Able Archer leads to War.....

[dmz23]

In early november 1983,during a Nato exercise known as Able Archer,American and British monitors were alarmed to see a surge in communications between Eatern Bloc Countries which seemed to indicate the possibility of an imminent attack by the Soviet Union and its allies.It was no illusion,the Soviets seriously thought the west was planning a pre-emptive strike with the New Pershing II missiles even though the West had not deployed these weapons or tested them at Ranges to hit Moscow.U.S-Soviet relations were already deteriorating and the leaders in the Kremlin were becoming increasingly paranoid as the Soviet Union seemed to be weakening in the face of economic/social challenges.Their Chairman Yuri Andropov was already a dying man by November so who was running the Soviet Union remains debatable.Clearly there were some in the Kremlin who urged action against the West but they were marginalised as Able Archer Wound down and Eastern Bloc Countries followed suit.
However lets assume that the Soviet leaders where more paranoid than usual and decide that they have to attack.What would happen?The soviets may have some element of Surprise if the Nato forces are still wrapped up in the Able Archer exercises.
Any thoughts?

 

[luakel]

More than likely something similar to what is proposed in Hot Cuban Missle Crisis TL's, except with a much more heavily damaged US.

 

[Wendell]

More than likely something similar to what is proposed in Hot Cuban Missle Crisis TL's, except with a much more heavily damaged US.

This assumes that most of the Russian missiles actually work.

 

[Communist Wizard]

In 1983? Oh yes, the U.S. is much more dutifully wiped out, as is Russia, Western Europe, Eastern Europe, and some spots of the world (Japan... Korea... if China becomes unwise, then China...).

 

[luakel]

This assumes that most of the Russian missiles actually work.

More will work than in 1962, for example. The 80's were probably the best time for the Soviets to strike, optimally before Gorbachev and before the Reagan administration strengthens their forces too much.

 

[Dave Howery]

would the Soviet attack be a nuclear one or a conventional one? If nuclear, then, yeah, the end of the world. If conventional, then attacking when the Allies are conducting an exercise and supposedly at a high state of readiness wouldn't be an auspicious time...

 

[Dean_the_Young]

Whether the USSR decides to fight conventionally or with nukes depends on which opportunity tree they choose to go down. Nukes would have high-risk/high-return, while conventional is more unknown.

Nuklear first strike: ---> (Low %) USSR preempts USA detection, wins while avoiding most of MAD
---> (High %) US detects the Russian preemption attempt, responds with MAD in response


Conventional invasion of Europe:---> (?%) USSR makes clear it's not going to start MAD and will rely on conventional, US decides to respond in kind (initially)
---> (?%) USA decides to fulfil promises and respond with nukes, forces USSR to decide between MAD and annihalation


On another note, a top-secret US war game on a conventional WW3 found that the US would lose in Europe (and later in Asia and so on) because inter-armed forces logistics were conflicted. Steps were made to rectify that with a unified supply structure, and a rerun of the scenario allowed the US to pull off a draw/victory.

 

[Dave Howery]

if the USSR was going to invade conventionally, doing so at the time when the Allies are running exercises and presumably have lots of troops in the field armed and ready seems to be poor timing...

 

[carlton_bach]

If the war stays conventional, it is liable to be over in a matter of hours as the Kremlin gets on the phone to Washington to yell at the President, or NATO gets an urge to talk over Soviet troop movements behind the Iron Curtain. The problem, of course, is that it wouldn't have. Both sides had nuclear response protocols. The fear of a surprise strike was the big therat - you can call off a tank division even if it is on the outskirts of Lüneburg, but you can't call off an ICBM once it's out of the silo.

 

[The Dean]

if the USSR was going to invade conventionally, doing so at the time when the Allies are running exercises and presumably have lots of troops in the field armed and ready seems to be poor timing...

Not such a bad idea really the NATO troops are in the field, armed and this is very important without ammunition.

 

[ninebucks]

Yeah, Game Over, basically.

The only two options in the MAD game are to do nothing or to destroy everything. There are no medial options, anything less than the full destruction of the enemy will result in your own destruction.

 

[Redbeard]

Not such a bad idea really the NATO troops are in the field, armed and this is very important without ammunition.

Supplying live ammo to a unit already in the field and under command is a tiny and quick job compared to gathering the unit and getting it out of the barracks, not to mention mobilising it.

Even more important is that practically the complete command structure was activated and working during an excercise like Able Archer. BTW I took part in Able Archer, and a lot of other NATO excersises in the 1980s. In my part of NATO (COMLANDZEALAND) it meant empty desks at the barracks everywhere as officers were out in their wartime field function - short of a full mobilisation you couldn't find a worse time to attack.

I doubt a WAPA conventional attack will succeed. By the 1980s NATO had become too good at stopping armoured columns. Where doctrines before that were relatively unfocussed and could appear as just a brush up of WWII experience - and relying on nukes, both doctrines and equipment by the 1980s, not at least in the Bundeswehr, became quite focussed on stopping a Soviet conventional attack - with conventional means. I was not at least impressed by how the Bundeswehr rehearsed channeling an enemy attack into "killing fields" (for instance by laying minefields from the air and from artillery) where all kids of fire power would be concentrated. It made it practically impossible for the Soviets to achieve anything near the advance speed they needed to be at the Channel coast before substantial US reinforcements arrived.

A full scale nuclear surprise attack would be looney, as there always would be enough sub carried ICBMs left to assue a total mutual destruction.

I could much rather imagine a full scale conventional attack, perhaps supplemented by some tactcal nukes, hoping that NATO/USA hasn't got the force to stop the attack or the guts to a full scale retaliation.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[The Dean]

Supplying live ammo to a unit already in the field and under command is a tiny and quick job

Having spent 22 years in the RCT/RLC I never found supplying live ammo to a unit in the field tiny or quick. If a surprise attack had been launched during any of the many major NATO exercises I was on, and I was on most of them from 1978 to 1997 there would have been total and utter chaos. There was anyway; add to it the carnage of the attack and by the time the soldiers on the ground realised they were under real and not simulated attack there would be little time to persuade people further up the command chain this was for real.
Then swapping all of the loads of simulated ammunition for live ammunition would have to be done under fire. That is of course if the live ammunition could be moved forward quickly enough. I was involved in outloading ammunition for desert shield and much civilian transport had to be used.
Then of course you have to convince all of the troops not involved in the initial contacts that this was "noduff" and not part of the exercise. Oh yes I think this would have worked if the Soviets had the bottle to try it. At the very least it would have caused the most NATO casualties they could ever hope to inflict.

compared to gathering the unit and getting it out of the barracks, not to mention mobilising it.
Even more important is that practically the complete command structure was activated and working during an excercise like Able Archer. BTW I took part in Able Archer, and a lot of other NATO excersises in the 1980s. In my part of NATO (COMLANDZEALAND) it meant empty desks at the barracks everywhere as officers were out in their wartime field function - short of a full mobilisation you couldn't find a worse time to attack.
I doubt a WAPA conventional attack will succeed. By the 1980s NATO had become too good at stopping armoured columns. Where doctrines before that were relatively unfocussed and could appear as just a brush up of WWII experience - and relying on nukes, both doctrines and equipment by the 1980s, not at least in the Bundeswehr, became quite focussed on stopping a Soviet conventional attack - with conventional means. I was not at least impressed by how the Bundeswehr rehearsed channeling an enemy attack into "killing fields" (for instance by laying minefields from the air and from artillery) where all kids of fire power would be concentrated. It made it practically impossible for the Soviets to achieve anything near the advance speed they needed to be at the Channel coast before substantial US reinforcements arrived.

The NATO defense plan was for the border defense units to take the first assault and reinforcements to deploy from the rear in an organised manner. They would be better off deploying to their layed out mobilisation timetable not having to improvise a plan after taking many casualties.

A full scale nuclear surprise attack would be looney, as there always would be enough sub carried ICBMs left to assue a total mutual destruction.
I could much rather imagine a full scale conventional attack, perhaps supplemented by some tactcal nukes, hoping that NATO/USA hasn't got the force to stop the attack or the guts to a full scale retaliation.

Agreed

 

[Redbeard]

Having spent 22 years in the RCT/RLC I never found supplying live ammo to a unit in the field tiny or quick. If a surprise attack had been launched during any of the many major NATO exercises I was on, and I was on most of them from 1978 to 1997 there would have been total and utter chaos. There was anyway; add to it the carnage of the attack and by the time the soldiers on the ground realised they were under real and not simulated attack there would be little time to persuade people further up the command chain this was for real.
Then swapping all of the loads of simulated ammunition for live ammunition would have to be done under fire. That is of course if the live ammunition could be moved forward quickly enough. I was involved in outloading ammunition for desert shield and much civilian transport had to be used.
Then of course you have to convince all of the troops not involved in the initial contacts that this was "noduff" and not part of the exercise. Oh yes I think this would have worked if the Soviets had the bottle to try it. At the very least it would have caused the most NATO casualties they could ever hope to inflict.



The NATO defense plan was for the border defense units to take the first assault and reinforcements to deploy from the rear in an organised manner. They would be better off deploying to their layed out mobilisation timetable not having to improvise a plan after taking many casualties.



Agreed

I used to be CO of a battery and always knew where my ammo depots were. If on a excersice on Zealand I would, from issuing the order, have handweapon ammo distributed in less than 60 minutes and the arty ammo in say three-four hours. If I could get my hands on a fork-lift truck I would need less.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[The Dean]

I used to be CO of a battery and always knew where my ammo depots were. If on a excersice on Zealand I would, from issuing the order, have handweapon ammo distributed in less than 60 minutes and the arty ammo in say three-four hours. If I could get my hands on a fork-lift truck I would need less.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

We could have been deployed anywhere in the Federal Republic of Germany depending on the scenario and small arms ammo may have been available locally but our live arty, tank and engineering stores would have been in Divisional stores Paderborn,Beilefeld and Osnabruck. We knew where they were alright mechanical handling wasn't an issue, we carried our own thats why we were called the transport then logistic corps, it was distance, time and tonnage that would count.
This makes no difference to the confusion that would have existed and all of the other factors I mentioned.

Yours Martin
The Dean

 

[Redbeard]

We could have been deployed anywhere in the Federal Republic of Germany depending on the scenario and small arms ammo may have been available locally but our live arty, tank and engineering stores would have been in Divisional stores Paderborn,Beilefeld and Osnabruck. We knew where they were alright mechanical handling wasn't an issue, we carried our own thats why we were called the transport then logistic corps, it was distance, time and tonnage that would count.
This makes no difference to the confusion that would have existed and all of the other factors I mentioned.

Yours Martin
The Dean

Would be nothing compared to the confusion in a mobilisation/deployment starting from scratch.

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[The Dean]

Would be nothing compared to the confusion in a mobilisation/deployment starting from scratch.

Well we never found mobilisation or deployment from scratch a problem certainly not confusing in any way. We trained for it and it was the least of our worries.

I think that in the middle of an intensive FTX after several days without sleep suddenly coming under live fire the first thought would not be that we were under attack but that somebody had screwed up somewhere with the pyro. It would be some time before it sank in that there was a real attack. Then all of the troops that were not in the initial contact would have to be told there was a real enemy and convinced it was not some new scenario.
I can actually see in my mind the farcical scenes that would be taking place if this had happened. Of course it would eventually sink in and the Toms would react as they always do shrug their shoulders say what the fuck and get on with it.

 

[Redbeard]

Well we never found mobilisation or deployment from scratch a problem certainly not confusing in any way. We trained for it and it was the least of our worries.

I think that in the middle of an intensive FTX after several days without sleep suddenly coming under live fire the first thought would not be that we were under attack but that somebody had screwed up somewhere with the pyro. It would be some time before it sank in that there was a real attack. Then all of the troops that were not in the initial contact would have to be told there was a real enemy and convinced it was not some new scenario.
I can actually see in my mind the farcical scenes that would be taking place if this had happened. Of course it would eventually sink in and the Toms would react as they always do shrug their shoulders say what the fuck and get on with it.

In all the mobilisation excersises I've taken part in (15-20) the first 24 hours were nothing short of chaos, but as soon as the unit had left the depot/baracks and deployed into the field things started to settle and after another 24 hours you had a cohesive unit.

Exercises like Able Archer were not survival exercises meant to push your men to and beyond their limits, but on the contrary a great opportunity to train total management of a unit, not at least including the maintenance of the units combat efficiency whic is so easily overlooked in staff excersises.

Even units manned with men out in the civilian for several years usually were extremely efficient after a couple of days in the field, often much better than the full time units.

BTW what is RTC/RLC?

Regards

Steffen Redbeard

 

[The Dean]

BTW what is RTC/RLC?

The RCT was the Royal Corps of Transport which rebadged to the Royal Logistic Corps in 1993. Before 1967 back through the two world wars it was the Army Service Corps and in 1918 awarded the prefix Royal for its service throughout the conflict.
It has been the largest Corps in the army since WW1 brought about the mechanisation of warfare. Most of our work in wartime would be keeping you guys in the artillery fed with 155mm. If there was a fire mission on the tonnage on Arty we had to move was monumental.
Of course everything else that everybody in the theater of operations used we had to move as well including all of the fuel. I did a FTX in Zealand some time back in the early 1980s. I was there with 5 Airbourne Brigade and a RM Commando Brigade. There were the Italian Alpini guys there on the same exercise with their Robin Hood hats with the feathers in. They had to be really tough to get away with walking around wearing them!
Copenhagen has to be one of the nicest city's I have visited. One day I am going to take another visit and show my kids, well I call them kids they're grown up now, the Carlsberg Museum and the Tivoli.

Yours Martin (The Dean)

 

[Dayton Kitchens]

I've researched this incident thoroughly and this is what I've managed to come up with.1) Able Archer was not a huge conventional military exercise by NATO (like Reforger) but was mainly an exercise practicing the release and use of tactical nuclear weapons including all the steps up to that release (but naturally not doing it).2) One thing that made the Soviet Union so fearful was that their plans for military offensives against NATO had often used those same types of exercises as a "cover". 3) Apparently, at least one Soviet bomber regiment (21 SU-24 Fencers from what I've gathered) actually had nuclear weapons including their arming codes loaded onto aircraft in East Germany for a potential first (or retaliatory) strike into West Germany and the low countries. 4) The Politburo or Yuri Andropov never actually authorized any kind of nuclear action though they (especially Andropov) were on the edge enough to if they thought a NATO nuclear attack was imminent.5) The Soviets actually had a really convoluted method of authorizing nuclear strikes. In 1983, they did not have the equivalent of the U.S. Presidents "nuclear football". A sealed briefcase that can be opened only by the President or Vice President that contains a series of nuclear release options, launch codes, and radio transmitters. Thus, if NATO had launched a nuclear attack on the Soviet Union, in all likelihood the Soviet response would be somewhat unplanned, uncoordinated and half hazard.If the Soviets had launched a preemptive strike against NATO and the U.S., it would have probably been like many Soviet war plans. That is planned in excruciating detail with many delays. Chances are some of that planning would've leaked out to the west long before an attack was launched. 6) A nuclear war could've broken out in 1983. In all likelihood it would've been a mess rather than the typical television portrayal where the U.S.S.R. launches 1500 ICBMs, U.S. launches 1000 ICBMs and its all over in 30 minutes.