AHC: Better Japanese campaign in Burma during WW2

[La Rouge Beret]

I was re reading my copy of Defeat into Victory and thought about how could the IJA have performed better during the Burmese campaign.

One idea that I considered was to politically rehabilitate Yamashita, as the Campaign is important yet will also be fought on a shoestring at the periphery of the conflict from the Japanese perspective. Otherwise the mental flexibility of Kuribayashi could also be useful.

Ultimately the Allies will win, it's just how difficult the IJA can make it.

 

[kvnrthr]

I'm not sure that even with excellent leadership that the Kohima-Imphal offensive would have gone very much farther. As I understand it, the Japanese achieved surprise and rather good results in their initial maneuver OTL, but after that both the Kohima battle and the Imphal siege seem like really attritional battles rather than ones where maneuver would play a significant role.

Perhaps a defensive orientation might be better? The Japanese lost a lot of soldiers trying to attack the British, and Slim's advance in 1945 was made easier due to the losses sustained in that battle. Now the British will be attacking well prepared Japanese positions with fresh troops rather than recently lost ground.

 

[GuildedAgeNostalgia]

- You are going to want a commander who excels more in logistics and organization than tactics/strategy. Burma is so far away from everything else, you need someone who can turn Burma into a economy built on supplying and supporting the army. Tactical and most strategic level decisions can be left to lower level generals.

- Instead of using the Indian National Army as a conventional force, train it as a guerilla force and use it in India the same way that the British used Ghurkas in Burma. Raid and sabotage enemy supply depots to prevent Allied counter-offensives.

- While staying on the defensive along the Burma/Indian border, the Japanese in Burma should launch a full scale invasion of Yunnan Province in south western China that coincides with Ichi-Go. Yunnan after Ichi-Go was one of the last relatively secure KMT holdouts in Western China. Invading, or even raiding this area would nock the KMT out for the remainder of the war and allow the Japanese to take troops from China and reallocate them to Burma and Manchuria to help against the 1945 Soviet, British, and American offensives.

 

[Admiral Bloonbeard]

Considering how well the Japanese did in Burma OTL, and how bad the British, Chinese, and Americans did in Burma, I do not think the Japanese can do any better and the Allies do any worse.

 

[La Rouge Beret]

I agree with the comments around pursuing a more defensive campaign in Burma interspersed with large scale raids. One thing that sticks to my mind is that the native Burmans (ethnic group) could be utilised more effectively by the Japanese. Is there any ability to create a partial light industrial base in Burma to provide small arms manufacturing?

I hadn't considered a Yunnan offensive and how plausible is that using the Japanese troops in Burma?

 

[Cryhavoc101]

Problem is the primary goal of the Burma campaign as far as the Japanese were concerned was the closing of the Burma road and to cut the main remaining supply route of Western arms and supplies to the Chinese which once they had captured Rangoon - well quite frankly job done.

So to do more the strategic goal has to be larger as they achieved their goal OTL

By the time the new routes were established to China the Allies were too strong and by 1944 the British commonwealth is unleashing Blitzkrieg in the Jungle and encirclement/infiltration tactics that worked up until 1943 no longer worked in the face of well supplied and well trained and led troops (and in fact was counter productive as the infiltrating troop units lacked supplies of their own with virtually no method of resupply so effectively became the isolated unit if the unit they had 'isolated' unsporting did not panic and collapse).

 

[La Rouge Beret]

Problem is the primary goal of the Burma campaign as far as the Japanese were concerned was the closing of the Burma road and to cut the main remaining supply route of Western arms and supplies to the Chinese which once they had captured Rangoon - well quite frankly job done.

So to do more the strategic goal has to be larger as they achieved their goal OTL

By the time the new routes were established to China the Allies were too strong and by 1944 the British commonwealth is unleashing Blitzkrieg in the Jungle and encirclement/infiltration tactics that worked up until 1943 no longer worked in the face of well supplied and well trained and led troops (and in fact was counter productive as the infiltrating troop units lacked supplies of their own with virtually no method of resupply so effectively became the isolated unit if the unit they had 'isolated' unsporting did not panic and collapse).

I might have to PM you with some ideas, but in that case having IJA troops transferred outside of Burma from 1942 to other theaters might enable Yamashita or a relatively unknown General to be given the poisoned chalice of defending Burma. Than with limited personnel and material might provide the push to consider different tactics against the Allies led by a very capable General in Slim.