A USSR starvation stragegy for Barbarossa, could it had worked?

Anti-GrammarNazi

I have read some very compelling posts that while capturing the oil fields would had been to hard and of no benefit to Germany, they could had captured the USSR breadbasket in the Kuban and Ukraine, which would had eventually caused a famine that would had made the USSR unable to continue fighting.

So what if instead of going for the oil fields, Hitler and the high command recognized this and went for a strategy of capturing the Kuban and relevant regions, then fortify defenses in those areas and camp there until starvation set in (I assume around 2 years) and have the USSR capitulate or easily crush a starving Red Army?
 
BlackDragon98

BlackDragon98

Banned
Anti-GrammarNazi said:
I have read some very compelling posts that while capturing the oil fields would had been to hard and of no benefit to Germany, they could had captured the USSR breadbasket in the Kuban and Ukraine, which would had eventually caused a famine that would had made the USSR unable to continue fighting.

So what if instead of going for the oil fields, Hitler and the high command recognized this and went for a strategy of capturing the Kuban and relevant regions, then fortify defenses in those areas and camp there until starvation set in (I assume around 2 years) and have the USSR capitulate or easily crush a starving Red Army?
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More food supplies are sent through the Soviet Far East and through Arctic convoys via Lend Lease.
The Soviets fight on like nothing has happened.
Za Rodina! :p
 
BlackDragon98

BlackDragon98

Banned
Anti-GrammarNazi said:
Is L-L enough to keep the USSR fed for years? I doubt it.
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The Soviets would notice and focus their forces on taking back the area.
And the Germans could never get that far (Kuban area) in the opening round of Barbarossa, unless they start earlier, which means they will have less equipment than OTL.

Honestly, there is no way that OTL Nazi Germany could win the Eastern Front.
 

TDM

Kicked
Anti-GrammarNazi said:
I have read some very compelling posts that while capturing the oil fields would had been to hard and of no benefit to Germany, they could had captured the USSR breadbasket in the Kuban and Ukraine, which would had eventually caused a famine that would had made the USSR unable to continue fighting.

So what if instead of going for the oil fields, Hitler and the high command recognized this and went for a strategy of capturing the Kuban and relevant regions, then fortify defenses in those areas and camp there until starvation set in (I assume around 2 years) and have the USSR capitulate or easily crush a starving Red Army?
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Problem is the Germans already captured the Ukraine and chunks of the Kuban? Great chunks of Soviet agriculture was seized (or burned in scorched earth retreats anyway) Russia already suffered food shortages and stringent rationing OTL.

An oddity here is that an awful lot of people the Soviet Gov had been responsible for feeding in June 1940 were now out of their area of control anyway being under German occupation. This wasn't much comfort for those people of course since the occupiers had 0% interest in feeding them (actually the opposite was a matter of intentional policy) but it was less people the soviet government had to feed in the short term. This works both ways of course one of the most chronic points of food shortage for Russia was 1944 -1945 when they were not only fielding a huge army, had been suffering for a couple of years accumulated food shortage and now suddenly taking back large amounts of territory which contained 10m's of very hungry Russians!

As pointed out LL already made food a big thing,

But your plan's issue is you've just given the soviets what they need, namely time.

In two years the Soviets will build, equip, train and concentrate their much greater numbers. The Germans can dig in sure, but stuck thousands of KM at the end of their already massively strained logistics chain fortifying in a big way is going to be tough (it'd not like the Soviets will just leave them alone either but will now be able to pick and choose when to mess with them).

Basically the Germans are screwed either way, but this is giving up the initiative.

Also the Germans need that oil, the fact that we know they had pretty close to zero change of actually getting much of it back in time to matter even if they had taken the fields doesn't change that.
 
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Derek Pullem

Derek Pullem

Donor
It's a change of tack (for which I apologise) but could an oil denial strategy have worked for the Germans.

Don't attempt to conquer the oil fields directly - just burn them to the ground via bombing and raids. And focus on denying the Soviets the means to ship the oil by mining the rivers and bombing the railways.

"In the land of the blind a one eyed man is king"
 

thaddeus

Donor
think they would need to capture Leningrad and/or Murmansk, as well as concentrating the KM to block the Arctic Convoys.

their efforts in 1942 confined to Ukraine with no splitting of forces, however that leaves the Kuban in Soviet control (offset somewhat by the Axis "sitting" on the Volga?)

do not think any "oil campaign" against the USSR would be effective, they are literally "swimming" in so much oil it would take years to affect their military, the Germans (just IMO) would have to be content with the coal of Donets.

it seems questionable whether the unoccupied parts of the country would collapse, but also (again just IMO) whether they could become the historical juggernaut?
 

Gannt the chartist

Anti-GrammarNazi said:
I have read some very compelling posts that while capturing the oil fields would had been to hard and of no benefit to Germany, they could had captured the USSR breadbasket in the Kuban and Ukraine, which would had eventually caused a famine that would had made the USSR unable to continue fighting.

So what if instead of going for the oil fields, Hitler and the high command recognized this and went for a strategy of capturing the Kuban and relevant regions, then fortify defenses in those areas and camp there until starvation set in (I assume around 2 years) and have the USSR capitulate or easily crush a starving Red Army?
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Largely what TDM said. The 1941 campaign takes Army Group South to the line Perekop. Almost Rostov. Izyum, Belgorod. Its a long way east which is most of the Ukraine but not Kuban. Thats probably the practical limit because of wear and tear on vehicles and transport issues - as long as there is a Soviet Army in front of you.

Before that there is a planning issue in which you side with Hitler BTW, OKH ( well Halder) is fixated on Moscow. And therein you have a problem. Once East of the Pripet Marshes the Soviets can move troops with relative ease. so unless the Germans also advance on both sides one army group will have a flank unprotected, which is what leads to the Kiev battles in41. So you have to advance at least as far as Vitebsk - Kiev

That highlights another issue. The Germans only have 4 panzergroups and it takes two to make an encirclement work at scale. You have to fight Kiev because AGS alone cannot pocket the VERY LARGE southern group of Soviet armies.

The reason for the priority on oil is that in 43 or 44 the western allies will be landing reinforced panzer armies under cover of massive air forces in various places in Europe and without more oil they will crush you and the horse you are trying to pull the cannon with.

The main point though is the basis for Barbarossa at all is that you can destroy the Soviet Army in a single campaign close to the Frontiers and compel a peace on your terms which includes the oil anyway. Once you fail to do that you have no actual strategy for defeating the USSR merely the hope they will give up and allow themselves to be exterminated. Because by invading you have created a coalition of at the least the British Empire, The USSR and the US economy and probably the US as well (and by default the economies of the other european overseas empires and south america).
 

Veiovis

The entire war took less then 4 years, so any tactic that has "just hunker down 2 years and wait" is kinda suspect? Like, what change enables the germans to hold this region into 44, instead of being pushed into Romania at the time as in OTL?
 

RousseauX

Donor
Anti-GrammarNazi said:
I have read some very compelling posts that while capturing the oil fields would had been to hard and of no benefit to Germany, they could had captured the USSR breadbasket in the Kuban and Ukraine, which would had eventually caused a famine that would had made the USSR unable to continue fighting.
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They did this otl, Kiev didn't fall until Dec 1943. They held onto most of the breadbasket for longer than 2 years
 

Deleted member 1487

Anti-GrammarNazi said:
I have read some very compelling posts that while capturing the oil fields would had been to hard and of no benefit to Germany, they could had captured the USSR breadbasket in the Kuban and Ukraine, which would had eventually caused a famine that would had made the USSR unable to continue fighting.

So what if instead of going for the oil fields, Hitler and the high command recognized this and went for a strategy of capturing the Kuban and relevant regions, then fortify defenses in those areas and camp there until starvation set in (I assume around 2 years) and have the USSR capitulate or easily crush a starving Red Army?
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That was sort of what the original plan for Case Blue was, a phased capture of Stalingrad first and only then invading the Caucasus in a logistically sustainable way; Hitler changed the plan mid-stream so his forces could try and pocket retreating Soviet troops (didn't work) and then tried Stalingrad and the Caucasus invasion at the same time and neither worked. Had they stuck to the original plan they might have pulled what you're saying off.
USA-EF-Decision-26.jpg
 

Catspoke

wiking said:
That was sort of what the original plan for Case Blue was, a phased capture of Stalingrad first and only then invading the Caucasus in a logistically sustainable way; Hitler changed the plan mid-stream so his forces could try and pocket retreating Soviet troops (didn't work) and then tried Stalingrad and the Caucasus invasion at the same time and neither worked. Had they stuck to the original plan they might have pulled what you're saying off.
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Wiking how much did the 17th and 1PA drive across the Don really hurt the drive on Stalingrad in the Don bend??? How much can you logistically supply in the Don bend anyway, perhaps the part about driving all the way to Grozny and beyond on a single track railway was dumb, (the Mountain divisions reaching for Batum was also dumb) but they did deny the Kuban to the Soviets, secured the Sea of Azov as a protected supply line up through the lower Don to help supply Stalingrad. It was also an areas where the Romanians could operate independently. Perhaps giving Army Group A limited goals of seizing Maikop, the Kuban, Tupase as a stretch goal , might have been realistic (just Maikop, not Grozny and Batum). After September 1st, you can stop Army groups A offensive, pull a full panzer corps and an infantry corps back out of Army group A to a reserve behind Stalingrad along with some extra supply not going down to the Terek, finish off Stalingrad in September and October, then defend until 1943.
 

GuildedAgeNostalgia

- No overextension caused by 1942 offensives means the Germans don't suffer from 1943 Soviet winter offensives.

- Staying on the defensive means no losses from a Operation Citadel.

- Staying on the defensive would allow the Germans to reroute focus on improving not only multiple lines of defenses, but also allows them to fix their logistical issues.

- Soviet offensives in 1943/1944 would be even costlier and would take less territory than otl.

- Most importantly however, is that although starving the Soviets out might not be possible, however successfully holding the Ukraine/Belarus/Baltic area for an additional year while fully committing to killing off the civilian population in the area could lead to a even more strained late Soviet late war manpower crisis.

If the above occurs, the Soviets potentially could run out of steam/offensive capabilities by the end of 1944, allowing the Germans to refocus their efforts on the Western Front.
 

Deleted member 1487

Catspoke said:
Wiking how much did the 17th and 1PA drive across the Don really hurt the drive on Stalingrad in the Don bend??? How much can you logistically supply in the Don bend anyway, perhaps the part about driving all the way to Grozny and beyond on a single track railway was dumb, (the Mountain divisions reaching for Batum was also dumb) but they did deny the Kuban to the Soviets, secured the Sea of Azov as a protected supply line up through the lower Don to help supply Stalingrad. It was also an areas where the Romanians could operate independently. Perhaps giving Army Group A limited goals of seizing Maikop, the Kuban, Tupase as a stretch goal , might have been realistic (just Maikop, not Grozny and Batum). After September 1st, you can stop Army groups A offensive, pull a full panzer corps and an infantry corps back out of Army group A to a reserve behind Stalingrad along with some extra supply not going down to the Terek, finish off Stalingrad in September and October, then defend until 1943.
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Cost them easily a month and diverted half the force during the vital period when Stalingrad could have been taken cheaply. If they're not also advancing into the Caucasus at the same time Stalingrad could have been the focus and the drive fully supported logistically. It wasn't just the rail situation, but also air supply and truck support. AG-A got the lion's share of everything.
 

alexmilman

Derek Pullem said:
It's a change of tack (for which I apologise) but could an oil denial strategy have worked for the Germans.

Don't attempt to conquer the oil fields directly - just burn them to the ground via bombing and raids. And focus on denying the Soviets the means to ship the oil by mining the rivers and bombing the railways.

"In the land of the blind a one eyed man is king"
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Much easier to say than to do even for Baku (it had a powerful AA defense) and the relevant supply lines. The Nazi did pretty much everything they could to keep lower Volga out of circulation (but Akhtuba was out of their reach) but they’d have to find the railroads to start with. Plus the Soviets already started exploration in new areas the Nazi had no clue about. Their bomber aviation was not big and powerful enough to perform both its frontline duties AND to do strategic bombing on any serious scale.
 

alexmilman

wiking said:
Only after August.
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IIRC, most of the summer the German aviation was quite busy dealing with the attempts of the Red Army’s counterattacks in Stalingrad direction. My impression (perhaps I’m wrong) was that they tried to do too many things with the limited resources.
 

Deleted member 1487

alexmilman said:
IIRC, most of the summer the German aviation was quite busy dealing with the attempts of the Red Army’s counterattacks in Stalingrad direction. My impression (perhaps I’m wrong) was that they tried to do too many things with the limited resources.
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Check out Joel Hayward's Stopped at Stalingrad. He also wrote an academic journal article about the potential to bomb Baku prior to September:
 
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