AANW - Stalemate
- Thread starter CalBear
- Start date
BlondieBC
Banned
The best way I heard it phrased is this way. "The distance from Rostov-on-the-Don (German starting point Case Blue) to Baku is roughly the same distance from Warsaw to Rostov-on-the-Don."
Hmmm. I considered it, but with tens of millions of slave laborers and no active hostilities in the USSR other than partisans you've stated aren't much of a threat, it seems like the rail and road line capacity would be/could be buffed up (it also seems like establishing internal lines of communication across your new empire, especially when it has an autobahn culture like Germany's, is the logical step). The logistical situation couldn't be any worse than fighting in the Caucasus in OTL or than North Africa where they were able to commit large numbers of troops (or at least I can't see how).
I'll let you write your TL though. Subbed and following with interest
Again, without giving too much away, the Western Desert is a very good example of the limits of logistics, as is OTL's Eastern Front. Keep in mind that the AANW POD centers around Sixth Army managing to gain about 300 meters more ground in Stalingrad and cutting off access to the Volga along with a brief moment of clarity for Hitler where he decides to keep his eye on the ball and stay the hell out of Africa. The first POD sets up the gutting of Stavka, the other allows the Reich to have enough additional Heer forces to stiffen the defensive lines along the Don & Volga. The Reich continues to have the same sort of logistical issues as IOTL.
Thanks for the comments.
@CalBear, how much do you know of this scheme?
Breitspurbahn
On the short time scale it makes no difference, but this going to be drawn into a decades-long existential struggle between an Axis east and an American led West, I think maybe this will have time to be developed.
Breitspurbahn
On the short time scale it makes no difference, but this going to be drawn into a decades-long existential struggle between an Axis east and an American led West, I think maybe this will have time to be developed.
Hooray!!!!
That said, a couple of quibbles.
Something's wrong there. Also, don't you want a comma after the word 'sled'?
That said, a couple of quibbles.
the speed OF a ? a speed COMPARABLE to a?
Something's wrong there. Also, don't you want a comma after the word 'sled'?
Scipio, surely
Enjoying this new TL.
If I can add a minor nitpick and it's not a major issue so feel free to ignore me, but it should be RN Mediterranean Fleet, not squadron.
If I can add a minor nitpick and it's not a major issue so feel free to ignore me, but it should be RN Mediterranean Fleet, not squadron.
Here is the next chapter.
Comments very welcome
2
The next Allied effort to draw Heer forces away from the Eastern Front even as they were shredding both Red Army counter-attacks was the far less successful Operation Spider, the attempt to recapture the Channel Islands. Unlike virtually undefended North Africa, the Channel Islands had drawn an almost bizarre amount of Hitler’s personal attention. Guernsey alone was garrisoned by over 8,000 German troops with half a dozen heavy gun emplacement, including the four 30.5 cm guns of Battery Mirus (which had begun life as part of the main battery of the Tsarist battleship Imperator Aleksandr III) with plans in place for a massive series of fortification as part of Organization Todt (the primary Reich major project engineering operation, named after its leader DR Fritz Todt) that were meant to make Guernsey one of the most heavily defended places on Earth. These plans, along with the movement of an additional 4,000 fortress troops, were still being finalized at the time of Spider. Jersey was also heavily garrisoned, although with only about half the forces dedicated to its neighbor.
Spider was meant to be the first of a series of raids and smaller scale incursions that would force Berlin to move substantial forces into France, with the final action to be a multiple divisional landing to seize the port of Brest (an alternative plan, Operation Husky, the capture of Sicily, was rejected due to relatively less well advanced planning). Had it succeeded it is possible that the entire operational package might have achieved its goal of reducing the pressure on the Red Army. Unfortunately, albeit not entirely unexpectedly for this stage of the war, the effort was poorly thought out and attempted on a shoestring.
Allied planners failed to identify all the German Army (Heer) units deployed to the Channel Islands, while this was to cause issues on Guernsey, where the total enemy force was underestimated by around 1,000 troops, it was to prove catastrophic elsewhere.
Operation Spider was built around a pair of parachute and glider assaults on the two largest Channel Islands with follow up landing by amphibious formations, small amphibious elements were also scheduled for Alderney and Sark. Protests from the commanders of both the British 1st Airborne Division and American 82nd Airborne Division related to the extremely limited size of the landing zones available and questionable weather were not so much ignored as brushed aside due to the urgency of the situation on the Eastern Front. Similar protests from Major Generals H. L.N. Salmon MC (1st Canadian Division) and Leonard Gerow (29th U.S. Infantry Division), this time related to the landing beaches and locations of possible defenses also fell on disinterested ears.
Originally Spider was envisioned for an early May execution, however the death of Stalin, with the huge ramifications his death represented, pushed the date forward to “as soon as weather permits”. This turned out to be April 7th, 1943.
Operation Spider also provides an interesting view of what was to eventually become the meticulously planned invasions that eventually resulted in the liberation of Europe and the complete destruction of the Third Reich in its earliest, raw form. The basics are all present; combined arms efforts involving multiple commands, heavy reliance on airpower and naval gunfire, and the understanding that tactical surprise was vital. Unfortunately, this basic framework also illustrates the elements that had not yet been added to the overall toolkit of Allied planning. Pre-assault reconnaissance, communication, rehearsals by the assault forces, even proper combat loading of transport vessels is either entirely missing or barely present. Spider also provides a view of the overly optimistic belief in the ability of heavy bombers to provide “pin-point” accuracy from high altitude, something that especially felt by the 1st Airborne Division.
Spider’s planners either ignored or dismissed as inaccurate Intel reports that later proved to have been shockingly accurate, mainly acquired at tremendous risk from civilians living on both primary targets. While this can, in part, be understood as a reaction to pressure from far above their pay levels, the hard truth is that it was the responsibility of the senior officers on the planning staff to stand behind the analysts providing the information. Had the Colonels, four stripe Captains and trio of flag officers responsible for various phases acted in concert it is possible that Spider might, at the least, have been modified. That none of these officers chose to make a stand allowed the disaster to unfold unimpeded.
The battle plan actually began well, the weather cooperating, at least as much as could be expected for early Spring. Visibility was good, but not excessively so, allowing the landing fleets to make good progress while avoiding detection. The air fields had especially good weather, permitting all the many moving parts there to launch as scheduled. This was the highlight of the entire operation, the first few hours, then things began to go wrong.
The operation depended on a successful series of steps meant to suppress the German forces on the islands to a degree that the airborne formations could secure their objectives and allow the seaborne reinforcements to make an orderly and rapid landing. The first, and arguably most important (and difficult) step were the attacks by most of Bomber Command along with a significant portion of the still expanding U.S. 8th Air Force. A series of separate decoy attacks across France, starting in Upper Normandy and extending as far north as Belgium and inland to the Rhine actually succeeded in drawing off most of the Luftwaffe fighter force, leaving only a dozen or so night fighters to contest the air above the Islands. Unfortunately, the next stage, the bombing raids meant to destroy or at least disrupt the extensive Heer defenses were far less successful than the diversionary efforts. After action analysis showed that only one bomb in five that struck Guernsey landed within 200 yards of a target (there is no way to know if these were bombs actually meant for the specific target, or just fortunate misses) while the vast majority of the bombs meant for Jersey missed the island altogether, leaving the defenders undamaged by entirely alert.
Bomber crews also reported that the amount of flak encountered over the targets far exceeded the expectations from pre-mission briefings. The overall leader of the RAF force considered this to be of such importance that he had the information broadcast to base before most of the bomber stream had even reached the target. This represented the last, best chance to avoid the airborne landings. The messaging, for reasons that remain somewhat murky to this day, did not reach the proper headquarters for almost half a day. No warn was sent to the incoming air assault formations.
It was the gliders of the 1st Airborne Division who realized just how badly the situation was, as medium and heavy Luftwaffe anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) started to explode all around them, sometimes before even separating from the towing aircraft. There were only a few sites on each island suitable for landing gliders, including the airfields, and Heer defenders had long since identified them. As near as can be reconstructed, somewhat over half of the Horsa and Hamilcar gliders assigned to the Jersey landing were lost either on approach or destroyed on the ground before the troops being carried could disentangle themselves and emerge to engage the enemy. Overall only one in four of the glider troops survived the battle (the Royal Ulster Rifles battalion was effectively wiped out, with only 68 survivors of the roughly 700 men who flew into action that day). The heavy losses inflicted on the glider formation robbed the 1st of most of its heavy weapons and ammunition resupply before the first paratrooper exited the door. The effort to take the Jersey airfield was defeated before it could properly begin.
The troops from the 2nd Parachute Brigade also suffered serious losses even before they could exit their aircraft due to heavy enemy flak. The Luftwaffe AAA also caused a number of aircraft to lose formation and disoriented a number of the pilots, who, unlike the Bomber Command crews, had little or no combat experience. This led to a number of mini-disasters, including several airborne collisions, pilots ordering men out too soon or too late (with most of these troops landing the water encumbered with close to 100 pounds of equipment) and other aircraft where men were deployed at speeds far greater than safe. The resulting landings, rather than depositing troops in something approaching organized formation scattered parachutists across the island like salt from a shaker. What had been designed to be a two brigade fist to the Jersey defenders jaw was reduced to a series of pin pricks.
Having expected to face close to their same number of German defenders, the much-reduced British forces quickly discovered that there were close to twice the number of Heer troops on Jersey as the planners had allowed for. Worse, unlike the second rate fortress troops expected, the Germans had at least one full battalion of veteran infantry, sent from the East to Jersey to rest and recuperate, on the island. The shock of the British landings, rather than freezing the enemy for the hoped for 30 minutes or longer, was absorbed in a few minutes, or less, as combat reflexes honed in some of the worst fighting of the entire war to date kicked in among the German infantry.
By sunrise, when the 1st had expected to have taken control of the airfield and at least some of the amphibious landing site, the surviving forces were cut into a group of platoon and company sized pockets that were being actively reduced by German forces. The largest surviving formation, a mixed bag force of around 550 men, was trapped in the northwest corner of the island, where a single small beach was their only hope for reinforcement. The reinforcements were, however, suffering their own problems.
The bomber force that attacked Guernsey had much the same problems as the Jersey force. It did, however, have some advantages. It was a larger force, Operation Spider planners having observed a more robust defense profile on Guernsey than on Jersey and included the USAAF bomber groups. Unlike their Bomber Command colleagues, who flew alone in a long stream of single aircraft, the Americans flew in a tight defensive formation. While only one of the two U.S. groups were successful (this being a relative term) the lead bombardier of the group dropped his bombs near the primary defensive works and barracks complex defending the airfield. With the other thirty-five aircraft following his lead the complex was comprehensively destroyed (along with some 30 villager’s homes, the first of many casualties that would be suffered by the civilian residents of Guernsey). Despite this signal success, with its spectacular series of secondary explosions, much of the German defenses remained undamaged, including some that the Allies had completely discounted.
With the main defensive positions, including three of the four fixed 20mm light flak batteries defending the airfield simply vanished in the bombing, and the garrison mainly obliterated seven of the eleven gliders assigned to the capture of the field managed to successfully land, disgorge their troops in good order fully able to take up defensive positions. Perhaps most importantly the gliders had managed to deliver three 37mm anti-tank guns, two 75mm pack howitzers, and six .30 caliber medium machineguns that provided the American troops the firepower that their counterparts on Jersey lacked. This was a significant bright spot, as the ground commander was able to confirm that the field could be used to land additional glider born forces immediately. It was a rare moment when things had gone exactly as planned.
The rest of the airborne assault was far less successful, with many gliders falling to AAA or being shredded upon landing, their human cargo often never even getting out of the safety restraints. The parachute force suffered much the same fate as Force Jersey, although fewer troops were lost over the Channel. Everything would depend on the reinforcements scheduled to arrive just before first light. The Germans, however, had a hole card to play.
The landing flotilla was supposed to split as it approached Guernsey, with roughly half the force set to move on to Jersey. It was a fine plan, each part of the formation would have a pair of cruisers, a heavy bombardment ship, and twelve destroyers to provide fire support. The Jersey squadron was somewhat lighter than the Guernsey group, since the available photo intelligence indicated a larger number of anti-boat guns on the western island, this meant the Jersey squadron was built around two light cruisers (HMS Sheffield and USS Savannah) and the monitor HMS Roberts. The Guernsey force, however, was built around the USS Massachusetts, a South Dakota class battleship along with the light cruisers USS Brooklyn and USS Philadelphia. The decision to include the Massachusetts, made over the strenuous objections of U.S. CNO Admiral Ernest King, proved to be providential when the supposedly inactive 300mm of Battery Nina opened fire on the landing force at a range of 29,000 yards. Unbeknownst to the WAllied commanders, the battery had intentionally refrained from firing at several British naval probes in the last six months, both to conceal the readiness of the guns and to preserve the gun tubes themselves (the blast damage the guns did each time they were fired was a contributing factor as well). Mere months after having engaged in a gun duel with the disabled, but functional French battleship Jean Bart during the Torch landings the Massachusetts found itself in another long range gun duel, this time with the fate of a full brigade of American airborne troops hanging in the balance.
Comprised of four guns in individual armored turrets that had 360 degree fields of fire spread over rough rectangular area 1000 meters x 500 meters in size the battery consisted of guns captured in Norway and had once been part of the main battery of a Tsarist WW I battleship. Each gun was supported by at least one of the six 88mm AAA guns covering the Island as well as by a number of 20mm emplacements. While the U.S. battleship had advantages in both number of guns and rate of fire, it also had to make its hits on a target only some 20 meters square and surrounds by concrete blast walls. The German guns, on the other hand had, in addition to the 680-foot-long Massachusetts at least 20 other targets to choose from, none of them as well protected as the battlewagon. The fight was made more difficult by the presence of three 220mm and one 150mm anti-ship guns along with three 21cm howitzers. Behind these guns were twenty 10cm howitzers meant to interdict the potential landing beaches. All of these guns had been targets of the bombing, only one of the 220mm guns and three of the 88mm guns had suffered damage. Until the heavy guns were silenced the landings were delayed and the men already fighting for their lives were on their own.
The engagement quickly reach a pitch that had not been planned for, with the Massachusetts being joined by the Roberts (the Jersey group being effectively cut off until the 300mm artillery was silenced) in the duel with Nina while knots of infantrymen made their way toward the smaller guns focused on the landing beaches. Massachusetts suffered a hit by one of the 220mm guns, the shell striking her main belt, leaving a dent and scraped paint mark its arrival just as the sun reached the horizon. Roberts then suffered a rattling near miss from Nina’s # 3 gun, cause her to radically alter course, just in time, as a shell from the #2 gun struck in her wake less than a minute later. At 7:20, having received confirmation that the first of what was to be a rotating umbrella of protective fighters was overhead Massachusetts catapulted off one of her Kingfisher observation planes to call shot. Three salvos later a 16” AP shell penetrated the armored top of Nina’s # 4 gun, causing a catastrophic detonation of the ready ammunition after the explosion’s flash defeated the protective door to the guns magazine. Within a few minutes guns # 1 and # 3 were disabled, with Gun # 3 being physically knocked off its barbette by two near misses from Roberts 15” guns and gun # 1 suffering a penetrating splinter damage from a 16” shell that disabled the barrel. Gun # 2, however, gained a measure of revenge, as a near miss caused serious damage to USS Niblack (DD-424) with splinters penetrating her hull and putting three boilers off-line. She fell out of formation and was ordered to limp back to port at a best speed of 7 knots.
Despite the best efforts of her crew Niblack took on an increasing list, making her unstable. Her CO beached her near Bolberry, some 14 miles from the safety of Plymouth Harbor.
Nina’s # 2 gun, having lost her camouflage netting during the engagement was put out of action by a 1000-pound SAP bomb direct hit, the bomb being dropped by a P-47 fighter bomber. By 11:00 hours the main defensive guns had been disabled by a combination of naval gunfire, close air support, and uncoordinated, but nonetheless effective assaults by paratrooper scratch units. As half past twelve the first elements of the 29th Infantry landed, fighting their way inland toward the air field behind continued naval gunfire support and close air support. Additional gliders had begun to land even as the artillery duel was underway with two gliders bringing in 57mm anti tank guns to support the lighter, and much more mobile 37mm guns.
With the small size of Guernsey the attackers had gained a unbreakable foothold by the end of the day. Nonetheless, the German defenders fought hard, for every inch of the island, with resistance finally collapsing on April 15th.
Having been delayed for half a day the Jersey squadron began to move toward its destination, the original landing mission having become an extraction as the disaster on Jersey became increasingly clear. As it did so HMS Sheffield was struck by two torpedoes fired by U-642. All but 42 members of her crew made it off the ship before she capsized three hours later. Two destroyers, one British, the other Dutch, were struck and sunk by dive-bombers while attempting to evacuate the men of the 2nd Parachute Brigade. USS Savannah was also hit by two 500 pound bombs but managed to limp back to port, have suffered 150 casualties. After emergency repairs she was sent to Brooklyn Naval Yard for a six-month overhaul.
The result of Spider was, at best, inconclusive. 1st Airborne was out of the war until mid 1944, with 82nd airborne running a brigade light for almost eight months. Guernsey was recaptured, but Jersey remained firmly in German hands. The two islands became a bizarre shooting gallery, with both sides emplacing more and heavier guns as the war continued. Both sides fired thousands of shells at the other, for no real gain. The islands’ civilian population was eventually evacuated by one side of the other, but nearly one in three of the pre-war population died before that movement.
The Reich made no noteworthy troop movements on the Eastern Front in response to Operation Spider.
Comments very welcome
2
The next Allied effort to draw Heer forces away from the Eastern Front even as they were shredding both Red Army counter-attacks was the far less successful Operation Spider, the attempt to recapture the Channel Islands. Unlike virtually undefended North Africa, the Channel Islands had drawn an almost bizarre amount of Hitler’s personal attention. Guernsey alone was garrisoned by over 8,000 German troops with half a dozen heavy gun emplacement, including the four 30.5 cm guns of Battery Mirus (which had begun life as part of the main battery of the Tsarist battleship Imperator Aleksandr III) with plans in place for a massive series of fortification as part of Organization Todt (the primary Reich major project engineering operation, named after its leader DR Fritz Todt) that were meant to make Guernsey one of the most heavily defended places on Earth. These plans, along with the movement of an additional 4,000 fortress troops, were still being finalized at the time of Spider. Jersey was also heavily garrisoned, although with only about half the forces dedicated to its neighbor.
Spider was meant to be the first of a series of raids and smaller scale incursions that would force Berlin to move substantial forces into France, with the final action to be a multiple divisional landing to seize the port of Brest (an alternative plan, Operation Husky, the capture of Sicily, was rejected due to relatively less well advanced planning). Had it succeeded it is possible that the entire operational package might have achieved its goal of reducing the pressure on the Red Army. Unfortunately, albeit not entirely unexpectedly for this stage of the war, the effort was poorly thought out and attempted on a shoestring.
Allied planners failed to identify all the German Army (Heer) units deployed to the Channel Islands, while this was to cause issues on Guernsey, where the total enemy force was underestimated by around 1,000 troops, it was to prove catastrophic elsewhere.
Operation Spider was built around a pair of parachute and glider assaults on the two largest Channel Islands with follow up landing by amphibious formations, small amphibious elements were also scheduled for Alderney and Sark. Protests from the commanders of both the British 1st Airborne Division and American 82nd Airborne Division related to the extremely limited size of the landing zones available and questionable weather were not so much ignored as brushed aside due to the urgency of the situation on the Eastern Front. Similar protests from Major Generals H. L.N. Salmon MC (1st Canadian Division) and Leonard Gerow (29th U.S. Infantry Division), this time related to the landing beaches and locations of possible defenses also fell on disinterested ears.
Originally Spider was envisioned for an early May execution, however the death of Stalin, with the huge ramifications his death represented, pushed the date forward to “as soon as weather permits”. This turned out to be April 7th, 1943.
Operation Spider also provides an interesting view of what was to eventually become the meticulously planned invasions that eventually resulted in the liberation of Europe and the complete destruction of the Third Reich in its earliest, raw form. The basics are all present; combined arms efforts involving multiple commands, heavy reliance on airpower and naval gunfire, and the understanding that tactical surprise was vital. Unfortunately, this basic framework also illustrates the elements that had not yet been added to the overall toolkit of Allied planning. Pre-assault reconnaissance, communication, rehearsals by the assault forces, even proper combat loading of transport vessels is either entirely missing or barely present. Spider also provides a view of the overly optimistic belief in the ability of heavy bombers to provide “pin-point” accuracy from high altitude, something that especially felt by the 1st Airborne Division.
Spider’s planners either ignored or dismissed as inaccurate Intel reports that later proved to have been shockingly accurate, mainly acquired at tremendous risk from civilians living on both primary targets. While this can, in part, be understood as a reaction to pressure from far above their pay levels, the hard truth is that it was the responsibility of the senior officers on the planning staff to stand behind the analysts providing the information. Had the Colonels, four stripe Captains and trio of flag officers responsible for various phases acted in concert it is possible that Spider might, at the least, have been modified. That none of these officers chose to make a stand allowed the disaster to unfold unimpeded.
The battle plan actually began well, the weather cooperating, at least as much as could be expected for early Spring. Visibility was good, but not excessively so, allowing the landing fleets to make good progress while avoiding detection. The air fields had especially good weather, permitting all the many moving parts there to launch as scheduled. This was the highlight of the entire operation, the first few hours, then things began to go wrong.
The operation depended on a successful series of steps meant to suppress the German forces on the islands to a degree that the airborne formations could secure their objectives and allow the seaborne reinforcements to make an orderly and rapid landing. The first, and arguably most important (and difficult) step were the attacks by most of Bomber Command along with a significant portion of the still expanding U.S. 8th Air Force. A series of separate decoy attacks across France, starting in Upper Normandy and extending as far north as Belgium and inland to the Rhine actually succeeded in drawing off most of the Luftwaffe fighter force, leaving only a dozen or so night fighters to contest the air above the Islands. Unfortunately, the next stage, the bombing raids meant to destroy or at least disrupt the extensive Heer defenses were far less successful than the diversionary efforts. After action analysis showed that only one bomb in five that struck Guernsey landed within 200 yards of a target (there is no way to know if these were bombs actually meant for the specific target, or just fortunate misses) while the vast majority of the bombs meant for Jersey missed the island altogether, leaving the defenders undamaged by entirely alert.
Bomber crews also reported that the amount of flak encountered over the targets far exceeded the expectations from pre-mission briefings. The overall leader of the RAF force considered this to be of such importance that he had the information broadcast to base before most of the bomber stream had even reached the target. This represented the last, best chance to avoid the airborne landings. The messaging, for reasons that remain somewhat murky to this day, did not reach the proper headquarters for almost half a day. No warn was sent to the incoming air assault formations.
It was the gliders of the 1st Airborne Division who realized just how badly the situation was, as medium and heavy Luftwaffe anti-aircraft artillery (AAA) started to explode all around them, sometimes before even separating from the towing aircraft. There were only a few sites on each island suitable for landing gliders, including the airfields, and Heer defenders had long since identified them. As near as can be reconstructed, somewhat over half of the Horsa and Hamilcar gliders assigned to the Jersey landing were lost either on approach or destroyed on the ground before the troops being carried could disentangle themselves and emerge to engage the enemy. Overall only one in four of the glider troops survived the battle (the Royal Ulster Rifles battalion was effectively wiped out, with only 68 survivors of the roughly 700 men who flew into action that day). The heavy losses inflicted on the glider formation robbed the 1st of most of its heavy weapons and ammunition resupply before the first paratrooper exited the door. The effort to take the Jersey airfield was defeated before it could properly begin.
The troops from the 2nd Parachute Brigade also suffered serious losses even before they could exit their aircraft due to heavy enemy flak. The Luftwaffe AAA also caused a number of aircraft to lose formation and disoriented a number of the pilots, who, unlike the Bomber Command crews, had little or no combat experience. This led to a number of mini-disasters, including several airborne collisions, pilots ordering men out too soon or too late (with most of these troops landing the water encumbered with close to 100 pounds of equipment) and other aircraft where men were deployed at speeds far greater than safe. The resulting landings, rather than depositing troops in something approaching organized formation scattered parachutists across the island like salt from a shaker. What had been designed to be a two brigade fist to the Jersey defenders jaw was reduced to a series of pin pricks.
Having expected to face close to their same number of German defenders, the much-reduced British forces quickly discovered that there were close to twice the number of Heer troops on Jersey as the planners had allowed for. Worse, unlike the second rate fortress troops expected, the Germans had at least one full battalion of veteran infantry, sent from the East to Jersey to rest and recuperate, on the island. The shock of the British landings, rather than freezing the enemy for the hoped for 30 minutes or longer, was absorbed in a few minutes, or less, as combat reflexes honed in some of the worst fighting of the entire war to date kicked in among the German infantry.
By sunrise, when the 1st had expected to have taken control of the airfield and at least some of the amphibious landing site, the surviving forces were cut into a group of platoon and company sized pockets that were being actively reduced by German forces. The largest surviving formation, a mixed bag force of around 550 men, was trapped in the northwest corner of the island, where a single small beach was their only hope for reinforcement. The reinforcements were, however, suffering their own problems.
The bomber force that attacked Guernsey had much the same problems as the Jersey force. It did, however, have some advantages. It was a larger force, Operation Spider planners having observed a more robust defense profile on Guernsey than on Jersey and included the USAAF bomber groups. Unlike their Bomber Command colleagues, who flew alone in a long stream of single aircraft, the Americans flew in a tight defensive formation. While only one of the two U.S. groups were successful (this being a relative term) the lead bombardier of the group dropped his bombs near the primary defensive works and barracks complex defending the airfield. With the other thirty-five aircraft following his lead the complex was comprehensively destroyed (along with some 30 villager’s homes, the first of many casualties that would be suffered by the civilian residents of Guernsey). Despite this signal success, with its spectacular series of secondary explosions, much of the German defenses remained undamaged, including some that the Allies had completely discounted.
With the main defensive positions, including three of the four fixed 20mm light flak batteries defending the airfield simply vanished in the bombing, and the garrison mainly obliterated seven of the eleven gliders assigned to the capture of the field managed to successfully land, disgorge their troops in good order fully able to take up defensive positions. Perhaps most importantly the gliders had managed to deliver three 37mm anti-tank guns, two 75mm pack howitzers, and six .30 caliber medium machineguns that provided the American troops the firepower that their counterparts on Jersey lacked. This was a significant bright spot, as the ground commander was able to confirm that the field could be used to land additional glider born forces immediately. It was a rare moment when things had gone exactly as planned.
The rest of the airborne assault was far less successful, with many gliders falling to AAA or being shredded upon landing, their human cargo often never even getting out of the safety restraints. The parachute force suffered much the same fate as Force Jersey, although fewer troops were lost over the Channel. Everything would depend on the reinforcements scheduled to arrive just before first light. The Germans, however, had a hole card to play.
The landing flotilla was supposed to split as it approached Guernsey, with roughly half the force set to move on to Jersey. It was a fine plan, each part of the formation would have a pair of cruisers, a heavy bombardment ship, and twelve destroyers to provide fire support. The Jersey squadron was somewhat lighter than the Guernsey group, since the available photo intelligence indicated a larger number of anti-boat guns on the western island, this meant the Jersey squadron was built around two light cruisers (HMS Sheffield and USS Savannah) and the monitor HMS Roberts. The Guernsey force, however, was built around the USS Massachusetts, a South Dakota class battleship along with the light cruisers USS Brooklyn and USS Philadelphia. The decision to include the Massachusetts, made over the strenuous objections of U.S. CNO Admiral Ernest King, proved to be providential when the supposedly inactive 300mm of Battery Nina opened fire on the landing force at a range of 29,000 yards. Unbeknownst to the WAllied commanders, the battery had intentionally refrained from firing at several British naval probes in the last six months, both to conceal the readiness of the guns and to preserve the gun tubes themselves (the blast damage the guns did each time they were fired was a contributing factor as well). Mere months after having engaged in a gun duel with the disabled, but functional French battleship Jean Bart during the Torch landings the Massachusetts found itself in another long range gun duel, this time with the fate of a full brigade of American airborne troops hanging in the balance.
Comprised of four guns in individual armored turrets that had 360 degree fields of fire spread over rough rectangular area 1000 meters x 500 meters in size the battery consisted of guns captured in Norway and had once been part of the main battery of a Tsarist WW I battleship. Each gun was supported by at least one of the six 88mm AAA guns covering the Island as well as by a number of 20mm emplacements. While the U.S. battleship had advantages in both number of guns and rate of fire, it also had to make its hits on a target only some 20 meters square and surrounds by concrete blast walls. The German guns, on the other hand had, in addition to the 680-foot-long Massachusetts at least 20 other targets to choose from, none of them as well protected as the battlewagon. The fight was made more difficult by the presence of three 220mm and one 150mm anti-ship guns along with three 21cm howitzers. Behind these guns were twenty 10cm howitzers meant to interdict the potential landing beaches. All of these guns had been targets of the bombing, only one of the 220mm guns and three of the 88mm guns had suffered damage. Until the heavy guns were silenced the landings were delayed and the men already fighting for their lives were on their own.
The engagement quickly reach a pitch that had not been planned for, with the Massachusetts being joined by the Roberts (the Jersey group being effectively cut off until the 300mm artillery was silenced) in the duel with Nina while knots of infantrymen made their way toward the smaller guns focused on the landing beaches. Massachusetts suffered a hit by one of the 220mm guns, the shell striking her main belt, leaving a dent and scraped paint mark its arrival just as the sun reached the horizon. Roberts then suffered a rattling near miss from Nina’s # 3 gun, cause her to radically alter course, just in time, as a shell from the #2 gun struck in her wake less than a minute later. At 7:20, having received confirmation that the first of what was to be a rotating umbrella of protective fighters was overhead Massachusetts catapulted off one of her Kingfisher observation planes to call shot. Three salvos later a 16” AP shell penetrated the armored top of Nina’s # 4 gun, causing a catastrophic detonation of the ready ammunition after the explosion’s flash defeated the protective door to the guns magazine. Within a few minutes guns # 1 and # 3 were disabled, with Gun # 3 being physically knocked off its barbette by two near misses from Roberts 15” guns and gun # 1 suffering a penetrating splinter damage from a 16” shell that disabled the barrel. Gun # 2, however, gained a measure of revenge, as a near miss caused serious damage to USS Niblack (DD-424) with splinters penetrating her hull and putting three boilers off-line. She fell out of formation and was ordered to limp back to port at a best speed of 7 knots.
Despite the best efforts of her crew Niblack took on an increasing list, making her unstable. Her CO beached her near Bolberry, some 14 miles from the safety of Plymouth Harbor.
Nina’s # 2 gun, having lost her camouflage netting during the engagement was put out of action by a 1000-pound SAP bomb direct hit, the bomb being dropped by a P-47 fighter bomber. By 11:00 hours the main defensive guns had been disabled by a combination of naval gunfire, close air support, and uncoordinated, but nonetheless effective assaults by paratrooper scratch units. As half past twelve the first elements of the 29th Infantry landed, fighting their way inland toward the air field behind continued naval gunfire support and close air support. Additional gliders had begun to land even as the artillery duel was underway with two gliders bringing in 57mm anti tank guns to support the lighter, and much more mobile 37mm guns.
With the small size of Guernsey the attackers had gained a unbreakable foothold by the end of the day. Nonetheless, the German defenders fought hard, for every inch of the island, with resistance finally collapsing on April 15th.
Having been delayed for half a day the Jersey squadron began to move toward its destination, the original landing mission having become an extraction as the disaster on Jersey became increasingly clear. As it did so HMS Sheffield was struck by two torpedoes fired by U-642. All but 42 members of her crew made it off the ship before she capsized three hours later. Two destroyers, one British, the other Dutch, were struck and sunk by dive-bombers while attempting to evacuate the men of the 2nd Parachute Brigade. USS Savannah was also hit by two 500 pound bombs but managed to limp back to port, have suffered 150 casualties. After emergency repairs she was sent to Brooklyn Naval Yard for a six-month overhaul.
The result of Spider was, at best, inconclusive. 1st Airborne was out of the war until mid 1944, with 82nd airborne running a brigade light for almost eight months. Guernsey was recaptured, but Jersey remained firmly in German hands. The two islands became a bizarre shooting gallery, with both sides emplacing more and heavier guns as the war continued. Both sides fired thousands of shells at the other, for no real gain. The islands’ civilian population was eventually evacuated by one side of the other, but nearly one in three of the pre-war population died before that movement.
The Reich made no noteworthy troop movements on the Eastern Front in response to Operation Spider.
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Jesus fucking christ, that sounds like a hell of a cluster fuck there. I wounder what happened to the Generals that approved Spider.