AHC: Strong post-war Royal Navy?

[Riain]

I've just started reading Friedmans book on British carriers, at chapter 14 the Malta class of course, and it's going into the structural and life of type aspects of American vs British carrier design. It appears the Americans used particularly long carriers and that came with 'issues' that the British didn't like. Have a lot of reading to go to reach a conclusion. In any case during the concept definition phase of the CVA01 the Forrestal class was looked at, as the minimum ship for 4 catapults and 4 deck edge lifts but specifically rejected as not suitable for british requirements.

On another tangent, all the talk about the 1952 design misses a vital point: from 1948 to 1957 British defence policy was to re fight a WW2 style war and RN strategy was to escort convoys with frigates and use light fleet carriers for trade protection. In this environment a big fleet carrier is not a requirement, the sweet spot for carrier approvals is from mid 1957 to late 1964, probably even mid 1963.

 

[PSL]

I was interested to read the other day that the reaction time of the Sea Dart was 12 seconds while the Terrier was 30 seconds. Furthermore that the US 5"/54 gun was twice the price of the Mk8 4.5".

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_45-55_mk8.php

FIGURES : 26 RPM firing a 45lb shell @ 24,000 yard range. 1170 pounds per minute...only 20,000 feet ceiling???

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_5-54_mk42.php

figures : 28 RPM firing 70lb shell @ 26,000 yards = 1960 lb per minute.with ceiling of 50,000 feet.

Twice the volume of fire for twice the price, at greater range & ceiling, sounds about right.

 

[Riain]

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNBR_45-55_mk8.php

FIGURES : 26 RPM firing a 45lb shell @ 24,000 yard range. 1170 pounds per minute...only 20,000 feet ceiling???

http://www.navweaps.com/Weapons/WNUS_5-54_mk42.php

figures : 28 RPM firing 70lb shell @ 26,000 yards = 1960 lb per minute.with ceiling of 50,000 feet.

Twice the volume of fire for twice the price, at greater range & ceiling, sounds about right.

By 1962 the RN had de-emphasized the gun to the point where the Type 82 DLG was considered with the Mk5 Mod 1, a single 4.5" gun with 150 rounds. The Mk8 gun was a step up from that, making the US 5" appear not only expensive but far in excess of capability requirements.

BTW IIRC the Mk8 was an anti-ship/shore bombardment weapon with low elevation, which would explain the low ceiling.

 

[Cryhavoc101]

And then there's manpower.
Something like a Forrestal needs about 5,000 for crew, airwing etc...

CVA -01 needs 3250
The 1952 was 2,550
Medium Fleet CV 2,400
Victorious about 2,000
1 Forrestal = 2 medium fleet carriers 2 Forrestals = 5 Victorious carriers

Since the RN had not just affordability issues with something like the Type 82, it had manpower issues with trying to get 13 ships of 325 crew per ship.....

While a pair of Medium Fleet CVs makes for 4,800.
So 1 Forrestal type CV is going to accelerate the crunch point of funds and manpower and force an even more severe cutback. Let alone 2.

Sustainment is the key here. Trying to be the USN is simply insane.
But keeping a pair of Medium Fleet CVs going is far more affordable.

This is a good point and manpower continues to be the issue even today - but I would counter it in saying that a British Forrestal type ship would not be operating as large an airgroup as a US Forrestal (what 90 AC) and had the decision been made......???

But this was one of the many reasons why larger carriers dissapeared and no replacements were made OTL so in order to have 2 or 3 this manpower issue would have to had to been addressed as part of that decision to have larger carreirs along with improvements to shore establishment/docks/dockyards/drydocks etc - all things that have had to be addressed with todays QE class CV

OTL Britain went with the the 3 'little carriers that could' instead and as I have said I think it was the correct decision at the time to focus on Britains NATO commitment by focusing on the BAOR and RAFG and northern flank with the Navy acting in a supporting role.

 

[yulzari]

Standing back from the detailed look at the OP it strikes me that the obvious force multiplier would be to integrate the builds and kit with the French Navy to benefit from economies of scale, cross decking and inter service use of resources. Independently they could get a cheaper fleet for their budgets and jointly operate a large naval fleet. Where the roles of the navies differ then each could call on the other when the other navy's role becomes required temporarily by the other. e.g. for the French the RFA would be a useful loan for keeping their vessels on station far from home and the loan of the odd carrier from time to time would allow the Royal Navy to cover refits or short term losses. The two navies are only 20 miles apart. It is not as if the Atlantic Ocean separated them and these days you can travel by train between London and Paris in less than 2 1/2 hours so liaison should not be hard.

 

[edgeworthy]

Standing back from the detailed look at the OP it strikes me that the obvious force multiplier would be to integrate the builds and kit with the French Navy to benefit from economies of scale, cross decking and inter service use of resources. Independently they could get a cheaper fleet for their budgets and jointly operate a large naval fleet. Where the roles of the navies differ then each could call on the other when the other navy's role becomes required temporarily by the other. e.g. for the French the RFA would be a useful loan for keeping their vessels on station far from home and the loan of the odd carrier from time to time would allow the Royal Navy to cover refits or short term losses. The two navies are only 20 miles apart. It is not as if the Atlantic Ocean separated them and these days you can travel by train between London and Paris in less than 2 1/2 hours so liaison should not be hard.

Co-operate with the French?

You see there's your problem!

 

[sonofpegasus]

"who needs enemies when you have the French for allies" proverbial British saying.

 

[Zen9]

Being far from my books and the time to do this justice I'll have to take some time to get back to all the issues thrown up here.

However that parliamentary statement on a 50,000ton ship is prior to being asked to go back and rethink the carrier. In a way this was the moment things got out of hand again.

However there was scope for a better outcome than Invincible and SHar.

In essence Invincible is a bit gold plated for attending CVA-01 and a bit under par for a ASW group leader CV with decent anti-fleet shadower and anti-ship capabilities.

Something around 30,000tons and with P1154 would deliver the latter.

While something more like 15,000tons meets the former.
Especially true if you are funding Type 82s.

 

[PSL]

To deal with the level of threat posed by a combined attack of 50 missile armed Bear bombers plus several ECHO I or II , is far more than a Ark Royal CVA with dozen Phantom can handle. If they could operate E2B AWACS that would be a step in the right direction. If they could operated 2 dozen Phantom , that would be another step in the right direction. If each CVA could count on 1/2 dozen TYPE 82/42 DDG, that would be a further step in the right direction. If they had NTDS to tie these all together into a network , they might have a chance of surviving. With any luck the convoy full of troops for NATO will bare the brunt of most of the missile hits.

 

[Zen9]

The hard case here is that in '63 the west got to see Soviet anti-ship missiles and realised that they could launch from 100nm out.

This meant that AEW of 200nm detection range was a bare minimum. Ideally 'up threat' some 100nm from the force being protected.

This is why they stated they needed 8 AEW and 24 CAP fighters. Ensuring they could have aloft some 2-3 AEW and some 8-12 Fighters of ideally 4 hours endurance some 100nm from the Carrier.
By contrast they felt that the future might allow a next gen fighter to be so capable that they'd only need 12.
Possibly this is alluding to the US AIM-54 Pheonix missile and the radar that goes with it.

Or that just 2 large missile shooters could do the job.....possibly this is Red Barrel's spiritual successor....

This is why some effort was put into a domestic AEWACS platform and systems.

 

[Riain]

To deal with the level of threat posed by a combined attack of 50 missile armed Bear bombers plus several ECHO I or II , is far more than a Ark Royal CVA with dozen Phantom can handle. If they could operate E2B AWACS that would be a step in the right direction. If they could operated 2 dozen Phantom , that would be another step in the right direction. If each CVA could count on 1/2 dozen TYPE 82/42 DDG, that would be a further step in the right direction. If they had NTDS to tie these all together into a network , they might have a chance of surviving. With any luck the convoy full of troops for NATO will bare the brunt of most of the missile hits.

That was not a planning assumption. In the NATO context until 1978 the RN strike carrier was the centrepiece of Atlantic Strike Fleet 'Strike Group 2' with a USN carrier as the centre of SG1. Until 1966 the assumption was that in a limited Hot war East of Suez, akin to the Suez Crisis or Korea and looking likely in 1961 in Kuwait and from 1963 in Malaysia, the RN alone would deploy 2 carriers.

In both cases the carriers would operate some 50 miles apart with their own close escort but also with shared Task Force pickets and other escorts.

 

[Zen9]

Yes this was why they were working hard to find ways to get as much Sea Dart equipped ships into that force.

 

[Riain]

Being far from my books and the time to do this justice I'll have to take some time to get back to all the issues thrown up here.

However that parliamentary statement on a 50,000ton ship is prior to being asked to go back and rethink the carrier. In a way this was the moment things got out of hand again.

However there was scope for a better outcome than Invincible and SHar.

In essence Invincible is a bit gold plated for attending CVA-01 and a bit under par for a ASW group leader CV with decent anti-fleet shadower and anti-ship capabilities.

Something around 30,000tons and with P1154 would deliver the latter.

While something more like 15,000tons meets the former.
Especially true if you are funding Type 82s.

The CVA01 was cancelled as part of a defence review that was to have the British not fight limited wars East of Suez from 1975. This is where the 'no amphibious landings without allies' came from; the RM would be landed in Norway in conjunction with the Dutch covered by the USN carriers of strike fleet Atlantic.

Thus the Invincibles were designed without reference to the ability to carry Harriers, which is why they were so undercooked for the role. To say that the RN needed 30,000t carriers to carry (already cancelled in 1963 & 64) transonic STOVL or even the Harrier is to say the RN DOES need aircraft operating from carriers.

Basically the bigger STOVL ship doesnt fit any of the 3 Defence policies going in the 60s. It only became possible after the 1970 decision to keep some carrier capability, and by then the RN had been irretrievably broken.

 

[Riain]

Yes this was why they were working hard to find ways to get as much Sea Dart equipped ships into that force.

Friedman goes through the process of how the RN initially decided they needed 13 Type 82s and how they pared that back to 6. 3 were upthreat pickets and 3 were scattered between the 2 carriers because they were too far apart for 1 to do the job.

By putting Sea Dart on the CVAs there were Sea Dart ships in the centre of each Task Group, and the detached pickets were scaled back to a single Type 82 leading the Task Force with other 3 or so doing more conventional AA and ASW roles within the Task Groups.

I think its important to recall, difficult from the distance of 55 years, that the RN thought Falklands style campaigns were their bread and butter rather than the amazing aberration they became. They used to have CBG and amphibious group East of Suez and expected to be able to call on HMAS Melbourne without a second thought. The British thought little of confronting Iraq in 61 and Indonesia from 64.

 

[PSL]

That was not a planning assumption. In the NATO context until 1978 the RN strike carrier was the centrepiece of Atlantic Strike Fleet 'Strike Group 2' with a USN carrier as the centre of SG1. Until 1966 the assumption was that in a limited Hot war East of Suez, akin to the Suez Crisis or Korea and looking likely in 1961 in Kuwait and from 1963 in Malaysia, the RN alone would deploy 2 carriers.

In both cases the carriers would operate some 50 miles apart with their own close escort but also with shared Task Force pickets and other escorts.

In other words they were doomed.

 

[Riain]

In other words they were doomed.

IIRC you posted a link in the fate of carriers 1983 thread, I assume you aren't a believer that carriers would win the battle against the Soviet Navy? Another article was linked in that thread about operating a carrier AVMF bases in 1982, talking missile traps and the rest.

It was assumed that a single Sea Dart ship could handle a target group of 5 closely spaced aircraft, so a well placed missile trap or 2 might take care of 10-20% of the attack before launch. With Phantom and close in SD ships taking care of many of the rest leaving the leakers for guns, close missiles, ECM and of course successful hits.

The thing that such an attack could not be undertaken lightly, any sort of even fight would see heavy losses for the Soviets making follow up attacks difficult.

 

[Zen9]

During simulation of the Type 43 with Sea Dart mkII and Sea Wolf, the combination successfully defended itself against a mass raid.
The only problem was they failed to limit the simulated ships store of missiles.
In reality it would run out of them.

 

[PSL]

If a carrier could mobilise 48 phantom jets in the 1960s , while the battle group had 1/2 dozen SAM CG/DDG- with some kind of data link- I would expect a lot of carnage both ways. I would expect both attacker and defender to be so damaged as to be still useless months later in any war. If such a war even lasts months, is an open question.

As far as this thread is concerned, the greatest threat to RN is post war period of mid 40s to late 50s. Each decade after that,its less and less likely to explode into hot war. The only way to negotiate this path and still end up with strong navy through out the NATO/WARPACT era and after , is to lean in opposite directions before and after 1960. A WW-II legacy fleet is mandatory for the before 1960 time period with as many of the last gen warships finished - post war, focusing on up to a dozen carriers escorted by a pair of gun cruisers , with plenty of dual purpose guns and 1/2 dozen BATTLE type DD. The carrier problem is also paramount as sustaining a fleet of even 1/2 dozen carriers through future decades, would require a new carrier built every decade, with periodic re-tasking of older models. So the fleet could easily have a new Phantom CVA carrier side by side with decade old ASW 'Harrier Carrier' and several older "commando carriers" with limited ASW HELO capability.

Since no one knew what such missile warships effectiveness would be and the unseen consequences , its best to approach such a future fleet by selectively modifying last war gen ships to explore cost effective combinations. Only then could decade blocks of warships be built with the right emphasis, as well as pervious decades warships refitted and re-tasked to best fit the evolving fleet concept.

Instead of 1/2 fleet replacement -you will need 1/3 to 1/4, fleet replacement. Moors law would force each decade to embrace several generations of computer upgrades into each new warship block. So any given weapon , would have to have a simpler "bolt on version" to 'back fit' the rest of the fleet -up to a common agreed standard....each decade!

 

[Riain]

If a carrier could mobilise 48 phantom jets in the 1960s , while the battle group had 1/2 dozen SAM CG/DDG- with some kind of data link- I would expect a lot of carnage both ways. I would expect both attacker and defender to be so damaged as to be still useless months later in any war. If such a war even lasts months, is an open question

The USN had the ability to put together such CVWs and CBGs with 48 Phantoms and 6 SAM escorts but didn't . They were satisfied with CVWs with 2 fighter squadrons and 3 attack squadrons and a carrier escorted by 2 Terrier and 2 Tartar ships. This says to me that the requirement for so many fighters and escorts for a single carrier is double and 2/3 of what is actually needed. Therefore its unreasonable to expect the RN to aim for it.

Since no one knew what such missile warships effectiveness would be and the unseen consequence

The same applies to missile firing bombers, ships and subs. It isn't reasonable to expect complete failure of your own weapons systems and complete success of the threat weapons systems.

 

[Zen9]

If you can fire Sea Darts every 12 seconds instead of 30 for Tartar/Terrier, then you can potentially engage twice as many targets.
Limiting factors apply.

24 was the figure for FAW for the ideal 1952 CV. Along with 24 Fighters (interceptors).

I'd also repeat that sending your F4 over Mach 1.9 caused the windscreen to start to cloud making such acts a one shot deal with replacement necessary for safety's sake.
48 would likely be a result of this issue.