AHC/WI - Mitigate the Panic of 1873 and Long Depression in Britain (in addition to the Great Depression of British Agriculture)

With a POD range as early as 1850 the challenge is to mitigate the Panic of 1873 and Long Depression in Britain in addition to the Great Depression of British Agriculture IOTL from 1873 to 1896.

Am interested to know the consequences of how a better British performance during the period from 1973 to 1896 ITTL would have helped the British not fall completely behind Germany and the United States during the Second Industrial Revolution between 1870 to 1914, since it seems the British approach to the Panic of 1873 below played a role in causing them to fall behind (and led to the Long Depression, etc).

OTL UK in Panic of 1873

Britain​

The opening of the Suez Canal in 1869 was one of the causes of the Panic of 1873 because goods from the Far East had been carried in sailing vessels around the Cape of Good Hope and were stored in British warehouses. As sailing vessels were not adaptable for use through the Suez Canal because the prevailing winds of the Mediterranean Sea blow from west to east, the British entrepôt trade suffered.

When the crisis came, the Bank of England raised interest rates to 9 percent. Despite this, Britain did not experience the scale of financial mayhem seen in America and Central Europe, perhaps forestalled by an expectation that the liquidity-constraining provisions of the Bank Charter Act of 1844 would be suspended as they had been in the crises of 1847, 1857 and 1866. The ensuing economic downturn in Britain seems to have been muted – "stagnant" but without a "decline in aggregate output". However there was heavy unemployment in the basic industries of coal, iron and steel, engineering, and shipbuilding, especially in 1873, 1886 and 1893.


Comparison with Germany​

From 1873 to 1896, a period sometimes referred to as the Long Depression, most European countries experienced a drastic fall in prices. Still, many corporations were able to reduce production costs and achieve better productivity rates, with industrial production increasing by 40% in Britain and by over 100% in Germany. A comparison of capital formation rates in both countries helps to account for the different industrial growth rates. During the depression, the British ratio of net national capital formation to net national product fell from 11.5% to 6.0%, but the German ratio rose from 10.6% to 15.9%. During the depression, Britain took the course of static supply adjustment, but Germany stimulated effective demand and expanded industrial supply capacity by increasing and adjusting capital formation. For example, Germany dramatically increased investment of social overhead capital, such as in the management of electric power transmission lines, roads, and railroads, thereby stimulating industrial demand in that country, but similar investment stagnated or decreased in Britain. The resulting difference in capital formation accounts for the divergent levels of industrial production in the two countries and the different growth rates during and after the depression.

OTL UK in the Second Industrial Revolution

United Kingdom​



Relative per capita levels of industrialization, 1750–1910.

New products and services were introduced which greatly increased international trade. Improvements in steam engine design and the wide availability of cheap steel meant that slow, sailing ships were replaced with faster steamship, which could handle more trade with smaller crews. The chemical industries also moved to the forefront. Britain invested less in technological research than the U.S. and Germany, which caught up.

The development of more intricate and efficient machines along with mass production techniques (after 1910) greatly expanded output and lowered production costs. As a result, production often exceeded domestic demand. Among the new conditions, more markedly evident in Britain, the forerunner of Europe's industrial states, were the long-term effects of the severe Long Depression of 1873–1896, which had followed fifteen years of great economic instability. Businesses in practically every industry suffered from lengthy periods of low — and falling — profit rates and price deflation after 1873.
 
1850 POD?

Analytical Engine built with punch cards. Massive revolution in engineering design and building powers British firms forward.

Fascinating, definitely in the right general direction as far as the British not falling behind in the Second Industrial Revolution is concerned though fearful of the huge butterflies a completed Analytical Engine would cause had it been built.
 
Am interested to know the consequences of how a better British performance during the period from 1973 to 1896 ITTL would have helped the British not fall completely behind Germany and the United States during the Second Industrial Revolution between 1870 to 1914, since it seems the British approach to the Panic of 1873 below played a role in causing them to fall behind (and led to the Long Depression, etc).
Let me preface my post by saying this: to an extent, it is an inevitable (barring any destruction or damage of U.S. and German economy) that the U.K. economy will grow more slowly than the U.S. or German economy. By that point in time, the British economy was the most mature of the bunch while the U.S.A. and Germany were at an earlier stage of economic growth, starting from lower levels of industrial output, and benefiting from British capital and technical experience. They were going through the same stage as the U.K. was in the earlier nineteenth century and their percentage growth-rates were inevitably higher than that of the comparatively 'mature' British economy of the late nineteenth century.

Furthermore, the Long Depression is not really what causes Britain to fall behind. Looking at the 1873—96 period, often referred to as the 'Long Depression' or Great Depression, we can actually see a cyclical behaviour more benign than that of either the long-term UK average or the position of other countries during the 1870-1913 period. There were six output recessions during this period (1878—9, 1883-5, 1891-3, 1899-1900, 1902-3, 1907-8), which were all short and mild, with a maximum output loss of 3.8% in the wake of the 1907 American banking crisis. The label 'The Great Depression' was given to the 1873-96 period by contemporaries, reflecting their belief in worsening economic conditions compared to earlier periods (mostly due to the massive fall in price). But with the economic knowledge we have today, we can confidently say that the deflation in the Long Depression was a good thing because these price falls were caused by increased productivity from tech advances.

What really causes the U.K. to fell behind the U.S.A and Germany is the failure to modernize the economy as rapidly as the Americans and Germans. The U.K. lost a lot of ground with the U.S. and Germany in terms of new innovations connected with electricity, the motor-car and chemicals. There are several hypotheses explaining as to how this happened. The theories are: entrepreneurial failure, a mis-aimed capital market, a weak British education and technical training and an over-reliance on 'self-regulating markets' and an unwillingness of the state to intervene.

The first theory refers to the idea that British entrepreneurs failed to embrace technological advances to create cost-effective technologies as quickly as the Americans. However, this is a theory I personally don't like. As Henry Ford discovered, American technology was not compatible with the British setting and most of the British decisions with choice of technology have been deemed rational by many economists. Moreover, Britain had committed a considerably greater proportion of her resources than the U.S.A. or Germany to industries such as textiles, coal, iron, and shipbuilding, with consequently greater problems of obsolescence, scrapping and re-equipping.

The second theory refers to the availability of external financing for new, modern industries (like chemical and electrical engineering). Due to asymmetric information (capital markets being unable to determine how viable an industry is), the British capital market favored foreign investment over investment into these new industries. Without external financing, these new industries cannot undertake as many risky innovative projects as the Americans or Germans. It has been argued that a pro-active government could have created legislation on auditing and disclosure of information that would have reduced uncertainty of investment and thus boosted the confidence of the UK capital markets to give finance to these new industries. However, it seems that some MPs with vested interests thwarted efforts at reforming company law.

The third theory refers to the relative superiority of American human capital over a British one. The Americans invested more in secondary and tertiary education than Britain. Thus, when the technological progress became more scientific, the British were increasingly disadvantaged. The United States notably had a higher R&D spending and more engineers and science graduates to continue searching for innovations. If the UK had done the same, their human capital might have been able to boost growth by coming up with more productive methods suitable to the British setting.

The fourth theory refers to the general unwillingness of the British government to intervene in the economy. Britain might have benefited from infant-industry policies designed to boost new, technologically progressive industries which were to some extent crowded out by the strength of Britain's traditional export sectors. This proposition seems unpersuasive, however. Primarily because the political economy of tariff protection was such that the proposals that had the most political support, such as those made by Chamberlain, would have actually tended to divert activity towards traditional sectors such as agriculture and textiles rather than new growth industries.
in addition to the Great Depression of British Agriculture IOTL from 1873 to 1896.
There's no helping this one. Unless the Native Americans somehow throw the colonizers off their soil, the opening up of virgin territory abroad and the fall in rail and shipping rates will pretty much drastically increase the supply of food in the U.K. Since demand for food is an price-inelastic (regardless of how much the price of food has changed, you are not going to dramatically change your level of consumption because you need a minimum amount to survive and have a maximum amount you can stomach) and food is homogenous (no difference between U.K. and U.S. corn/wheat/cereal/whatever), the price of agricultural products outside of animal produce was going to collapse. Still, British livestock farming was profitable and could (and did) survive.
 
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How about this timeline?

On the 8th of November 1861 the USS San Jacinto fires a second warning shot at the unarmed RMS Trent.

POD: Something happens at the moment of firing (the gunner has a heart-attack /one of the gun's supports break / etc) and the shot actually hits the Trent before it stops.
Captain Wilkes, when he reports to the Union emphasises accidental nature and the (relatively) minimal damage of the shot. He repeats that it was only fired after the Trent ignored the first warning shot, and the American public supports him.
Britain demands not only the release of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, but also insist that Wilkes be handed over to face trial for attacking a Royal Mail ship.
Knowing the American people would never agree to have Wilkes tried in Britain, President Lincoln refuses the entire demand including the release of the Confederate ambassadors. Lincoln attempts to resolve the issue diplomatically, without any unpopular concessions but it fails in the face of international anger.

A British-French alliance begins a war against the Union, the British imposing a blockade on the Union and the French invading Mexico and supplying weapons to the Confederacy. The Union loses that war and is forced to accept an expanded Canada, French control of Mexico, and significant financial reparations to Britain (much much smaller than the war cost Britain making it a net loss, but still high).
Possibly the Confederacy wins it's war with the Union, or possibly the Union succeeds at returning the South into the United States. Either way the Civil War is far more costly and draining for the United States.


Withington's Reaper-binder (1872) is butterflied away, and only invented much later. The USA is less able to invest in railroads and shipping, partly because of the reparations to Britain and the increased cost of the war, but mostly because European banks and financial institutions are less willing to risk their money in American investments.
Britain actively pursues normal and friendly relations post-war, but decides to maintain protective agricultural tariffs. That averts (or at least delays for a decade or two) the Great Depression of British Agriculture.
 

mial42

Gone Fishin'
How about this timeline?

On the 8th of November 1861 the USS San Jacinto fires a second warning shot at the unarmed RMS Trent.

POD: Something happens at the moment of firing (the gunner has a heart-attack /one of the gun's supports break / etc) and the shot actually hits the Trent before it stops.
Captain Wilkes, when he reports to the Union emphasises accidental nature and the (relatively) minimal damage of the shot. He repeats that it was only fired after the Trent ignored the first warning shot, and the American public supports him.
Britain demands not only the release of Messrs. Mason and Slidell, but also insist that Wilkes be handed over to face trial for attacking a Royal Mail ship.
Knowing the American people would never agree to have Wilkes tried in Britain, President Lincoln refuses the entire demand including the release of the Confederate ambassadors. Lincoln attempts to resolve the issue diplomatically, without any unpopular concessions but it fails in the face of international anger.

A British-French alliance begins a war against the Union, the British imposing a blockade on the Union and the French invading Mexico and supplying weapons to the Confederacy. The Union loses that war and is forced to accept an expanded Canada, French control of Mexico, and significant financial reparations to Britain (much much smaller than the war cost Britain making it a net loss, but still high).
Possibly the Confederacy wins it's war with the Union, or possibly the Union succeeds at returning the South into the United States. Either way the Civil War is far more costly and draining for the United States.


Withington's Reaper-binder (1872) is butterflied away, and only invented much later. The USA is less able to invest in railroads and shipping, partly because of the reparations to Britain and the increased cost of the war, but mostly because European banks and financial institutions are less willing to risk their money in American investments.
Britain actively pursues normal and friendly relations post-war, but decides to maintain protective agricultural tariffs. That averts (or at least delays for a decade or two) the Great Depression of British Agriculture.
There's a couple of issues with this. The first is that Lincoln knew full-well the importance of keeping the British neutral, and would be willing to turn over Wilkes if it was that or face war. The second is that while a Trent war would certainly screw the Union, it would also screw the British, for the simple reason that the Union was a major* trading partner and center of investment for the British. Britain would be relatively stronger compared to the US, but weaker in absolute terms and in comparison to Germany.
*I believe the largest by a significant margin.

The third is that, like with most post-industrial technological PODs, you can't really delay the reaper-binder much. All the tech is there, the utility is there, there was rapid development in the field of agricultural machinery, and there are plenty of people who could have made the invention. Farming is mechanizing very, very quickly, and once that happens, the economies of scale of the US vis a vis GB will lead to British agriculture crashing.
 
What really causes the U.K. to fell behind the U.S.A and Germany is the failure to modernize the economy as rapidly as the Americans and Germans. The U.K. lost a lot of ground with the U.S. and Germany in terms of new innovations connected with electricity, the motor-car and chemicals. There are several hypotheses explaining as to how this happened. The theories are: entrepreneurial failure, a mis-aimed capital market, a weak British education and technical training and an over-reliance on 'self-regulating markets' and an unwillingness of the state to intervene.

The first theory refers to the idea that British entrepreneurs failed to embrace technological advances to create cost-effective technologies as quickly as the Americans. However, this is a theory I personally don't like. As Henry Ford discovered, American technology was not compatible with the British setting and most of the British decisions with choice of technology have been deemed rational by many economists. Moreover, Britain had committed a considerably greater proportion of her resources than the U.S.A. or Germany to industries such as textiles, coal, iron, and shipbuilding, with consequently greater problems of obsolescence, scrapping and re-equipping.

The second theory refers to the availability of external financing for new, modern industries (like chemical and electrical engineering). Due to asymmetric information (capital markets being unable to determine how viable an industry is), the British capital market favored foreign investment over investment into these new industries. Without external financing, these new industries cannot undertake as many risky innovative projects as the Americans or Germans. It has been argued that a pro-active government could have created legislation on auditing and disclosure of information that would have reduced uncertainty of investment and thus boosted the confidence of the UK capital markets to give finance to these new industries. However, it seems that some MPs with vested interests thwarted efforts at reforming company law.

The third theory refers to the relative superiority of American human capital over a British one. The Americans invested more in secondary and tertiary education than Britain. Thus, when the technological progress became more scientific, the British were increasingly disadvantaged. The United States notably had a higher R&D spending and more engineers and science graduates to continue searching for innovations. If the UK had done the same, their human capital might have been able to boost growth by coming up with more productive methods suitable to the British setting.

The fourth theory refers to the general unwillingness of the British government to intervene in the economy. Britain might have benefited from infant-industry policies designed to boost new, technologically progressive industries which were to some extent crowded out by the strength of Britain's traditional export sectors. This proposition seems unpersuasive, however. Primarily because the political economy of tariff protection was such that the proposals that had the most political support, such as those made by Chamberlain, would have actually tended to divert activity towards traditional sectors such as agriculture and textiles rather than new growth industries.

Thanks for clearing up aspects of what caused the UK to fall behind both the US and Germany, am aware there are factors that would not have prevented both from surpassing the UK in other areas.

Would the UK managing to modernize its economy as rapidly as the US and Germany as well as keeping up with both in terms of innovations have been enough to at least put the UK in a much better position prior to the outbreak of WW1 onwards, especially to the point where ATL UK does not adopt a declinist narrative (with their exit from Empire being more graceful compared to OTL)?

Fascinating to note the OTL automobile and motorcycle industries in the UK were making use of outdated (even 2nd hand) tooling even during the post-WW2 period, though no idea when would be the earliest point they could switch from old fashioned transfer machinery to modern production lines and tooling or be in a position to viably utilize thin-wall cast-iron and die-cast all-alloy in engines and cylinder heads.

Even today with parts of the UK rail network not being electrified (*) and the country not managing to further expand let alone modernize the canal network, would seem to stem from the UK's lackluster performance in the Second Industrial Revolution period from 1870-1914 and the lack of opportunity to rectify it from the interwar and post-WW2 periods up to the present.

*- Though an earlier POD than mentioned in beginning of thread, it would have been interesting seeing an alternate resolution to the UK Railway Gauge Wars being instead a slight compromise to placate both Isambard Brunel and George Stephenson, with the Standard Gauge still being mandated for the Track Gauge in favour of Stephenson while the Loading Gauge chosen was slightly larger as well as significantly less restrictive compared to real-life being in essence the same as the later named Berne Gauge roughly in though not completely in favour of Brunel.
 
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