AHC-Operation Overlord: Double Allied Losses, Halve German Losses

[politicalnomad]

With a POD of no more than 4 months before June 6, 1944 and without WMDs/weather/landing date changes, your challenge is to make Operation Overlord much, much bloodier for the Allies. You can marginally, but not significantly increase troop strength, and you can swap out Panzer Divisions for Infantry Divisions and the like. You can wrestle tactical flexibility from Hitler, and you can replace field commanders.

At the same time, avoid disasters like the Falaise Pocket for the Germans. While Axis forces are almost certainly going to lose, the idea is to make things difficult whilst hanging onto as much strength as possible for the defense of the Fatherland.

 

[lionhead]

There was a panzer division in Calais, if that would have been in Normandy Allied losses would have been much higher.

 

[Aber]

With a POD of no more than 4 months before June 6, 1944 and without WMDs/weather/landing date changes, your challenge is to make Operation Overlord much, much bloodier for the Allies.

On June 6th, or over the whole campaign?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I doubt it would get the numbers you're looking for, but I've been musing with the idea that the StG44 is fully adopted and replaces the MP40 and K98k as the standard infantry rifle for units in Normandy. IOTL there were at most <1000 StG44s AND FG42s available in Normandy during that campaign (they vast majority were deployed in the East, which was still only some 10,000 rifles total by that time). Couple that with an earlier Panzerfaust (full production of the PzF 60 wasn't reached until September 1944 IOTL) of greater performance (say the PzF 100 or 150, the former didn't enter production until September 1944 IOTL, the latter didn't until March 1945) and you'd probably see a substantially higher loss rate to the Allies in Normandy where the close in terrain favored such weapons. I'd say even having a version of the Japanese Type 89 grenade launcher would be a big help too. IOTL the Germans were also working on a claymore type mine, which if ready for Normandy would have made the fighting even more hellish in the hedgerows.

The most likely way to inflict larger losses on the Allies would probably be a better artillery supply chain and support network; IOTL there were serious problems with proper storage of ammo, which let the Allied air forces hit supply dumps and deprive German artillery of sufficient ammo to reply to the Allied artillery. Having the Germans be able to effectively fight back in terms of artillery would have deprived the Allies of a major one-sided advantage in that campaign.

In terms of getting forces there earlier apparently the 21st Panzer division was the only division close enough to the beaches to have been able to have counterattacked on the day of the invasion, so if say Rommel was present instead of being on leave or Hitler being woken up, it could have disrupting the landings at Sword beach:
https://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/21._P...dung_in_Frankreich_und_Kampf_in_der_Normandie

The headquarters of Feuchtinger was in Saint-Pierre-sur-Dives, It was the only German Panzerverband that could have attacked immediately after landing. However, the division was not immediately applicable, since it was " v. Rundstedt ( Commander-in-Chief West ) in operative reserve (held), but he had strict orders not to dispose of them without permission of the OKW, so Hitler. "Feuchtinger could the infantry and reconnaissance troops assigned to the division on 6 June shortly after 1 clock "but in the hours of darkness during which they could have marched unhindered from Falaise to Caen, his tanks were condemned to motionlessness because Army Group B had no orders for their deployment." It was not until 6:45 pm that the 7th Armya release cause, "but since the communication links were broken, took another two hours before Feuchtinger [...] received an operational command." [1] The landing of the 3rd British Infantry Division in Sword could no longer be affected by the delay, However, the German defense managed to prevent the planned rapid capture of Caen.

If then also able to get to the beach earlier enough and toss the 3rd Infantry division back into the sea, then the Normandy campaign would get a lot tougher for the Allies and the British 6th Airborne would be overrun/cut off.

http://www.historynet.com/die-another-day-counterattack-normandy.htm

At 1 p.m., the first of two British commando battalions from Sword arrived at Bénouville and the Orne bridges with a single company of tanks and another coming up the road. Meanwhile, 21st Panzer Division, which the British believed would not reach the battlefield until the next day, was a 15-minute drive from the eastern bridge span, was in contact with elements of German 711th and 716th infantry divisions feebly attacking the bridgehead on both sides of the river-canal system, and was beginning to form up for a massed attack. Then, suddenly, 21st Panzer Division received orders to halt all preparations to storm the bridges. Instead, it was directed to launch itself at the British beaches on the other side of the Orne.

General Friedrich Dollmann, commander of German 7th Army, had directed the change of plan at 10:30 that morning. The panzer division did not receive its instructions until around noon, and then it notified the regimental commanders an hour later after hastily developing a new plan of action. The result was near chaos as major elements of 21st Panzer Division were ordered to backtrack along their approach route instead of punching through the thin British screen ahead of them – the direct route to Sword, little more than three miles beyond Bénouville.

“The regrouping of the division took hours,” said regimental commander Major Hans von Luck. “Most of the units from the east side of Caen and the Orne had to squeeze through the eye of a needle at Caen and over the only bridges available in this sector [while] under virtually constant bombardment from the [Allied] navy and fighter-bombers.”

While Kampfgruppe Meyer was being ground down to the point of annihilation, the 21st Panzer elements to the east painfully retraced their path and then picked their way through the rubble of Caen. This forced a delay of nearly three and a half hours, which British 3d Infantry Division and 27th Armored Brigade put to good use by establishing pre-planned defensive concentrations along the very axis of attack the panzers were ordered to take. The 21st’s commander, Major General Edgar Feuchtinger did not protest the move and compounded the misstep by breaking up his division. A third of the formation was left behind to assault the bridges. Strong enough to take the position at the original time planned for the attack, it now faced a much tougher job later in the day when British 6th Airborne Division defenders were able to call in naval gunfire at will. The panzergrenadiers would fail to take the bridge and, in any event, had no forces behind them to exploit a success.

 

[James Ricker]

Have the Germans pull out faster so no or a diminished Falaise pocket.

 

[politicalnomad]

On June 6th, or over the whole campaign?

Whole Normandy campaign.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

I've done some more research about the situation with the 21st Panzer division and it looks like the best POD is to have Rommel not on leave on June 5th/6th. Had he been on station when the reports came in he'd have disobeyed Hitler's orders and gotten the Panzer divisions in motion during darkness so that they could react before airpower and naval firepower would disrupt their movement and attacks (at least Hans von Luck was convinced that was the case...in his bio he also cites an order that wasn't passed down standing orders to counterattack airborne landings with the entire 21st Panzer division, which came out after the war). Had that happened and the 21st Panzer and the 12th SS Panzer divisions (or at least advanced elements of them) gotten moving within the first hours of the airborne landings they probably could have wiped out the British airborne landings and gotten through to Sword beach to stop the British from getting a beachhead. Juno beach was unlikely to be stopped though, but could be better contained, especially with Sword failing.

If that happens then the Normandy campaign is certainly going to be a lot more costly to the Allies and take longer, while the V-1 launch sites are able to operate longer. I wonder if the British could even really advance on Caen for quite some time, which might well make the Falaise Pocket impossible.

 

[History Learner]

Delay D-Day:

What actually happened: Bad weather almost forced Ike to postpone D-Day at the last moment, but he decided to let it go ahead on June 6, 1944. Things worked out well, though a sudden, severe channel storm (the worst in a century) wrecked a lot of supply ships, wrecked the Mulberry artificial harbors, made air support impossible, and almost stopped resupply a couple of weeks later (June 19-22).

What might have happened: If the weather had been a little worse on June 6, Eisenhower would have been forced to postpone the landing. That by itself would have caused enormous security problems. Too many people had to know too much in the last day or two before the invasion. Hundreds of thousands of people would have to keep their mouths shut and not lose written material they had been given on the invasion. The German spy network in England had been neutralized, but the allies could not be sure there weren't other rings.

There would have been intense pressure to go at the next moment the moon and the tides were right. That would have put the landing around June 18 or 19, just in time for the severe storm. That storm, by the way, came up without warning, which is part of the reason it did a lot of the damage it did. If the allies had been caught by the storm in the early stages of the landing, with troops trying to establish themselves on the beaches, the troops that made it would have been cut off from resupply and reinforcements for almost four days. Allied air power would have been neutralized. The Germans might well have been able to destroy the invasion on the beaches and destroy airborne forces before they could link up with the main invasion force.

Immediate results: The initial invasion force is essentially wiped out—50,000 to 100,000 men killed or captured, including a lot of specialists like the airborne troops. The Allies also lose a lot of equipment captured or destroyed, including landing craft, specialized tanks modified to support the invasion force on the beaches, and other vital cogs in the wheels of an amphibious Allied landing. The artificial harbors that would have made supply over the beaches at Normandy possible are destroyed by the storm on their way over. Bottom line: D-Day has become an allied disaster that makes an immediate second try very difficult both politically and militarily.

 

[thaddeus]

if they had concentrated all their efforts on the smaller of the two Elektroboot designs Type XXIII http://german-navy.de/kriegsmarine/ships/uboats/typxxiii/index.html there likely would be at least some available?

 

[FBKampfer]

Well, I think first we need to establish what would cause abortion of the landings on D+1, once large quantities of men and matériel have been put ashore. Ideally we would see Dunkirk II.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

Delay D-Day:

This gets you there better than any wishful thinking for the Germans. Maybe it can be avoided by a hasty rescheduling of the landings to a different hour. Aiming for maximum daylight is a nice to have thing, but not a one and only thing. But hasty short fuzed changes have their own set of problems.

 

[Takonas]

I guess another proposed scenario would be if more veteran German soldiers had been deployed along with extra reserves for the entrenched positions. This proposed scenario partially results from Bodo Zimmerman who proposed the reasons they failed, and to which I will respond to how they could've inflicted more casualties or even have won based off the information he had and the choices he wanted to make.
This is just a little prefrace before I go on to describe the actual description of the events prior to the invasion of D-Day itself, if you guys want I'll make an actual description of the actual D-Day landings and their direct aftermath.
So here's the actual proposal:
March 8th, 1944: Someone,(Cough) Rundstedt (Cough), listens to Zimmerman that all inactive personnel SHOULD reside or rest in Air-raid shelters that SHOULD be built following the Allied Air Dominance of Northern France
March 11th, 1944: Fliegercorps IX and Fliegercorps X are merged into Fliegercorps IX and is put in charge of Northern France
March 17th, 1944: German Industry begins producing equipment at a faster scale with more emphasis being made on the use of larger labor forces with more nationalized armament manufacturies
April 4th, 1944: Rommel is designated Commander-in-Chief of the West due to the status of the Atlantic Wall reported under Rundstedt's command
April 5th, 1944: Bodo Zimmerman assumes the position of Commander of Forces in France under Rommel
April 7th, 1944: The order is given to mobilize 4 full Infantry Divisions under the titles of 712th, 713th, 714th, and 717th from Soviet, French, and German Prisoners/Conscripts
April 8th, 1944: Rommel's suggested reforms are made a reality and units along the Northern Coast of France begin drilling and rigorously fortifying their defenses
April 9th, 1944: German High Command is able to spare extra materials and armaments from overworked armament manufacturies in France, Germany, and Czechia
April 15th, 1944: Bodo Zimmerman submits his report that the allied forces may be planning a bluff at Calais (OTL)
April 16th, 1944: Rommel agrees with Bodo Zimmerman's claim
April 17th, 1944: The Kriegsmarine is instructed to get Naval Intelligence of British Assets (OTL)
April 23rd, 1944: Extra armaments, ammo, and materials arrive in Normandy in order to strengthen the defensive positions
May, 1944: Drills, entrenchment of the channel, and the successful negotiation of deploying the 1st Panzer Army as reserves for the Atlantic Wall on the Northern Coast of France
June 5th, 1944 at 0700: The Radio Londres Broadcast of
"Les sanglots longs
Des violons
De l’automne
Blessent mon cœur
D’une langueur
Monotone."
is mispronounced and/or is lost altogether. (I'm actually on the fence here, it almost happened and did happen in some areas. So, should the French Resistance be active or inactive?)
June 5th, 1944 at 2000: Rommel would remain in France due to a increase in encrypted radio transmissions that looked like a possible Allied Action. Rommel would then alert units to raise readiness status along the Northern coast of France and contact Fliegercorps IX with orders to intercept any allied aircraft.
June 5th, 1944 at 2100: French Resistance members move to attack their targets
June 5th, 1944 at 2110: CIO of the C in C of the West decrypts a communique between a High-Rank French Resistance Officer and SOE in London, the message is simple "Do I mobilize forces to assist in the landing at Normandy or do I direct my attentions towards German reserves at Paris". (OTL)
June 5th, 1944 at 2115: Bodo Zimmerman is informed of the development. (OTL)
June 5th, 1944 at 2118: Bodo Zimmerman calls up Rommel and informs him the invasion is imminent. (OTL, yes this actually happened and Bodo Zimmerman was told to "Stop making up stories" when he called Rundstedt who was in the same position OTL)
June 5th, 1944 at 2130: Luftwaffe units are to go to full readiness status along with Army and Naval units
June 6th, 1944 at 0015: Allied pathfinders land at their designated zones (like OTL)
June 6th, 1944 at 0100: Axis interceptors strike at the Allied transport planes flying over Normandy
June 6th, 1944 at 0130: Allied paratroopers begin landing (like OTL)

GERMAN ORDER OF BATTLE OF AXIS BY JUNE 6th, 1944 at 0000:
709th Infantry (Russian/Ukranian, Conscripts), 716th Infantry (German, Conscript), and the 352nd Infantry (German) at NORMANDY
712th Infantry (French, Conscripts) and 21st Panzer (German) at CAEN
12th Hitlerjugend Panzer at AVRANCHES
713th Infantry (French, Conscripts) and 714th Infantry(Sickly, Elderly, German) at PARIS
Panzer Lehr at ROUEN
243rd Infantry, 91st Air Landers, and 6th Parachute at COTENTIN
FLIEGERCORPS IX: ~1,200 operable fighters, ~500 available bombers, and ~1,300 varying of varying classification (I will find a list one of these days and this aircraft list may be changed by next post)
3 DDs, 5 TBs, 163 Minesweepers, 34 E-Boots, and 37 Submarines

SOURCES:
There's like 30 different direct documents but am mostly "Fatal Decisions", "Armor Battles of the Waffen-SS 1943-45", and a number of deployment orders throughout the years of 1943-44.

 

[marathag]

There was a panzer division in Calais, if that would have been in Normandy Allied losses would have been much higher.

That means they eat more shells from the Bombardment Squadron before the British would land

 

[Deleted member 1487]

That means they eat more shells from the Bombardment Squadron before the British would land

The initial bombardment before the landings was generally ineffective except as harassment.

 

[Carl Schwamberger]

The initial bombardment before the landings was generally ineffective except as harassment.

...& As soon as the spotting teams got ashore, or in the air over moving columns it was devastating. The preparatory fires represented less than 1 pct. of the naval ammunition fired into Normady. German accounts describe the NGF variously as significant, important, severe, and horrible.

 

[Gannt the chartist]

...& As soon as the spotting teams got ashore, or in the air over moving columns it was devastating. The preparatory fires represented less than 1 pct. of the naval ammunition fired into Normady. German accounts describe the NGF variously as significant, important, severe, and horrible.

And that’s from the survivors

 

[Takonas]

And that’s from the survivors

...& As soon as the spotting teams got ashore, or in the air over moving columns it was devastating. The preparatory fires represented less than 1 pct. of the naval ammunition fired into Normady. German accounts describe the NGF variously as significant, important, severe, and horrible.

Oh god, the NGF actually terrified regional commanders. It had maybe an arguable effect on the actual men at the front, but it caused too many morale problems in the Static Infantry which caused massive routes and surrenders to occur. The result of this is the elite forces of the Wehrmacht holding the frontline with all the 'green' units running the other way.

Just to reiterate this, the Commander of Army Group D, Bodo Zimmerman, wrote that "We were totally and woefully unequipped for the amount of naval bombardment that struck our positions on the 6th of June." while even absolute American air dominance and the preemptive bombings were left unmentioned. You could argue this to be General Zimmerman trying to rewrite history before any of us, or you could state that the naval bombardment was so effective that it took priority over the rest of the factors.


P.S. Do you guys think I should actually write up a real scenario in coordination to my earlier post involving possible preparations?

 

[Deleted member 1487]

...& As soon as the spotting teams got ashore, or in the air over moving columns it was devastating. The preparatory fires represented less than 1 pct. of the naval ammunition fired into Normady. German accounts describe the NGF variously as significant, important, severe, and horrible.

Considering that the prep-fire was a few hours of a multi-month campaign, that isn't surprising.
Going by Hans von Luck's autobiography a lot of naval fire was harassing fire against nearby logistics hubs like Caen rather than against specific units. But the point stands that it was pretty heavy and hard once the invasion itself stuck. The point was that if the panzers got into place while the invasion was still on the beaches, the lesson learned from Salerno and Sicily, the ability for naval fire support to be effectively directed was limited.

 

[Deleted member 1487]

http://www.historynet.com/die-another-day-counterattack-normandy.htm

At 1 p.m., the first of two British commando battalions from Sword arrived at Bénouville and the Orne bridges with a single company of tanks and another coming up the road. Meanwhile, 21st Panzer Division, which the British believed would not reach the battlefield until the next day, was a 15-minute drive from the eastern bridge span, was in contact with elements of German 711th and 716th infantry divisions feebly attacking the bridgehead on both sides of the river-canal system, and was beginning to form up for a massed attack. Then, suddenly, 21st Panzer Division received orders to halt all preparations to storm the bridges. Instead, it was directed to launch itself at the British beaches on the other side of the Orne.

General Friedrich Dollmann, commander of German 7th Army, had directed the change of plan at 10:30 that morning. The panzer division did not receive its instructions until around noon, and then it notified the regimental commanders an hour later after hastily developing a new plan of action. The result was near chaos as major elements of 21st Panzer Division were ordered to backtrack along their approach route instead of punching through the thin British screen ahead of them – the direct route to Sword, little more than three miles beyond Bénouville.

“The regrouping of the division took hours,” said regimental commander Major Hans von Luck. “Most of the units from the east side of Caen and the Orne had to squeeze through the eye of a needle at Caen and over the only bridges available in this sector [while] under virtually constant bombardment from the [Allied] navy and fighter-bombers.”

Per a Hans von Luck interview about the history of the campaign the order to attack east of the Orne was actually a mistake and original order was to attack west of it via Caen north toward Sword beach; the faulty order cost a lot of time that morning and casualties from air attack as they deployed via Caen east to attack the 6th Airborne and at 1pm the correction got through to redeploy the bulk of the division back west through Caen and air/naval strikes to do what they did in the afternoon IOTL. By then the British had gotten Fireflies ashore and AT weapons deployed to exactly the area 21st Panzer attacked, which slaughtered the panzer spearhead.

So another option, besides getting going at night, would have been for the correct order to arrive on time at 6:45 AM and the 21st Panzer to attack via Caen, west of the Orne river right at Sword beach that morning east of late afternoon. Given that the British 3rd Division hadn't cleared the beach until 9:30 AM or so that might have been enough time to stop them at the beach and cut off the 6th Airborne. Even if not the inland advance had to overcome several strong points after moving inland that sat on the high ground before being able to link up with 6th Airborne or be able to clear fire from that high ground onto the beach:

 

[marathag]

Seems like it should have had the planned 'BAND' Landings on the 6th that were decided against East of the Canal