A True and Better Alamo: The Battle For Wake Atoll

Interesting? You wouldn't happen to know where you heard/read this would you? Not trying to be condescending FYI, just it hasn't come up in any of my research.

From what I've read, the problem wasn't avgas per se but rather, the fact that the Japanese carriers were needed elsewhere. High Command wanted to allocate only 1 strike before having Carrier Division 2 depart. However Inoue countermanded that and managed to ensure that Carrier Division 2 would remain for the duration of the combat.

The next part will deal primarily with the American reaction, before moving to the Japanese reaction and subsequent events. As for how this altered battle of Wake affects things...y'all will just have to stay posted.

At first I thought it was Robert J. Cressman's A MAGNIFICENT FIGHT: THE BATTLE FOR WAKE ISLAND. But on page 157 is the following:

"While Wake's defenders doggedly carried on and the man who had set in motion the efforts to relieve their bitter siege seemed reconciled to the uncertainty that lay ahead for him, the appeals for help by Inoue and Kajioka were bearing fruit - although not on the scale originally desired. Nagumo sent a dispatch informing Inoue that the _Kido Butai_ could not 'afford full cooperation because of [a] fuel problem.' At 1800 on 18 December he informed the anxious admirals that the Eighth Cruiser Division [the eight-inch gunned heavy cruisers _Tone_ and _Chikuma_], the Second Carrier Division [the aircraft carriers _Hiryu_ and _Soryu_] and two destroyers [the _Tanikaze_ and the _Urakaze] would cooperate with the Wake Island invasion force on about 20 December, upon completion of which operations the force would 'return to home waters as soon as possible' and make ready for future deployment."

Skimming the paragraphs detailing carrier ops avgas couldn't have been too much of a problem given the number of sorties the planes of the two carriers made and the losses they took before Wake fell.

I then checked Gregory J.W. Urwin's FACING FEARFUL ODDS: THE SIEGE OF WAKE ISLAND. On page 429 is the following:

"Although Admiral Nagumo submitted to Yamamoto's authority, he did not like the idea of dividing the aerial component of the Pearl Harbor Task Force. When he released Carrier Division 2 on the sixteenth, Nagumo warned the Fourth Fleet that Abe's force had only enough fuel to deliver one air raid against Wake. After that the carriers had instructions to retire. Finding Nagumo's restrictions unacceptable, Admiral Inoue countermanded Abe's orders on 18 Deccember. Carrier Division 2 was to attack Wake until it destroyed all of the garrison's aircraft, artillery, and machine guns. If a strong American naval force tried to stop the invasion, Inoue directed Abe to close in and join his ships with Kajioka's."

This must be what I remembered, and the report of low fuel was a lie. Again, both Hiryu and Soryu flew a lot of sorties so fuel wasn't as low as I thought.
 
I decided to re-order the parts, Part VI will deal with the Japanese siege/attempt to take Wake while Part VII will deal with the American response.

Part VI: Resistance is Futile...

“We’d hurt them too badly for them to just let us walk away from this one...” -Frank "Battleaxe" Tharin

(From “An Unexpected Obstacle: The Japanese Story of the Battle of Wake Island” By Bill Ray)

...The dawn of December 23rd was not a happy one for Admiral Kajioka. Once again he had found his invasion force lacking against the fierce defense put up by Wake Island. Though indeed he had managed to silence the coastal batteries and secure a beachhead on the island, he had paid a terrible price for his achievements. His vessels had fired off most of their high explosive ammunition in the naval bombardments of the 21st and the 22nd and would be able to offer minimal further support if the Marines tried once again to drive the Japanese into the sea. Even his destroyers, though they still possessed some high explosive ammunition, were unable to offer significant support due to the damage they had taken earlier and the fact that their crews had been plundered to bolster the now dilapidated landing force...

...Though Admiral Yamaguchi’s carrier aircraft would certainly be able to render some assistance, even these assets were nearing the end of their usefulness as a lack of munitions and fuel was beginning to constrict the options available to the invaders. Furthermore, there were concerns that the losses incurred over Wake coupled with the losses incurred at Pearl Harbor would hamper their effectiveness if American carriers were to arrive. Maintaining a proper CAP in addition to properly escorting a strike force would be a problem, especially as the majority of aircraft lost during the attack on Wake were Zeroes(1)...

...Fortunately for Kajioka, the potential existed for a quick end to the siege. In comparison to the invasion force sent to Guam, even the revised Wake Island landing force seemed paltry. Furthermore, unlike the Wake invasion force which had lost nearly two thirds of its strength during the first 48 hours of the invasion, the Guam invasion force had not been touched. Everyone from Yamamoto, to Inoue, to Kajioka wanted Wake to be wrapped up as soon as possible. Though it probably meant delaying Operation R, the capture of Rabaul, planned for late January 1942, on the 22nd orders were given for the express transport the bulk of the South Seas Landing force on Guam, some 2000 men, and their commander Tomitaro Horii to Wake. Thus, beginning on the 23rd, in a manner not unlike the famed First Relief convoy, the minesweepers and destroyers still present around Guam were laden with Japanese troops and rushed across the Pacific to Wake (2)...

...With Horii’s troops scheduled to arrive on the 26th of December, Kajioka began taking measures to prepare for the upcoming assault. Foremost among his priorities was the preservation of the existing beachhead on Wake’s south shore. Further airstrikes were ordered on the resilient 5-inch guns to ensure their inactivity and to allow for Kajioka to deploy his destroyers as potential fire support to the beleaguered beachhead. When Wake’s defenders managed to shoot down a handful of these aircraft, yet another bombing raid was launched to suppress those few remaining AA guns...

...Finally, on December 26th the much promised and needed reinforcements arrived. Kajioka had taken time to develop a strategy. It had been decided to split Horii’s force. A third would land and reinforce the existing beachhead while the bulk would land roughly a kilometer west near the western tip of Wake Island, where it met the channel to Wilkes Island. From there Horii would lead his troops inland, flank the American position, link up with the existing beachhead and take the airfield. The only hitch in the plan lay in the paucity of landing craft available to the Japanese. Unfortunately, the landings would have to take place in three waves, one to reinforce the existing beachhead and two to land the rest of Horii’s flanking force...

...No one expected the fight for Wake to be an easy one, but Kajioka at least believed that with Horii’s troops he would finally be able to put an end to this nightmare...

(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)

...The period between December 22nd and 26th is generally regarded as the worst period of the Siege of Wake by its defenders. Unanimously referred to as “The Christmas from Hell”, constant skirmishing, fears of further bombardment, sickness, and poor hygiene began to take their toll on the Americans on the island. The surge of morale that came from repelling the Japanese attacks on the 21st had been dampened by their inability to finish off the Japanese beachhead and constant fear of further bombardments. Had Devereux known just how few high explosive rounds the Japanese had left he may have risked a final assault on the beachhead, yet instead he decided to shepherd his resources and steel himself for a further attack...

...Yet despite the generally dismal situations, a few bright spots stand out during the period. One of them being Devereux’ appearance as “Santa”. Somewhere, somehow, some red fabric had been scrounged together for an outfit for the island’s diminutive Marine commander. In a moment of uncharacteristic levity, Devereux braved Japanese sniper fire, dawning the outfit and proceeding to tour his men’s emplacements passing out gifts of ammunition and food. Such visits deviated considerably from his terse earlier appearances and raised morale considerably. Though few would have called him a “soldier’s general” at the beginning of the battle, by Christmas 1941 this seems to have changed dramatically. In addition to becoming a hero stateside, Devereux was worshipped by his men. This would be key as in the coming days, Devereux would demand more from them than he had ever before(3)...

...Though Kajioka expected his landing of reinforcements to catch the Americans by surprise, he once again failed to take into account the nature of the American command structure. Since the 22nd, everyone on the island knew that the Japanese would be landing troops shortly. Given their decision to maintain their beachhead, a limited number of options existed for potential to relieve it. Both Cunningham and Devereux believed that a landing to the west of the existing beachhead was most likely, though a landing in the American rear was also considered. Nevertheless, a fear of further Japanese bombardment ensured that Devereux refrained from committing his reserve too early. Only when the battle was joined and the potential for Japanese fire support lessened would he press the attack and deploy his three remaining “tanks”...

...Taking stock of the American forces available on Wake at the time of the 2nd Japanese landing, one can begin to understand Devereux’ fear of further bombardment. Devereux had lost roughly 400 men, including 147 Marines, all told since the beginning of the war, most of those in Kajioka’s frantic bombardment on the 21st. Nevertheless it should be noted that at the time of the Japanese invasion, his force of 550 Marines and 1000 civilian militiamen was still formidable given their defensive preparations. Though some of these militiamen were indeed still armed with venerable Krag rifles, others had taken to using captured Japanese arms. In particular the infamous “knee mortar” had gained something of a following due to its perceived usefulness and flexibility. Having captured a number of knee mortars and Japanese grenades since combat began in earnest on the 19th, the civilian militia formed an impromptu mortar company of their own and were eager to unleash their newfound weapons on their former owners...

...Fortunately for the Americans, any hope the Japanese had of attaining surprise with the landing of the remainder of the South Seas Force was hindered by a lack of landing craft. The arrival of more transports and a flurry of activity to bolster the existing beachhead had Cunningham and Devereux lurch into high gear. Troops were rotated, extra ammunition was passed out, and the defenders of Wake once again steeled themselves for the worst...

...Facing certain annihilation, the men of the Wake Island Militia hurriedly checked their papers. None of them knew how the Japanese would respond to their enlistment. Would they be treated as enemy combatants? As Mercenaries? Or would the Japanese hold true to their fearsome reputation and not take any prisoners at all. If anything the latter sentiment was the most common as every defender on the island believed that the coming fight would be one to the death. They expected no quarter from the Japanese nor were they prepared to give it at this point...

...Though firing increased exponentially from the moment fresh Japanese troops reinforced the beachhead, Devereux and the rest of the defenders weren’t willing to leap on the opportunity. Men were stationed all along the south coast and in particular, contact had been made with the defenders of Wilkes island to come to the aid of the main force if need be. Thus, Horii’s main landing to the west of the main beachhead did not come as a surprise. The Marines stationed along the beach in their bunkers had a field day as they poured .50 and .30 caliber machinegun fire on the advancing Japanese. Only the timely intervention of a pair of Japanese destroyers prevented Horii’s first wave from taking inordinate casualties and allowed it to carve out a big enough beachhead...

...Had Devereux realized that the Japanese were now incapable of offering any significant naval gunfire support, he may have been more aggressive in these early stages, yet his operational plan served its purpose just as well. By drawing Horii’s men off the beachhead, Devereux lured them into a position where they could be caught between the hammer of the Wilkes island garrison and the anvil of the bulk of his forces on Wake proper...

...Fighting raged for the duration of the 26th as Horii’s men advanced inland and then ran into a wall of Marines and civilian militia. Particularly effective were the militia’s employment of captured “knee mortars” which provided immediate fire support. Bayonets and entrenching tools joined the battle, especially as the battered original landing force, now reinforced surged forward to attack the weakened Marine lines pinning them down. At 1100 hours on December 26th it very much appeared that the Japanese may finally be able to overcome the American defenders. Now outnumbering them roughly 2-1, they had made large strides towards the airfield and many of them were considerably fresher than their opponents...

...Battered, bruised, but not knocked out, Devereux called in his final trump card, committing all of his reserves to stop the Japanese attack. Sensing that the airfield itself was about to fall, Devereux made the unprecedented decision to cede total control of the island’s defense efforts to Cunningham. Devereux along with his aides proceeded to leave the CP, don their helmets and join the scratch force defending the airfield...

...Like a prize fighter summoning the last dregs of his strength to fight one more round, the defenders of Wake effectively ground the Japanese advance to a halt. Devereux’ arrival on the airfield singlehandedly revitalized flagging Marine and militia units. As the Japanese charged out of the brush, screaming onto the airfield, Devereux and his men opened fire, turning AA machine guns against mere infantry to deadly effect. Caught in the open, facing Marines and militia, who though exhausted, outgunned them and benefitted from prepared positions, the Japanese attack on the airfield quickly faltered. Yet failure was not an option, so the Japanese pressed on, closing the gap at a terrible cost and engaging the Marines with bayonets and knives...

...As fighting raged hand to hand, entrenching tool to bayonet, on Wake Island’s airfield, to the west, the main body of Japanese troops under Tomitaro Horii were about to receive an equally potent surprise. Having managed to get off the beach, the troops of the South Seas Landing Force suddenly found themselves beset on all sides. Masters of infiltration, the Japanese troops had failed to adequately guard their rear, leaving it open for a company of Marines from Wilkes Island, to slip in behind them. Yet even though they were pressed on all sides, the large body of Japanese troops continued to work its way towards the airfield...

...The roar of bulldozer engines cut through the din as the three remaining converted tanks spearheaded the Marine counter-attack. Screaming like banshees, the Marines spearheaded a major counter-offensive around 1500 hours that rocked the South Seas Landing force on its heels...

...By 1600 hours the situation had deteriorated to such an extent that yet another air strike was called in from Carrier Division 2. Admiral Yamaguchi allowed the strike but protested heavily, stating that his carriers desperately need to refuel and re-arm if they were to be an effective defense against American naval incursions. This airstrike, going nearly unopposed gave Horii valuable breathing room and allowed him to consolidate his position somewhat. Digging in, he was determined to outlast the Americans and eventually move forward to take the airfield...

...An airfield that now was firmly in American hands. By the time Japanese planes once again roared overhead, the fighting was all but over. A handful of Japanese escaped the carnage and blended back into the scrub where they would either attempt to link up with Horii’s force, or attempt to snipe at or sabotage American installations. Knowing that any victory was temporary, Devereux moved with admirable speed. Laying down the entrenching tool that he’d been using during the hand to hand combat phase, Devereux picked up his rifle and proceeded to move those troops that could still fight towards Horii’s pocket of troops to the west...

...Fighting continued into the night of the 26th as the smell of death pervaded the atmosphere of the island. Hundreds of bodies littered the beaches, the roads, and the brush that covered the island slowly decomposing in the Pacific sun as their comrades continued to fight. Though the Americans had managed to inflict grievous casualties on the Japanese, some 1000 all told, they had suffered nearly 600 casualties themselves, 326 of them being Marines. Indeed, one of Devereux’ main concerns was his dwindling number of Marines now at just over 250 effectives....

...As night fell, Horii began to send out troops to outflank American positions. His troops were now, the freshest on the island, and despite a good initial showing by the defenders, he was sure that as the battle dragged out his men would surely gain the upper hand...

Footnotes

1)Carrier Division 2 had an air group of 32 Zeroes, 32 divebombers, and 36 torpedo planes upon arriving at Wake. During the First air raid, 22 Zeroes, 29 Divebombers, and 5 torpedo planes were dispatched. VMF-211 ended up shooting down 10 Zeroes 3 dive bombers and 2 torpedo planes before all of its planes were destroyed. A further 3 Zeroes were destroyed by AA fire in subsequent air raids leaving Yamaguchi with only 19 Zeroes between both carriers on December 23rd.

2) In OTL troops for the 2nd invasion attempt on Wake were transported via minesweeper and additional transport. TTL just sees this applied to a larger scale.

3) Though Devereux spent a good deal of time in the command post in OTL, he always made a point of visiting his men’s positions albeit briefly. TTL’s increased requirements, and a better communications network have allowed him to visit his men more often and make more of an impression.
 
Great update and I really appreciated all the personal emotions and sense of drama with the combat. Looking forward to the next update when you can share.
 
Devereux is going to get the Medal for sure. Also a lot of Navy Cross and a few more Medals will be awarded.

I got a feeling this is going to be a fight to the death with this being a very costly battle for the Japanese.
 
.... Nagumo sent a dispatch informing Inoue that the _Kido Butai_ could not 'afford full cooperation because of [a] fuel problem.'

...I then checked Gregory J.W. Urwin's FACING FEARFUL ODDS: THE SIEGE OF WAKE ISLAND. On page 429 is the following:

.... When he released Carrier Division 2 on the sixteenth, Nagumo warned the Fourth Fleet that Abe's force had only enough fuel to deliver one air raid against Wake. After that the carriers had instructions to retire.

....This must be what I remembered, and the report of low fuel was a lie. Again, both Hiryu and Soryu flew a lot of sorties so fuel wasn't as low as I thought.

I am unsure if this was a "lie", but dont have sources at hand. Memory fails me. I dont know if either Cressman or Urwin throughly checked Japanese sources. Some have more clarity than others. What I remember is the fuel for 'one strike' represented a fuel reserve or unallocated quantity aboard the carriers that was not planned for those other unnamed operations the 2d Carrier Div. was to be shortly engaged in. Japans fuel stock had been divided up with allocations for military & industrial use for the coming year, and the military naturally had its portion 'budgeted with quantities identified for the expected operations. If this is correct then what Nagumo may have been communicating is that he had unbudgeted fuel for one strike, and any additional strikes would be using fuel required for those other operations. If HQ wanted the 2d CD to bring its full weight against Wake then it would be necessary to provide additional fuel when the 2d CD finished the Wake Island task. This could lead to the conclusion that the decision was made at some level of command to allocate more fuel to the 2d CD so they could bring full force on Midway.

I am sure you are aware, as Glen will attest, one of the difficulties in interpreting the Japanese record is that their military language does not translate directly and easily to US military language. In the 1980s I found this to still be very true when communicating with the Japanese Self Defense Force officers. We had to spend a lot of extra time clarifying definitions and revealing meanings within meanings. I found there were some concepts on our side they probably never did understand in their context. I certainly failed to grasp some of their points or meanings.
 
WOW!

You really brought out the emotions and the scene--amazing! The Japanese are winning a pyrhic victory in the end, I think. I can't imagine them taking any prisoners here--I suspect that even people too badly wounded to fight will be murdered at the end.

Wake Island--the post of no return...

This could spawn more legends than the alamo. How many planes (and more importantly, fighter pilots) has Japan lost.

Of course, this might also inspire them to begin a better pilot training program...

After a battle like this, I suspect that Wake will be recaptured as soon as practical...

Essex-class carier "USS Wake Island" may be in the water by late '42 or early '43...
 
Bravo sir.

Take a bow, you deserve it. Great update as usual I like the bit about Santa delivering rations & ammo, Bravo! :D:cool:
 
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Only 19 Zeroes left? Things are going to get vary interesting if any American carriers arrive.


I agree that if tbe US can get a carrier strike in then the low Zero strength lowers the CAP thus allowing more strikes against the Japanese carriers and ships.

Guess we shall have to see what develops.
 
I agree that if tbe US can get a carrier strike in then the low Zero strength lowers the CAP thus allowing more strikes against the Japanese carriers and ships.

Guess we shall have to see what develops.
Who replaced Kimmel? Because Pye would never order such an attack.
 
Who replaced Kimmel? Because Pye would never order such an attack.

Well in OTL Pye was in charge till 12/31 When Nititz took over. So unless Nimitz took over sooner in TTL, then we might have to have Halsey take an indepenent strike.

Unless US subs can be diverted to Wake to go hunting.
 
My wifes father was captured on Wake, I have tried to find information about him.Were you able to find rosters of the men and what they did? Any information would be appreciated.
Thanks
D
 
Considering how tought the battle is and the fact that there are books about the battle some US soldiers will survive, but the title say Alamo, a place were according to the legend all defenders perished
 
Well in OTL Pye was in charge till 12/31 When Nititz took over. So unless Nimitz took over sooner in TTL, then we might have to have Halsey take an indepenent strike.

Unless US subs can be diverted to Wake to go hunting.

Pye's problem, afaik, was partly that he was a caretaker, and knew it, so he didnt dare do anything too risky. Here, wih Wake holding on, the pressure from Stateside maybe higher. He's still in a 'damned if you do, damned if you dont' position, but the downside of NOT doing something ittl is greater. If his primary concern was ass-covering, and im not saying it was, then that might incline him ittl to send support this time.

Pye really was caught between a rock and a hard place, and while i think he was overly cautious iotl, 20-20 hindsight is a wonderful thing.
 
Dathi makes a good point. There could immense political pressure for the Navy to do something as at this point in time Wake is the only bright spot for the Allies. Even if it is just a evacuation being seen to do something to support the guys on Wake might be necessary from a political standpoint.

I'd hate to be Pye in this situation.
 
Dathi makes a good point. There could immense political pressure for the Navy to do something as at this point in time Wake is the only bright spot for the Allies. Even if it is just a evacuation being seen to do something to support the guys on Wake might be necessary from a political standpoint.

I'd hate to be Pye in this situation.

I too would not want to be in his seat, If King and company decide to "encourage" Pye to send in a strike from the carriers, subs, or both, then they might draw more casualties on the IJN and transports.:D
 
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