AHC/WI: Liberal Democracy in the Eastern Block

VadisDeProfundis

Gone Fishin'
The world is entering the final decade of the Twentieth Century, and the “Evil Empire”, the Warsaw Pact are rapidly disintegrating. Your challenge is to have, by 2018, as many nations of the former Eastern Block as possible be regarded as successful, liberal (and social) democracies, developed on par with the West. On par is very difficult, but imagine every country being as rich as Slovenia and having the state and services of Estonia, something like that.

The POD can be as early as you like, even before the Soviet Collapse or at the tail end of the Second World War.

Some ideas of my own would be a Marshall Plan for Russia, perhaps a different path to European integration, butterflies killing off Boris Yeltsin, a more successful Glasnost & Perestroika that still end up in a more “orderly” Soviet collapse.
 
Keep the oligarchs in Russia from rising in power and probably have the USA and Western Europe be more involved with Eastern Europe’s

Yugoslavia would require extensive intervening due to it being a powder keg
 
The world is entering the final decade of the Twentieth Century, and the “Evil Empire”, the Warsaw Pact are rapidly disintegrating. Your challenge is to have, by 2018, as many nations of the former Eastern Block as possible be regarded as successful, liberal (and social) democracies, developed on par with the West. On par is very difficult, but imagine every country being as rich as Slovenia and having the state and services of Estonia, something like that.

The POD can be as early as you like, even before the Soviet Collapse or at the tail end of the Second World War.

Some ideas of my own would be a Marshall Plan for Russia, perhaps a different path to European integration, butterflies killing off Boris Yeltsin, a more successful Glasnost & Perestroika that still end up in a more “orderly” Soviet collapse.
You would have to shift the borders of the Soviet Union much farther East to make more of the former Soviet bloc democratic. The Warsaw Pact members and the Baltic States did better than Russia because they had only had 40 years of a Soviet rule, so there was still a living memory of what semi-functional democracy and free markets look like.

Democratization basically traces the original interwar soviet borders', with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, and Central Asia left out for deep historical reasons. In Russia, privatization went so poorly because 70 years of bolshevik rule had eviscerated any living memory of a free society, and there was no rule of law left to prevent the Oligarch's rise. If eastern Galicia and the areas that had been part of interwar Poland were an independent country, they would've done just as well as Poland and the Baltic States.

Eastern Ukraine was the more urbanized and industrial area of the postwar Ukrainian SSR, but it suffered the same problems as Russia due a longer period of communist rule.

Eastern and Western (former Polish) Belarus don't provide as start of a test case as Ukraine, because 1/4 to a 1/3 of Belarus's prewar population was killed during the war, and the region saw substantial postwar Russification. Belarusian national consciousness is still so weak because the urban intellectuals who provide the vanguard of a high culture were wiped out by the Nazis. The Belarusian nation was decapitated by having its elite killed off, and the remaining body of peasants had a Soviet-Russian body placed on its neck.
 
You would have to shift the borders of the Soviet Union much farther East to make more of the former Soviet bloc democratic. The Warsaw Pact members and the Baltic States did better than Russia because they had only had 40 years of a Soviet rule, so there was still a living memory of what semi-functional democracy and free markets look like.

Democratization basically traces the original interwar soviet borders', with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, and Central Asia left out for deep historical reasons. In Russia, privatization went so poorly because 70 years of bolshevik rule had eviscerated any living memory of a free society, and there was no rule of law left to prevent the Oligarch's rise. If eastern Galicia and the areas that had been part of interwar Poland were an independent country, they would've done just as well as Poland and the Baltic States.

Eastern Ukraine was the more urbanized and industrial area of the postwar Ukrainian SSR, but it suffered the same problems as Russia due a longer period of communist rule.

Eastern and Western (former Polish) Belarus don't provide as start of a test case as Ukraine, because 1/4 to a 1/3 of Belarus's prewar population was killed during the war, and the region saw substantial postwar Russification. Belarusian national consciousness is still so weak because the urban intellectuals who provide the vanguard of a high culture were wiped out by the Nazis. The Belarusian nation was decapitated by having its elite killed off, and the remaining body of peasants had a Soviet-Russian body placed on its neck.

Actually, Belarussian national counsciousness has been weak for longer than that. User David T has pointed out, that, in 1917, there were very few votes for Belarussian nationalists. Most Belarussians voted for the Bolsheviks. For some weird reason, the Bolsheviks decided to create a Belarussian SSR. Not all Bolsheviks agreed with that decision, though. There were some Bolsheviks who argued, that, Belarussians were not a nation and that it was wrong to artificially foster nationalism.
 
Actually, Belarussian national counsciousness has been weak for longer than that. User David T has pointed out, that, in 1917, there were very few votes for Belarussian nationalists. Most Belarussians voted for the Bolsheviks. For some weird reason, the Bolsheviks decided to create a Belarussian SSR. Not all Bolsheviks agreed with that decision, though. There were some Bolsheviks who argued, that, Belarussians were not a nation and that it was wrong to artificially foster nationalism.
David T sounds right. In 1917 most of the nationalist intellectuals who supported a Belarusian elite were easily co-opted by the Bolsheviks. Belarusian nationalism has been historically weak because it was the only non-partitioned nation in the region. Timothy Snyder's book The Reconstruction of Nations: Poland Ukraine, Lithuania, Belarus 1569-1999 lays out a theory of partition increasing national consciousness. It was useful for the great powers to irritate each other by provoking Lithuania, Polish, and Ukrainian national consciousness, and in each of these cases a "piedmont" like Eastern Galicia became nationalistic first, with sentiment spreading across the border from there.

If Belarus had been partitioned alone the interwar Polish-Soviet eastern border for most of the twentieth century with no Second World War, a stronger Belarusian nationalism would've emerged. There's nothing inherently artificial or false about Belarusian nationalism, its just emerging at a slower and later rate than other national movements due to a series of of contingent geographic factors that affect other nationalisms.

Historically much of modern day Belarus was part of the multiethnic duchy of Lithuania ruled by Polish-speaking nobility, there is no historical tradition of statehood like there is for Poland. The Wilno/Vilnius dispute arose because the city was the capital of the multiethnic Lithuanian Duchy, but historical revisionism by Lithuanian nationalists proclaimed their new nation-state as the reincarnation of the ancient Duchy.

This is why a city that never had a Lithuanian majority before the 1940s was claimed by Lithuanians as the historic capital of their nation. Adam Mickiewicz, a poet born in the Duchy's former territory, is claimed as the "national poet" by Lithuania, Poland, and Belarus.
 
You would have to shift the borders of the Soviet Union much farther East to make more of the former Soviet bloc democratic. The Warsaw Pact members and the Baltic States did better than Russia because they had only had 40 years of a Soviet rule, so there was still a living memory of what semi-functional democracy and free markets look like.

Democratization basically traces the original interwar soviet borders', with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, the Caucasus, and Central Asia left out for deep historical reasons. In Russia, privatization went so poorly because 70 years of bolshevik rule had eviscerated any living memory of a free society, and there was no rule of law left to prevent the Oligarch's rise. If eastern Galicia and the areas that had been part of interwar Poland were an independent country, they would've done just as well as Poland and the Baltic States.
Did Hungary, Serbia, Romania or Bulgaria have any democracy to speak of in the interwar period?
 
Did Hungary, Serbia, Romania or Bulgaria have any democracy to speak of in the interwar period?
Romania had a relatively democratic period during the '20s, but I'd argue that most of these states would have been on the road to democracy without WW2. Most of these states had something resembling a party system, and they elections they held had the potential to become less flawed over time. An authoritarian regime like Horthy's Hungary with an elected parliament creates expectations for more meaningful political participation, and provides the dress rehearsal for a consolidated liberal democracy.

These states would probably be flawed democracies or hybrid regimes by today's standards, it's not exactly North Korea.

Yugoslavia is a somewhat separate issue, I don't think stable democracy is possible without a clear answer to the national question. The other 3 countries listed had large majorities who belonged to the titular nationality, so political parties could be something more than a headcount of each identity group.
 
Romania had a relatively democratic period during the '20s, but I'd argue that most of these states would have been on the road to democracy without WW2. Most of these states had something resembling a party system, and they elections they held had the potential to become less flawed over time. An authoritarian regime like Horthy's Hungary with an elected parliament creates expectations for more meaningful political participation, and provides the dress rehearsal for a consolidated liberal democracy.

These states would probably be flawed democracies or hybrid regimes by today's standards, it's not exactly North Korea.

Yugoslavia is a somewhat separate issue, I don't think stable democracy is possible without a clear answer to the national question. The other 3 countries listed had large majorities who belonged to the titular nationality, so political parties could be something more than a headcount of each identity group.
So, was Russia less democratic than even other eastern european orthodox countries?
 
Perhaps a solution would be a further fragmenting of Russia sometime in the mid-90s? At the start, violent communist coup and putin-style ultranationalist groups fight with each other and the remnants of a deeply corrupt legitimate government in and around Moscow.

More pro-western groups in and around St Petersburg, not wanting to loose the tourist money, declare themselves the legitimate government, but see much resistance in turn. They end up successfully separating from the still-contested muscovite rule along with a hinterland extending at least to lake Ilmen and, in an attempt to foster a national identity of their own, call themselves the Republic of Novgorod. Building their identity on both the old medieval republic and on the enlightenment ideas espoused by Peter the Great, they focus on making themselves known as the democratic Russians.

Now separated from the bulk of Russia by the existence of a reborn Novgorod, Karelia makes a bid for it's own independence. Despite the native Karelians being a minority by now, they hope to gain better western approval by playing up their connections to Finland. They are allied and friendly to Novgorod, but want to be separate to have more of a focus on their own issues. It's not a likely state to be too successful, but maybe they might pull it off?

It's a very unlikely suggestion, but this would add two governments with a better chance of becoming a real democracy despite the long soviet rule by virtue of orienting themselves towards being democratic from their inception. This would also weaken Russia itself, potentially allowing for Ukraine and Belarus to be largely free from it's influence, which might allow at least the former to eventually become a functional democracy.
 
So, was Russia less democratic than even other eastern european orthodox countries?
Yes, I'd say so, Greece and Romania had a parliament much earlier than the Russian Empire did. During WW1 the Greek Prime Minister represented a powerful opposition to the King's foreign policy desires, in Russia that kind of conflict wouldn't have happened or it would have been quickly resolved in the Czar's favor.

Our opinions on how democratic a given country is will vary based on the relative importance placed on different metrics like how widespread suffrage is, constraints on the executive, civil liberties, etc.
 
Yes, I'd say so, Greece and Romania had a parliament much earlier than the Russian Empire did. During WW1 the Greek Prime Minister represented a powerful opposition to the King's foreign policy desires, in Russia that kind of conflict wouldn't have happened or it would have been quickly resolved in the Czar's favor.

Our opinions on how democratic a given country is will vary based on the relative importance placed on different metrics like how widespread suffrage is, constraints on the executive, civil liberties, etc.
Why was Russia behind the rest of Europe in this regard even to countries like Bulgaria?
 
Why was Russia behind the rest of Europe in this regard even to countries like Bulgaria?
It depends on which category of democracy is in question. Bulgaria gained independence in an era when constitutional monarchy was the norm, whereas Czarist institutions were a continuation of earlier absolutism.

Both the Russian Empire and Bulgaria were less urbanized than places like Germany or Britain, where demands for democratic reforms were combined with a push for labor organizing and work regulations. An agrarian society has a different set of values than a more urban, industrial, and market-oriented society.

The nationalities question would also make democratization in Russia much more complicated. Democracy generally requires the idea of a single people that accounts for most of the country's population, otherwise politics can devolve into a competition for political power and public services between different groups, and there is no idea of a common good. Poles, Russians, and Finns would see themselves as distinct peoples with different or mutually exclusive interests. Bulgaria was basically a nation-state, whereas the Russian Empire was like a larger Yugoslavia that was just barely Russian-majority.

The answer changes a lot whether it's the Empire as a whole, or separate regions of the Russian Empire are in question. The socioeconomic conditions in Finland, the Baltic Governates, and Petrograd were very different from the Russian country-side or Central Asia. Finland's autonomous parliament provided "democracy with training wheels" for the nation-state that emerged after WW1, but Finland had a unique political situation in the Empire.
 
The answer changes a lot whether it's the Empire as a whole, or separate regions of the Russian Empire are in question. The socioeconomic conditions in Finland, the Baltic Governates, and Petrograd were very different from the Russian country-side or Central Asia. Finland's autonomous parliament provided "democracy with training wheels" for the nation-state that emerged after WW1, but Finland had a unique political situation in the Empire.
This part reminds me, I remember seeing a literacy rate of the Russian empire, and the Baltic sea area (Finland, Baltics, saint petersburg) was the most literate. Why was this?
 
Because Finland and the Baltics had been aquired when some basic (or indeed not so basic) education had already been put into place by the previous owners and St. Petersburg, being the main port for contact and trade with Europe, was for centuries the centre for intellectuals and merchants.
 
Because Finland and the Baltics had been aquired when some basic (or indeed not so basic) education had already been put into place by the previous owners and St. Petersburg, being the main port for contact and trade with Europe, was for centuries the centre for intellectuals and merchants.
So why did Russia on the whole have a worse education system than Sweden or something? Is it the religious difference?
 
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