radar coming. Remember, in OTL the RN had, if not won, at least bettered the U-boats by 1941. American involvement is a double edged sword - you get the easy US targets in 1942, but you also get a huge supply of liberty ships.

So if we can't get more U-boats, we need better ones (or ones used better). Personally I don't think better training and deployment would make a huge difference until the U-boats start surging in late 41 (the peacetime boats obviously had better trained crews). Better more realistic training is certainly achievable, the actual resources are doable apart from one thing - fuel. Germany was short of fuel all through the war, every litre used to train a U-boat is one that isn't driving a tank around. The interesting question is would investing in better training butterfly away the wolf pack? This was a tactic with two aims - mass destruction by overwhelming the escorts, also hitting the merchant crews morale, and compensating for the poorer crews by the weight of attack. There is also the issue of crewing the U-boats. Better training implies more training time. IIRC, the U-boast were the only submarine force that had to draft in sailors - all the others were volunteers to serve in subs. This is one of the big reasons the quality and commitment fell off in later years. If you have more U-boats, this problem just hits you faster.

Better air support would be possible until Russia is attacked (maybe even after that to some extent). It rather assumes the British sit back and let this happen - Britain wasn't short of aircraft in 1941, just that a lot were being misused. Losing a battle tends to concentrate the mind, and long range fighters, more raids against the airfields, and panic production of escort and merchant carriers are on the cards. As are more LRMP aircraft, with the Atlantic supply link under serious threat, Bomber Commands theories about strategic bombing will get little support until things are safer.

It also needs to be remembered that Britain, while considering the Atlantic Battle crucial, could have allocated considerably more resources to it. Of course, that means you aren't doing something else, but once your crucial supply link is under serious threat, priorities change.

Overall, I do think the U-boat force could have been adjusted to do more damage, and by forcing changes in resource allocation affect other operations, but I don't see them winning this battle.

You hit on what is a larger problem in most of the Axis Do Better TLs - they are usually dependent on the Allies doing exactly what they did OTL while the Axis do something better and smarter. That's normally not how things work.

 

[Garrison]

OTL the only problems were quality related and that was because Speer gave them to the wrong companies and those companies were most likely using slave labor.

There were no right companies. The modular approach to U-Boat construction was one that no one had any familiarity with. The whole point of it was to enrol companies that weren't involved in conventional shipbuilding to construct the modules that the shipyards could then just join together. Introducing a completely new manufacturing technique, as well as aa completely new model of U-Boat that no one had experience with building, was going to create issues regardless of the quality of the labour involved and I take it by 'most likely' you mean that you haven't any information as to whether these factories used slave labour and if they did how much and in what roles?

The preparations for such a building program would have to have it's roots before the Nazis even took power. Wegener instead of Raeder as Reichmarine C in C, which means prepping for a guerre de course (raider war).

And this is flat out impossible. One thing for Weimar to defy Versailles by experimenting with a few tanks and planes safely out of sight in Russia, quite another to create the infrastructure for a massive U-Boat construction program where everyone can see it at a time when Germany is desperately trying to wriggle out of making reparations payments. They also have an army of only 100,000 men, but you expect them to focus on a program that can only be of use to try and blockade the British while they can't even defend their borders. And speaking of the British the idea that they will still proceed with OTL style appeasement of Germany when they are clearly engaged in a build up aimed at Britain's maritime trade is also imposssible.

 

[Garrison]

You hit on what is a larger problem in most of the Axis Do Better TLs - they are usually dependent on the Allies doing exactly what they did OTL while the Axis do something better and smarter. That's normally not how things work.

You forgot to add doing something smarter and better without regard to economics, logistics, geography, or in some cases the laws of physics.

 

[BlackDragon98]

Who won? And why?

The Axis were outnumber 100 to 1 by the Allies, easily.
WW2 was still a number game. Unlike modern warfare.

 

[BlackDragon98]

And this is flat out impossible. One thing for Weimar to defy Versailles by experimenting with a few tanks and planes safely out of sight in Russia, quite another to create the infrastructure for a massive U-Boat construction program where everyone can see it at a time when Germany is desperately trying to wriggle out of making reparations payments. They also have an army of only 100,000 men, but you expect them to focus on a program that can only be of use to try and blockade the British while they can't even defend their borders. And speaking of the British the idea that they will still proceed with OTL style appeasement of Germany when they are clearly engaged in a build up aimed at Britain's maritime trade is also imposssible.

The slips are utilitarian.
They could just say that the slips are for merchant ships as the German merchant marine was seized at the end of WW1.
Rebuilding a merchant marine isn't going to cause WW2 to break out earlier.
As well, factories making batteries, engines and all the other internal component can just have their purpose disguised. Batteries could be for cars, engines for merchant ships, etc.

The French opted for a massive program focused on defending their borders that turned out to be very useless when push came to shove. Your point?
As well, the UK isn't going to fight Germany without France. And France was bankrupt in 1936 after their whole economic debacle so war was definitely the last thing on their minds.
Unless you envision a Gallipoli style landing on German shores which results in total disaster?

 

[McPherson]

The Axis were outnumber 100 to 1 by the Allies, easily.
WW2 was still a number game. Unlike modern warfare.

Is that supposed to be a serious answer?

And in 1944, when the Germans had about 2.7 million men in their land army in direct combat, the Wallies had about 1.5 to 1.8 million soldiers in direct combat and the Russians, depending on whose sources you believe, had about 2.5 to 2.7 million at the most. So where is this 100 to 1 ratio? Might add that the air ratio was more like equal over the Reich and only 2 to 1 at the FEBA when the Luftwaffe dared to show up to fight.

In the Pacific War. PACFLT was outnumbered until mid 1943. During the crunch time in late 1944, they managed to finally get 3 to 2 odds in the air and about 2 to 1 in surface ships.

That is far from 100 to 1.

 

[BlackDragon98]

Is that supposed to be a serious answer?

Subject to your interpretation.

 

[McPherson]

Subject to your interpretation.

Not subject to interpretation. We have data.

 

[alfredtuomi]

Maybe the Luftwaffe does a training mission over a U-boat building port before the war and notices how easily they spotted the construction?
Massive tarp go up as a response.

It's the tarp that says I am hiding something.

 

[alfredtuomi]

The slips are utilitarian.
They could just say that the slips are for merchant ships as the German merchant marine was seized at the end of WW1.
Rebuilding a merchant marine isn't going to cause WW2 to break out earlier.
As well, factories making batteries, engines and all the other internal component can just have their purpose disguised. Batteries could be for cars, engines for merchant ships, etc.

The French opted for a massive program focused on defending their borders that turned out to be very useless when push came to shove. Your point?
As well, the UK isn't going to fight Germany without France. And France was bankrupt in 1936 after their whole economic debacle so war was definitely the last thing on their minds.
Unless you envision a Gallipoli style landing on German shores which results in total disaster?

i would be interested in hearing about the car that utilizes a submarine battery.

 

[phx1138]

Peacetime exercises in the Baltic Sea would be good enough to hide from the Allied commission, or maybe the Black Sea. It is the subs that would be difficult to procure and hide. Probably have to train with a partner using a sort of British Perisher and American PCO course exchange program. (Postwar, that is for the Wallies.). The Russians and Germans were already playing footsie with tanks. (Devil’s Bargain: Germany and Russia Before WWII). Odessa?

That's pretty much what I was thinking. I imagine having the boats built in SU, maybe part of a program to supply them to the Red Navy (which is also a cover). Odessa works fine for me.

One might not be able to operate akin to the Americans in the 1930s (5, 6 and 7.) (Fleet Problem annual exercises.) but convoy tabletops and mechanical feedback simulators are pre-war doable. Just get the Russians to pay for it. Plus the Germans did run a torpedo boat school with corvettes as stand-in for U-boats in mock convoy battles to simulate wolf pack tactics under the guise of "convoy defense" exercises.

Oh, sure, those I'd expect as standard. It's the live fire training that I'd consider really key to getting the best skippers & crews. That's how IJN did it. And even USN Fleet Problems led to bad doctrine based on umpire biases.

Considering that the U-boaters have to get their act together a full decade before WWII to see positive results, I'll suggest that the air component which "S" for Brains overlooked or did not emphasize enough, I am also more concerned with the staff problems than an impossible to create or use before 1940 aerial wonder weapon. Tactics overcome gee-whizz gimmickry. The FW Condors were dropping (conventional high explosive (CHE) free-fall ordnance well enough to get it done.

I wouldn't insist on it to start, just as a project to consider.

What they were not doing was flying search overlaps and talking to BdU West (Western Submarine Command) or "S" for Brains and his staff was not paying attention to what the LW reported.

That's the emphasis I'd be putting on it. I'm much more interested in improving recce to supply info to U-boats than improving Luftwaffe antiship performance. (Not that I'd oppose it...)

On the wonder/wander weapon front, the German torpedoes(and bombs) were CRAP. A decent wet-heater with contact pistol in 1939 that worked 80% of the time would have been better than magnetic influence exploder electrics that failed 50% of the time in 1940.

Absolutely right.

With 10 construction slips, you could pour out 20 U-boats a year. With 50 slips that number becomes 100 a year. And these subs are to be assembled in camouflaged slips which would be patrolled by Luftwaffe operational training squadrons.
1935-1939 is 4 years.
4x100=400
Now Donitz has his 400 U-boats.
Add anechoic tiles for operations near the UK coast, steal snorkel designs from the Dutch in 1938, reliable contact detonators on their electric torps, more training, and goodbye UK.

If you could make it work, it would be great. (Trial it on the Red Navy boats for the PCO Training Plan.) I'd avoid building too many for KM, because that's going to provoke an undesirable RN response...

Training & using women welders would be an excellent idea.

If we're going to improve the boats themselves, developing something like the Sargo battery would be good; so would increased battery capacity. However, as I've said, on-station endurance isn't as important as faster transit, & I'm not sure battery would matter much (unless we also have faster dived speeds, enabled by more battery capacity). Could an early version of Prairie/Masker be developed to reduce hull friction? (During the war, Morton, IIRC, discovered he could get more speed with a release of HP air.)

If we're allowing live fire exercises, quieter pumps are likely to be revealled as desirable, & that could reduce losses, which would be good; how much it helps is impossible to know.

 

[ArtosStark]

i would be interested in hearing about the car that utilizes a submarine battery.

Oh, it will fit, don't worry about it.