AHQ: Royal Marines acting like USMC

[ArtosStark]

Is it a good strategy against the best and second largest land army in the world?

No idea. I have seen well reasoned lectures on why it was, and others dismissing it as an ineffectual fantasy.

 

[marathag]

Fisher and his successors somewhat failed to bring the Army around to that point of view in the early 1910's. Had they done, and it actually went well in WW1 (not guaranteed but an interesting POD) then that could possibly lock the British army into a true Expeditionary Force through the 20'th Century.

Like with China having the People's Liberation Army(Navy) would have been the Royal Navy(Army)

 

[Riain]

Even with a more muscular RN Operation Corporate would still have been very difficult. You still have that immensely long SLOC spread over thousands of miles of ocean, while a pair of CTOL carriers gives you a lot more punch, the drawback is that they would be consuming fuel at roughly twice the rate that Hermes and Invincible did. Also the Harriers were able to operate in sea states that would have grounded Phantoms and Buccaneers.
If the carrier programme had gone ahead then by 1982 the RN would have had CVA-02 “HMS Duke of Edinburgh” in commission along with Eagle, Queen Elizabeth would probably have been in for refit while CVA-03 was still on the slipway in Clydebank. If the junta wants to do the invasion then it’s going to have to think about how to counter a British response. Sending their navy directly at this alternate RN would be suicide, so they likely decide to strike at the supply lines, the loss of Atlantic Conveyor meant to original plan to travel across the island by Chinook was lost, imagine if they’d managed to sink some more cargo ships or some RFA tankers or even hit Ascension Island as was feared at the time.

How will the Argentines operate against these SLOCs? In early 1982 they had 2 subs at sea, but 1 was sunk at South Georgia and the other unsuccessfully attempted 2 attacks near Islands before withdrawing. The navy might have attempted it but would be extremely vulnerable to the RNs SSNs and CBGs while the Navy's air arm and the Air Force lacked the range to interdict SLOCs operating beyond about 500 miles from the Argentine coast. They may be able to get lucky ones or twice, like the Exocet attack on the carriers which hit Atlantic Conveyer and the Hercules rolling bombs out the back, but the British took up 43 ships from trade and conducted almost daily Hercules air drops from mid May and putting s dent in this will take more than one or two lucky hits.

In any case a more muscular RN will be far more able to protect it's SLOCs.

 

[Riain]

No idea. I have seen well reasoned lectures on why it was, and others dismissing it as an ineffectual fantasy.

Me too, I can see the strategic potential of the Dardanelles campaign but landing in Germany in WW1 look to be suicidal folly. Similarly while Bruneval and Overlord were a success Dieppe, Salerno and Anzio weren't quite so amazing.

 

[Dorknought]

The choice in 1911 was between:

• Army - Send a Expeditionary Force to fight on the continent
• Navy - Use the Expeditionary Force to hold strategic islands in the North Sea and Baltic to affect a close economic blockade of Germany. Note that in 1911 these islands were undefended.

The Army took victory over the Navy to mean Cabinet tacit approval to expand from 60 Battalions to 60 Divisions. While the Navy was interested in Joint operations, the Army thought that they were absurd and didn't want anything to do with them. Unfortunately, the expansion to 60 Divisions required the 'army of sergeants' that the British sent in 1914 and 4/5th were casualties by the end of 1914.

This is not to say that the Army had no idea how to conduct landings. Much of the received 'wisdom' on Gallipoli is based on Hamilton's disingenuous claim that he was only given 'a 1912 handbook on the Turkish army; a sort of tourist guide to the area with a thoroughly defective map; and a single sheet of instructions from Lord Kitchener'.

At the Dardanelles Commission, the planning officer dumped mail bags of pre-war material that Hamilton was given or had been quickly sent to him for planning purposes. Such documents included:

• 'Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, 1913',
• 'Report on the Defences of Constantinople, General Staff, Secret 1909. War Office' (50 pages covered the Peninsula),
• 'Naval Intelligence Department, NID 838 Turkey'. 'Coast Defence Ordnance and Arsenals May 1908' and
• 'Military Report on Eastern Turkey in Europe 1905. Confidential'.

Officers had walked the ground as late as early 1914. The Staff appreciation from 1907 that followed on from the Aquaba Crisis in 1906, was that forcing the Dardanelles could only be done as a combined Naval-Military effort. The Navy was well aware of this. More importantly, the 'Manual of Combined Naval and Military Operations, 1913' highlighted the absolute need for surprise.

D-Day was 2 years of planning. After 6 months of WW1, 200 X-Lighters were ordered in Feb 1915 and they were deployed 6 months later in August 1915 at Suvla Bay. The capability to land 20,000 men a day over a beach could have been established well before 1914.

 

[ArtosStark]

Me too, I can see the strategic potential of the Dardanelles campaign but landing in Germany in WW1 look to be suicidal folly. Similarly while Bruneval and Overlord were a success Dieppe, Salerno and Anzio weren't quite so amazing.

For what it is worth, this video lecture by Andrew Lambert (which I do recommend if you have 1.5 hrs to watch a Youtube video) lays out Fishers Baltic plan (as he understands it at least). The steps of the plan were, in general, as follows:

1. Begin to build and retrofit a "Siege fleet" including monitors, inshore fire support vessels (like the refitted Edgar class armoured cruisers used at Gallipoli), minesweepers, X and Y lighters, and the Courageous class Large Light Cruisers. This fleet would be used to support landings in the later stages of the plan and would be separate from the Grand Fleet.

2.While this fleet is building, clear the coast of Belgium (presumably this would have been done in preferance to Gallipoli but if more detail on how this was to be done was mentioned I didn't catch it. I am also unclear as to whether this step was considered a prerequisite to those that come later or simply the best use of resources in the interim.

3. When the fleet is ready it would be moved (presumably escorted by at least some of the Grand Fleet) to the entrance of the Baltic and it would be made clear that the intent is to transit. Probably by beginning to clear the mines. This would cause the Germans to invade Denmark to stop it. This came up in another thread a few months ago about the British invading Denmark at the outset of war (https://www.alternatehistory.com/fo...ion-of-denmark-at-start-of-ww1.509081/page-14) Based on the discussion in that thread it did seem to be the German plan if it seemed as if the British could get into the Baltic. Though what would actually happen was not fully established. There is also a lot in the thread discussing the relative political situation in Denmark and what moves they might make. To quote a portion of a post from @Admiral Fisker:

The policy of the government, the Navy and Venstre were that Denmark should never join the war on the side of Germany's enemies. I. C. Christensen even proposed an alliance in return for Northern Schleswig during his secret talks with Moltke. However, the King, the Army and most of the population had a strong anti-German sentiment, and would've been against Denmark fighting on the side of Germany. The King did, however, realise that fighting Germany probably would mean the end of Denmark, and made assurances to the Kaiser that Denmark wouldn't join on the side of Germany's enemies. Such an assurance doesn't mean that he doesn't want Denmark to fight Germany if forced, though.

Denmark is an extremely centralised country. It probably rivals France for the top spot in Europe. Everything revolves around Copenhagen. A British squadron demanding the keys to Copenhagen and forcing Denmark to pick sides would ironically make Denmark join the British, since that means that the British have control of the Baltic, and the Germans therefore can't threaten Copenhagen. This also gives the King and the army leadership a free hand to pursue a pro-British line (though both would prefer neutrality, if perhaps a pro-British neutrality, if possible. The King very much wanted Denmark to be kept out of the war, and every day throughout the war he thanked God in his diary for "the peace which he has granted our country". If forced, he would fight, though). However, as Wenck says, such an operation is unlikely, and only the Germans would be able to pull off a coup attack on Copenhagen. A German coup attack could mean that Denmark would be forced to join the German side, as Denmark falls if Copenhagen falls.

I think that the Germans could feel forced to make a move on Denmark, but they didn't have the ressources for such an operation in August 1914. Clemmesen writes that the German ultimatum given to Denmark about the mining of the Belts was a bluff and that there wasn't any force behind it, but that the Danish didn't realise this. As such, the Germans might possibly be able to execute another more daring bluff, and make a surprise attack on Copenhagen to force Denmark to join Germany's side. So yes, I think you might have your scenario for an invasion in 1914 here: the British adopt a different attitude towards the Baltic prior to the war, meaning that Wilhelm II also allows the German Navy to go through with a surprise coup landing in Copenhagen, forcing Denmark to join the side of Germany. Meanwhile the British occupy the small but strategically important Danish islands in the Kattegat and Denmark's colonies in the Atlantic. Denmark would be a very reluctant ally, however, especially since the hundreds of years old animosities have just been reinforced by a new German act of aggression, and Denmark would most likely keep all of her forces at home to guard against a possible landing operation, while also strengthening the navy. I think Denmark would switch sides if the British make a Gallipoli in the Baltic and land on Sjælland.

Which to me says that the British chances of pulling it off are not zero, but Germany may not react exactly the way that Fisher believes, which could derail the plan somewhat. It is not directly mentioned but I assume that a fleet battle could be added to this step, as it seems unlikely to me that the Germans would not use the HSF to try and break up this action, necessitating combat between the battlefleets. The 1905 War Plans that recommend something somewhat similar to this one also have provision for the close blockade of the North Sea with the capture of Borkum and Sylt as actions supporting the blockade. I am not sure if this portion of the plan would have survived the rise in danger of submarines and mines and the expansion of the Kiel Canal. I suspect not, but its possible.

4. Once Germany has invaded Denmark the siege fleet and the troops it carries will be used to occupy the Danish islands and defend them against the Germans (according to Lambert Denmark being on the Allied side is a prerequisite for this portion. I assume they would at least need to know that the King would remove the pro-German government in the event of a landing). The 1905 plans (which are covered in this thesis paper by Shawn Grimes https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/2926803/408275.pdf) have the landing on Zealand taking place between Ise Fjord and Siero Bay. This force would then advance to try and defeat the German forces who would be assumed to already be invading Zealand.

5. With the Islands secured, the British would blockade and possibly bombard Kiel, to remove the Kiel Canal from operation. The operational goals, however would be to cut Germany off from trade with Sweden. This could be done through submarine campaigns, bombardment of the much less well defended Baltic ports, surface interdiction of merchant ships, or (most likely) a combination thereof. Germany relied heavily on imports from Sweden during WW1, and it was thought that cutting them off from it would significantly harm their war production or cause them to collapse.

Suffice to say, people have varying opinions on the feasibility of the plan. But if pulled off, the rewards would be substantial. German production would be hurt, and Germany would be forced to reallocate forces to Denmark, the Belgian coast and the Baltic coast (whether it happens or not, they would need to guard against a British landing there), thereby taking pressure off of France and Russia.

 

[ArtosStark]

In regards to the OP, in my opinion the best way to get a true Expeditionary Force out of the Royal Marines is to have the divide in strategic vision between the Army and Navy come to light earlier and be better addressed. If somewhere in the 1890's or early 1900's the Army and Navy were forced to both consider their potential strategies for a continental war, it seems likely that either something resembling an actual national strategy will come about or (more likely) the Navy will understand that the Army is not willing to operate as an Expeditionary Force in the way initially envisioned. The Navy may then turn to creating their own organic Expeditionary Force out of the Royal Marines.