Absolute Best Case Scenario for the USSR in WW2

What's the absolute best case scenario for the USSR during WW2, considering two objectives: achieving the biggest area of influence possible in Europe and Asia for the lowest casualty and economic damage level achievable. I know a lot of the actions there would've been out of character (ASB) for Stalin to take without hindsight, but I just want to explore the best course of action without getting into if he would even do it.

The idea that the Russians should've mobilized earlier and taken the Germans more serious for a better outcome is common sense, but what about the specifics? Should Stalin have made the pact with Germany at all? Maybe doing the pact but then letting Germany overextend itself taking all of Poland, delaying the Battle of France and then proceeding to demand Eastern Poland as Germany's part of the bargain? Regardless if they cede Eastern Poland or not, don't give them any oil in the aftermath.

Take the Baltics or not? Finland is certainly a no no, considering they would probably not attack the USSR without the Winter War. If the USSR needs to bloody itself against some minor enemy, this enemy should be Romania, the nation that contributed the most for Operation Barbarossa. So if the Soviets can defeat Romania in detail, get some experience and take the oil fields away from Germany, this could've been a very cost-effective way of fighting the Nazis. This also gives an avenue to help Yugoslavia against the Axis or maybe even prevent the invasion of Yugoslavia at all.

What about defensive lines? It's better to be conservative and make the Stalin line your main line of defence or advance your defences towards the Molotov line like OTL?

How much land could the USSR take and with how many losses? Could they meet the Allies in Paris and Rome?
 
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Finland is certainly a no no, considering they would probably not attack the USSR without the Winter War.
Either leave Finland well enough alone, and practically support their attempt to form a neutral mini-bloc with Sweden, or then attack Finland with enough resources to easily beat the Finns in under two months, and occupy (and likely annex) the country. Like I've commented before, Soviet control of the entire Finnish land area after early 1940 would be a significant boon for the Soviet defensive effort against Nazi Germany.

Either of these options above would be better for the USSR than the OTL, which pretty much was the worst the USSR could have done vis-a-vis Finland in 1939-1940. In either case, it would be more difficult for Germany to attack the USSR north of the Baltic states than IOTL, and give the USSR more resources to have them not tied up in the northwest.
 
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Either leave Finland well enough alone, and practically support their attempt to form a neutral mini-bloc with Sweden, or then attack Finland with enough resources to easily beat the Finns in under two months, and occupy (and likely annex) the country. Like I've commented before, Soviet control of the entire Finnish land area after early 1940 would be a significant boon for the Soviet defensive effort against Nazi Germany.

Either of these options above would be better for the USSR than the OTL, which pretty much was the worst the USSR could have done vis-a-vis Finland in 1939-1940.
Yes, the worst combination of all, creating an enemy while not eliminating it completely.

But what about invading Romania and setting up a puppet state to deny oil to the Germans instead of invading Finland? Let's say during the Phoney War or during the first days of the Battle of France. The Red Army was awfully underprepared to take on an enemy like Romania at that time, but they surely would take Bucharest more seriously than Helsinki. Besides, it can't be worse than facing the Romanians + the Germans, both with oil to supply it's operations. Even if Russia takes heavy losses, it would still compensate in the end, assuming they go all the way. Barbarossa couldn't even start to be properly supplied without Romania and Soviet oil.

There are some meeting notes that imply that Hitler himself was dead afraid of the Soviets moving against Romania while Germany was with it's hands full in France.
 
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Besides no Winter Wars, there are two other PODS:
  1. Stalin actually listens the various spies, diplomats and defectors about Operation Barbarossa. Rather than being completely caught off guard, the Soviets are actually ready for the German invasion ITTL
  2. The IJN decides to launch a third strike on Pearl Harbor, destroying its port facilities and crippling the American Pacif Fleet. The Japanese end up being even more against surrendee than OTL, leading to more Soviet involvement in the defeat of Tokyo in 1945.
 
For me, a slightly stiffer resistance in France deprives the Germans of a lot of captured equipment, short of a couple of panzer and motorised divisions and with Britain a bit stronger (more MGs mortars and guns salvaged). This makes it less likely that Italy formally joins as a combatant, leaving the Med as a largely allied lake, thus leaving vulnerable flanks on German-held Europe to west, south and north.

Saving the Afrika Korps for use in Europe is partly balanced by lack of Italian units and by allied resources having freedom to move in the Med which puts Ploesti in range of allied bombers. Italy may get non-military support from the US to keep it neutral (as OTL with Spain and less successfully with Vichy).

The reduction in German mobile troops and logistics vehicles would limit OTL encirclements early in Barbarossa saving the soviets several hundred thousand experienced troops.

Add this to a more pragmatic soviet diplomatic approach to Finland that results in a hostile neutrality rather than being an actual enemy and now AGN starts from a worse place and the siege of Leningrad is less severe.

Barbarossa will still look impressive early on, but with less initial territorial gains, reduced resources and stronger soviet forces, the Germans will struggle in 1942 and will face bigger and more effective counter attacks whenever they stall.
 
Either leave Finland well enough alone, and practically support their attempt to form a neutral mini-bloc with Sweden, or then attack Finland with enough resources to easily beat the Finns in under two months, and occupy (and likely annex) the country. Like I've commented before, Soviet control of the entire Finnish land area after early 1940 would be a significant boon for the Soviet defensive effort against Nazi Germany.

Either of these options above would be better for the USSR than the OTL, which pretty much was the worst the USSR could have done vis-a-vis Finland in 1939-1940. In either case, it would be more difficult for Germany to attack the USSR north of the Baltic states than IOTL, and give the USSR more resources to have them not tied up in the northwest.
So not attacing Finland in november 1939, but in spring 1940? Possibly waiting till the Germans attack France so the UK and France don't pay attention to what's happening in Finland.
Besides no Winter Wars, there are two other PODS:
  1. Stalin actually listens the various spies, diplomats and defectors about Operation Barbarossa. Rather than being completely caught off guard, the Soviets are actually ready for the German invasion ITTL
  2. The IJN decides to launch a third strike on Pearl Harbor, destroying its port facilities and crippling the American Pacif Fleet. The Japanese end up being even more against surrendee than OTL, leading to more Soviet involvement in the defeat of Tokyo in 1945.
A third wave would never be aimed at port facilities and if it would, it wouldn't do that much damage to them (you can look up previous discussions about it).
For me, a slightly stiffer resistance in France deprives the Germans of a lot of captured equipment, short of a couple of panzer and motorised divisions and with Britain a bit stronger (more MGs mortars and guns salvaged). This makes it less likely that Italy formally joins as a combatant, leaving the Med as a largely allied lake, thus leaving vulnerable flanks on German-held Europe to west, south and north.

Saving the Afrika Korps for use in Europe is partly balanced by lack of Italian units and by allied resources having freedom to move in the Med which puts Ploesti in range of allied bombers. Italy may get non-military support from the US to keep it neutral (as OTL with Spain and less successfully with Vichy).
The Afrika Korps was just 4 divisions, that's a small difference to Barbarossa anyway. I always gathered that the biggest difference would have been the trucks the AK used, until someone pointed out that they mostly used Italian trucks that were already in Africa.
 
So not attacing Finland in november 1939, but in spring 1940? Possibly waiting till the Germans attack France so the UK and France don't pay attention to what's happening in Finland.

A third wave would never be aimed at port facilities and if it would, it wouldn't do that much damage to them (you can look up previous discussions about it).

The Afrika Korps was just 4 divisions, that's a small difference to Barbarossa anyway. I always gathered that the biggest difference would have been the trucks the AK used, until someone pointed out that they mostly used Italian trucks that were already in Africa.
In the scenario I had in mind, these would be valuable to make up the shortfall in mobile units. But they'd be short of numbers overall due to no Italians and more unsecured borders to be defended. They would also face the moderate inconvenience of needing to place German units between Romanian and Hungarian units.
 
Besides no Winter Wars, there are two other PODS:
  1. Stalin actually listens the various spies, diplomats and defectors about Operation Barbarossa. Rather than being completely caught off guard, the Soviets are actually ready for the German invasion ITTL
That would be good because the Soviet Union can prepare better against the German invasion. Also, training and weapons must be improved like better logistics and supply. Also, of better quality weapons like SVT-40 that doesn't jam.
 
Besides no Winter Wars, there are two other PODS:
  1. Stalin actually listens the various spies, diplomats and defectors about Operation Barbarossa. Rather than being completely caught off guard, the Soviets are actually ready for the German invasion ITTL
Which ones? Because Stalin had spies, diplomats and defectors telling him basically every single thing that Germans possibly could do or could not and we nowadays can select the ones who were correct because we know what happened. But back then there was no way of actually telling who is lying, who is misinformed and who is simply peddling rumors as intelligence.

Soviet problem OTL was two-fold: they knew that Germans will attack eventually and were preparing for that. They didn't knew when and what will Germans do before attacking.

Basically, Stalin was expecting one of the two things: either Germans somehow manage to conclude their business with the British and then turn on the Soviet Union or Germans will offer an ultimatum to the USSR to join their war against UK and then use the Soviet refusal to do so as a pretext for war.

He didn't expect out of the blue invasion because it was simply way too stupid course of action for the Germans.
 
Don't do the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact. Germany will have a harder time beating Poland, thus wasting much-needed weapons and without a direct supply of Soviet resources can't keep up the war production. Doing a sickle cut could now be too dangerous for the Wehrmacht, so they launch a 1914-style invasion which leads to years of exhausting trench warfare. When Germany finally breaks, swoop in and collect free real estate. And even if Germany manages a successful sickle cut, it will still lack resources to attack you in 1941. Also you would have much better build-up defensive lines.

Give covert supplies to Polish Communists and thus strengthen the Polish view on the USSR. Also you don't have this akward period where the communist parties had to have an akward neutrality on the war, which weakened them and led to many sympathizers getting increasingly hostile to the Soviet Union. Maybe the West this time will actually accept your pretense of invading the Baltics to prevent a fascist alliance, since you weren't seen doing happy business with a nation less than a year ago.
 
Don't do the Molotov-Ribbentrop-Pact. Germany will have a harder time beating Poland,
Would Germany even invade Poland without Soviet guarantees? If Hitler doesn't invade, you could end up with Nazi Germany lasting well into the 50s and beyond, and possibly developing nukes. And any prolonged period of time that Germany isn't at war with the Western Allies you increase the chances of them coming to an agreement, and ganging up on the USSR.
 
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Stalin invades Germany in 1940.
After noting how few German divisions remained in the East ("barely enough for the customs service" as Halder put it) Shirer stated that if Stalin had attacked Germany in June 1940, "he probably could have gotten as far as Berlin before any effective resistance was organized." Maybe it would've been better to attack a bit earlier, in May, before the campaign in the West was decided.
 
Would Germany even invade Poland without Soviet guarantees? If Hitler doesn't invade, you could end up with Nazi Germany lasting well into the 50s and beyond, and possibly developing nukes. And any prolonged period of time that Germany isn't at war with the Western Allies you increase the chances of them coming to an agreement, and ganging up on the USSR.
Even assuming a mere economic downturn (instead of the collapse and fall of Nazis when their financial reserves runs out), A Nazi Germany lasting into the 50s would be rather mediocre if not weak as the long term damages of their actions against academia and questionable economic policies began to show. Also without a major war it's unlikely that anyone would be developing nukes (because of the massive costs, especially for first developers who don't have hindsight and other people's notes (so Pakistan & DPRK's nuke programs are not relevant to this discussion)).
 
Would Germany even invade Poland without Soviet guarantees?
As far as I know Hitler was dead-set on the idea of an invasion and Case White was drafted long before an agreement was secured.
If Hitler doesn't invade, you could end up with Nazi Germany lasting well into the 50s and beyond, and possibly developing nukes.
Two points:

The German nuclear program was massively underfunded and on a completely wrong track, partly because Hitler saw the necessary physics as Jewish.

On the other hand, Hitler had already geared the entire Reich's finances to a war of colonial conquest. Without a war, he would have to abandon all planning and massively reallocate spending.
And any prolonged period of time that Germany isn't at war with the Western Allies you increase the chances of them coming to an agreement, and ganging up on the USSR.
But why? After the Soviet Union had established itself, no serious voice in the Western states was interested in starting a war with it. The US had even abandoned its policy of non-recognition in the 1930s.

Moreover, this ignores the strategic antagonisms between the individual states: Germany and France have completely different ambitions when it comes to Eastern Europe. France wants to strengthen its small entente, Germany wants as much territory of influence as possible (at the expense of France's allies).
 
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